CAUSE PENDING. "Cause pending," as used in Act 1790, providing that perjury may be committed in any "suit, controversy, matter, or cause pending" in any of the courts of the United States, should be construed to mean a first indictment with issue joined upon a plea of not guilty, though the indictment does not allege acts constituting a public offense at the time of their commission, and that on a demurrer it would have been so held, because the subsequent proceedings of the court thereon, including the requiring of bail | for the appearance of the defendant, were not void. United States v. Reese (U. S.) 27 Fed. Cas. 746, 748. CAUSEWAY. As part of bridge, see "Bridge." "Cautious" differs in meaning from "prudent." It suggests the idea of timidity, and Webster gives its secondary meaning as overprudent; fearful; timorous. A man is cautious chiefly as a result of timidity; hence an instruction that probable cause means a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances in themselves sufficiently strong to warrant a really cautious man in the belief that the person so accused is guilty of the offense charged, is erroneous in substituting cautious for prudent. Eggett v. Allen, 82 N. W. 556, 558, 106 Wis. 633; McClafferty v. Philip, 24 Atl. 1042, 1043, 151 Pa. 86. "Webster defines a 'causeway' as 'A way raised above the natural level of the ground by stone, earth, timber, fascines, etc., serving as a dry passage over wet or marshy ground, or as a mole to confine water to a pond or restrain it from overflowing lower ground;' and such is substantially the defi- CAVEAT. nition of the Century Dictionary." Ocean Causeway v. Gilbert, 66 N. Y. Supp. 401, 404, 54 App. Div. 118; Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Severin, 46 N. W. 842, 843, 30 Neb. 318. As used in a statute requiring a railroad to make one "causeway" or other adequate means of crossing its tracks, the term indicates the legislative judgment that a causeway, when applied to a railroad, is an adequate means of crossing its track. Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Severin, 46 N. W. 842, 843, 30 Neb. 318. "Causeway," as used in Act 1849, § 12, requiring a railroad to make one "cause way" for each property through which the railroad passes, if necessary and if demanded, means a crossing so as to afford access to the lands separated by the railroad. Port v. Huntingdon & B. T. R. R., 31 Atl. 950, 951, 168 Pa. 19. "Causeway," as applied to railroads in Code, § 1268, requiring railroads to make and keep in repair a causeway, means a way raised above the road. State v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 68 N. W. 819, 99 Iowa, 565; Gray v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 37 Iowa, 119, 123. CAUTION. "that the probate by the register of the propThe act of April 22, 1858, providing er county of any will devising real estate with five years from the date of such proshall be conclusive as to such realty, unless bate those interested to controvert it shall by caveat and action at law, duly pursued, realty," is badly worded, and hence difficult contest the validity of such will as to such of comprehension. The framer of the act knew that it would not do to make the probate absolutely conclusive of the execution of the will, that some time must be given within which to contest that execution, but he evidently was not acquainted with the legal forms necessary to reach that end. This is evident from the manner in which he has used the word "caveat," and also that in which he has connected it with the words "and action at law." He evidently regarded a caveat as a means or process for contesting a will, and an action or issue at law as a continuation thereof. Taking this view of the matter-and it is the only one that can be adopted without the rejection of a word which was evidently deemed material by the framer of the act-and the difficulty is of easy solution. Thus, the caveat will then mean the initiatory process, or notice preceding a contest before the register, See "Ordinarily Cautious Person"; "Or- and the action at law an issue triable in the dinary Caution." The caution which the law requires a man to exercise in order to excuse homicide by misadventure is not the utmost caution that can be used. The law is not so extravagant as to require that a man should always common pleas, directed by the orphans' court, after an appeal thereto from the decree of the register, and this appeal may be taken, in the ordinary form, at any time within five years. Wilson v. Gaston, 92 P. 207, 213, 215 (cited and approved in Appeal of McCort, 98 Pa. 33, 37). A caveat "is an intimation given to some from his ignorance of the kind or quality Judge or officer notifying him that he ought of the article sold and from his inability to beware how he acts in some particular to examine it fully, by an express agreement affair, and suspend the proceedings until of warranty. Wright v. Hart (N. Y.) 18 the merits of the caveat are determined." Wend. 449, 453. Slocum v. Grandin, 38 N. J. Eq. (11 Stew.) 485, 488. A caveat is a caution entered in the court of probate to stop probates, administrations, faculties, and such like from being granted without the knowledge of the party that enters. Ex parte Crafts, 5 S. E. 718, 720, 28 S. C. 281 (citing Williams, Ex'rs, 581). The office of a caveat, in proceedings to probate a will or other paper, is to arrest the proceedings until the truth of the facts alleged or affecting the validity of the will can be determined, and it inures to the benefit of all parties interested in the subject. In re Miller's Estate, 31 Atl. 58, 62, 166 Pa. 97. CAVEAT EMPTOR. The rule of law that the purchaser buys at his own risk is usually expressed in the maxim caveat emptor. Wood v. Ross (Tex. Civ. App.) 26 S. W. 148, 149. Caveat emptor is an ancient rule of the common law, and stands in contradistinction to the rule of caveat venditor, and means that where a sale of goods is not accompanied with an express warranty by the seller, or there is fraud on his part, the buyer must stand all losses arising from latent defects. Hargous v. Stone, 5 N. Y. (1 Seld.) 73, 82. Caveat emptor means, "Let the purchaser beware." It is one of the best settled maxims in the law, applying exclusively to a purchaser who is bound by actual as well as constructive knowledge of any defect in the thing purchased which is obvious, or which might have been known by proper diligence. Wissler v. Craig's Adm'r, 80 Va. 22, 32; Burwell's Adm'rs v. Fauber, 21 Grat. 446, 463; Tilley v. Bridges, 105 Ill. 336, 339. The maxim caveat emptor signifies that it is the business of the buyer to be upon his guard, and that he must abide the loss of any imprudent purchase unless the goodness and soundness of the thing sold are warranted by the seller. It is said, however, that this principle is now exploded, and a more reasonable principle has succeeded, to wit, that a fair price implies a warranty, and that a man is not supposed in the contract of sale to part with his money without expecting an adequate compensation. Lynch v. Postlethwaite (La.) 7 Mart. (O. S.) 69, 186, 12 Am. Dec. 495. Caveat emptor is a rule of the common law which implies that the purchaser must take care to examine and ascertain the kind or quality of the article he is purchasing, or provide against any loss he may sustain The rule is that every man dealing with another in reference to property that the other may have in his possession must take care. The property may be stolen or borrowed or pledged or in the possession of the bailee for some specific purpose, and, if so, the party in possession can convey no better or further right than he has himself. There are some exceptions, however, to this rule, as where the property is money or promissory notes not due, and also cases where the conduct of the true owner is such that he is estopped from setting up his title against an innocent purchaser. First Nat. Bank of Macon v. Nelson, 38 Ga. 391, 399, 95 Am. Dec. 400. Caveat emptor means that where there is neither fraud nor warranty, and the buyer receives and retains the goods without objection, he waives the right to object afterwards, and is finally concluded, and the fact that he paid a full price for the goods does not raise an implied warranty that the goods were sound. Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U. S. (1 Wall.) 298, 309, 17 L. Ed. 540. "As applied to sales of personalty in the absence of express warranty, where the buyer has an opportunity to inspect the commodity, and the seller is guilty of no fraud and is not the manufacturer or grower of the article he sells, the rule of caveat emptor applies, and the seller is not liable for defects in the article sold. If the purchaser distrusts his judgment, he can require of the seller a warranty as to quality or condition, and he cannot relieve himself and charge the seller on the ground that the examination and inconvenience. The rule applies even will occupy time and is attended with labor in the case of sales by sample, since the buyer may in such case protect himself by requiring a warranty that the goods to be delivered shall be the same as the sample exhibited." Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U. S. (10 Wall.) 383, 388, 19 L. Ed. 987. The doctrine of caveat emptor is that where the means of information are at hand, and are equally open to both parties, and no concealment is made, an attempted misrepresentation on the part of the vendor furnishes no ground for a court of equity to refuse to enforce the contract of the parties, providing such misrepresentation was not relied on by the vendee, and he judged for himself without availing himself of the means of knowledge at his command. Slaughter v. Gerson, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 379, 383, 20 L. Ed. 627. The rule caveat emptor applies to the making of the contract of purchase, the ne gotiations, the agreement, the inducements or artificial. Schultz v. Bower, 59 N. W. upon which the purchaser acts, the grounds 631, 632, 57 Minn. 493, 47 Am. St. Rep. 630. on which the minds of the parties meet, but not to the formal, clerical process of giv ing the purchaser written evidence of the completed bargain. Hitchins v. Pettingill, 58 N. H. 3 (citing Monroe v. Skelton, 36 Ind. 302). In judicial sales. "It may be regarded as a general and well-settled rule that the doctrine caveat emptor applies to all judicial sales." Tilley v. Bridges, 105 Ill. 336, 339. The rule caveat emptor applies to the purchase of lands at a sheriff's sale, not only as to existing incumbrances, or paramount titles, but as to whether or not there is in fact any judgment sufficient to support the sale and deed. Brookfield v. Morse, 12 N. J. Law (7 Halst.) 331, 333. In sales of land. The maxim is used with reference to sales of property with respect to which the buyer must use proper diligence to inform himself as to its quality, and, in the case of real estate, as to its location. The quality of land on which its value depends, and which is too various for a market standard, the purchaser can see, if he will but look. No action lies against the vendor of real estate for false and fraudulent representations as to the location of lands. Land is not like a ship at sea; it has a known location and can be approached, and, even should it be necessary to purchase the land unseen, cove nauts may be inserted respecting the quality as well as seisin or title. Sherwood v. Salmon, 2 Day, 128, 136. He must look to the title papers under which he buys, and is charged with notice of all the facts appearing upon their face, or to the knowledge of which anything there appearing will conduct him. He may not shut his eyes or his ears to the inlet of information, and then say he is a bona fide purchaser without notice. Burwell's Adm'rs v. Fauber, 21 Grat. 446, 463. CAVEAT VENDITOR. Caveat venditor is a rule of the civil law, and means that, if the seller wishes to secure himself from future responsibility in case the article sold should afterwards be found to be different in kind or quality from what the party supposed it to be, he must take care or provide against such responsibility by a particular agreement with the purchaser. Wright v. Hart (N. Y.) 18 Wend. 449, 453. CAVING. Caving, as applied to land, means the falling in of the surface by reason of the taking away of its supports, either natural CAYENNE PEPPERS. The genuine Cayenne peppers are a product of Cayenne, South America. The article commercially known as "Cayenne pepper" is composed of capsicum, rice flour, and other mixtures. The Encyclopedia Britannica, in describing Cayenne pepper, says: "Cayenne pepper is manufactured from the ripe fruits, which are dried, ground, mixed with wheat flour, and made into cakes with yeast. The cakes are baked hard, until like biscuit, and then ground and sifted. The pepper is some times prepared by simply drying the pods, and pounding them fine in a mortar." Cruikshank v. United States (U. S.) 59 Fed. 446, 447, 8 C. C. A. 171. Cayenne pepper, as used in Tariff Act 1890, par. 326, relating to the duties on Cayenne pepper, unground, does not include Sierra Leone chilies, or bird peppers, whole, but in a dried state. Cruikshank v. United States (U. S.) 59 Fed. 446, 448, 8 C. C. A. 171. CEASE. The word "ceased," when used in speaking of a statute as having ceased to have any existence, means that it has passed out of existence as if repealed by a valid act of the Legislature. When it ceased to have existence, it was recalled or revoked. Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 11 Pac. 3, 6, 69 Cal. 479. "To cease is to put a stop to; to be done away with; to be an extinction. Webst. Dict. Thus, where a constitution declared that a statute should cease, it extinguished the statute as thoroughly as a legislative repeal would have done." Thomason v. Ruggles, 11 Pac. 20, 26, 69 Cal. 465. Where a contract recited that a sum of money was loaned to a certain seminary, to be repaid when such seminary should cease, the word "cease" had no reference to the physical existence of the institution, but meant cease to be conducted as an institution of learning. Trustees of Canandarqua Academy v. McKechnie, 90 N. Y. 618, 626. Existence of what is to cease implied. "Cease," as used in Rev. St. c. 11, § 33, providing that a schoolhouse lot shall revert to the owner when the schoolhouse has ceased to be thereon for two years, requires that a schoolhouse should have been once maintained on the lot; and hence the statute does not cause the land to revert to the owner in a case where there never has been a schoolhouse on the lot, and the ground is allowed to remain without a schoolhouse for a period exceeding two years. Jordan v.|which might be reasonably expected. City Haskell, 63 Me. 189, 191. As be forfeited. The word "cease," in a corporation charter declaring that its corporate power shall cease for nonuser, etc., is equivalent to the phrase "shall be forfeited." Wallamet Falls C. & L. Co. v. Kittridge (U. S.) 29 Fed. Cas. 85, 86. Planing & Shingle Mill Co. v. Merchants', "Ceased to be operated," as used in a fire policy on the machinery, tools, etc., of a manufacturing company which provided that it should become void if the establishment should cease to be operated without special agreement indorsed thereon, meant a permanent cessation of operations, and did not apply to a mere temporary interruption of operations occasioned by the prevalence of an epidemic. Poss v. Western Assur. Co., 75 Tenn. (7 Lea) 704, 707, 40 Am. Rep. 68. A policy of life insurance providing that, if the premium was not paid on the days named and in the lifetime of the insured, the policy should cease and determine, should be construed as meaning that it is suspended; that it ceases to bind the company and to protect the assured without any act or declaration on the part of the company. It does not require a formal forfeiture. It is voidable at the election of the company, and that election can be exercised without notice to the assured, for the reason that the polises were occupied by the foreman, who was icy itself is notice that his rights cease with the nonpayment of the premium. As to him it is a dead policy. Lantz v. Vermont Life Ins. Co., 21 Atl. 80, 82, 139 Pa. 546, 10 L. R. A. 577, 23 Am. St. Rep. 202. A fire policy on a sawmill providing that if the insured ceases to operate the mill it shall be void is to be construed as meaning its operation in the usual method, and is not violated by a temporary suspension of work by reason of sickness. Ladd v. Etna Ins. Co., 24 N. Y. Supp. 384, 386, 70 Hun, 490. A policy of insurance on a steam tannery, stipulating that the policy should be void in case of the assured "ceasing to operate the establishment," did not mean a mere temporary suspension of the business of the establishment for the purpose of repairing or from want of a supply of materials. Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Leathers (Pa.) 8 Atl. 424, 425. A policy of insurance providing that, if the mill insured cease to be operated without the consent of the company, the policy should be void, meant something more than a temporary suspension. It meant a closing with the intention of ceasing operation, not a shutting down for a few days or weeks because of the happening of events incident to the conducting of a mill in that locality and Where a policy on a manufacturing establishment was renewed at the request of the assignee for the benefit of the assured's creditors, many days after the operation of the machinery ceased, but while the prem engaged in putting together and selling engines and other articles belonging to the assigned estate, the establishment has not "ceased to be operated," within the meaning of the policy providing that it should become void if the factory ceased to be operated for more than 10 consecutive days. Bole v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 28 Atl. 205, 206, 159 Pa. 53. CEASE TO OCCUPY. "Cease to occupy," as used in the homestead exemption laws of this state in refer ence to the act of an owner in ceasing to occupy the premises, means "a cessation of actual occupancy and residence, though accompanied with an intention to return and resume such occupancy." Quehl v. Peterson, 49 N. W. 390, 391, 47 Minn. 13. CEASE TO RESIDE. A provision in the charter of the city of Camden, § 11 (Laws 1871, p. 210), that when any officer elected at any election under this act shall cease to reside in the city, or, if elected for any ward, shall cease to reside in such ward, his office shall thereby become vacant, means the loss of such a residence therein as will disqualify him to be an electWhen the officer removes himself and his family out of the city or ward for a mere temporary residence elsewhere, as to a cottage at the seaside for residence during the summer, he does not cease to reside in such city or ward. State v. City Council of City of Camden, 39 N. J. Law (10 Vroom) 57, 58. or. "Ceasing to reside," as used in Const. providing that the commission of any justice of the peace shall become vacant upon his ceasing to reside in the township in which he is elected, means the changing of his residence, and he does not cease to reside in the town or ward in which he was elect ed by the changing of such town or ward and the throwing it into a new municipality. State v. Dilloway, 31 N. J. Law (2 Vroon) 42, 43. CEDAR. The expression "cedar and other cabinet woods," as used in Tariff Act Aug. 27, 1894, par. 673, does not include lumber manufactured from the tree botanically known as "thuja gigantea," and commonly called "red cedar" or "canoe cedar." In re Myers (U. S.) 69 Fed. 237, 238. CEDE. Where one nation cedes territory to another, it hands over the title and sovereignty good against all the world, but this does not necessarily determine in what way it shall be held by the new sovereign. Goetz v. United States (U. S.) 103 Fed. 72, 77. "Cede," as used in Act 1825, c. 105 (Pub. Loc. Laws for Baltimore City, art. 4, § 818), providing that the president, directors, and companies of the different turnpike companies owning roads running into the city of Baltimore may cede to said city such parts of the roads as lie within the corporate limits of said city, is not synonymous with, and to be interpreted in the same sense as, the word "grant." This is a word in no sensé a technical one, but one in everyday use, and about which there ought not to be any difficulty as to its natural import and meaning. Like many other words, its precise meaning and signification depend somewhat upon the subject-matter in connection with which it is used. In some instances, it may, it is true, be used in the sense of grant, but ordinarily it means to yield, surrender, give up. In this statute it means to surrender. City of Baltimore v. Baltimore & Y. Turnpike Road, 31 Atl. 420, 421, 80 Md. 535. A will giving a life estate to testator's wife, and at her death the lands to "cede" to his son, his heirs and assigns, to all intents and purposes means to yield up. Somers v. Pierson, 16 N. J. Law (1 Har.) 181. CEDULE. In the jurisprudence of France, "cedule" is the peculiar name of an act under private signature. "Obligation," when opposed to "cedule," means, in that jurisprudence, a notarial act. Campbell v. Nicholson, 3 La. Ann. 458, 461. CELEBRATE. ery religious society according to its rules shall be empowered to solemnize marriage, and means "nothing more than to be present at a marriage contract in order that it may have due publication before a third person or persons for the sake of notoriety and the certainty of its being made, and may be done before parents, friends, or strangers able to testify to the fact. In point of mere legal competency for witnessing or solemnizing a contract of marriage the law has made no distinction of persons." Pearson v. Howey, 11 N. J. Law (6 Halst.) 12, 19. The word "cemetery" is defined by Webster to be a place or ground set apart for the burial of the dead, and this is the popact of setting the ground apart for the burial of the dead-marking and distinguishing it from adjoining ground as a place of burial. Concordia Cemetery Ass'n v. Minnesota & N. W. R. Co., 12 N. E. 536, 541, 121 Ill. 199. ular idea. What creates the cemetery is the "Cemetery" is synonymous with "burial ground." Jenkins v. Inhabitants of Andover, 103 Mass. 94, 104. Six or more human bodies buried at one place constitutes the place a cemetery. Pol. Code Mont. 1895, § 2881. Under Pol. Code, § 3016, a cemetery is created where six or more human bodies are buried at one place. City of Stockton v. Weber, 33 Pac. 332, 333, 98 Cal. 433. "Celebrate" is equivalent to "solemnize," as used in Rev. Laws, 181, providing that every A cemetery includes not only lots for justice of the peace of the state, every stated depositing the bodies of the dead, but also and ordained minister of the gospel, and ev-avenues, walks, and grounds for shrubbery |