by the state's attorney in any true sense of the meaning of that word. We must assume that the Legislature had in mind, in the passage of these two sections of the Criminal Code distinguishing between bribery and the attempt to bribe, the common law as it existed at that time. This being so, the con the official received it in ignorance or retained it solely for the purpose of public Justice (Commonwealth v. Murray, 135 Mass. 530; Henslow v. Fawcett, 3 Ad. & Ell. 51). The gist of either offense is the tendency of the bribe to pervert justice. Such being the case, the attempt to bribe as well as the completed act of bribery are dangerous and in-clusion logically follows that they did not jurious to the community at large, for, as this court has said in Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58, 16 Am. Rep. 569: "The offer is a sore temptation to the weak or the depraved. It tends to corrupt, and, as the law abhors the least tendency to corruption, it punishes the act which is calculated to debase, and which may affect prejudicially the morals of the community." intend that a person should be guilty of the offense of bribery unless the bribe was accepted. It must therefore be held that plaintiff in error cannot, on the facts in this record, be held guilty of bribery. [4] Counsel further argue that plaintiff in error, under these facts, was not guilty even of an attempt at bribery. With this we do [2, 3] The Legislature, in passing the two not agree. This case does not come within sections of the Criminal Code in question, the reasoning of this court in Love v. Peoevidently thought that the completed act was ple, 160 Ill. 501, 43 N. E. 710, 32 L. R. A. more serious and corrupting in its tendency 139, where it was held that the offense of than an ineffectual attempt to bribe. Read- burglary there under consideration was coming these two sections together, did the Leg-mitted at the instigation and encouragement islature intend that in order to constitute the of the owner of the premises, but rather crime of bribery the acts of two persons were comes within the reasoning of this court in essential-that of him who gives and him People v. Smith, 251 Ill. 185, 95 N. E. 1041, who receives, the minds of the two concur- and People v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 252 ring? Or did they intend that the offense of Ill. 398, 96 N. E. 1049, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) bribery was complete if the public official 778, where it was stated it was not in violatook the money or other thing offered as a tion of the law to find out whether offenses bribe but not with a corrupt intent? No one were being committed and to take precaureading this record would for a moment con- tions to ascertain whether the suspected pertend that the state's attorney was guilty of sons would commit the offense. The evidence bribery. In the common understanding of justifies the submission of this last mentionthat term no one would argue that he had ed offense to a jury. been bribed. If he, instead of having Betts receive the $20, had in his interview told plaintiff in error positively that he would not accept the money under any circumstances and ordered him out of his office, it would hardly be contended that plaintiff in error would then be guilty of more than an attempt to bribe. Bishop, in discussing bribery and the attempt to bribe, says: [5] Counsel further contend that the court erred in refusing to permit plaintiff in error to testify as to his intention in giving the $20 to Betts for the state's attorney. The prevailing rule of law, sustained by the great weight of authority, is that whenever the motive, intention, or belief of a person is relevant to the issue, it is competent for such person to testify directly on that point. Jones on Evidence (2d Ed.) § 170. This court has held that where the intent is an important element constituting the offense, the accused has the right to testify what his intention was in the commission of the act. Wohlford v. People, 148 Ill. 296, 36 N. E. 107. The court erred in not permitting plaintiff in error to answer the question. We do not think, however, we would reverse for that error alone, as a reading of his examination shows that he gave practically a complete statement as to what his intention or motive was. For the reasons stated, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded. Reversed and remanded. 265 Ill. 87) ADAMS v. GORDON. Supreme Court of Illinois. (No. 9522.) Oct. 16, 1914.) COURTS (219*)-SUPREME COURT-JURIS DICTION-FREEHOLD. of an easement in certain water facilities and a way thereto, situated on the lands of appellee. A demurrer was sustained to the bill, and, appellant electing to abide by her bill, a decree was entered dismissing the bill for want of equity. She prayed and perfected an appeal to the Appellate Court for lefendant's adjoining land for the use of cerain water facilities located thereon by means the Second District, which has transferred f which complainant's house, barn, and prem- the cause to this court pursuant to the statses were supplied with water, such right, if itute, for the reason that a freehold is in Where complainant sought to establish a ight in the nature of a perpetual easement in xisted, was an easement appurtenant to comlainant's estate in fee, and her bill filed to stablish such easement involved a freehold so s to confer jurisdiction of an appeal on the upreme Court. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 539-542, 545-547, 549, 550, 552-573; Dec. Dig. § 219.*] . CONTRACTS (§ 169*)-CONSTRUCTION. volved. It appears from the allegations of the bill that prior to November 29, 1911, appellee was the owner of a tract of about 100 or more acres of land situated on what is known as Deerpath avenue, in the vicinity of Lake Forest, Ill. 'November 29, 1911, he entered into a contract with John F. Tracy for the sale of a portion of this land, in which he contracted, among other things, that the purchaser should have the right to the use of the well located on his adjacent property, together with the pump, gasoline engine, and tank situated thereon, until such time as public water mains should be installed in Deer The object of construing and interpreting n instrument is to ascertain and make it speak he true intention and meaning of the parties t the time it was made, and, where any doubt kists as to its sense and meaning, resort may e had to the circumstances surrounding its xecution to discover the subject-matter and le standpoint of the parties in relation thereto. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Contracts, ent. Dig. 752; Dec. Dig. § 169.*] WATERS AND WATER COURSES (§ 154*)-path avenue, with the right to use a path, EASEMENTS EXISTENCE-RIGHTS OF PUR CHASER. Where defendant, when he sold certain real roperty, which plaintiff occupied as a tenant, T., agreed that the grantee should have the ght to use certain water facilities on defendit's adjoining land not sold to convey water r the benefit of the land sold, plaintiff, on subquently purchasing the property from T., as entitled to assume that she was buying it its then condition and would have a right use and enjoy all those water facilities and at she acquired an easement in the right ereto under the rule that, where the owner land divides his property into parts and dis-ses of one part, he, by implication, includes his grant all such easements in the remaing land as are necessary for the reasonable enment of the property which he grants in the m in which it was at the time he transferred e property. Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Waters and ater Courses, Cent. Dig. §§ 167-173; Dec. g. § 154.*] EASEMENTS (§ 15*)-CONVEYANCE. It is not necessary that an easement claimby a grantee of a portion of a grantor's land, -r the land retained, be absolutely necessary the use and enjoyment of the property coned, but it is sufficient if the easement is hly convenient and beneficial to the grantee. Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Easements, at. Dig. §§ 42-58; Dec. Dig. § 15.*] -ppeal from Circuit Court, Lake County; arles Whitney, Judge. ill by Amie I. Adams against John Gor. From a judgment of dismissal, plainappeals. Reversed and remanded, with ections. or decision on transfer of cause from Apate Court, see 186 Ill. App. 286. ppellant filed her bill in chancery in the uit court of Lake county, Ill., against ellee, for an injunction to restrain him n interfering with her in the exercise of rights which she claimed in the nature not exceeding 8 feet in width, from a gate on the west line of the property leading in a direct line to the well, the purchaser to maintain the well, pump, engine, and tank at his own expense and furnish water for the use of appellee without charge or expense to him, and, should said Tracy fail to so maintain and furnish water, his right to the use of the well and pump might be terminated by the vendor and all obligations under the contract canceled. On the same day the contract was made appellee conveyed the land described in the contract to said Tracy by warranty deed, in which no reference whatever is made to the provision in the contract in relation to the use of water facilities as above set forth. At the time the contract was made between appellee and Tracy appellant was a tenant on the property under a lease expiring on November 30, 1911. January 4, 1912, Tracy conveyed the land purchased by him to appellant by warranty deed in all respects the same as the deed he had received from appellee; the deed making no mention whatever of the easement contained in the contract between appellee and Tracy. Appellant alleges the omission of this matter was due to the mistake of the scrivener in drafting the deed, but she does not ask that the deed be reformed. For some years the water facilities located on appel lee's land have been used by him and his tenants, including appellant, for the purpose of supplying the premises now owned by her with water for domestic purposes and to supply water for the stables, lawns, and gardens thereon; said water facilities being absolutely necessary and essential to the full enjoyment of her premises. Appellant charges that one of the important factors inducing her to other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes CRAIG, J. (after stating the facts as above). [1] Appellant by her bill asserts and seeks to establish and maintain a right in the nature of a perpetual easement in the adjoining lands of the appellee in the use and maintenance of certain water facilities located thereon, by means of which her house, barn, garden, and premises are supplied with water. This right, if it exists, is an easement appurtenant to an estate in fee, and a bill filed for the purpose of establishing such an easement involves a freehold, and the case was therefore properly transferred to this court. Tinker v. Forbes, 136 Ill. 221, 26 N. E. 503; Foote v. Marggraf, 233 Ill. 48, 84 N. E. 42; Foote v. Yarlott, 238 Ill. 54, 87 N. E. 62; Espenscheid v. Bauer, 235 Ill. 172, 85 N. E. 230. purchase the premises was the fact that she Shepard, McCormick & Thomason, of Chishould have the right to the free and unob-cago, and John D. Pope, of Waukegan (Perry structed use of the water facilities mention- S. Patterson, of Chicago, of counsel), for ed in the contract between said Tracy and appellant. Elam L. Clarke, of Waukegan, appellee. The pump, pumphouse, tank, and for appellee. engine are located on appellee's premises about 100 feet from the west line of appellant's property, and the water is conveyed from there to her premises and buildings by means of an underground pipe leading from the tank on appellee's property to the house, stable, lawn, and garden on appellant's premises. The pipe is visible on appellee's land between the point where it leaves the tank and enters the ground, and also visible on appellant's premises where it emerges from the ground and connects with the faucets, plugs, flush boxes, and hydrants on her land. A view of the premises at the time of the purchase by Tracy and of her purchase from Tracy would have disclosed that the faucets, plugs, flush boxes, and hydrants on her property were connected with the tank on appellee's land, and that the pump, pumphouse, engine, and tank situated thereon were Appellant insists that she is entitled to used as the means of supplying these prem- the benefits of the contract of November 11, ises with water, and that the water facilities 1912, between Tracy and appellee, and also thus provided were highly beneficial to her that the water facilities on appellee's land property. No public water mains have been constitute an open and visible easement apinstalled or constructed in Deerpath avenue purtenant to her premises, which passed by leading to this property, and it is indispen- the deed of conveyance of the land from sable to its use and enjoyment by appellant appellee to Tracy and from Tracy to her. that she have the advantage of water facil-Appellee insists that no rights passed to apities provided for it, situated on appellee's pellant under the contract with Tracy, for land. After appellant became a purchaser appellee permitted her to continue to use the water facilities for some time without protest, and from time to time to make the necessary repairs thereon. Shortly before filing the bill he demanded of her the payment of $50 which he claimed was due on a former tenancy by her, and when she refused to pay, on the ground that it was without any foundation, appellee refused to allow her servants to make repairs on the engine used for pump-contentions separately, but the substance of ing water into the tank, locked the door to the pump house, shut the water off, forbade appellant or her servants to use the well or the pathway thereto and blockaded the same by installing posts and wires across the pathway, and threatened violence to appellant and her servants if they attempted to obtain water from the well or to use the pathway leading thereto. The bill prayed for an injunction enjoining the appellee from interfering with appellant's rights in the premises and in the use of the water, pumphouse, engine, and tank and other water facilities as above set forth, and for general relief. A general demurrer was sustained to the bill, setting forth the above facts. Appellant elected to abide by her bill, and a decree was entered dismissing the bill for want of equity. This appeal followed. The errors assigned are: (1) That the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the bill; and (2) that the court erred in dismissing ap the reasons it was never executed by Tracy, that it was a personal contract, and that it became merged into, and extinguished by, the deed subsequently made conveying the land to Tracy. The appellee further insists that, in order for an easement to pass as appurtenant to land, it must be open, visible, and continuous, and such as does not require the interference by man. We do not deem it necessary to pass upon each one of these each and all of these contentions will be given full consideration. [2] The object in construing and interpreting an instrument is to ascertain and make it speak the true intention and meaning of the parties at the time it was made, and where any doubt exists as to its sense and meaning, resort may be had to the circumstances surrounding its execution, for the purpose of ascertaining the subject-matter and the standpoint of the parties in relation thereto. Without this knowledge it would be impossible to fully understand the meaning of an instrument or the effect to be given to the words of which it is composed. Goodwillie Co. v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 Ill. 42, 89 N. E. 272. This knowledge is almost as indispensable as that of the language in which the instrument is written, and a reference to the actual condition of things at the time as they appeared to the parties themselves will often afford the court arriving at the true intent and meaning of the agreement they have made. the conveyance is made, unless a contrary intention is manifested in the grant. This doctrine has often been applied by this court. Morrison v. King, 62 Ill. 30; Clarke v. Gaffeney, 116 Ill. 362 [6 N. E. 689]; Newell v. Sass, 142 Ill. 104 [31 N. E. 176]; Hankins v. Hendricks, 247 Ill. 517 [93 N. E. 428]." The following are a few of the cases which will illustrate how that doctrine has been applied by the courts in analogous cases: In Larsen v. Petersen, 53 N. J. Eq. 88, 30 Atl. 1094, it was held that a water pipe [3, 4] By referring to the situation of the parties and the condition of the premises at the time appellant became a purchaser of the same, we find she had been a tenant thereof for some years, the length of time not being stated in the bill, and during all of that time had used and enjoyed all of the privileges which she now claims as an easement appurtenant to her premises. In purchasing the property she had a right to as-leading from a driven well in a yard to a sume and expect she was buying it in its then condition and would have the right to use and enjoy all of those necessary conveniences which had been placed thereon by the owner and were used in connection therewith and were recognized by the owner as being appurtenant to the premises and passing with a lease under which she had enjoyed the same as a tenant. The rule is, where the owner of lands divides his property into two parts and disposes of one part, he by implication includes in his grant all such easements in the remaining part as were necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the part which he grants in the form in "If the owner of lånd devises a system of which it was at the time he transferred the pipes or conduits through which water is conproperty; the general rule of law being that, yeyed from a spring on one portion of his premises to another portion for the benefit of the when a party grants a thing, he by implica- latter and then alienates the portion to which tion grants whatever is incident to it and the water is thus conveyed, the right to renecessary to its beneficial enjoyment. New-ceive water through such pipes or conduits over ell v. Sass, 142 Ill. 104, 31 N. E. 176; Keegan the land conveyed will pass to the grantee by general words.' v. Kinnare, 123 III. 280, 14 N. E. 14; Foote V. Yarlott, supra; Feitler v. Dobbins, 263 Ill. 78, 104 N. E. 1088; Martin v. Murphy, 221 Ill. 632, 77 N. E. 1126; Hankins v. Hendricks, 247 Ill. 517, 93 N. E. 428; Powers v. Heffernan, 233 Ill. 597, 84 N. E. 661, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 523, 122 Am. St. Rep. 199. And it is not necessary that the easement claimed by the grantee be absolutely necessary to the use and enjoyment of the property; "it is sufficient if it is highly convenient and beneficial therefor." Newell v. Sass, supra; Powers v. Heffernan, supra. sink in the kitchen of a dwelling house, there ending in a pump by which water could be habitually drawn from the well to the kitchen for domestic purposes, would pass by a conveyance of the dwelling house alone by the owner of both house and yard, although the well and water pipe were both hidden from view, and that the same result would follow a simultaneous conveyance of the house to one person and the yard and well to another, if the latter took with notice of the connection between the well and pump. In this connection see, also, 14 Cyc. 1183, where the rule is stated to be as follows: In Ingals v. Plamondon, 75 Ill. 118, a furnace flue projected eight inches through The owner of the two lots In Powers v. Heffernan, supra, it was held that, where the owner of a building, upon erecting a new building on an adjoining lot, uses the stairway and hall of the old building for many years as the only means of access to the second floor of the new build Where an owner sells a portion of his land he is presumed to intend that the purchaser shall take it in its then condition. 14 Cyc. 1166. This intention is to be sought, not in the undisclosed purpose of the vendor, but in what is manifest and implied from his acts. Liquid Carbolic Co. v. Wallace, 219 Pa.ing, an easement attaches in favor of the new 457, 68 Atl. 1021, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327; Hopewell Mills v. Savings Bank, 150 Mass. 519, 23 N. E. 327, 6 L. R. A. 249, 15 Am. St. Rep. 235. In Feitler v. Dobbins, supra, the rule is stated as follows: building upon a sale of the old building, although the only reservation in the deed is the right to one-half the party wall between the two buildings. This holding is based on the principle that, where the owner of a "The law applicable to the situation here is building, while he was seised of the entire that, where the owner of entire premises ar- title, made certain arrangements with referranges for ways, light, etc., for the benefit of ence to access, heat, light, and air which are the different parts or portions of the premises, highly beneficial and convenient to the use and afterwards the premises are severed and and enjoyment of the property and enhance the title vested in separate owners, each grant will carry with it, without being specifically its value, sells a portion of the building he mentioned, the rights and burdens and advan- sells it in its then condition, and each portages imposed by the owner prior to such sev- tion of the severed premises is subject to erance. The doctrine is founded upon the principle that the conveyance of a thing imports the burdens or advantages thereby imposed a grant of it as it actually exists at the time or conferred upon the other by the owner. In Foote v. Yarlott, supra, we held that, where the owner of a flat building executed two trust deeds for the north and south halves of the building, respectively, and afterward installed a heating plant so as to heat the whole building, the heating plant be ing located on the north half, an easement was created in favor of the south half in the beneficial use and enjoyment of that part of the heating plant located in the north half, which right could be asserted by any one who might become the owner of the south half under the trust deed. It was there said: "After the trust deeds were executed, and be fore the extension of the time of payment, the owner of the property put in the steam heating plant, with its pipes and radiators, to heat the entire building. While it was designed for the benefit of every part of the building, that portion where the steam heat was generated was on the north half. If the plant had been in the building at the time of the making of the trust deeds, an easement for the enjoyment of the heating plant by any one who should become owner of the south 20 feet upon foreclosure would have passed, although not expressly stated, on the principle that when a party grants a thing he grants everything pertaining to it necessary to its enjoyment. The owner could not create any charge or easement on the north half, after the execution of the trust deeds, to the detriment of the owner of that half, but the natural conclusion would be that the installing of the heating plant subject to the right of the owner of the south half to the beneficial use of the same plant constituted an addition to the security as to the north half, and, so far as appears, that is true. The owner installed the heating plant, which increased the value of both parcels and which was necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of both, in such a way that the portion of the plant designed to generate the steam heat was on the north half, and the advantages and burdens of the arrangement attached to the property. Even more liberal principles ought to be applied in such a case than in case of the implied reservation sustained in Powers v. Heffernan, 233 Ill. 597, 84 N. E. 661, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 523, 122 Am. St. Rep. 199. In our opinion, the trust deed includes the easement of the beneficial use of that part of the heating plant located on the north 20 feet, and the owner of said north 20 feet must permit such beneficial use by any one who may become the owner of the south 20 feet under the trust deed." No distinction, in principle, exists or can be made in the application of the law of easements, between easement of heat, light, and air or of ingress and egress, and the right to the use and enjoyment of the water rights and facilities shown in the case at bar. Nor can it well be said that an easement in the beneficial use and enjoyment of the heating plant in Foote v. Yarlott, supra, was more open, visible, and continuous, and susceptible of being operated, used, and enjoyed without the interference of man, than the water facilities, pump, and engine are in the case at bar. The aid of man to put them in operation and keep them in repair is equally as necessary and essential in both cases. The above cases so conclusively answer appellee's contentions upon this question as to render a further discussion of them at this time wholly unneces As to the rights conferred, if any, by the supposed contract between appellee and Tracy, appellee insists that it never became a binding contract, for the reason that it was never fully executed by the parties, as it was never signed by Tracy, and there is no allegation in the bill that after it was signed by appellee it was delivered to, and accepted by, Tracy or acted upon by him as a binding contract. If it was never executed by the parties or acted upon by them it would not constitute a binding contract and no rights were conferred by it. It appears that upon the same day the contract was signed by appellee he executed a warranty deed conveying all of the lands mentioned in the contract to said Tracy, and if it ever did become a binding contract it was fully executed on the same day it was made, in so far as the conveyance of the land therein described and agreed to be conveyed was concerned. Just what part this contract was intended to play, if any, in the transaction consummated that day is not made clear by anything contained in the record, and in view of appellee's insistence that it never became a binding contract and its incomplete and only partial execution, which tends very strongly to support his contention, we feel we ought not at this time to attempt to determine its effect upon the rights of the parties in the transaction had on that day. We are unable to perceive why the contract was drawn at all and signed by appellee, unless there was a definite purpose on his part to place something in existence from which a prospective purchaser of the property might be led (or misled) into believing, without carefully investigating the legal force and effect of such writing, that the right to use the water went with the property mentioned in the contract. contract does, however, at least show, wholly irrespective of the question as to whether or not it ever became a binding obligation, that appellee fully recognized the burden imposed by him upon his adjoining lands by reason of the water facilities he had installed for the purpose of supplying the property now owned by appellant with water for domestic and other uses, and would seem to have been intended to enable him to relieve his adjoining property of the burden of this easement just as soon as adequate water facilities should be afforded by the installation of water mains in Deerpath avenue by the public authorities. But, however that may be, the only question before us for determination at this time is the sufficiency of the allegations of the bill to entitle appellant to the relief prayed. As we are clearly of the opinion that the allegations of the bill are sufficient in this respect, the decree of the circuit court of Lake county must be reversed, and the cause remanded. The For the reasons given, the decree will be reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court of Lake county, with directions |