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between Portland and Goble does not affect the transportation due from the latter company to the plaintiff. It is still open to the latter to have its freight carried over every part of the railroad of the land grant company at fifty per cent of the regular rate. This is the extent of its right. And this right, as already appears, has not been affected by the use of a part of that company's track by the defendant company. It is a matter of no consequence to the plaintiff (United States) how many railroads use this particular track of the Northern Pacific Company, nor what their traffic rates are, 80 long as the latter company continues to afford all the facilities for transportatior over every part of its road required by the plaintiff.” United States v. A storia & C. R. R. Co., 131 Fed. Rep. 1006.

The order denying application for injunction was pleaded in the Court of Claims, as it appears from the opinion of the court, as res judicata of the “subject-matter” there involved, and therefore the full breadth of the contentions of the railroad company in the Circuit Court and of the decision of that court was considered by the Court of Claims, and all of the elements of decision and all the distinctions which depended upon them the court must have taken into account in rendering its decision.

We are brought then to the question whether the decision of the court was right. Certain concessions are made by appellant at the outset of the argument. It is conceded that the acceptance of the land grants by the "owned and aided companies” completed a contract between them and the United States, and that privity was established between them and the United States. That is privity (we use the word, as we presume that counsel does, in the sense of party for the United States, and the companies are parties, not successors, to rights or obligations) of contract, a personal obligation, that is, not an obligation which attached to the property and covered every use of it. This is necessarily what appellant means, though it is confused in discussion.

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Appellant quotes the statute to show that the obligation is on the companies, not on the roods, as follows: “That railroad companies whose railroad was constructed ... by grant of land

shall receive only eighty per centum of the compensation authorized by this act.”

And further, it points out, as we have seen, that it has not succeeded "to the title or any part of the title” of the roads, nor "directly or indirectly receives any benefit from the respective grants.” And, finally, it urges that if appellant "is a mere licensee, owing no contractual duty as a corporate individual to the Government, owning no railroad property which is pledged to the Government as security for the performance of any duty, and operating its trains on the joint track in such manner as to interfere in no wise with its licensor in the transaction of its business and the performance of its contractual duty to the Government, it is difficult to understand how appellant can be held to fall within the terms of the thirteenth section of the act of 1876, or why it does not stand upon the same footing as any other company without privity with the United States."

This is stating by periphrase the simple proposition that there is a contract only between the United States and each of the aided companies, in which such company “has bound itself” (we quote from appellant's brief]" to operate trains for the transportation of the Government business.” And "whenever" appellant says “one of these companies shall fail to perform its duty, whatever reliei the United States may be entitled to must be sought by appropriate proceedings directed against the delinquent company.” Appellant joins to this as a concession that the “railroad property” of an aided company “is pledged to secure the performance” of its obligation. In what way is not pointed out, or how the security can be availed of.

The opposite contention to that of appellant is, therefore, what it was decided to be by the Court of Claims, that the obligation is upon the property of an aided company, and

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attaches to all of the uses of the property, whether by the “owned and aided companies" or any other company. We concur with the decision of the Court of Claims, and we think further discussion is not necessary, except to notice some of the reasons urged against the decision.

We have noticed and commented on one concession of appellant. Another is made, which we quote with its qualifications, as follows: “We do not contend that a land-aided road can be sold, either in whole or in part, so as to avoid its obligations to the government. To this extent we concede that the obligation runs with the railroad aided by land grant, but the act does not say that companies permitted simply to run trains on the road shall suffer reductions. They receive no aid from the grant, and are neither within the terms or the reason of the statute.” Of course, the statute did not deal with other companies or with deductions. It would be very strange if it had. It either imposed a service on the companies or on the road as well. If on the companies alone, there would necessarily be exclusion of all others. If on the roads as well, it would comprehend all that used them. If a difference in degree of use or a participation in the use by other companies than the aided ones, had been intended it would have been expressed. The concession as to the effect of the sale or lease of the road is fatal. As we have already said, the obligation is either upon the aided companies, to be enforced by remedies against them, or it is on ihe property as well, and if on the property, necessarily on it by whatever company or person it is used.

It is further contended in the brief filed for the Great Northern that the condition of earning its grant was the building of a single track and it or its grantors, it is said, has provided several. It has therefore, it is further said, “a surplus of track capacity and, by contract, permits the Omaha (appellant) and other companies to run their trains over its tracks.” To this it is only necessary to reply that the service that the Government reserved was coextensive with

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the road as constituted under the grant and attached to as many tracks as should be used.

Again, it is urged that if the Omaha Company had built its own road there would be no assertion of a right to deduct from its mail pay, and that it is to run over the Great Northern, the latter not being made thereby less useful or efficient, is for its purpose equivalent to building its own road. An answer to this is contained in what we have said. We may add, however, that the appellant no doubt considered the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative presented before making its selection, but it could not have supposed, nor can we admit, that it could lessen rights in property be cause it could acquire like property for itself.

Union Pacific v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 564, and Lake Superior & Mississippi R. R. Co. v. United States, 93 U. S. 442, are cited as authorities against our conclusion. We content ourselves by saying that they have not that effect. On United States v. Astoria Company, 131 Fed. Rep. 1006, we have commented.

Judgment affirmed.

BOSTON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE v. CITY OF

BOSTON.

ERROR TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF

MASSACHUSETTS.

No. 99. Argued March 2, 3, 1910.-Decided April 4, 1910.

This court accepts the construction of a state statute as to condemna

tion of land given to it by the state court. While in condemnation proceedings the mere mode of occupation does

not limit the right of an owner's recovery, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a disregard of the mode of ownership, or re

quire land to be valued as an ynencumbered whole when not so held. Where one person owns the land condemned subject to servitudes to

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

217 U.S.

others, the parties in interest are not entitled to have damages estimated as if the land were the scie property of one owner, nor are they deprived of their property without due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment because each is awarded

the value of his respective interest in the property. 195 Massachusetts, 338, affirmed

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Charles A. Williams and Mr. Charles S. Hamlin for plaintiff in error:

The market value of the "locus,” the land taken for this street at the time of the taking, was $60,000.

Consequently, the owners ir fee simple of the land unencumbered were entitled to recover in this proceeding $60,000. Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403.

In determining the dama sustained by an owner of land taken by eminent domair., the use which the landowner at the time of taking happens to be making of his land is not the only thing to be considered. The use which the owner of the land taken is making of the lard at the time of the taking is absolutely and wholly immaieral. Maynard v. Northampton, 157 Massachusetts, 218, 219. tretern R. R. v. Boston & Maine R. R., 111 Massachusetts, 120, 132; and see also Providence &c. R. R. v. Worcester, 155 Ma buclusetts, 35; Conness v. Commonwealth, 184 Massachusetts, 541; Fales v. Easthampton, 162 Massachusetts, 422, 425.

The right of the petitioners to recover the fair market value of the land is not lost becausn of the fact that there is more than one owner, nor by rear of the fact that the entire title is held by different owners w nown different interests, nor because of the fact that at the time of the taking the petitioners were making a use of the land similar in kind to the use which the city intended by its taking, to make of it.

And this although neither without the coöperation of the other could convey a clear vitle to the whole estate. Edmands v. Boston, 108 Massachusetts, 535.

The statute was not intended to be used so as to prevent

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