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devoted admirer of the common law would not hesitate to say that the proceedings of a court of justice in this State on either of those days would be valid. Ib.

COMMON CARRIERS.

1. CARRIERS OF LIVE STOCK are not insurers. For accidents necessarily incident to the live stock in transportation, they are not liable. Louisville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Hedger, Am. Law Reg., March, 1874.

2. They are bound nevertheless to extraordinary diligence, such as a prudent and careful man would exercise in the business of stock transportation. lb.

3. They cannot discharge themselves from this liability by any contract with the owner of the live stock. lb.

4. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Common carriers may limit their liability as insurers by special agreement; but such agreement cannot be implied from the publication of notices by the carrier, unless the owner knows of such notices, and expressly assents to the limitation of liability therein contained.

lb.

5. NEGLIGENCE. The loss or injury of live stock in the custody or care of the carrier is prima facie evidence of negligence. But when the owner takes charge of his stock during transportation, negligence must be shown to render the carrier liable. Ib.

6. COMMON CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS have the legal right to make reasonable and proper rules and regulations for the conduct and accommodation of all persons who travel by their conveyances. Coger v. Northwestern Union Packet Co., Am. Law Reg., March, 1874.

7. The sale of a ticket to a passenger is a contract to carry such passenger according to their rules and regulations. Ib.

8. RULES AND REGULATIONS. They have no right however to make rules or regulations for their passengers, based upon any distinction as to race or color.

A negro woman who purchases a first class dinner ticket on a Mississippi steamboat is entitled to sit at the same table as the other pas

sengers.

This is a right secured to her by the laws of the State of Iowa, and the Constitution of the United States.

The object of the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States was to relieve citizens of African descent from the effects of the prejudice theretofore existing against them; and to protect them in person and property from its spirit. lb.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURTS. To effect the removal of a cause from a state court to a federal court, under the acts of Congress for that purpose, all of the plaintiffs or all of the defendants, as the case may be, must be non-residents and must join in the petition for the removal; therefore, held, in an action brought in a Massachusetts court by a resident of Massachusetts against several defendants, one of whom was a resident of Massachusetts and the others non-residents, that the defendants were not entitled to a removal of the cause to the

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circuit court. Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Florence Sewing Machine Co., Albany L. J., March 28, 1874.

CONTRACTS.

1. VOID CONTRACT. · - A contract to do an act forbidden by law is void, and cannot be enforced in a court of justice. Tiffany v. Boatman's Savings Institution, Leg. Gazette, April 3, 1874. 2. USURIOUS CONTRACT.

Where a contract is usurious, the debtor,

in the absence of any special statutes regulating the matter, cannot recover both principal and interest, but only the excess he has paid over the legal interest.

lb.

3. INVALID CONTRACT.- Non-conformity with section 38 of the Charter of 1857, and section 1 of the Act of April 17, 1861, which direct contracts to be given out founded on sealed proposals, made in compliance with public notice advertised in such newspapers of the city as may be employed for that purpose, and inserted for ten days, is fatal to the validity of a contract. Brown v. The Mayor, &c. of New York, Daily Reg., April 2, 1874.

See PREEMPTION.

CORPORATIONS.

1. CHARTER. — It is settled law that charters of corporations, other than municipal, although the objects of the corporation may be quasi public, are contracts within the protection of the federal Constitution. Phila. &c. R. R. Co. v. Bower, Am. Law Reg., March, 1874.

2. ACT ABRIDGING PRIVILEGE OF CHARTER. Any act having the effect to abridge or restrict any power or privilege vested by the charter, which is material to the beneficial exercise of the franchise granted, and which must be supposed to have entered into the consideration for the acceptance of the charter by the corporators, is an impairing of the obligation of the contract within the prohibition of the Constitution. 1b.

3. In the construction of a statute, it is to be presumed that the legislature did not intend to grant to a corporation such an exemption from the operation of the general law applicable to similar corporations as would create an unreasonable monopoly or immunity at variance with constitutional principles; and when such an exemption is excluded by a fair construction implying the qualification that the statute is to operate in harmony with and subject to the general law, such a construction will be adopted. Delancey v. Rockingham Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Ins. L. J., February, 1874.

CUSTOMS LAWS.

See SEIZURE.

EJECTMENT.

See EVIDENCE, 3.

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EVIDENCE.

1. PAROL TESTIMONY is admissible to establish the existence of a waiver of condemnation, which had been a record and become lost. Hamberger v. Brooker, Leg. Chron., March 28, 1874.

2. OBJECTION TO THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE must be specifically taken at the trial. Gardiner v. Schmaelzle, Pac. Law Rep., March

10. 1874.

3. WHERE THE PLAINTIFF IN EJECTMENT claimed title to a lot of land under a deed executed by authority of a power of attorney to sell "all lots now unsold: Held, that the power of attorney was admissible in evidence without proof that the lot was unsold. Ib.

4. AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE. Statements on information made in an affidavit of defence should be averred to be believed by the defendant. Cake v. Stidfole, Leg. Chron., March 28, 1874.

See LIFE INSURANCE, 5; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 3.

INSURANCE.

1. AN ASSIGNMENT OF A POLICY was absolute in form, passing the title unconditionally; but the receipt for the assignment contained the clause, " Said assignment to be null and void upon the payment of said note at its maturity, otherwise to continue for the sole benefit of W." Held, that this contract was a mortgage and not a pledge, and as the note was not paid at maturity, the policy became the absolute property of W. Dungan's Adm'x. v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., Ins. L. J., February, 1874.

2. WARRANTY. - A discrepancy appeared between the representations made in the policy and the statements in the proofs of loss, and defendant claimed that the proofs of loss were conclusive evidence against the plaintiff that the warranty was broken. Held, that the representation as to the occupancy of the building was a warranty, and if broken avoided the policy.

Held, that the plaintiff was not estopped by the statement in the proofs of loss from showing that the warranty was not broken, and that evidence as to the fact of the occupancy of the building was properly admitted. Parmelee v. Hoffman Ins. Co., Ins. L. J., February, 1874.

The

3. CHANGE OF TITLE IN PROPERTY INSURED. Personal property insured by the defendants was sold by the insured during the life of the policy to the plaintiff, and the policy delivered to him. The policy contained a condition that if any change took place in the title to the property, by transfer or otherwise, the policy should become void. plaintiff, to secure the protection of his interest by the insurance, carried the policy to an insurance broker to have whatever was necessary for the purpose done. The broker wrote in pencil on the back of the policy, "Privilege to use kerosene oil for lights - Loss, if any, payable to Charles Batchelor - Transfer," and sent it to the defendants. The secretary of the company read the memorandum, and wrote in the policy the following: "July 19, 1867. Privilege to use kerosene oil for lights. Loss, if any, payable to Charles Batchelor." This he signed in his official

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character, affixed to the policy a fifty cent revenue stamp (required by law for a new policy, but not necessary for the indorsement actually made), and sent the policy back to the broker, who delivered it to the plaintiff. Before the term of the insurance expired the entire property was burned. Held, that the word "Transfer," in the pencil memorandum, was an important word, having a distinct meaning, and must be regarded as conveying notice to the defendants of whatever it would in the circumstances reasonably import.

Held, that the only sensible meaning that could be given to it in its connection, and in view of the use of the same term in the condition of the policy, was, that the property had been transferred to the plaintiff.

Held, that the defendants, by returning the policy to the plaintiff with the loss made payable to him, and by affixing the stamp required for a new policy, were to be regarded as having assented to the transfer of property to the plaintiff, and made the policy an operative one for his benefit.

The plaintiff offered to furnish the defendants with formal proof of the loss, but they informed him that they denied his right to recover for the loss, and that they should not receive any proofs made by him as sufficient. Held, to be a waiver of the proof. Batchelor v. Þeo. Fire Ins. Co., Ins. L. J., February, 1874.

4. LIBEL BY INSURER. In case of a total loss of a cargo by collision, a libel may be brought by the insurer against the colliding vessel, after notice and proof of the loss and demand of payment, though without actual payment. Traders' Ins. Co. v. Propeller Manistee, Ins. L. J., February, 1874.

5. WHEN WILL LIE, THOUGH LOSS NOT ACTUALLY PAID. The insured having been fully satisfied for the loss, and not intervening or opposing the prosecution of the libel of the insurer, the carrier cannot be permitted to raise the objection of non-payment of the loss before libel brought. Ib.

6. POLICY ISSUED IN DISREGARD OF STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.— Where the statutes of a state require foreign insurance companies to comply with certain requirements, and declare penalties for doing business in disregard of these requirements, in case of a loss on a policy issued in disregard of such requirements, a carrier cannot be permitted to make this a defence to a libel, the loss having been paid by the company. 1b.

7. NOTICE OF LOSS.- Notice not given till eighteen days after loss. Held, not reasonable. Trask v. Insurance, 5 Casey, 198, followed and criticised; Edwards v. The Lycoming Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Leg. Int., March 27, 1874.

8. CONTRACT OF INSURANCE. Held, that in an action against an insurance company to compel it to issue a policy upon an alleged contract of insurance, there must be conclusive proof that such contract was actually made. McCann v. Ætna Ins. Co., Ins. L. J., February, 1874. 9. Held, THAT DUE NOTICE OF LOSS and statements supported by affidavits are conditions precedent to recovery. 1b.

10. FRAUD.-INSURABLE INTEREST.- PREMIUMS.—The defendants, through R., their local agent, issued a policy of insurance for $10,000 on the life of L., a brother of the plaintiff, for the benefit of and payable

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to the plaintiff. By a secret arrangement between R. and the plaintiff, R. advanced $525 toward the payment of premiums, and agreed to advance the subsequent premiums, the amounts so advanced to be refunded by the plaintiff; and it was further agreed that R. should assume the policy if requested by the plaintiff within three years, and refund to him the amount of premiums paid by him with interest, and should receive $1,000 of the sum insured, if paid by the defendants, in case L. should die within three years. L. did not know of the existence of the policy, and was not examined by a physician as the rules of the defendants required, and the plaintiff had no interest in his life except such as arose from the relationship between them. The defendants were ignorant of all these facts. In the application for insurance the plaintiff stated that he had an interest in the life of L. to the full amount of insurance applied for.

The defendants having cancelled the policy, in an action to recover the amount of premiums paid, Held, that the transaction between the plaintiff and R. constituted a fraud upon the defendants, to which the plaintiff was a party in contemplation of law, and that the defendants could take advantage of the fraud as well against him as against R., although the plaintiff did not actually participate in the fraudulent intent.

Held, that the mere relationship between the plaintiff and L. was not such an interest as would support the policy, but that the policy was prima facie valid, and could only be avoided by showing by parol evidence such want of interest, and that the plaintiff was now estopped from averring such want of interest against the defendants.

Held, that the responsibility assumed by the defendants, and the risk and inconvenience to which they were exposed by the acts of the plaintiff, constituted a consideration for the premiums paid. Lewis v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., Ins. L. J., February, 1874.

See LIFE INSURANCE.

JUDICIARY ACT.

1. CIRCUIT COURT. Original cognizance of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, is vested in the circuit courts by the eleventh section of the judiciary act, concurrent with the courts of the several states, subject to certain limitations, conditions, and restrictions. & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Florence Sewing Machine Co., Leg. Gazette, March 27, 1874.

Grover

2. CONDITIONS OF COGNIZANCE OF SUITS. Those conditions, applicable to the present case, are that the matter in dispute shall exceed, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and that an alien is a party, or that the suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought and a citizen of another state. lb.

3. WHEN CIRCUIT COURT HAS JURISDICTION. Where the matter in dispute does not exceed, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, the circuit courts have no jurisdiction, except in revenue and patent cases; and the restriction applicable to all cases is that no civil suit shall be brought before any circuit court against any inhabitant of the United States by any original process in any other district than that