217 U.S. Argument for Fetitioner. former act, amounts to a repeal of all not so reenacted. Sutherland on Stat. Const., § 154. Congress evidently, ex industria, evolved a different scheme and plan of denouncing offenses against the naturalization laws from that first contained in the act of July 14, 1870, in view of the rule that perjury is properly punishable only by the court of jurisdiction where committed. State v. Pike, 15 N. H. 33 (4 N. H. 83); Ex parte Bridges, 2 Woods, 428; State v. Shelley, 11 Lea (Tenn.), 594; Ross v. State, 55 Georgia, 192; State v. Adams, 4 Black, 146; People v. Kelly, 38 California, 145; State v. Kirkpatrick, 32 Kansas, 117; Rump v. Commonwealth, 30 Pa. St. 475; State v. Whittemore, 50 N. H. 245; Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet. 393, 408. See subject discussed in United States v. Severino, 125 Fed. Rep. 949. There was no Federal statute when the petitioner was charged and convicted in the Federal court, which, in plain terms, conferred jurisdiction upon the Federal courts to punish perjuries and false oaths committed in naturalization proceedings in state courts. If there was such a Federal statute, it would be unconstitutional and void. Congress cannot endow state courts with any jurisdiction. The California courts get jurisdiction to naturalize aliens from the constitution and laws of the State. Ex parte Knowles, 5 California, 300; see Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Maryland v. Butler, reported in 12 Niles' Register, 115; United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johnson's Ch. Rep. 4; State v. McBride, Rice's Ch. Rep. 400. While Congress cannot confer on state courts jurisdiction to naturalize, it can, in naturalization proceedings, limit the state court in its mode of proceeding, and can prohibit the state courts from acting, and it actually has done so as to any state court which is not a "Court of Record" and does not have "common law jurisdiction, and a Seal and Clerk." Ex parte Knowles, supra; State v. Whittemore, supra; Rump v. Commonwealth, supra; In re Loney, supra. State tribunals cannot punish breaches of the United States Argument for Petitioner. 217 U.S. laws, even though an act of Congress undertakes to give them the authority. Neither can perjury against the United States be punished in the States as an offense against the States. 2 Bishop's Comm. Crim. Law, § 866. Federal tribunals cannot punish breaches of the state laws in Federal courts, such as perjury committed in the state courts. This is well-settled law, and the converse is equally true. See People v. Kelly, 38 California, 145. It was misconduct on the part of the court to give to the jury indictments, containing information of the adverse result of a previous trial, and it would be presumed that prejudice had been generated by such misconduct. Ogden v. United States, 112 Fed. Rep. 523, citing Dana v. Tucker, 4 Johns. 487; Cluggage's Lessee v. Swan, 4 Bin. 150; Stull v. Stull, 197 Pa. St. 243; La Bonty v. Lundgren, 41 Nebraska, 312; State v. Snyder, 20 Kansas, 306; People v. Knapp, 42 Michigan, 267; Moss v. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. St. 267; Meyer v. Cadwalder, 49 Fed. Rep. 32. Although an appellate court will not consider objections first raised on appeal, errors apparent on the face of the record may be considered by the court, though not objected to below. 2 Cyc. 678, 717, and cases there cited; 2 Cent. Dig., title Appeal and Error," §§ 1145 et seq.; Fuller v. Ferguson, 26 California, 546; Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 669; Garland v. Davis, 4 How. 131; Kentucky L. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 63 Fed. Rep. 93; Macker v. Thomas, 7 Wheat. 530; Ringgold v. Haven, 1 California, 108; Suydam v. Williamson, 20 How. 427; United States v. Pena, 175 U. S. 500; Stevenson v. Barbour, 140 U. S: 48; Rowe v. Phelps, 152 U. S. 87. No presumption can be made in favor of the judgment of a lower court where error is apparent in the record. United States v. Wilkinson, 12 How. 246; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145. The error was substantial. Ogden v. United States, supra. The trial court erred in failing to warn the jury of the danger in convicting a defendant on the testimony of an ac 217 U. S. Argument for the United States. complice. Greenleaf on Evidence, 6th ed., 493, § 380; 12 Cyc. 453; United States v. Ybanez, 53 Fed. Rep. 536; United States v. Flemming, 18 Fed. Rep. 907; United States v. Harries, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,309; S. C., 2 Bond Rep. 311; United States v. Lancaster, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,556; United States v. Reeves, 38 Fed. Rep. 404; United States v. Van Leuven, 65 Fed. Rep. 78; United States v. Sykes, 58 Fed. Rep. 1004; United States v. Kessler, Baid. Rep. 22; United States v. Sacia, 2 Fed. Rep. 708; People v. Bonney, 98 California, 278. The trial court not only declined to instruct as requested by counsel for petitioner, but failed to give the jury any instructions as to being cautious in convicting upon such testiLony, and the weight to be accorded it. Although an accomplice is a competent witness for the prosecution, his testimony should be received with great care and caution and a refusal to so instruct is ground for reversal. United States v. Smith, Fed. Cas. No. 16,322; United States v. Babcock, Fed. Cas. No. 14,487; United States v. Goldberg, Fed. Cas. No. 15,223; United States v. McKee, Fed. Cas. No. 15,686; Solander v. People, 2 Colorado, 48; Cheatham v. State, 67 Mississippi, 335; People v. Sternberg, 111 California, 11; People v. Strybe, 36 Pac. Rep. 3; People v. Bonney, 98 California, 278; United States v. Neverson, 1 Mackey, 152; United States v. Bicksler, 1 Mackey, 341; State v. Hyer, 39 N. J. Law, 598; State v. Honey, 19 N. C. 390; State v. Miller, 97 N. C. 484; Hanley et al. v. United States, 123 Fed. Rep. 849. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Fowler for the United States: Federal courts have jurisdiction to inflict punishment for the offense of perjury committed in naturalization proceedings had in state courts. Section 5392, Rev. Stat.; Art. I, § 1, cl. 4, Constitution; Title 30, §§ 2165-2174 of the Rev. Stat.; In re Loney, 134 . S. 372, 374; § 5395, Rev. Stat. And see Shmidt v. United States, 133 Fed. Rep. 257, 264, holding that § 5395, Rev. Stat., is as broad in its application as the first section of the act of 1870. A change of phraseology VOL CCXVII-33 Argument for the United States. 217 U.S. in revision of statutes will not be regarded as altering the law where it has been settled by plain language in the statutes, unless it is clear that such was the intent. McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619, 629; United States v. Ryder, 110 U. S. 729, 740; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 302; Doyle v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 50. In finding the meaning of an ambiguous statute in the revision, the courts may refer to the original statute from which the section was taken to ascertain from its language and context to what class of cases the provision was intended to apply. The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 122; United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508; Myer v. Car Company, 102 U. S. 11; United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 626. The validity of such proceedings in state courts, when had under acts of Congress, has been recognized from the early history of the Government. Campbell v. Gordon, 6 Cranch, 176, 182; Stark v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 7 Cranch, 420; 2 Cyc. Law & Proc. 111, 112; Constitution of California, § 5, Art. VI; § 76, Code of Civil Procedure of that State. A new trial should not be awarded on the ground that the jury had in their possession, while considering their verdict, the indictment upon which had been written the finding of a former jury that petitioner was guilty on the third count of the indictment. The allowance or refusal of a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the court to which the application is addressed, and the result cannot be made the subject of review by writ of error. Henderson v. Moore, 5 Cranch, 11, 12, Marine Insurance Co. v. Young, 5 Cranch, 187, 191; McLanahan v. Insurance Company, 1 Pet. 170, 183; United States v. Buford, 3 Pet. 12, 32; Indianapolis &c. R. R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291, 301; Kerr v. Clampitt, 95 U. S. 188; Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U S. 581; Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140, 147; Haws v. Victoria Mining Company, 160 U. S. 303, 313; Ogden v. United States, 112 Fed. Rep. 523 The trial court's attention was not called to the fact that the indictment with the indorsement complained of thereon was handed to the jury when the same was done, but it was first mentioned in the motion for a new trial. Cook v. The State, 4 Tex. App. 265, 268; Anschicks v. The State, 6 Tex. App. 525, 536; State v. Tucker, 75 Connecticut, 201, Forbes v. Commonwealth, 90 Virginia, 550; Cargill v. Commonwealth, 93 Kentucky, 578, 581; Railway v. Higgins, 53 Arkansas, 458, 467; cited and followed in Railway Company v. Sweet, 60 Arkansas, 550, 556; State v. Shores, 31 W. Va. 491, 499; Smalls v. The State, 105 Georgia, 669, 675; Maynard v. Fellows, 43 N. H. 255, 259; Gardner v. King, 58 N, H. 203; Clapp v. Clapp, 137 Massachusetts, 183. Plaintiff in error was not prejudiced by the fact that the indictment with the indorsement complained of thereon was in possession of the jury. 12 Enc. of Pl. & Prac. 599; Hardy v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 545, 561; State v. Shores, supra; Green v. The State, 38 Arkansas, 304, 314; Harold v. Commonwealth, 8 S. W. Rep. 194, 196. It had no bearing on the facts presented in this case. Ogden v. United States, supra, and La Bonty v. Lundgren, 41 Nebraska, 312, can be distinguished. It was not error for the trial court to refuse to charge that the witness Werta was an accomplice and that his testimony should be corroborated. There is no evidence showing that Werta was an accomplice either as the principal or as an accessory before the fact. Insurance Co. v. Foley, 105 U. S. 347, 353; Bank v. Hunt, 11 Wall. 391, 394; Railroad v. Gladmon, 15 Wall. 409; Insurance Co. v. Baring, 20 Wall. 159, 161, Katz v. Phalen, 2 How. 375, 381. MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court. The petitioner, Gustav Holmgren, was convicted and sentenced in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California of the crime of false swearing in naturalization proceedings, in violation of § 5395 of the |