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of the laws does not rest upon any solid basis. The statute makes no distinction among such wholesale dealers as handle the particular articles specified in 89. The State had the right to classify such dealers separately from those who sold, by wholesale, other articles than those mentioned in that section. The statute puts the constituents of each of those separate classes on the same plane of equality. it is not arbitrary legislation, except in the sense that all legislation is arbitrary. If it be within the power of the legislature to enact the statute, then arbitrariness cannot be predicated of it in a court of law. And it cannot be held to be beyond legislative power simply because of its classification of occupations. What were the special reasons or motives inducing the State to adopt the classification of which the Oil Company complains, we do not certainly know. Nor is it important that we should certainly know. It may be that the main purpose of the State was to encourage retail dealing in the particular articles mentioned in 8 9. If the statute had its origin in such a view, we do not perceive that this court can deny the power of the State to proceed on that ground. We may repeat what was said in Delaware Railroad Tax Cases, 18 Wall. 206, 231, that “it is not for us to suggest in any case that a more equitable mode of assessment or rate of taxation might be adopted than the one prescribed by the legislature of the State; our only concern is with the validity of the tax; all else lies beyond the domain of our jurisdiction.” But we will not speculate as to the motives of the State, and will assume the statute, either upon its face or by its necessary operation, not suggesting a contrary assumption—that the State has in good faith sought, by its legislation, to protect or promote the interests of its people. It is sufficient for the disposition of this case to say that, except as restrained by its own constitution or by the Constitution of the United States, the State of Texas, by its Legislature, has full power to prescribe any system of taxation which, in its judgment, is best or necessary for its people and government; that, so far as the

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power of the United States is concerned, the State has the right, by any rule it deems proper, to classify persons or businesses for the purposes of taxation, subject to the condition that such classification shall not be in violation of the Constitution of the United States; that the requirement by the State, that all wholesale dealers in specified articles shall pay a tax of a given amount on their occupation, without exacting a similar tax on the occupations of wholesale dealers in other articles, cannot, on the face of the statute or by reason of any facts within the judicial knowledge of the court, be held, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, to deprive the taxpayer of his property without due process of law or to deny him the equal protection of the laws; and that the Federal court cannot interfere with the enforcement of the statute simply because it may disapprove its terms, or question the wisdom of its enactment, or because it cannot be sure as to the precise reasons inducing the State to enact it. For the reasons herein stated, the judgment is

Afirmed.

UNITY BANKING AND SAVING COMPANY v. BETT

MAN, TRUSTEE OF HOLZMAN & CO., BANKRUPTS.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH

CIRCUIT.

No. 126. Argued March 4, 7, 1910.-Decided April 4, 1910.

As against the true owner, a right of property cannot be acquired by

means of a forged written instrument relating to such property, except when the owner has by laches or gross or culpable negligence induced another who proceeds with reasonable care to act in belief that

the instrument was genuine or would be so recognized by the owner. Where the owner of property which passes only by written transfer has

left it with another who has wilfully forged the name of such owner to a transfer of the property, the person taking it acquires no right thereto merely because the property was left with party committing the forgery.

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Quære, how far a broker having lawful possession of stock certificates

belonging to a customer, the legal title to which has not been transferred to him, may retain the same as security for any debt balance of such customer.

The only question to be determined in this case relates to the ownership of fifty shares of preferred stock in the Philip Carey Manufacturing Company, a corporation of Ohio.

On or about May 13th, 1905, Richard Fritz, the owner of such shares, placed the certificate for them in the hands of a member of the partnership of Holzman & Co., brokers, with or through whom Fritz had some dealings. The deposit of the stock with that firm was upon an express agreement that it was to be held by them only to show Fritz's financial responsibility, and was not to pass out of their possession. There was no change in the terms or conditions of that contract. The certificate was in the name of Fritz Brothers, and was thus indorsed: “For value received, I, the undersigned, hereby sell and transfer to Richard Fritz fifty shares of stock within mentioned and described and hereby appoint

true and lawful attorney irrevocable, with power and (of) substitution to transfer said stock on the books of the company. Witness hand and seal this 5th day of January 1905. Fritz Bros. per Otto H. Fritz. Witness Max Winkler.”

On May 5th, 1905, without the knowledge or consent of Fritz, this certificate was pledged by Holzman & Co. with the Unity Banking and Saving Company as a substituted security for a note, dated March 21st, 1905, for $10,000, which that firm had executed to the bank, other security of substantially the same value being withdrawn at the time of the substitution. That transaction had no connection with any dealings by Holzman & Co. for or on behalf of Fritz.

When the pledge to the bank was made there was pinned to the certificate a blank power of attorney purporting to have been signed May 13th, 1905, by Richard Fritz in the presence of Ross Holzman, the active member of the firm of

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Holzman & Co. None of the blanks in the power of attorney were then filled out, and the only writing on the paper included the date, the name of Richard Fritz in the blank for the signature, and Ross Holzman in the blank for the attestation.

Upon the petition of certain creditors of Holzman & Co., that partnership and the individuals composing it were on July 1st, 1905, adjudicated bankrupts by the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, the petition charging that the act of bankruptcy was committed May 25th, 1905. Boyden was the first trustee in the bankruptcy case. He subsequently resigned and was succeeded by Bettman. The case was sent to a Referee in Bank ruptcy to take such further proceedings as might be necessary.

Richard Fritz filed in the bankruptcy proceeding a claim, supported by affidavit, that he owned the certificate of stock placed with Holzman & Co., and which, as above stated, was afterwards pledged by that firm, without the authority or knowledge of Fritz, with the Unity Banking and Saving Company. He neither signed, nor authorized to be signed for him, the blank power of attorney of May 13th, 1905, and his name to that paper was a forgery. It does not appear who committed the forgery. But at the time of the hearing of the case Ross Holzman was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and in parts unknown. The Referee so stated.

The relief sought by Fritz was, among other things, an order requiring the delivery to him of the above stock in the Philip Carey Manufacturing Company, free from the claims of all the parties.

At the time of the hearing below the certificate for the stock had come under the control of the court. The Banking and Saving Company asserted its right to the possession of the stock and to retain the certificate therefor, with authority to apply the proceeds of the sale of the stock on the loan for which it had been pledged to the bank. The trustee asked

VOL. CCXVII–9

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the determination of the controversy between Richard Fritz and the Manufacturing Company and for the protection of the interests represented by him as trustee. He contended that if Fritz did not sign the power in question, he authorized it to be signed for him.

The cause was sent to a Referee in Bankruptcy, who found that Richard Fritz had never signed the above power of attorney, nor authorized any one to sign it for him; that he was the owner of the fifty shares of stock represented by the certificate; and that he was entitled to the possession of them, free of all liens and interests, either by the Unity Banking and Saving Company or of the trustee in bankruptcy. The Referee thus stated his conclusion of law from the facts found by him: “Where F deposits with a broker a certificate of stock belonging to F and in his name, without any indorsement or power to execute or transfer of said stock, upon an agreement that said stock is to be held by said broker as an evidence of F's financial responsibility only and is not to leave the broker's possession, and the broker pledges said certificate to a bank as security upon a note of the broker for money loaned by the bank to the broker for general use of the broker, the bank holds said certificate, subject to all the conditions of the original deposit by F with the broker, and F is not estopped to claim title to said certificate as against the bank by the mere placing of said certificate in the hands of the broker, or the further fact that in the course of dealings between F and the broker large balances have at various times been owed by F to the broker when it appears that no demand for the payment of said balances was made upon F or notice served upon him changing the conditions of the deposit of said stock and further, that at the conclusion of the dealings between F and the broker, F is a creditor and not a debtor of said broker."

This order, upon being brought before the court in bankruptcy for review, was affirmed. The case was then carried by appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the

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