the part of the defendant were alleged as follows: 1. That defendant should have provided a watchman to warn plaintiff of the movement of the cars, and notify other employees of his whereabouts; 2. That a proper signal-flag should have been used to give notice of his presence under the cars; 3. That the cars under which he was working should have been "locked," or placed against a "bumper," or stationary post; 4. That defendant neglected to provide such watchman, flag, or bumper; 5. The defendant neglected all reasonable means to prevent the movement of the cars while plaintiff was at work under them; 6. Defendant negligently required the cars to be repaired on an open track, upon which engines or cars might be run while plaintiff was at work; 7. And negligently exposed plaintiff to the risk from the movement of the cars; 8. That while plaintiff was under the cars, and in the absence of such precautions, without any warning to him, defendant wrongfully caused a number of cars to be pushed in upon the track where plaintiff was at work, by locomotive power, at a high rate of speed, unattached to the locomotive, and insufficiently provided with brakemen.

The proof showed that no watchman or bumpers were provided, and no signal used except the red flag, which would undoubtedly have answered the purposes of a sufficient signal had it been removed to the front end of the section last run upon the track.

Upon the conclusion of the testimony, the circuit judge directed a verdict for the defendant, holding,-1. That the injury was caused by the neglect of Carlson or Leith to remove the flag from the rear section, and place it at the head of the front section of the cars upon the track; 2. From the neglect of the switchman, Farnum, to perform his duty; that he had no business or right to uncouple the cars from the engine as he did.

He then ruled that, inasmuch as there was no evidence offered or claim made that either Carlson, Leith, or Farnum, were incompetent, the plaintiff could not recover, because all these parties were, in law, fellow-employees with the plaintiff.

It is claimed by the counsel for the plaintiff that it was negligence on the part of the defendant to run the last section of cars upon the track while the others were being repaired, and had the signal-flag at the front of them; that the evidence shows it was their custom to do so, the only instructions being to leave space between the cars being repaired; and

that the plaintiff had a right to go to the jury upon this question.

His counsel assert that the primary cause of the injury was the existence of the rule or custom to permit encroachments upon the track, or a want of sufficiently definite rules to govern the use of the signal-flag, or both combined.

The testimony shows that the following rule was in force, and had been for some time before the accident. There was a dispute in the testimony as to whether or not notices of this rule were posted up while plaintiff was in the employ of defendant. But there is no question, from the record, but the instructions of the defendant were that the red flag should be placed at the front end of the cars on the repairing track, and that in no event should any train be run against cars having such flag upon them.

The following is a copy of said notice:

"CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY,
"OFFICE OF THE GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT.
"General Notice.

"CHICAGO, October 27, 1881. "Hereafter it is made the duty of all car-inspectors and repair-men, before they go under or between any cars to inspect or repair the same, to have first displayed a red signal on the end of car or cars in the direction from which a train or engine could approach.

"All train-men must carefully observe this notice, and under no circumstances must they back against or couple onto any car while such signal is displayed.

"Car repair-men and car-inspectors must provide themselves with such signal, which can be obtained from their foreman, and have them on hand at all times for use."

I think it must be considered that this rule, if enforced, was adequately sufficient for the protection of plaintiff, and the men working at the same employment. A similar method of protection is adopted by other roads, and has in one case been judicially determined to be "a very efficient rule, and if faithfully and carefully observed, would give reasonable protection to repair-men": Abel v. President etc., 103 N. Y. 586; 57 Am. Rep. 773.

With this rule in existence, and with instructions to all employees to observe it, it was not, in my opinion, negligence on the part of the defendant in not having a watchman or "bumpers"; nor was it negligent to run other cars upon the same

track where cars were being repaired, when space was left between them, and the red flag was respected according to the rule.

While the negligence of Farnum, in detaching the engine from the cars used in "kicking" the B. O. car upon the main track, had something to do with causing the accident, the real neglect which was the main cause of the injury was the failure of the foremen, or one of them, to remove the flag, and place it at the head of the front section of the cars upon the repair-track. If this had been done, none of the cars would have been moved while plaintiff or any of the men were at work repairing the cars if the rules of the defendant had been obeyed.

As stated by the circuit judge, there could be no claim, from the record, that either Farnum, Leith, or Carlson were incompetent men in such sense as to charge defendant with the results of their negligence. If the question were an open one in this state, I should not be inclined to hold that either of these persons was a fellow-employee of the plaintiff. But the law in this respect is well settled in this state, and the circuit judge followed the decisions of this court, citing them in his charge to the jury: See Railroad Co. v. Dolan, 32 Mich. 510; Smith v. Potter, 46 Id. 258; Railroad Co. v. Austin, 40 Id. 247; Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 Id. 34; Greenwald v. Railroad Co., 49 Id. 197; Gardner v. Railroad Co., 58 Id. 584; Hoar v. Merritt, 62 Id. 386.

Under the plaintiff's evidence, and the other undisputed facts in the record, and the law applicable to the same, the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

MASTER AND SERVANT - WHO ARE CO-SERVANTS OR CO-EMPLOYEES: Cincinnati etc. R. R. Co. v. McMullen, 117 Ind. 439; 10 Am. St. Rep. 67, and note 75; Ewald v. Chicago etc. R'y Co., 70 Wis. 420; 5 Am. St. Rep. 178, and note; Theleman v. Moeller, 73 Iowa, 108; 5 Am. St. Rep. 663, and note; McMaster v. Illinois etc. R. R. Co., 65 Miss. 264; 7 Am. St. Rep. 653, and note 657; Fisk v. Central P. R. R. Co., 72 Cal. 38; 1 Am. St. Rep. 31-33. An engineer is a fellow-servant of a brakeman, where, being deprived of their conductor, both pursue, independently of each other, the duties prescribed by the rules of the railway company in such emergency: Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Martin, 87 Tenn. 398, and cases there cited. Where A was employed upon the diin a blacksmith-shop of a locomotive and machine works, a.. rection of an officer of the company repaired a chain which had been used in raising locomotive driving-wheels, to be worked on by B, employed by the works for that purpose, and when the chain was again furnished to and used by B for that purpose, and B was injured by its breaking at the link which had been repaired, A and B were fellow-servants in a common employment:

Rogers etc. Works v. Hand, 50 N. J. L. 464; compare Handelun v. Burlington etc. R'y Co., 72 Iowa, 709.

MASTER AND SERVANT-MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO SERVANT BY NEGLIGENCE OF CO-SERVANT. - The general doctrine that a master is not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of fellow-servants engaged in the same common employment is now regarded as settled law: Anderson v. Bennett, 16 Or. 515; 8 Am. St. Rep. 311, and note 328; Ewald v. Chicago etc. R'y Co., 70 Wis. 420; 5 Am. St. Rep. 178, and note 187; Theleman v. Moeller, 73 Iowa, 108; 5 Am. St. Rep. 663, and note 664; note to Faren v. Sellers, 4 Am. St. Rep. 264; Jones v. Old Dominion Cotton Mills, 82 Va. 140; 3 Am. St. Rep. 92, and note 106; Fisk v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 72 Cal. 38; I Am. St. Rep. 22, and note 31-33; Ashley v. Hart, 147 Mass. 573; Dunlap v. Barney Mfg. Co., 148 Mass. 51. But there are exceptions to this general rule that a master is not liable to one servant for an injury resulting from the negligence of a fellow-servant: Jones v. Old Dominion Cotton Mills, 82 Va. 140; 3 Am. St. Rep. 92; and it is settled that the master is liable when he has, through negligence, selected and employed a servant who is totally incompetent: Anderson v. Bennett, 16 Or. 515; 8 Am. St. Rep. 311; Evansville etc. R. R. Co. v. Guyton, 115 Ind. 450; 7 Am. St. Rep. 458, and note 465; McMaster v. Illinois etc. R. R. Co., 65 Miss. 264; 7 Am. St. Rep. 653, and note 657; McKinnon v. Norcross, 148 Mass. 533. Nor is the master responsible for the mere personal negligence of a superior servant to an inferior servant; and in order to render the master liable for the consequences of the superior servant's negligence, the latter must so far stand in the master's place as to be charged, in the particular matter from which the injury results to the inferior servant, with the performance of some duty which, under the law, the master owes to such servant: Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Lahr, 86 Tenn. 335.

MASTER AND SERVANT-VIOLATION OF RULES. - When an injury is received by one in the employ of another, while engaged in the performance of a service for his employer, but which is rendered in a manner violative of the rules of the employer, no damage can be recovered from such employer: Pilkinton v. Gulf etc. R'y Co., 70 Tex. 226; Cincinnati etc. R'y Co. v. Lang, 118 Ind. 579.

MASTER AND SERVANT-RULES.

-A railway company must promulgate rules for the protection of its employees against one another's negligence: Abel v. President, 103 N. Y. 581; 57 Am. Kep. 773; Lewis v. Seifert, 116 Pa. St. 628; 2 Am. St. Rep. 631, and note 638.

PERRY V. CITY OF BIG RAPIDS.

[67 MICHIGAN, 146.]

TAXATION -ABSTRACT-BOOKS NOT SUBJECT TO. -The Michigan constitu. tion requiring that property shall be assessed at its cash value means, not only cach property as may be put to valuable uses, but also such as has a recognizable cash value inherent in itself, and not enhanced or diminished according to the person who owns or uses it. Books of abstracts of title have no intrinsic value, and are only valuable for the information they contain, conveyed by consultation or extracts, hence they are not subject to taxation.

M. Brown, for the plaintiff, appellant.

Austin Herrick, for the appellee.

CAMPBELL, C. J. Plaintiff sued to recover taxes paid under protest, for which the tax collector was proceeding to collection under his warrant.

The taxes were levied in 1885. The supervisor had assessed plaintiff for three hundred dollars upon the contents of his office, to which plaintiff did not object. When the board of review met, that body, of its own motion, and without testimony, raised the assessment to eighteen hundred dollars, doing so upon the claim that certain abstract-books referring to land titles in Mecosta County should be taxed at that rate. After raising the assessment, plaintiff was notified of it, and appeared by counsel to object to it, but the board refused to change the enlarged rate.

While some question may exist as to the validity of this action in the manner in which it was had, we do not propose to discuss that, inasmuch as the subject-matter which they proposed to assess in that way was not subject to their jurisdiction.

The constitution requires assessments to be made on property at its cash value. This means, not only what may be put to valuable uses, but what has a recognizable pecuniary value inherent in itself, and not enhanced or diminished according to the person who owns or uses it. The court below found expressly, and could not have found otherwise, that these abstractbooks have no intrinsic value. They are only valuable for the information they contain, and that information is conveyed. by consultation or extracts. Their value is only kept up by their completeness and continued correction. The sale of a complete copy would practically destroy the value of the books in the hands of the plaintiff. So a similar compilation by any one else would have a like result. The value of the books, except as used, is nothing. They resemble in nature, if not precisely, the books which are consulted by any person who makes an income from his acquired knowledge, whether scientific or otherwise; as a surveyor's notes, an author's memoranda, a druggist's recipes, and many analogous things. They may be and are very serviceable, but they are not things that the law has made subject to seizure or assessment. If these books were taxable as personalty, they could be made liable to satisfy it, and this, in our opinion, cannot be done.