The contention, however, has not much relevancy. The agreement sued on states the authority of plaintiff to be the Vaile contract and the foundation of his power to engage defendants in error. His services and their services get their sanction from that contract, and according to the findings of the trial court he was paid the full amount of the fees contemplated to be received by him according to the terms of the said contract between him and Dudley & Michener." 66 Our construction of the contract is fortified by that finding. It is also fortified by the letter which plaintiff in error addressed to the defendants in error April 17, 1905, which is set out in the bill of exceptions, and the subsequent conversation he had with them. It is also fortified by the finding of the trial court that the attorneys of record had absolute control of the distribution of the fees. The latter finding is attacked by plaintiff in error, and it is asserted that it has no justification in the rules of the Court of Claims, and is contradicted by the fact that fees were allowed others for services. We must take the record as we find it, and under what circumstances fees were allowed others does not appear. But the fact does appear, and we repeat it because we regard it as especially pertinent, that the plaintiff in error received the fees and the exact fees that he expected to receive by his contract with Vaile with aid of legislation, upon which event he promised to pay defendants in error ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for their services. And there is no denial that they rendered them, and no question is made of their value and efficiency. Judgment affirmed. 217 U.S. Opinion of the Court. H. C. COOK COMPANY v. BEECHER. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT. No. 659. Submitted March 14, 1910.-Decided May 16, 1910. An action on a judgment obtained in a patent case is not itself a suit upon a patent, and the Circuit Court, in the absence of diverse citizenship, does not have jurisdiction thereof; and so held in regard to an action against directors of an insolvent corporation to make them personally responsible for a judgment recovered in the United States Circuit Court for damages for infringing Letters Patent; nor in this case can the complaint be construed as making such defendants joint tort-feasors with the corporation in infringing the patent so as to confer jurisdiction on the court. THE facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Verenice Munger for plaintiff in error. Mr. Talcott H. Russell for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court. This case comes here on the single question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, certified from the court below. 172 Fed. Rep. 166. The judge dismissed the complaint of his own motion, and the defendants in error confine themselves to the suggestion that for that reason the judgment should be reversed at the cost of the plaintiff in error, concurring in the argument that the judgment was wrong. As we are of opinion that the judgment was right it will be unnecessary to consider that point. The suit is brought by a Connecticut corporation against residents of Connecticut. We give an abridgment of the comVOL. COXVII—32 plaint. The plaintiff is the owner of a patent for fingernail clippers. The defendants during the time of the acts complained of were directors in control of another Connecticut corporation, The Little River Manufacturing Company. This company infringed the patent, and the plaintiff brought a suit in equity against it in the same Circuit Court, which ended in a decree for an injunction, $12,871 damages and $496.35 costs. The defendants voted to continue the sale of the infringing clipper pending the suit, and also voted and caused to be executed a bond of indemnity from their company to the selling agent against liability for the sale. As directors and as individuals they authorized and brought about such sales, and they directed the defense of the equity suit. In consequence of the expenditures to the foregoing ends their company became and is insolvent, and the defendants knew that that would be the result of a judgment against it, but did the acts alleged for the purpose of increasing the value of their stock in the company, and of receiving the profits and dividends that might be received from the sale. The plaintiff's argument is that the defendants and their corporation were joint tort-feasors, and that this is a suit against the defendants for their part in infringing its patent, the judgment against their co-trespasser not having been satisfied. It is unnecessary to speculate whether this is an afterthought or whether the complaint was framed with intentional ambiguity, so that if one cause of action failed another might be extracted from the allegations, or what the explanation may be. But the present interpretation is not the natural interpretation of the complaint. The natural interpretation is that which was given to it by the court below; that it is an attempt to make the defendants answerable for the judgment already obtained. There was no other reason for alleging that judgment with such detail, while on the other hand the patent now supposed to be the foundation of the claim is not set forth. The judge was fully warranted in taking this not to be a suit upon a petent. Indeed it would seem from his opinion that one of the grounds of jurisdiction urged before him was that this is an action ancillary to the judgment in the former suit, which of course it is not, any more than Stillman v. Combe, 197 U. S. 436; but the argument recognized that the former judgment was the foundation of the present case. Apart from that contention, there can be no question that, as the judge below said, if the directors are under obligations by Connecticut law to pay a judgment against their corporation, that is not a matter that can be litigated between citizens of the same State in the Circuit Court of the United States. The only argument attempted here is that which we have stated and have decided not to be open on the complaint. Judgment affirmed. STOFFELA v. NUGENT. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA. No. 179. Argued April 28, 1910.—Decided May 16, 1910. One committing a fraud does not become an outlaw and caput lupinum. Although one by reason of fraud may have no standing to rescind his transaction, if it is rescinded by one having the right to do so the court should do such justice as is consistent with adherence to law. Alhough one holding a mortgage may have fraudulently endeavored to prevent another from acquiring the fee of the property, he may still be entitled to Lave his mortgage paid if the other finally gets the property. Deeds and discharges of mortgages although different instruments may be parts of one transaction; and one setting aside the deed may also be required to give up the discharge so as to restore other parties to the condition in which they stood prior to the transaction. 18 Arizona, 151, reversed THE facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. J. J. Darlington, with whom Mr. John J. Hawkins and Mr. Thomas Armstrong, Jr., were on the brief, for appellants. Mr. Eugene S. Ives for appellee submitted. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court. This is a complaint in the nature of a bill in equity brought by the appellee, Nugent, to set aside a deed and mortgage as a cloud upon his title to certain land. The defendant denied the allegations of the complaint and filed a cross-complaint to set aside the deed to the plaintiff. The case was tried before a judge without a jury and he made findings of fact of which the following is an abridged statement. The land was subject to two mortgages held by the defendant, upon which a judgment of foreclosure had been rendered, the sum due being $15,700 and interest. Mrs. Heyl, the mortgagor and owner of the equity, sold and conveyed the land to Nugent on January 4, 1905, he agreeing to procure the payment of the mortgage and judgment liens. On January 9, the day before that fixed for the mortgage sale, the defendant, having knowledge of the conveyance to Nugent, and having evaded Nugent's efforts to pay the mortgage debt, induced Mrs. Heyl to convey a part of the premises to him absolutely in satisfaction of $10,000, and to mortgage the residue for $5,700, and recorded the deeds before Nugent had recorded the deed to him. He also, with fraudulent intent to defeat Nugent's title, it is said, although the possibility is hard to conceive, satisfied of record the former mortgages and judgment licns, the only consideration for his act being the later deed and mortgage given by Mrs. Heyl. On these facts judgment was given for the plaintiff, conditioned upon his paying to the defendant $15,700 without interest, less $600 counsel fees and costs. The plaintiff appealed and the Supreme Court of the Territory gave the plaintiff an unconditional judgment, on the ground that |