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- Under the

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2. NOTICE TO PARTY APPEARING BY ATTORNEY. tice act, where a party appears in an action by attorney, a notice to take depositions must be served on the attorney and not on the party personally.

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3. OBJECTION TO EVIDENCE.

Objection to the form in which evidence is offered must be first taken in the trial court. Gill v. O'Connell, Pac. Law Rep., March 10, 1874.

4. CERTIORARI.If the president judge certifies, in answer to a certiorari suggesting diminution of the record, that all has been fully and perfectly returned, the certiorari has performed its office, and the only remedy is an action against the judge for a false return. Flagg v. Searle, Leg. Int., March 27, 1874.

5. DEPOSITIONS.- Defendant may be compelled, on application of plaintiff, to file the depositions taken on his behalf on payment by plaintiff of the costs for taking the depositions. Martin v. Dearie, Leg. Int., April 3, 1874.

6. ROAD JURORS should be sworn in the manner required by the act of assembly. In re Cambria Street, Leg. Int., April 3, 1874.

7. WHEN TO BE SWORN. All the jurors should be sworn before they enter on their duties. 1b.

8. AMENDMENT.

An amendment made by the court cannot cure radical defects in the proceedings of the jury. Ib.

9. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE. Held, that a later statute which is general and affirmative does not abrogate a former which is particular, unless negative words are used, or unless the two acts are irreconcilably inconsistent. City of St. Louis v. Life Association of America, Ins. L. J., February, 1874.

10. REMOVAL OF ACTION FROM STATE COURT INTO CIRCUIT COURT OF UNITED STATES. An action cannot be removed from a state court into the circuit court of the United States under the act of Congress of 1867, c. 196, after a trial on the merits, although such trial has resulted in a disagreement of the jury. Galpin v. Critchlow, Am. Law Reg., February, 1874.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY ACT.

PRACTICE.

See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

PREEMPTION.

VOID CONTRACT. - An executory contract, made by one claiming the benefits of a preemption law of 1841, before making proof and payment as a preemptor, to convey land upon receipt of a patent from the United States, cannot be enforced. Hutson v. Walker, Pac. Law Rep., March 10, 1874.

RAILROADS.

1. CHARTER. An act prohibiting a railroad company from charging at a greater rate per mile for carriage of passengers or freight from place to place within a state, than for similar carriage through or beyond the state, no such power to regulate charges having been reserved in the char

ter, is unconstitutional and void. Law Reg., March, 1874.

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Phila. &c. R. R. Co. v. Bower, Am.

2. Such an act is not within the police power of the state. The legislature may regulate the exercise of the corporate franchise by general laws passed in good faith for the legitimate ends of the police power, that is, for the peace, good order, health, comfort and welfare of society; but it cannot, under color of such laws, destroy or impair the franchise itself, nor any of those rights or powers which are essential to its beneficial exercise. 1b.

See COMMON CARRIERS.

REAL PROPERTY.

See STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

SEIZURE.

CUSTOM LAWSs. Where dutiable merchandise was imported as passengers' baggage, but no attempts were made by the owners and consignees to have it passed as such; and the owner, without knowledge of the seizure by the officers of customs, offered the goods, with correct bills of lading and moneys, for entry at the custom-house. Held, that such goods were not forfeitable either under the 50th section of the act of March 2, 1799; the 1st section of March 3, 1863; or the 4th section of July 18, 1866. The United States v. Ninety-five Boxes, containing, &c., Int. Rev. Rec., March 28, 1874.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

A PAROL AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE REAL ESTATE is of no effect. A part payment without possession, and which was afterwards appropriated to another indebtedness, will not take it out of the statute of frauds. Newkumet v. Kraft, Leg. Int., April 3, 1874.

SURETY.

LEASE. A was surety on a lease renewable from year to year, and having given sixth months' notice that he would not continue surety after the end of the current year; held, that he having died in the mean time, his estate was not liable for any rent in arrear after that date. In re Estate of De Silver, Leg. Chron., March 28, 1874.

TRADE-MARK.

1. FAMILY NAME. - A manufacturing company will be protected in the use of a certain trade-mark, though part of the trade-mark consists of a family name. Meriden Britannia Co. v. Parker, Am. Law Reg., March, 1874.

2. Equity will restrain the use of the same name in so far as it forms a material part of the trade-mark, and will necessarily injure the company, even though another may acquire the right of that name from parties to whom it legitimately belongs.

It is not every use of the name, however, that will be held to necessarily infringe the trade-mark, or that will be restrained by injunction. Ib.

3. Though equity will not protect a trade-mark which deceives the pub

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lic, it is not every erroneous impression which may be drawn from the use of a trade-mark that will be sufficient to destroy its validity. Ib.

4. The employment of a family name as a component part of a trademark is no fraud upon the public, though the family does not actually make the articles bearing the name, provided they are the result of their skill and experience. Ib.

5. INFRINGEMENT OF TRADE-MARK. The complainant, a company engaged in manufacturing plated forks and spoons, acquired the right to the use of the trade-mark" 1847 Rogers Bros. A. 1."-subsequently the respondent, by an arrangement with three brothers named Rogers, manufactured plated spoons marked "C. Rogers Bros. A. 1." Held, that this was an infringement of complainant's trade-mark, and that the use of the term "Rogers Bros." should be restrained. lb.

TRADING WITH THE ENEMY.

See WAR.

WAR.

TRADING WITH THE ENEMY. In February, 1862, while the whole State of Louisiana, including the city of New Orleans, was under the civil and military control of the rebels of the late rebellion, a mercantile firm in New Orleans sent their agent into certain interior parishes of the State to collect money due to the firm, and to make purchases of cotton. After the agent had got into the interior parishes, but before he had bought any cotton, the city of New Orleans, where his principals were, was captured (April 27th, 1862) by the forces of the United States, and remained from that time under the control of the government, the interior parishes, however, still remaining in the control of the rebels. Subsequently to this the agent made purchases of cotton from persons in these interior parishes, still, as just said, under the control of the rebels. Held, that he was guilty of trading with the enemy, and that the property was rightfully taken by the federal government. United States v. Lapene, Leg. Gazette, March 27, 1874.

SIR FLETCHER NORTON was noted for his want of courtesy. When pleading before Lord Mansfield on some question of manorial right, he chanced unfortunately to say, "My lord, I can illustrate the point in an instance in my own person; I myself have two little manors." The judge immediately interposed with one of his blandest smiles, "We all know it, Sir Fletcher."

CHIEF JUSTICE KENYON was curiously economical about the adornment of his head. It was observed for a number of years before he died that he had two hats and two wigs. Of the hats and the wigs, one was dreadfully old and shabby, the other comparatively spruce. He always carried into court with him the very old hat and the comparatively spruce wig, or the very old wig and the comparatively spruce hat. On the days of the

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LEGAL ANECDOTES.

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very old hat and the comparatively spruce wig, he shoved his hat under the bench and displayed his wig; but on the days of the very old wig and the comparatively spruce hat, he always continued covered.

AT a dinner of a Law Society, the president called upon the senior solicitor of the company to toast the person whom he considered the best friend of the profession. Then," responded he, "the man who makes his own will."

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LORD NORTHINGTON was one of the "swearing Chancellors." When his lordship was chosen a governor of St. Bartholomew's Hospital, a smart gentleman, who was sent with the staff, carried it in the evening, when the chancellor happened to be drunk. "Well, Mr. Bartlemy,' said his lordship, snuffing, "what have you to say?" The man, who had prepared a formal harangue, was transported to have so fair an opportunity given him for uttering it, and with much dapper gesticulation congratulated his lordship on his health, and the nation on enjoying such great abilities. The chancellor stopped him short, saying, "By God, it is a lie! I have neither health nor abilities; my bad health has destroyed my abilities." In his last illness he was recommended to avail himself of the services of a certain prelate. "He will never do," said the chancellor; "I should have to acknowledge that one of my heaviest sins was in having made him a bishop!"

Lady Northington, who was an ignorant woman, told George III. at a drawing-room, that their country house was built by Indigo Jones. To this the king replied that he "thought so by the style." so by the style." When her ladyship related this conversation to Lord Northington, the latter remarked, to her surprise, that he could not well tell which was the greater fool, she or his majesty.

By the laws of England, the lord chancellor is held to be the guardian of the persons and property of all such individuals as are said to be no longer of sound mind and good disposing memory, in fine, to have lost their senses. Lord Chancellor Loughborough once ordered to be brought to him a man against whom his heirs wished to take out a statute of lunacy. He examined him very attentively, and put various questions to him, to all of which he made the most pertinent and apposite answers. "This man mad!" thought he; "verily, he is one of the ablest men I ever met with." Towards the end of his examination, however, a little scrap of paper, torn from a letter, was put into Lord Loughborough's hand, on which was written, "Ezekiel." This was enough for such a shrewd man as the chancellor, who forthwith took his cue. "What fine poetry," said his lordship, "is in Isaiah!” “ Very fine," replied the man, especially when read in the original Hebrew." "And how well Jeremiah wrote!" Surely," said the man. "What a genius too was Ezekiel!" "Do like him?" said the man; you "I'll tell you a secret—I am Ezekiel ! "`

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THE AMERICAN LAW TIMES.

NEW SERIES.-JUNE, 1874. — VOL. I., No. 6.

DIGEST OF CASES

PUBLISHED IN EXTENSO IN LATE ISSUES OF AMERICAN LEGAL PERI

1. SALVAGE SERVICES BY WRECKING COMPANY. Where salvage services were rendered by the agents of a wrecking company in pursuance of a contract with the company; held, that the vessel and her cargo were not liable. Baker & Co. v. The Tros, Leg. Gazette, April 17, 1874; Leg. Int., April 24, 1874.

2. COLLISION AND TOTAL LOSS. Where there is a total loss by reason of collision the party in fault is liable for the full value of the lost ship. Bodine, &c. v. The Falcon, &c., Leg. Int., April 24, 1874; Pittsb. L. J., May 6, 1874.

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