The Stage II contract costs which can be attributed to each CHCS site are displayed below.

STAGE II CONTRACT COSTS SPECIFICALLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO EACH CHCS SITE

STAGE II CONTRACT COSTS SPECIFICALLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO EACH CHCS SITE

STAGE II CONTRACT COSTS SPECIFICALLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO EACH CHCS SITE-Continued

The DOD will not make a deployment decision until the completion of the OT&E. The significant milestones for each of the OT&E sites are indicated. The date on which the site survey is completed is the earliest date the contractor will install the CHCS. The phase-in start date is the projected date the contractor's installed system is first available for Government use. The projected completion date for the OT&E is July 1989.

RESERVE ISSUES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

MILITARY PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Thursday, March 10, 1988.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 334, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Beverly Byron (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. BEVERLY B. BYRON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE

Mrs. BYRON. Good afternoon.

Today's subject is the reserve component, and our focus is twofold. First, the impact on readiness and the reserve skill training shortfall, and second an overview of the fiscal year 1989 budget request for the reserve and for the guard.

Before we get underway, I would like to note that it seemed quite fitting to hold the reserve hearing in the Sonny Montgomery full committee room. Last year, I believe we worked out the GI bill legislation here and we have a good track record in this facility.

The annual report of the reserve foreign policy board again this year identifies individual skill qualification deficiencies as one of the two most critical limiting factors of readiness for both the army reserve component as well as for the marine corps reserve. Where there is increased reliance on the reserve and guard for wartime mobilization, this is clearly a very serious matter, and I have asked the General Accounting Office to look into the problems and the potential solutions.

At this time, GAO has only a preliminary assessment of what will be a much larger project, but I thought it was important to get this information on record as part of our reserve overview hearing.

Reserve skill qualifications is only one of several reserve issues that I hope we will be able to address this year. We will also want to take a look at incapacitation pay, the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act, the recommendations of the sixth quadrennial review of military compensation.

With respect to the incapacitation pay, the fiscal year 1987 National Defense Authorization Act included a DOD legislative proposal restructuring that pay. Several unanticipated problems have surfaced since the law was changed, however. We will include the necessary corrections in this year's authorization.

Both the departments wrote model legislation in the report of the sixth quadrennial which when it is submitted, will be a lengthy

and complex undertaking requiring the dedication, I think, of several-of considerable time on the subcommittee's part. I hope that we will be able to start the process rolling with several days of hearings on both these subjects once the authorization bill is completed.

There is no question that the subcommittee is going to have a full plate of major reserve issues for the-in the foreseeable future. This afternoon, we have a large number of witnesses, actually a cast of thousands, so to speak, and I will ask each of you all to submit for the record your full written statement which was provided in advance to all members, and then to keep your opening remarks as brief as possible in order to allow the maximum time for questions.

We have three groups of witnesses: first, Richard A. Davis, Senior Associate Director of GAO's National Security and International Affairs Division, followed by Stephen M. Duncan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and finally, a panel composed of the reserve component chiefs.

Gentlemen, we welcome all of you and look forward to your testi

mony.

Mr. Bateman, do you have opening remarks?

Mr. BATEMAN. Madam Chairman, in light of the numbers of witnesses we have, today, I would ask unanimous consent that my written statement extolling the virtues of our reserve component be inserted in the record without my taking their time to tell them, "How great thou are."

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you.

You may proceed, Mr. Davis.

[The prepared statement of Representative Bateman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT H. BATEMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM

VIRGINIA

Thank you, Madam Chairman, and let me join with you in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon.

There is no doubt in my mind that maintaining the quality and size of our reserve forces is one of the most important challenges we face in this committee today. We all know that reserve units, on the average, cost far less than Active duty units and that's important in these fiscally constrained times. It's also important, however, that we get the maximum return for every dollar invested in defense and-once again-the reserve are paying big dividends in this area.

Before yielding to the witnesses to begin this afternoon's hearing, I would like to briefly review some statistics that show how heavily we rely on our reserve forces. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve provide nearly one-half of the total Army's combat power and two-thirds of its combat support, service support and wartime medical capability.

The Naval Reserve provides 100 percent of U.S. based Naval logistics aircraft, inshore undersea warfare units and combat search and rescue capability.

The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve provide 73 percent of strategic interceptors and 50 percent of tanker and cargo crews, respectively.

Finally, one-third of Marine light attack aircraft and antiaircraft missile battalions are in the Marine Corps Reserve.

The list goes on and on but, in the interest of time, I will not. Suffice it to say that if the United States becomes involved in a major war and if the reserves aren't ready, there's no need to show-up on the battlefield because we will have already lost the ballgame. It is, therefore, incumbent on us to ensure that the reserves are ready-and that they are properly trained, equipped and staffed at the levels needed to do the job.