1829. DAVIS V. CAPPER. ant, therefore, committed for such a period as would just go over that time. For the defence, a police officer, named Russell, was called-He stated, that the defendant committed the plaintiff for fifteen days, by his advice; but he admitted, that he knew of no inquiries being made respecting the writer of the letter, except in Cheltenham, all which inquiries might have been made in a few hours. Mr. Baron VAUGHAN (in summing up)-The question here is, whether Mr. Capper has exceeded his jurisdiction; for, if he has, I think that he is answerable in this action. That question involves two points, which are these:-Was this a commitment not made bona fide, but tainted with some sinister motive, such as the hope of extorting a confession? or was it, without being made from a corrupt motive, a commitment for an unreasonable time? In either of these cases, it would be illegal. There is no doubt, that, on charges of felony, a magistrate has a power to commit for further examination, but that can only be for a reasonable time; and as to what is a reasonable time, that must greatly depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. The question of reasonable time is a mixed question of law and fact. Whether the facts were such as have been detailed in evidence, is a question for you; but if you are satisfied that these were the facts, it will be for me to tell you, as matter of law, whether the commitment was for a reasonable time. Now, fifteen days is, in my judgment, an unreasonable time, unless there be circumstances to account for it, and these circumstances it will be incumbent on the magistrate to shew. Then let us consider what is shewn here. In this case, a woman named Hamerton makes an accusation, unsupported by any corroboration, except a letter, which never reached the hands of the plaintiff, and the defendant commits her for fifteen days. On these facts, I am of opinion, that this commitment is illegal, as being for an unreasonable time. It appears, that, on the 12th of February, when the plaintiff was brought up for re-examination, Mr. Capper was attending an insurance company's meeting, instead of being in attendance to hear the further examination. Now, I have no hesitation in saying, that when a magistrate commits a person till a certain day, for further examination, it is his bounden duty to be in attendance on that day, to take the further examination, and to discharge the party if there be not sufficient evidence to warrant a further commitment. The Jury returned the following verdict, (in writing)— Curwood, Godson, and Carrington, for the plaintiff. 1829. DAVIS v. CAPPER. In the ensuing term, Taunton moved to enter a nonsuit, on the ground that the form of the action should have been case, and not trespass; but the Court refused a rule (a). (a) See the cases of Crepps v. Durden, 2 Cowp. 640; Morgan v. Hughes, 2 T. R. 225; Lowther v. Lord Radnor, 8 Ea. 113; Gray v. Cookson, 16 Ea. 13; Groome v. Forrester, 5 M. & S. 314; Hill Cox v. v. Yates, 8 Taunt. 182; CASES AT NISI PRIUS. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Second Sitting at Westminster, in Michaelmas BEFORE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE TINDAL. 1829. Nov. 18th. NORTHAM V. LATOUCHE, To justify the ASSUMPSIT on a bill of exchange for 1000%., dated December 8th, 1828, drawn by one Joseph Hudson on, and accepted by, the defendant, at two months from the date, made payable to the order of the drawer, and indorsed by him to the plaintiff. Jury in giving a indorser, and from which he had been discharged under the Insolvent Debtors' Act, they must be satisfied, not only that the plaintiff gave The defendant pleaded, First, The general issue; and Secondly, this special plea. "And for a further plea in this behalf, the said defendant, by leave of the Court, here, for this purpose first had and obtained, according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, says, that the said plaintiff ought not to have or maintain his aforesaid action thereof against him, because he saith, that value for the bill, but that he took it, bona fide, for his own purposes, without any concert with the indorser, and without any knowledge of the defect in the indorser's title. The provision in the 76th section of the 7 Geo. 4, c. 57, that a certified copy of the petition, schedule, order of adjudication, &c., "shall, at all times, be admitted in all Courts whatever, as sufficient evidence of the same" does not take away the right of producing in evidence the original order of adjudication procured from the Court. of heretofore, and before the day of exhibiting the plaintiff's The plaintiff took issue upon the plea of non assumpsit, and replied to the special plea, that the defendant " was not discharged of and from the said several promises and undertakings and causes of action in the said declaration mentioned, or any of them, in manner and form as" the defendant had alleged. The acceptance and indorsement being proved, Wilde, Serjt., for the defendant.-The 61st section of the 7 Geo. 4, c. 57, enacts, "That, after any person shall have become entitled to the benefit of this act, by any such adjudication as aforesaid, no writ of fieri facias or elegit shall issue on any judgment obtained against such prisoner, for any debt or sum of money, with respect to which such person shall have so become entitled; nor in any action upon any new contract, or security for payment thereof, except upon the judgment entered up against such prisoner, according to this act; and that if any suit or action shall be brought, or any scire facias be issued against any such person, his or her heirs, executors, or administrators, 1829. NORTHAM v. LATOUCHE. 1829. NORTHAM V. LATOUCHE. for any such debt or sum of money, or upon any new contract or security for payment thereof, or upon any judgment obtained against, or any statute or recognizance acknowledged by such person for the same, except as aforesaid, it shall and may be lawful for such person, his or her heirs, executors, or administrators, to plead generally that such person was duly discharged, according to this act, by the order of adjudication made in that behalf, and that such order remains in force, without pleading any other matter specially; whereto the plaintiff or plaintiffs shall or may reply generally, and deny the matters pleaded as aforesaid, or reply any other matter or thing which may shew the defendant or defendants not to be entitled to the benefit of this act, or that such person was not duly discharged, according to the provisions thereof, in the same manner as the plaintiff or plaintiffs might have replied in case the defendant or defendants had pleaded this act, and a discharge by virtue thereof specially." Now, I submit, that, under this section, it is only necessary for the defendant to prove his discharge, and that this bill was given as a new security for an old debt, and then the plaintiff will be bound to shew that he is a bona fide holder for a valuable consideration. Copies of the petition and schedule of the defendant were put in; and a document, purporting to be the order of adjudication, was produced by the defendant's attorney. The copies of the petition and schedule were certified copies, but there was no certificate on the other do cument. Russell, Serjt., and Moody, objected, that it was not sufficient. By the 76th section of the act of Parliament it is enacted, That the proper officer of the Court shall, on the reasonable request of any prisoner, or of any creditor, or his, her, or their attorney, produce and shew, at such times as the Court shall direct, the petition, schedule, order of ad |