title of Mexican and Spanish grants prior to the treaty. New Orleans v. De Armas, 9 Pet. 224; Iowa v. Rood, 187 U. S. 87; Phillips v. Mound City Association, 124 U. S. 605."

In Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S. 389, referred to by the Chief Justice in Los Angeles v. Hooker, it was held, referring to the previous case of Phillips v. Mound City Assn., 124 U. S. 605, that the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo protected all existing property rights, but neither created nor defined the rights, and that a confirmation of such rights by a decree of the court did not determine rights which depended upon the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.

Similar questions came before this court in Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 313. In that case 244 complainants, owners of lands situated in the county of Los Angeles and in the Ranchos San Rafel, Los Felis and Providencia, and whose title was alleged to have. been confirmed pursuant to the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo by the board of land commissioners created under the act of Congress of 1851, and to whom patents had been issued by the United States, brought suit against the city of Los Angeles to quiet their title as against the claims of the city of Los Angeles to the paramount use of the water of the Los Angeles River. The bill is abstracted at length in the report of that case and it was alleged there, as here, that the rights asserted by the city and acts of the legislature and charters of the city were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and that the city of Los Angeles should have presented its claims to the waters of the river to the board of land commissioners under the act of Congress of March 3, 1851, and that a decree should be granted declaring the acts of the legislature of California and the charters of the city of Los Angeles invalid in respect to conferring upon the city any rights in the waters of the Los Angeles River other than those which were ascertained and confirmed under the act of March 3, 1851.

An answer was filed by the city, fully setting up its rights and contentions, as the successor of the pueblo to the owner

ship of the waters in the river and its tributaries, and admitting that it rested its claim to the Los Angeles River and the waters thereof, including the waters in the lands of the complainants, upon the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which protected the rights of pueblos as well as the rights of individuals, and in part upon the act of Congress of March 3, 1851, confirming the claims of pueblos and municipal corporations to lands granted by Spain and Mexico, and that the confirmation thereof had the effect of confirming the water rights contended for by the city; that said act did not require claims for property otherwise than for land to be presented for confirmation. The answer sets out a detailed history of the pueblo and city of Los Angeles, and certain prior adjudications which were claimed to conclude the plaintiff in the suit.

After the pleadings were filed the city of Los Angeles moved the court to dismiss the case on the ground that there was no Federal jurisdiction thereof; the motion was sustained, and the case brought to this court upon a certificate. This court held that there was no jurisdiction of the case in the Federal court, quoting in the opinion from the previous cases to the effect that the rights of the complainant depended upon the Spanish and Mexican grants confirmed by the board of land commissioners, (Los Angeles v. Hooker, 188 U. S. supra), and again held that the extent of the riparian rights of the plaintiffs alleged to be derived from the patents of the United States and confirmed Mexican grants, did not present a right, title, privilege or immunity arising under statutes or treaties of the United States. The court also cited Chrystal Springs Land & Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 177 U. S. 169, in which this court affirmed the ruling of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Californis, holding that a controversy between parties claiming under Mexican grants, alleged to be confirmed and patented by the United States in accordance with the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, was only a controversy as to what rights were thus granted and confirmed, and could not lay the basis for a suit as one arising un

der the laws and treaties of the United States, and the decree of the Circuit Court dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction was affirmed.

It is insisted that the Supreme Court of California, in holding that the term "land," as embraced in the act of March 3, 1851, did not include the riparian rights of the patentee of the land nor conclude the city from making claim of ownership of the water rights in controversy, and leaving to local law the determination of what riparian rights are embraced in the word "land," denied to the plaintiff in error the rights which had accrued to it because of the proceedings under the act of 1851 and the benefits of the limitations upon the rights conferred upon the city of Los Angeles by reason of the proceedings and determination of the commissioners. But as these alleged rights and limitations arise under the act of March 3, 1851, which this court has repeatedly held did not originate Federal rights or titles, but merely confirmed the old ones, we cannot review the judgment of the state court in this respect. In its opinion in the case at bar the Supreme Court of California said that in this respect it was following Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, and this court has frequently held that the extent of the right and title of a riparian owner under a patent is one of local law. See recent decision of Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510, and cases therein cited.

And whatever the rule may be as to patents conveying title to the lands of the United States, it has been distinctly held in this court that neither the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo nor patents under the act of March 3, 1851, are original sources of private titles, but are merely confirmatory of rights already accrued under a former sovereignty.

Both parties claim under Spanish or Mexican titles, confirmed by proceedings under the act of March 3, 1851. The Federal rights alleged by the plaintiff in error to have been violated by the decision and judgment of the Supreme Court of California, so far as concerns this act, relate to the extent of the right and ownership in the use of the waters of the Los

Angeles River by the one or the other of the parties to this suit. The plaintiff in error, as we have seen, contends that by its grant it became the owner of riparian rights in such waters without limitation by any supposed right in the city of Los Angeles to use the water of the river, and that the city of Los Angeles, by failing to present the claim it now makes for the use of the waters of the river to the commissioners under the act of 1851, and by the effect of the judgment of the commissioners upon the petition presented by the city is forever adjudicated to have no such water rights in the river as the city now contends for and as were awarded to it by the decision and judgment of the Supreme Court of California.

The defect of these contentions from the standpoint of Federal jurisdiction is that this court has already determined, in the cases above cited, that the act of 1851 was a confirmatory act; that by its terms it did not undertake to originate titles or make the patents to be issued in pursuance of the decisions of the commission conclusive except upon the United States; and that the extent of the riparian rights belonging to pueblos or persons receiving such patents are matters of local or general law.

In this view the writ of error must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

WYNNE v. UNITED STATES.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

No. 449. Argued February 28, March 1, 1910.-Decided April 4, 1910.

The words "out of the jurisdiction of any particular State" as used in § 5339, Rev. Stat., refer to the States of the Union and not to any separate particular community; and one committing the crimes referred to in that section in the harbor of Honolulu in the Territory of Hawaii is within the jurisdiction of the District Court of the

217 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

United States for that Territory. United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 337, and Talbot v. Silver Bow County, 139 U. S. 438, distinguished. While by § 5 of the Organic Act of the Territory of Hawaii of April 30, 1890, c. 339, 31 Stat. 141, the Constitution of the United States and laws not locally inapplicable were extended to Hawaii, and by § 6 of that act laws of Hawaii not repealed and not inconsistent with such Constitution and laws were left in force, nothing in the act operated to leave intact the jurisdiction of the territorial courts over crimes committed in the harbors of Hawaiian ports exclusively cognizable by the courts of the United States under § 5339, Rev. Stat.

A copy of the original certificate of enrollment of a vessel certified under seal by the deputy collector of customs of the port where issued which is in form as required by § 4155, Rev. Stat., held to be sufficient under the conditions of identification of the signature and seal and § 882, Rev. Stat., to prove the national character of the vessel upon which the crime was committed by one indicted and tried under § 5339, Rev. Stat.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Henry E. Davis, with whom Mr. Frank E. Thompson and Mr. Charles F. Clemons were on the brief, for plaintiff in

error:

The trial court was without jurisdiction of any act alleged in the indictment, and of any act proved to have been committed.

If defendant is prosecuted for violation of § 5339, Rev. Stat., the justification for the indictment must be found, if at all, in the provisions of § 5 of the organic act for Hawaii, by which in a general way the laws of the United States are extended to the Hawaiian Islands, 31 Stat. 141, but the extension is limited by the provision continuing the laws of Hawaii not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Among the statutes so preserved and continued in force are those relating to homicide and punishing murder. Organic act, 6; Penal Laws, 1897, Hawaii, pp. 62-64; Rev. Laws, 1905, Hawaii, pp. 1074-1076.