ing with the agent of the extent of his authority to bind the principal under it. Sup. Ct., Nebraska, Jan. Term, 1877. Cones v. Neligh. Suretyship: bond signed on condition.—In an action on an administrator's bond, it is no defense on the part of a surety that he signed the bond on condition that the name of another person should be obtained as co-surety, and that the principal forged the name of such person as surety upon such bond. Sup. Ct., Missouri, Oct. Term, 1877. State v. Barker (4 Cent. Law Jour. 389). Voluntary conveyance: what necessary to sustain: liability of grantor as indorser.-In order to sustain a voluntary conveyance to a wife or child, the proof must show, not merely a sufficiency of property retained to pay the creditors assailing the conveyance, but that ample property was reserved to pay all existing creditors at the time of the conveyance. The inquiry is limited to the circumstances of the donor at the time of the execution of the conveyance, such debts as he then owed are to be estimated. Liabilities as an indorser, when there is no evidence that the persons for whom he was liable are unable to pay them, cannot be taken into account. Sup. Ct., Tennessee, Dec. 9, 1876. Weaver v. Hawley (1 Tenn. Law Rep. 1). Will: construction of: devise subject to annuities: nature of estate. - Real estate was devised to B. for life, and from and after her decease, then to the issue of her body who should be living at the time of her death, equally to be divided between them as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants, subject to certain annuities, one of which was perpetual, and in case B. should die without issue, then to J. in fee, subject to the annuities. Held, that the issue of B., who were living at her death, took an estate in fee simple in the premises. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, Jan. 15, 1877. Coyle's Appeal, Smith v. Coyle (3 W. N. Cas. 533). FINANCIAL LAW. DEALINGS WITH PRINCIPAL DISCHARGING SURETY.CONSTRUCTION OF MUNICIPAL BONDS. - CONDITIONAL PROMISSORY NOTE. THE 'HE decision of the Common Pleas Division of the English High Court of Justice in the case of Croydon Commercial Gas and Coke Co. v. Dickinson and Pollard, referred to in our current volume, at page 236, has been passed upon by an appellate court (the Court of Appeal). As will be remembered Pollard was surety under a bond for payment by Dickinson to plaintiffs of money becoming due under a contract by which payment was to be made within the first fourteen days of each month, unless plaintiffs by writing signed by their secretary allowed a longer time. Dickinson made default in one payment, and after the fourteen days had expired plaintiffs' secretary wrote to Dickinson, inclosing a promissory note payable one month after date, and stating that if he signed it time would be given. Dickinson signed and returned the note. The appellate court hold (36 L. T. Rep. N. S. 135), affirming the judgment of the Common Pleas Division, that time had been given to Dickinson in a manner not within the agreement, and therefore defendant was discharged as to the payment for which time had been given, but reversing the judgment of that court that defendant was not discharged as to the subsequent payments. The general principle laid down by the court is that where a surety guarantees a series of payments to be made at stated periods, if time is given to the principal debtor in respect of one payment by a binding agreement, the surety is discharged from liability in respect of that payment, but not in respect of future payments. -In the case of Mayor, etc., of Griffin v. City Bank of Macon, decided on the 20th of March, 1877, by the Supreme Court of Georgia, the facts were these: The mayor and council of the city of Griffin having subscribed for stock in a railroad, on the 20th of March, 1872, issued bonds of the city to discharge the subscription. On each bond was indorsed a resolution of the mayor and council, to the effect that, in case default should be made in paying any coupons at maturity, then as a part of the contract the bond itself should become due and payable. Each of the coupons was for a half year's interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum. The bonds, on their face, had many years to run, some of them twenty-nine years. They were payable to the railroad company or bearer, and were delivered to the company, having upon each of them at the time of delivery a copy of the resolution above mentioned. Certain of the bonds, some due at twenty-five years, some at twenty-seven, and some at twenty-nine years, became the property of the City Bank of Macon, and upon these default was made in paying the coupons which fell due in January and July, 1874, and in January, 1875, being the fifth, sixth, and seventh installments of interest. Suit was brought upon the bonds themselves. The court held that it was competent to make the terms specified in the resolution a part of the bonds; and this was effected by indorsing the resolution upon the bonds before they were put in circulation. Time thus became of the essence of the contract, and, on failure to meet the interest promptly, a right of action accrued for the principal also. Citing 3 Kelly 94; 7 Paige's Ch. 179; 54 Penn. St. 127; 15 Ill. 336; 4 Edw. Ch. 207; 28 Barb. 29; 37 id. 60; 44 id. 336. -The Supreme Court of Indiana, in the case of Walker v. Woolen et al. (4 Ceut. L. J. 248), decided at the February, 1877, term, hold that a note which promises to pay a given sum of money at the expiration of a specified time, or sooner, if the sum named is made from the sale of an article mentioned in the note, contains an absolute promise to pay the sum specified, which cannot be modified by such conditional promise. Such a note has all the qualities necessary to render it negotiable by the law-merchant. The court also hold that a contract sued on in Indiana will be presumed to have been executed in that State; and where a note is made in Indiana, payable at a specified bank. but not naming the State in which the bank is situa ted, it will be presumed, unless the contrary appear, that the bank is situated in the same State. STATE TAXATION OF NATIONAL BANKS. N the case of Waite, plaintiff in error, v. Dowley, treasurer of Brattleboro, just decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, the plaintiff in error was cashier of a national bank in Vermont, and the judgment which in this case was brought up for review was rendered against him for penalties imposed by a statute of that State, for his refusal to transmit to the clerk of the town of Brattleboro a true list of the shareholders of the bank who resided in that town, with the number of shares held and the amount paid on said shares. The record showed that "the defendant's counsel claimed in defense that as said bank was organized under the law of Congress referred to in plain-State, as conceded to it by the act of Congress itself. formation needed for the purposes of taxation by the tiff's declaration, the defendant as such cashier was amenable to no law but said law of Congress, and that the State legislature had not power to prescribe or define his duties as such cashier." The court said that "this proposition raises what is called a Federal question, within the meaning of the act of 1867, admits of no doubt. We are also of opinion that no judgment could have been rendered against the defendant in the State courts without holding, and in effect deciding, that this plea was bad, for if the State could not impose the duty of making such a list on the cashier by reason of the act of Congress or the constitution of the United States, then the defendant was guilty of no offense, and the judgment is for that reason erroneous. This plain proposition cannot be evaded by any opinion delivered by the Supreme Court of that State. This court, therefore, has jurisdiction." The other question involved in the case was whether the statute of Vermont is void which requires "the cashier of each national bank within the State, and the cashiers of all other banks, to transmit to the clerks of the several towns in the State in which any stock or shareholder of such banking association shall reside, a true list of the names of such stock or shareholders, with the number of shares standing against the name of such share or stockholder, on the books of such banking association, together with the amount of money actually paid in on such share on the first day of April." The court says: We have more than once held in this court that the national banks organized under the acts of Congress are subject to State legislation except where such legislation is in conflict with some act of Congress, or where it tends to impair or destroy the utility of such banks as agents or instrumentalities of the United States, or interferes with the purposes of their creation. This doctrine was clearly and distinctly announced in the case of The Bank v. The Commonwealth of Kentucky, 9 Wall. 353, and that case has been often referred to since with approval in this court. The statute of Kentucky required "the cashier of a bank whose stock is taxed to pay into the treasury the amount of the tax due. If not he was to be liable for the same, with twenty per cent upon the amount." The stock thus to be taxed was, as in the present case, the stock of the shareholders, as authorized by the act of Congress, and that statute went a step further than to require a list of the names of these shareholders and the amount of their stock, and obliged the cashier to collect the tax out of the dividends and pay it over to the State. The precise point raised here was taken there and overruled by this court, namely, that the laws of the State could impose no such duty on the banks organized under the laws of the United States. The case is directly and conclusively in point. It seems to have been supposed that because Congress has required of each national bank that a list of its stockholders shall be kept posted up in some place in their business office, this covers the same ground as that covered by the Vermont statute. The act of Congress, however, was merely designed to furnish to the public dealing with the bank a knowledge of the names of its corporators, and to what extent they might be relied on as giving safety to dealing with the bank. It had no such purpose as the Vermont statute, and was wholly deficient in the in Some legislation of Vermont was, therefore, necessary to the proper exercise of the rightful powers of the State, and so far as it required this list, was not in conflict with any provision of the act of Congress. Another objection was raised to the validity of the statute, on the ground that its purpose was to tax bank shares in other places than that where the bank was located, but the court held that the case did not raise the question. RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. Prevents judgment creditors obtaining priority of lien.— Where an assignment for the benefit of creditors is set aside at the suit of the assignee in bankruptcy, judgment creditors who have levied upon the property aftr the assignment and before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy have no priority over the assignee. While, in general, the title of the assignee relates back only to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, yet where transfers have been made which are void as to him, his title relates back to the time of such transfers. U. S. Cir. Ct., N. D. N. Y. In re Beisenthal, 15 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 228. DISCHARGE. Bar to claim by vendee of land against bankrupt warranting title for eviction. The plaintiff bought property of the defendant, who gave him a warranty deed for the same, but he afterward found that there was a mortgage on the land, and the defendant then gave him a written agreement that he would pay off the incumbrance; soon after the defendant became a bankrupt, and the mortgagee elected to take the mortgaged property as payment of her debt. She afterward foreclosed and sold it off, and the plaintiff became evicted from the premises. Held, that he has no remedy against the bankrupt now. He should have proved up his claim against the estate of the bankrupt before it was settled and the defendant discharged. Sup. Ct., Iowa, Dec. T., 1876. Barber v. Bradford. JURISDICTION. Attachment proceedings in State court.-The jurisdiction of a State court in cases of attachment is not ousted by proceedings in bankruptcy, unless properly pleaded in the State court. Sup. Ct., Mo., Oct., 1876. Haber v. Klauberg, 4 Cent. L. J. 342. PRACTICE. When discharge must be applied for. - A bankrupt must apply for his discharge before the final disposition of the administration of the estate. U. S. Cir. Ct., N. D. N. Y. In re Brightmann and Losee, 15 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 213. PREFERENCE. Act amounting to, not tortious. The receipt of property by a creditor taking a transfer contrary to the provisions of section 5128 of the Revised Statutes is not tortious. Such transfer is contingently valid. In an action by an assignee to recover the value of goods transferred by the bankrupt contrary to the provisions of section 5128 of the Revised Statutes, the complaint must allege a conversion of the goods by defendant, or a demand and refusal. In such an action the assignee may recover damages for an injury to, or detention of the goods. U. S. Dist. Ct., Oregon. Schuman, assignee, v. Fleckenstein, 15 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 224. STATE. Claim by, against bankrupt for public funds in his hands.- A State may prove a claim for a balance of moneys appropriated for the support of a State prison which have been deposited by the warden of the prison with the bankrupt, a bank, in the name of such warden as such officer, where the directors of the prison had previously arranged with the bank for such deposits, and agreed upon the form in which the account was to be kept, although there was no law requiring the warden to deposit such moneys, and the State held his bond to account for all moneys coming into his hands. But the proof should be made by some officer holding a relation to the State similar to that which a president, cashier or treasurer bears to a corporation of which he is such officer. U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Wis. In re Corn Exchange Bank, 15 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 216. SHAREHOLDER OF NATIONAL BANK ESTOP- otherwise have been made to the evidence upon which he acted." In this we concur. There is another ground upon which both pleas must be held bad. Where a shareholder of a corporation is called upon to respond to a liability as such, and where a party has contracted with a corporation, and is sued upon the contract, neither is permitted to deny the existence or the legal validity of such corporation. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the plainest principles of reason and of good faith, and involve a mockery of justice. Parties must take the consequences of the position they assume. They are estopped to deny the reality of the state of things which they have made appear to exist, and upon which others have been led to rely. Sound ethics require that the apparent in its effects and consequences should be as if it were real, and the law properly so regards it. Eaton et al. v. Aspinwall, 19 N. Y. 119; S. C., 6 Duer, 176; Cooper v. Shaver et al., 41 Barb. 151; Camp v. Burne, 41 Mo. 525; Danbury & N. R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 22 Conn. 435; Ellis v. Schmock & Thomas, 5 Bing. 521; McFarlan v. The Triton Ins. Co., 4 Denio, 392; Rector & Co. v. Lovett, 1 Hall, 191; Topping v. Beekford, 4 Allen, 121; In the ous of Caseon, receiver of the New Orleans N the case of Casey, receiver of the New Orleans Dooley v. Wolcott, id. 407; Eppes v. R. R. Co., 35 Ala. (2.) the Supreme Court of the United States, the action 33; Hamtramack v. Bank of Edwardsville, 2 Mo. 169; Jones v. Cincinnati Type Foundry, 14 Ind. 88; Worcester Med. Ins. v. Harding, 11 Cush. 285; Hughes v. B'k of Somerset, 5 Little, 47; Tar River Nav. Co. v. Neal, 3 Hawkes, 520. The demurrer was sustained. RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN - FEBRUARY AND EASEMENT. 1. Right of way: conveyance by owner of one of several adjacent lots.-Where the owner of several adjacent lots, in a conveyance of one of them, grants a right of way thereto (not being a way of necessity) over the next adjoining lot, such grant is inoperative as against one to whom he sells and conveys such adjoining lot, unless the latter has actual or constructive notice of the grant. Pentland v. Keep. 2. Constructive notice: recording act. Where the deeds of the two lots are made and delivered on the same day, and are subsequently both recorded on the same day, and there is no such use of the property at the time as would charge a purchaser of either of the lots with notice of the existence of an easement therein, such purchaser takes without constructive notice of the easement so granted. Ib. 3. Recitals in deed. — A deed from W. to. H. referred to a deed that day executed by W. to R., and reserved the right of way conveyed in said deed to R., his heirs and assigns." W. had that day executed a deed to one M. of a lot adjoining that conveyed to H., which deed purported to convey to M., his heirs and assigns, a right of way across said last-named lot; and it is claimed that this is the deed improperly described as executed to R.; but there is no proof that H. knew that fact, nor that he was otherwise chargeable with notice of the grant to M. Held, that the rights of H., and those succeeding to his title are not affected by such grant. Ib. 4. Easement by prescription.-To establish an ease From O. N. Conover, Esq., State reporter. To appear in 41 Wis. 1. Priority of: unexecuted conveyance and judgment. Where, before a judgment is docketed in a certain county, land of the judgment debtor there situate has been purchased by a third person in good faith, but no conveyance has been executed, the judgment does not become a lien thereon. Goodell v. Blumer and another. 2. Homestead: conveyance by judgment debtor: execution.-Under the exemption laws of this State (Tay. Stats. 1550, § 30), a sale and conveyance of his homestead by a judgment debtor does not render it liable to sale on execution. Ib. MASTER AND SERVANT. 1. When master liable for injuries to servant.-A master is liable for injuries suffered by his servant, where, by his own negligence or malfeasance, he has enhanced the risk to which the servant was exposed beyond the natural risk of the employment, or has knowingly, and without informing the servant, used defective machinery which has caused the injury. Wedgwood v. C. & N. W. Railway Co. 2. Suitable appliances must be furnished for doing work. A railroad company is under a legal obligation to its servants engaged in running and operating its trains, to supply and maintain suitable cars and appliances for operating its road, and to use all reasonable means to guard against defects in its locomotives and cars which would endanger the lives and limbs of such servants while in the performance of their duties. Ib. 3. Brakeman on railroad: projecting bolt on car.The complaint avers that plaintiff was in defendant's employ as a brakeman on a freight train, and it was his duty, whenever occasion should require, to go between the freight cars and couple them with such machinery, appliances and fixtures as defendant provided; that on, etc., defendant negligently took upon its track, used and operated a car upon whose brakeframe or brake-beam, at the end of the car, was a large and long bolt, out of place, and which unneces sarily, carelessly and unskillfully projected beyond the frame, beam or break-head, in the way of the brakeman going to couple the cars; that defendant negligently suffered the bolt to remain, without cutting off the projecting part thereof and without informing plaintiff of its dangerous condition; and that, while going between said car and another to couple them, plaintiff was tripped and thrown down by said bolt, and thus sustained certain injuries. Held, that a cause of action is stated. Ib. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. When trespass necessary to render liable for.-In an action to recover damages for unlawfully breaking and entering the dwelling-house of the plaintiff and removing the roof therefrom, whereby the property and family of the plaintiff were exposed to the inclemency of the weather, and the plaintiff became sick, held, that if the plaintiff fails to prove the trespass, no recovery can be had on account of any of the alleged consequential damages. Brown v. Lake. GOOD FAITH. Innocent purchaser of note: retention of property sold for note. To defeat the title of an innocent purchaser to a note, on the ground of inadequacy of the price paid for it, the inadequacy must be such, under the circumstances, as to impeach the good faith of the purchase. Where the purchaser of such note receives it in part payment of property sold, his title to the note is not affected by the fact that he retains the title and possession of the property sold as security for the unpaid purchase-money. Rooker v. Rooker. INFANCY. Infant cannot recover upon void agreement between employer and parent.- An infant, who renders services under a verbal contract, which could not be performed within a year from the date thereof, entered into by and between his employer and his parent, cannot abandon the service in violation of the agreement and recover upon quantum meruit for the services rendered. Abbott v. Inskip. RECOGNIZANCE. Defense to action upon, when insufficient.— In an action upon a recognizance entered into before a justice of the peace, for the appearance of a party in court to answer a criminal charge, it is not a good defense to show or allege that at the time of his arrest, and at the date of the recognizance, an indictment against him for the same offense was pending in said court, without showing or alleging that the party had been arrested upon such indictment. Gage v. State of Ohio. SLANDER. Words actionable per se.-Words charging a man with being afflicted with a venereal disease are actionable in themselves. Kaucher v. Blinn. TRUSTS. 1. Dealings of trustee with trust property: title of trustee to trust property acquired by him.—The general rule in equity is that a trustee can acquire no personal interest in the trust property; and where he is author * From advance sheets of 28 Ohio State Reports. ized to do so by statute the validity of his title depends, in equity, upon its bona fides. Rammelsberg et al. v. Lape. 2. Trustees of partnership interest of testator.Trustees under a will to whom is bequeathed the partnership interest of the testator in the assets of a copartnership, with power "from time to time to change the property by sale or otherwise, and the proceeds to reinvest and change," may sell and dispose of such interest as an entirety, to a stranger, although one of the trustees be the owner of all other interests in the partnership property. Ib. 3. Repurchase by trustee of trust property sold.— When such sale is made without any intention to repurchase, the subsequent repurchase of the same interest from the vendee by one of the trustees for his own benefit is not of itself such indicium of fraud in the first sale as will restore the property to the trust estate at the election of the beneficiaries. Ib. BOOK NOTICES. DILLON ON REMOVAL OF CAUSES. Removal of Causes from State Courts to Federal Courts, with Forms adapted to the several Acts of Congress on the subject. Second and Revised Edition. By John F. Dillon. Circuit Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, Author of a Treatise on "Municipal Corporations," etc. St. Louis: The Central Law Journal, 1877. ANY thing from the writer of this treatise will always be welcomed by the profession, and the article which was the foundation of it has already been of great value to those who practice in the Federal courts. This article, as will be remembered, appeared in the Southern Law Review for July, 1876. The regular edition of that number of the Review not being sufficient to meet the demand, an extra edition was struck off, which has also been exhausted. At the request of the present publisher, the author revised and enlarged what he had written, bringing into view more fully the State court decisions, and adding the decisions of the Federal courts down to date, a table of cases and of contents, an index, and an appendix of forms. For the benefit of those who are not familiar with the original essay appearing in the Southern Law Review we will state that the same is divided into seventeen sections, each section being devoted to a separate topic. The topics are as follows: The Federal judicial system, its growth and importance; Principal statutes on the subject; Constitutional validity of removal acts; Essential elements of statutory right of removal; Judiciary act, section 12, conditions of right of removal thereunder; Act of July 27, 1866, nature of right thereby conferred; Act of March 2, 1867, nature of right, etc.; Act of March 3, 1875, nature and extent of right, etc.; Nature of suits that may be removed under above acts-Practice - Repleader; From what court removed - Removal, how enforced; Value of amount in dispute as a condition of removability; Party entitled to removal - Corporations Aliens; Time when application must be made; Mode of applying; Effect of petition of removal upon jurisdiction of State court; Same on Federal court; Remanding causes to State court. It will be seen that the work covers fully every part of the subject, and will be all that is needed to enlighten and guide the profession in this department of its practice. WOOD'S LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT. A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant. Covering the Relations, Duties and Liabilities of Employers and Employees. By H. G. Wood, author of "A Treatise on the Law of Nuisances," editor of "Best on Evidence," and "Addison on Torts." Albany, N. Y.: John D. Parsons, Jr., Publisher, 1877. Mr. Wood obtained an excellent reputation as a learned, accurate, and original law author by the publication of his work on Nuisances. The work before us will in no respect impair his reputation, and should materially advance his position, not merely as among the most promising of American law writers, but as firmly fixed in the more limited class of the latest standard legal classics. There can be no question but that the author is most fortunate in his topic. Indeed, it may fairly be said that there was not a single open topic in the law so useful and so captivating as that of Master and Servant. But it does not by any means follow thence that Mr. Wood's book must be pronounced a success. The felicity of his topic would only tend to enhance the measure of deserved condemnation, if an incomplete or inartistic work had been the outcome. The outline of the topics, the method of treatment, the completeness of the array of cases, the skill in reconciliation of conflicts, and the resulting correct statement of legal principles, in a style of composition clear, precise, and accurate; these are the prime tests of the practical utility of his labor. And in all these respects Mr. Wood may be congratulated on his success. The book consists of 956 pages, divided into seventeen chapters, and a resume of the contents will at once aid in the critical estimate, and afford information as to the lay of topics involved, viz.: Chapter 1, Classification. Chapter 2, Apprentices. Chapter 3, Implied Contracts. Chapter 4, Express Contracts. Chapter 5, Rewards. Chapter 6, Professional Services. Chapter 7, Statute of Frauds. Chapter 8, Illegal Contracts. Chapter 9, Injuries to Servant. Chapter 10, Enticing Away. Chapter 11, Seduction. Chapter 12, Liability of Master for Servant's Contracts. Chapter 13, Liability of Master for Servant's Acts. Chapter 14, Servant's Liability. Chapter 15, The Master's Liability to the Servant. Chapter 16, Co-servants. Chapter 17, Municipal Corporations. This will be seen to be a comprehensive and exhaustive outline. In the method of treatment there are some peculi arities which should be commended. The author has given the gist of nearly all the leading cases, either in the text or in the notes, and in some instances where their importance warranted it, the cases are given entire. Whatever doubt there may be of this method on a topic already largely treated in other text-books in a topic situated like Master and Servant, this mode is useful and essential. Much of the ground indicated by this map must have been treated by others in works on Contracts, and on various branches of the general Law of Torts. On those heads novelty was impossible, but the hand of legal genius appears even on this already well-worked mine. Nothing of stale quotation or common-place commentary is here apparent; a few master strokes present in lively colors the law as adjudicated on these heads, bringing the cases down to the latest dates. The part of Master and Servant which is most intricate and abstruse is that relating to the master's liability for the tortious acts of his servant. This is treated in the thirteenth chapter, and the reader who desires to test at once, the research, the acumen and the reasoning power of the |