gave orders not to forward such letters to him on account of their annoyance. But as to allowing strange lawyers indiscriminately to approach lunatics, if you will turn to the matter of Richard Beckwith, 3 Hun, 443, you will there see a very striking illustration of a legal speculation which called forth a severe rebuke from the General Term before which it came up. If I were asked to suggest any thing in this connection, although nothing, in my opinion, is necessary, it would be for the General Term of the Supreme Court, or county judge, to appoint some reputable lawyer in every place where any asylum is situated, to visit there as amicus curia, and ascertain who really needs his services. I would give him a per diem for every case proved upon investigation, to present a reasonable ground for judicial interference. In this way speculative cases would offer no inducements to him, while real ones would. Practically, however, there is no difficulty in the way of any patient who is coherent sending letters to the Commissioner. I often receive them and examine into the case according to its aspects. Sometimes I advise a commission, sometimes proceed under my own powers upon a melius inquirendum, and sometimes I advise a supersedeas. I have never known but one instance where a superintendent refused to allow a communication from me to reach a female lunatic, and this he did in ignorance of my powers, and through the legal advice of the committee of the lunatic, who, being a lawyer, told him that he, the committee, was virtute officii an officer of the court, having the exclusive custody of the lady, and no one had any right of access to her without his previous assent. As soon as he discovered that I was about to join issue on that demurrer, he surrendered to the jurisdiction of my office. I am satisfied, from the course of events since the passage of our revised lunacy laws, that the insane have all the safeguards to personal liberty which they need. But here, as elsewhere, security of person will chiefly depend upon the manner in which courts discharge their part of the duty of committing lunatics. If, as I know is often the case, a batch of medical certificates are presented to a judge busily employed at chambers, and he signs them without sufficient scrutiny, just as he might an order of sale on the foreclosure of a mortgage, or for the taxation of costs, then necessarily consequences of a serious character might arise to the personal liberty of citizens. But even then, with the other safeguards provided by the common law and the statute, only a very few days at most would be required to bring relief to the person wronged. In the presence of all these bulwarks of civil liberty, risks of illegal detention of sane persons in our lunatic asylums are becoming things of the past, and practically impossible. A drunkard iu delirium tremens may find his way there, or a man may so feign insanity in violence of conduct as to justify restraint. Society is but the mirror in which every human being's conduct reflects itself. If he behaves like a lunatic, and is dangerous to himself or others, he is quoad hoc a lunatic, and should be treated like one. The fact that he has feigned it casts no disparagement upon the law, since, physically speaking, every man defines his own status before the law, which then only proceeds to name the civil relations which flow from it. JOHN ORDRONAUX. OFFICE OF THE STATE COM'R IN LUNACY, ROSLYN, QUEENS Co., Jan. 3, 1877. [It was certainly not our intention to convey the impression either that the State had done little to protect the rights of the insane, or that the laws were not zealously and judiciously enforced. Such was undoubtedly the facts until the office of State Commissioner in Lunacy was created; but since that time and under that officer's intelligent direction, the laws have been carefully remodeled with the cardinal objects in view: first, to secure the best possible safeguards against illegal commitments to an insane asylum, and second, to secure the inmates of asylums against maltreatment. The first of these objects the law practically secures, and, whatever occasion may have existed in years gone by for public apprehension on this score (and we believe it was small as regards public asylums), such occasion exists no longer. The second object, the most stringent laws and the most careful attainable supervision will not entirely insure, so long as the task of caring for the insane is committed to underpaid and ignorant attendants. But the danger, in that direction, is largely exaggerated, and the public ear is always erect for the first note of danger, and open to any sensationalist or charlatan who may choose to denounce the law and its administration. There could be no better illustration of this, than was afforded by the case of Mrs. Norton, which has recently been occupying the public attention. A year after her removal from the asylum, and while still laboring under a delusion, she complained to her husband that she had been maltreated by an attendaut. The Commissioner in Lunacy instituted an investigation, — although there was no allegation of existing abuses in the asylum, and reached the conclusion that the charges were not well founded. We have examined his elaborate report of the case with care, and are satisfied that his conclusion was justified. It was this case that gave occasion to Mr. John E. Townsend to deliver a lecture wherein he displayed alike his lack of good taste and of a knowledge of the lunacy laws. On this last point we will only suggest, in passing, that, had Mr. Townsend been familiar with the laws of 1876, he would hardly have attacked the Commissioner for "failing to present this case to a justice of the Supreme Court, as he was bound by law to do." The State Commissioner in Lunacy needs no commendation from our hands. His ability and acquirements in medical jurisprudence and psychological law are well-known and recognized wherever those branches of human knowledge are best understood, his energy is indomitable, and he is not a politician. Whatever is desirable and best for the afflicted wards of the State he will be likely first to find out, and will questionless seek to secure. If the Legislature will improve the tentative legislation of the present as his experience and knowledge shall lead him to suggest, and will place in his hands the authority requisite to the complete enforcement of the laws, our Lunacy Code and its administration will be the best of which the age and the circumstances admit.ED. A. L. J.] corporate board created by the State of Louisiana, and known as the Board of Levee Commissioners of the parishes of Madison and Carroll. This board, at the time of the issue of the warrants, was empowered to assess and collect taxes for the payment of warrants issued. In 1861 each of the parishes was made a separate levee district, but power was left in the old board to assess taxes and settle up the already incurred indebtedness. Subsequently the management of the levees was transferred to a new body under a general law, and other changes were made. In 1867 plaintiff obtained judgment against the old board upon those warrants, and he in this case sought by mandamus to compel payment by the old board, or by the police justices of the parishes named, who are the administrative officers thereof. But in the meantime a number of the members of the old board had died, so that there were not enough living to constitute a quorum of such board for the performance of any act. The Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, to whom the application was made, denied the same. The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the Circuit Court, hold that a corporation created for municipal purposes, being superseded by new and different corporations created for accomplishing the same purposes, ceases to exist, except so far as its existence is expressly continued for special objects, such as settling up its indebtedness and the like. If in such case no provision is made for the continuance or new election of the officers of such corporation, the functions of the existing officers will cease when their respective terms expire, and the corporation will be de facto extinct. In such case also, if there be a judgment against the corporation, mandamus will not lie to enforce the assessment of taxes for its payment, there being no officers to whom it may be directed. The court cannot by mandamus compel the new corporations to perform the duties of the extinct corporation in the levy of taxes for the payment of its debts, especially where their territorial jurisdiction is not the same, and the law has not authorized them to make such levy. Nor can the court order the marshal to levy taxes in such a case, nor in any case, except where a specific law authorizes such a proceeding. Under these circumstances, the judgment creditor is in fact without remedy, and can only apply to the legislature for relief. RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. MARRIAGE. 1. Habit and repute only evidence of marriage in Scotland. - Per Lord Selborne: Habit and repute is not a mode of constituting but of proving a marriage; and when a true and undivided habit and repute is shown, a presumption of the marriage arises by the law of Scotland. De Thoren v. Attorney-General, L. R., 1 App. Cas. H. L. (Div.) 686. 2. Presumption of: onus of rebutting.- Per the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cairns): The presumption of marriage is much stronger than the presumption in regard to other facts. When a matrimonial ceremony took płace in Scotland, the parties being ignorant of an impediment, afterward removed, and when, believing themselves to be validly married, they lived together continuously for years as husband and wife, and were regarded as such by all who knew them, the marriage was held to have been established by the force of habit and repute, without any proof of mutual consent by verbal declaration. It must be inferred that the matrimonial consent was interchanged as soon as the parties were enabled, by the removal of the impediment, to enter into the contract. The onus of rebutting a marriage by habit and repute is thrown on those who deny it. Ib. 3. Ratification of: invalid.- Per Lord Chelmsford: The ceremony which took place, although invalid, was undoubtedly a consent by the parties to live together as husband and wife. And their subsequent cohabitation was a proof of continued consent. Ib. STATUTE OF FRAUDS. Vendor and purchaser: memorandum of agreement: description of contracting party as "vendor": deposit, when recoverable: acquiescence.-The plaintiff signed a contract for the purchase of a leasehold shop from the "vendor," subject to particulars and conditions; and the auctioneer signed as agent for the vendor." The plaintiff paid a deposit, and the vendor's solicitor forwarded to the plaintiff's solicitors an abstract of title, and in reply they wrote: "Without prejudice to any question which may arise as to the contract of purchase herein, we beg to name Tuesday next to examine abstract of title, with deeds, etc." And after examining the abstract they forwarded requisitions, writing at the foot of them, "The above requisitions are made without prejudice to any question which may arise as to the contract for the purchase of the premises " The plaintiff subsequently repudiated the contract, on the ground (inter alia) that the contract did not disclose the name of the vendor, and brought an action to recover the deposit. Held, without deciding whether the memorandum was insufficient under the Statute of Frauds, that the plaintiff could not recover, having chosen, knowing that the vendor's name did not appear in the memorandum, to pay the deposit and receive the abstract of title: and that the expression in the correspondence "without prejudice to any question which may arise as to the contract of purchase," could not have been meant or understood as referring to the validity of the contract. Sale v. Lambert (L. R., 18 Eq. 1), and Potter v. Duffield (L. R., 18 Eq. 4), discussed; Casson v. Roberts (31 Beav. 613; 32 L. J. [Ch.] 105), questioned; Thomas v. Brown, L. R., 1 Q. B.D. 714. SURETYSHIP. Principal and surety-discharge of surety by time given to principal — contract for performance at several distinct times. Although where one enters into a bond as surety for the performance by another of two things which are separate and distinct, a subsequent alteration of the principal's contract as to one of them without the surety's consent does not release the surety from his contract of suretyship as to the other, yet, where the contract is one entire contract for the performance by the principal of two or more things at different times, if by any dealing with the principal without the consent of the surety the latter is discharged as to one of them, his liability as surety is altogether released. When once a surety is relieved from the obligation which he has undertaken, that obligation cannot be renewed by any subsequent act to which he is no party. D. contracted with a gas company to take from them tar and ammoniacal liquor, and to pay for each month's supply within the first fourteen days of the ensuing month after the account rendered, “unless the company should by writing signed by their secretary allow a longer time for payment." The defendant became surety for the performance of the con tract by D. On the 3d of August an account was delivered for the July supply; and after the fourteen days had expired, viz., on the 21st, the secretary of the company, without the knowledge of the surety, sent D. a letter inclosing a promissory note at a month for the amount, with a request that he would sign and return it. D. signed the promissory note and returned it to the secretary, who kept it: Held, that, assuming this to be a giving of time "by writing signed by the secretary," within the meaning of the agreement, being after breach, the surety was released; and that, once released, he was not liable in respect of debts contracted in respect of subsequent months' supplies. The Croydon Commercial Gas Co. v. Dickenson, L. R., 1 C. P. D. 707. WATER-COURSES. Rights of riparian proprietors along navigable river. -The right of navigating a tidal river is common to the subjects of the realm, but it may be connected with a right to the exclusive access to particular land on the bank of the river, and the latter is a private right to the enjoyment of the land, the invasion of which may form the ground for an action for damages, or for an injunction. The right of a riparian owner to the use of the stream does not depend on the ownership of the soil of the stream. Lyon v. Fishmongers, Co., L. R., 1 App. Cas. H. L. (E.) 662. PATENTS FOR GOVERNMENT LANDS-WHEN THE case of Sherman, plaintiff in error, v. Buick, de cided at the present term of the United States Supreme Court, was an action brought in the courts of California, to recover possession of a tract of land which plaintiff claimed under a patent of the United States, dated May 15, 1869. Defendant claimed under a patent issued by the State of California, dated Jan. 1, 1869. The title of the State was supposed to rest on the statute of the United States, passed March 3, 1853, granting certain lands, for school purposes, to that State. Plaintiff offered to show that he settled on the land in December, 1862, that the land was not surveyed until August, 1866, and that he filed and proved his preemption claim in November, 1866, paid for and procurred a patent certificate on which his patent was issued. This evidence was rejected in the State courts. The United States Supreme Court held, reversing the judgment, that testimony, whether parol or documentary, which shows a want of power in officers who issue a patent, is admissible in an action at law to defeat a title set up under it. In such case the patent is absolutely void, and not merely voidable, and the party is not obliged to resort to a court of equity to have it so declared. In construing the act of March 3, 1853, 10 U. S. Statutes, 246, the court held: (1) That the school sections, sixteen and thirty-six, granted by section six to the State, are also excepted from the operation of the preemption law to which, by the same section, the public lands generally are subjected. (2) That the seventh section of the act provides the rule by which the right❘ of preemption on the school sections is governed, and by that rule a settlement is protected if the surveys ascertain its location to be on a school section when those surveys are made. (3) In such case the only right conferred by the statute on the State is to select other land in lieu of that so occupied. (4) The proviso in the sixth section forbidding preemption on unsurveyed lands after one year from the passage of the act, is limited to the lands not excepted out of that section, and has no application to the school sections so excepted. RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS. EXEMPTION. Homestead under State laws: what is not homestead.Although a bankrupt, upon becoming insolvent, moves into a block erected for business purposes, and not in any manner constructed so as to have the appearance or character of a dwelling-house, yet he cannot claim it as exempt under the laws of Wisconsin. In re Lammer, 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 460. INDORSEMENT. Acts discharging indorser.—If the holder of a note assents to the discharge of the maker, without the consent of the indorser, this releases the indorser. Creditors will not be allowed to intervene after the return day, to prosecute specifications filed by a creditor whose claim was stricken out after the filing of such specifications. In re McDonald, 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 477. JUDGMENT. Docketed on dies non void and not a lien. - The docketing of a judgment on a day that is declared a holiday by statute is void, and confers no lien, for the term "holiday" imports dies non juridicus. When a party voluntarily appears and moves for the enforcement of a pretended lien, the District Court thereby acquires jurisdiction to proceed and dispose of the whole matter in a summary way. In re Worthington, 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 388. JURISDICTION. 1. When State court has not.- Under the Revised Statutes of the United States, the Supreme Court of New York has no jurisdiction of an action by an assignee or trustee in bankruptcy, to recover property alleged to have been conveyed by the bankrupt, in fraud of his creditors. Frost, Trustee, v. Hotchkiss, 14 Nat. Bank, Reg. 443. 2. When United States Circuit Court has not.-Where a party claims a right to a part of the proceeds of a judgment, and the assignee denies the claim, this is a controversy over which the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction under the bankrupt law. The jurisdiction over controversies between an assignee and adverse claimants may be exercised by any Circuit Court having jurisdiction of the parties, and is not confined to the Circuit Court of the district in which the decree of bankruptcy was made. Whenever the State courts have jurisdiction over controversies between the assignee and third parties, the Circuit Courts have it independent of the bankrupt law, if the proper citizenship of the parties exist. Burbank v. Bigelow, 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 445. LUNATIC. When he may and when he may not be proceeded against. A party who is under guardianship as a lunatic may be proceeded against in involuntary bankruptcy in opposition to the wishes of his guardian. If the person was insane at the time of the commission of an alleged act of bankruptcy, he cannot be adjudged a bankrupt for that act. In re Weitzel, 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 466. MARSHAL. When not liable for seizure of property.-The marshal, under a provisional warrant, is justified in seizing property which the debtor transferred before the commencement of the proceedings by a transfer which was void under the bankrupt law, and is not liable to the transferee for such seizure. Stevenson v. McLaren, 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 403. MORTGAGE. 1. When enforceable: exempt property.—If a mortgagee does not prove his debt, he may enforce his mortgage in a State court, although the assignee set the property apart to the mortgagor as exempt. Hatcher v. Jones, 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 387. 2. On property acquired subsequent to its execution.— Where a mortgage made by a railroad corporation provides that it shall include all property subsequently acquired by the mortgagor, it will include a railroad with its appurtenances subsequently leased by the mortgagor, and the title thereto will be valid as against the assignee of the mortgagor. Barnard, assignee, v. N. & W. Railroad Co., 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 469. PRACTICE. 1. Discretion of District Court as to allowing appearance, etc.- The District Court may, in its discretion, allow the creditor to enter his appearance and file specifications in opposition to a discharge, although the time for entering an appearance in opposition thereto has expired. In re Levin, 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 385. A 2. Bankruptcy proceeding case at law: review by Circuit Court.- A proceeding to have a debtor adjudged a bankrupt is substantially an action at law, and terminates with the final judgment on the petition or verdict therein; and the subsequent proceedings to ascertain and distribute the estate of the bankrupt are merely consequent upon such action, but no part of it. Such an action is a case at law, the proceedings therein cannot be reviewed in the Circuit Court until after final judgment therein; and if the case, by the election of the defendant, becomes triable by jury, it cannot be reviewed otherwise than upon a writ of error. stay of proceedings in bankruptcy in the Distrct Court is in the discretion of the Circuit Court, and ought not to be granted where it does not appear that the rights of the defendant will be prejudiced or seriously endangered, if the plaintiff is allowed to proceed to final judgment in the court below. Semble, that all the appellate jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts in bankruptcy is conferred upon them by section 4986 of the Revised Statutes, and that section 4980 of said Revised Statutes to section 4984, inclusive, do not confer any such power, but only regulate its exercise; and the terms cases and questions are used in said section 4986 in contradistinction to one another; that a case in bankruptcy, whether at law or equity, is only reviewable in the Circuit Court according to the mode pre scribed in ordinary actions at law, or suits in equity; and that the appellate jurisdiction, which the Circuit Courts may exercise upon bill or petition, is confined to the review of the action of the District Courts upon isolated questions arising in the proceedings subsequent to an adjudication of bankruptcy. Rule to show cause why the proceedings in the District Court should not be stayed pending a petition for review in the Circuit Court. In re Oregon Bulletin Printing and Publishing Co., 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 394. PREFERENCE. Co-operation between creditor and bankrupt as to seizure of property on execution. If the bankrupt facilitated the taking of his property on execution by any affirmative action, and the creditor was aware of it, the preference thereby gained may be annulled. That the bankrupt and the creditor co-operated in adopting the form of an apparently hostile legal proceeding may be proved by circumstantial evidence. In re Baker, 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 433. SET-OFF. Claim against bankrupt cannot be set off against claim by assignee for goods sold: claim against bankrupt estate may be.- A claim against the bankrupt, before his bankruptcy, cannot be set off against an indebtedness for goods purchased from the assignee. A claim against the bankrupt's estate may be set off against an indebtedness for goods purchased from the assignee. If a register determines the amount due on a claim without hearing the claimant, or appointing a time for hearing, his determination is not conclusive, although the claimant and the assignee agreed that he should adjust it. Moran v. Bogert, 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 393. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. Revised Statutes, when passed: act of June 22, 1874: bankrupt law of 1867: petition against corporation.The Revised Statutes must be regarded as passed on the 1st day of December, 1873, and all other acts of the same session of Congress passed subsequent to that date, are to be treated as subsequent acts, repealing the Revised Statutes, so far as they are inconsistent therewith. The act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stats. 178), purporting to amend and supplement the bankrupt act of 1867, must be regarded as having passed subsequent to the passage of the Revised Statutes, and although referring in terms to the act of 1867, must be construed as referring to the provisions of that act, as carried into and expressed in the corresponding provisions of the Revised Statutes; and as amending and supplementing the provisions of the statutes relating to bankruptcy as therein found expressed. Since the passage of the amendatory and supplemental bankrupt act of June 23, 1874, the same proportion of creditors must join in a petition seeking an adjudication of bankruptcy against corporation, as is required in the case of natural persons. A petition in bankruptcy against a corporation, which does not show that the corporation is either a moneyed, business or commercial corporation, is insufficient. In re Oregon Bulletin Print. & Pub. Co., 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 405. BOOK NOTICES. A Treatise on Trial by Jury, including Questions of Law and Fact. With an Introductory Chapter on the Origin and History of Jury Trial. By John Proffatt, LL B., Author of "Curiosities and Law of Wills," etc. San Francisco: Sumner, Whitney & Co. New York: Hurd & Houghton, 1877. THE trial by jury is the distinguishing feature of the common law. Such a trial is indeed now known in countries where other forms of law prevail, but it is not a native institution. There were, in the civilized nations of ancient times, modes of trial which have been said to bear an analogy to that by jury; but so far as we can ascertain, the only resemblance was, that the individuals with whom rested the determination of the case were chosen from the people. The jury, as we now have it, is clearly a Saxon institution. How or when it originated, of course we do not know, and it may have in principle existed in other sections of that race from which the Saxons sprang; but the right of trial, in a fixed and determinate manner, by one's peers, seems to have made its appearance in the written enactments of the Anglo-Saxons alone. Whether a better form of trial than that by judges or not, it has been retained by the English people through all ages of their existence and in every land where they have taken up their abode; and the day when it shall be abrogated or essentially modified seems to be no nearer than it was six centuries ago, when King John and the barons discussed the matter at Runnymede. A work upon the subject of jury trial was therefore one much needed, and it is a matter of surprise that the subject was not before treated. We believe the book of Mr. Proffatt will be found to be such as to entitle it to an honorable place in legal literature, not only as being the pioneer upon this topic, but as being written in a clear, easy style, and as containing matter of great interest, both to the student and the practicing lawyer. The author takes up first the origin and history of the jury. He next treats of the several kinds of jury. The subject of right to trial by jury occupies a chapter, the selection and return of the jury another, and its impaneling and swearing another. The succeeding chapter is devoted to a consideration of the trial of the issue, and of the duty and license of counsel. Then come the topics of questions of law and fact, province and duty of the court, and province and duty of the jury. The matters relating to the verdict are then considered, and the treatise closes with a chapter devoted to the subject of the discharge of the jury. It will be seen that the author endeavors to embrace all that appertains to his subject. There is a good index and a table of cases cited. The chapter upon the origin and history of jury trial is of peculiar value and interest, as may be seen by a perusal of the extracts therefrom which have heretofore appeared in the LAW JOURNAL. We would recommend the careful reading of this work to law students who desire to gain a thorough knowledge of the most important of the institutions of our law; and to those in the profession who think they already know all about trial by jury, its perusal will not be without value. The mechanical execution of the volume is of the best character. A Treatise on the Law of Evidence. By Simon Greenleaf, LL.D., Emeritus Professor of Law in Harvard University. Vols. III and II. Thirteenth Edition. Carefully revised, with large additions. By John Wilder May, Author of "The Law of Insurance," etc. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1870. These two volumes complete the thirteenth edition of this widely known treatise. We reviewed the first volume of this edition in our issue of December 9, 1876, and need only say that work of the editor upon the volumes now before us in every respect equals that done upon the first volume. As is well known the second volume of this work is devoted to a consideration of the evidence requisite in certain particular actions and issues at common law, and is apt to be found of great practical value in the investigation and trial of causes. In respect to certain of the topics considered the law at the present time is being rapidly developed, and the present editor has been able to make important additions under the title of “Carrier" (including the law applicable to railroad, express and telegraph companies), "Case" (including the subject of negligence), "Damages" and "Insurance." The third volume is devoted to a consideration of criminal evidence, evidence in proceedings in equity, evidence in courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and evidence in courts-martial. That portion devoted to criminal evidence probably constitutes the most practical treatise on criminal law in existence. To the second volume about seven hundred new cases have been added in this edition, and about two hundred and twenty new cases to the third volume. Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas. By W. C. Webb, Reporter. Vol. XVI. Containing Cases Decided at the January and July Terms, 1878, Topeka, Kansas. Geo. W. Martin, Kansas Publishing House, 1870. Mr. Webb is entitled to commendation for the promptness with which he issues his reports after the cases to be reported are determined. In this volume we have the decisions of the Supreme Court of Kansas up to July term, 1876, and a number of the cases decided that term, probably all in which the opinions. were ready when the book went to press, and not those of two, three, or four years ago, as is the habit in many States. Among the cases of importance contained in this volume, we find these: Wood v. Bartling, p. 109, wherein at p. 114, the now important subject of votes for an ineligible candidate is considered. Sibert v. Wilder, p. 176, which holds that an acknowledgment of a debt, to take the case out of the statute, must be made not to a mere stranger, but to the creditor or his representative. The A. T. & S. F. Railroad Co. v. Bates, p. 252, contains a consideration of the liability of a railroad company for fires set by its engines, and the subjects of proximate and remote causes. The S. S. & G. Railroad Co. v. Maris, p. 333, and Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Mower, p. 573, also involve railroad questions of interest. The case of Jansen v. City of Atchison, is upon the question of the liability of a city corporation for injury caused by a defective sidewalk, and whether the city has recourse over against the adjoining lot owner for damages it is compelled to pay. Ornn v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, p. 341, involves the question as to whether the taking of a mortgage by a National bank was a violation of the National Banking Law. Missouri Val. Life Ins. Co. v. Kelso, p. 481, is upon the much vexed subject of life insurance. Here it is decided that a claim for damaages against a life insurance company upon a policy, is assignable In Gregg v. George, p. 546, some interesting questions in relation to bank checks are discussed. Wright v. Noll, p. 601, is upon the all absorbing question of the right of women to hold office, and the woman carries the day. The volume contains 102 cases; the reporting is well done, the index good; there is a table of cases cited, and the book is well printed and bound. CORRESPONDENCE. DIVORCE IN INDIANA. To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal: SIR: In No. 26, of Vol. 14 of the LAW JOURNAL, I find two incidental remarks upon the divorce laws of Indiana. As the writers of the respective articles do not seem to be posted as to the present status of our laws on that subject, and in order to dispel erroneous ideas yet pretty generally prevailing, I here subjoin a statement of the present law, with some references to |