property within the assessment district of a street opening pro-
ceeding, and so held as to act of June 6, 1900, c. 810, 31 Stat. 668,
as to the opening of extension of Eleventh Street. Columbia
Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, 547.
2. Assessment made under superseding act; effect of statute of limitations
as bar.
Where Congress passes an act superseding a former act in regard to
condemnation proceedings and providing for a reassessment of
benefits, the reassessment is a continuance of the proceeding under
the former act and not a new proceeding; and the assessment for
benefits is not barred by the statute of limitations if the proceed-
ing was commenced in time under the original act. Ib.
3. Objections to jurors; timeliness of.
Objections to qualifications of jurors and their examination and oath
in condemnation proceedings must be taken at the time. Ib.
4. Jury; validity of; effect of absence of counsel when impaneled.
That counsel was not present when they were accepted and sworn does
not invalidate the impaneling of the jury if the statute does not so
provide. Ib.
5. Jury; oath of jurors; sufficiency of.
On condemnation proceedings where the statute directs the court to
follow the procedure prescribed for other proceedings, the court
will properly vary the oath so as to relate to the property involved,
and not to the property in the other proceedings; and if the bill of
exceptions does not show that the essential matters were omitted
from the oath, the presumption is that the statutory oath was
complied with as far as applicable to the proceeding in which it
was administered. Ib.
6. Verdict; res judicata effect of part awarding damages on setting aside
part assessing benefits.
Where a verdict of damages and benefits is set aside as to benefits
and a reassessment ordered, the remainder of the verdict as to
damages alone does not stand as res judicata that the property is
damaged and there are no benefits that can be assessed under a
subsequent act as to procedure for reassessment of benefits. Ib.
7. Review of award by court; scope of.
Where the jury in a condemnation proceeding exercises its own judg-
ment derived from personal knowledge from viewing the premises
and from expert opinion evider ce not taken in presence of the
court, the power of the court to review the award is limited to
plain errors of law, misconduct or grave error of fact indicating
partiality or corruption, and the court is not required to review
all the evidence taken before the jury in order to determine
whether the award is unreasonable or unjust where no specific
wrong or injustice is pointed out. Ib.
8. Payment on; duty of owners to furnish survey.
Before the Government is required to pay for land held to have been
taken by it, the owners should furnish a survey definitely ascer-
taining the land by metes and bounds. United States v. Sewell,
601.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17, 18;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 9, 26.
CONGRESS, ACTS OF.
See ACTS OF CONGRESS.
To authorize state courts to enforce Federal laws; and to punish perjury
committed therein.
Although Congress may not create courts for the States, it may au-
thorize a state court to enforce in a prescribed manner a Federal
statute relating to a matter within Federal control, and may
punish the offense of perjury if committed in such a proceeding in
a state court, as well as in a Federal court. Holmgren v. United
States, 509.
See CONDEMNATION OF LAND, 1;
CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 1.
CONSPIRACY.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7, 8.
1. Commerce clause; power of Congress; police power of State.
The right to regulate interstate commerce is exclusively vested in
Congress, and the States cannot pass any law directly regulating
such commerce; but the States may, in the exercise of the police
power, pass laws in the interest of public safety which do not
interfere directly with the operations of interstate commerce.
Southern Railway Co. v. King, 524.
2. Commerce clause; validity of state regulation of operation of railroad
The constitutionality of a state statute regulating operation of rail-
road trains depends upon its effect on interstate commerce; and, in
the absence of congressional regulation on the subject, States may
make reasonable regulations as to the manner in which trains shall
approach, and give notice of their approach to, dangerous cross-
ings, so long as they are not a direct burden upon interstate
commerce. Ib.
3. Commerce clause. Statute of State relative to distribution of railroad
cars as burden on. Validity of Arkansas act.
A state statute which compels a railroad to distribute cars for ship-
ments in a manner that subjects it to payment of heavy penalties
in connection with its interstate business imposes a burden on its
interstate business, and is unconstitutional under the commerce
clause of the Constitution; and so held in regard to the Arkansas
act and order of the commission in regard to distribution of cars
for shipment of freight. St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 136.
4. Commerce clause; state interference with interstate commerce; what
amounts to.
A transaction is not necessarily interstate commerce because it relates
to a transaction of interstate commerce; and so held that a statute
of Tennessee prohibiting arrangements within the State for
lessening competition is not void as a regulation of interstate
commerce as to sales made by persons without the State to per-
sons within the State. Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 413.
5. Commerce clause; burden upon interstate commerce. Gen. Laws,
Kansas, 1901, § 1283, held to be.
A state statute which makes it a condition precedent to a foreign cor-
poration engaging in a legitimate branch of interstate commerce
to obtain what practically amounts to a license to transact such
business is a burden and restriction upon interstate commerce
and as such is unconstitutional under the commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution; and so held as to the requirements of § 1283,
General Laws of Kansas of 1901, when applied to a foreign cor-
poration carrying on the business of teaching persons in that
State by correspondence conducted from the State in which it is
organized. International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 91.
6. Commerce clause; val dity of tax imposea on producers of commodities.
While taxation discriminating . favor of .esidents, and domestic
products, and against non-residents and foreign products, might
be invalid under the commerce clause, that objection does not
apply to uniform taxation on a business which does not dis-
criminate in favor of residents or domestic products. Brown-
Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 563.
See Infra, 24;
COMMERCE, 2.
7. Contract impairment clause; police power of State to prohibit agree-
ments in restraint of trade.
An act harmless when done by one may become a public wrong when
done by many acting in concert, and when it becomes the object
of a conspiracy and operates in restraint of trade the police power
of the State may prohibit it without impairing the liberty of con-
tract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; and so held that
while an individual may not be interfered with in regard to a fixed
trade rule not to purchase from competitors, a State may prohibit
more than one from entering into an agreement not to purchase
from certain described persons even though such persons be com-
petitors and the agreement be made to erable the parties thereto
to continue their business as independents. Grenada Lumber Co.
v. Mississippi, 433.
8. Contract impairment clavee; validity of Mississippi anti-trust statute.
In this case, in an action by the State in equity and not to enforce
penalties, held that the anti-trust statute of Mississippi, § 5002,
Code, is not unconstitutional as abridging the liberty of contract
as against retail lumber dealers uniting in an agreement, which the
state court decided was within the prohibition of the statute, not
to purchase any materials from wholesale dealers selling direct to
consumers in certain localities. Ib.
9. Contract impairment clause; effect of Kentucky tax act of March 21,
Citizens' Savings Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636; Covington v. First
National Bank, 198 U. S. 100, followed to effect that the act of
March 21, 1900, of Kentucky, does not impair the obligation of
the supposed contract under the Hewitt Bank Act of that State.
Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Kentucky, 443.
See Infra, 34;
PUBLIC LANDS, 2.
10. Cruel and unusual punishments; proportioning penalties.
In interpreting the Eighth Amendment it will be regarded as a precept
of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and pro-
portioned to the offense. -Weems v. United States, 349.
11. Cruel and unusual punishments; definition of.
What constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment has not been exactly defined and no case has
heretofore occurred in this court calling for an exhaustive defini-
tion. Ib.
12. Cruel and unusual punishments; what prohibited by Eighth Amend-
The Eighth Amendment is progressive and does not prohibit merely
the cruel and unusual punishments known in 1689 and 1787, but
may acquire wider meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by humane justice, and a similar provision in the Philippine bill of
rights applies to long continued imprisonment with accessories
disproportionate to the offense. Ib.
13. Cruel and unusual punishment; history of adoption of Eighth Amend-
ment.
The history of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States and cases involving constitutional
prohibitions against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punish-
ment reviewed and discussed in the opinion of the court and the
dissenting opinion. Ib.
See CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS;
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
14. Double jeopardy; re-trial after reversal on appeal by accused not un-
constitutional.
Where one has been tried in a state court for murder and convicted
of manslaughter, and, on his own motion, obtains a reversal and
new trial, on which he is convicted of a higher offense, and the con-
stitution of the State provides that no one shall be put in second
jeopardy for the same offense save on his own motion for new trial
or in case of mistrial, there is no question involved of twice in
jeopardy under the Constitution of the United States. Brantley
v. Georgia, 284.
15. Due process of law; deprivation of property; state law requiring rail-
roads to put in switches at own expense held invalid.
It is beyond the police power of a State to compel a railroad company
to put in switches at its own expense on the application of the
owners of any elevator erected within a specified limit. It amounts
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