Williamsburgh side of the river; on the outer side of the Oneota lay a float or stage, made fast to the Oneota, upon which the men were standing while the repairs were being made; the pier immediately above the Oneota extends more than one hundred feet into the East river, at right angles with the bulkhead or wharf to which the Oneota was made fast; and at the time of the collision, a plank run from the pier to the stern of the Oneota, upon which the workmen passed and repassed while the repairs were going on. There was no controversy about the facts thus far. The answer of the respondents admits that they are the owners of the steamboat Chelsea, and by way of defense, the answer alleges that at the time of the supposed collision, the tide was running strong flood, and from the formation of the docks, vessels bound up the East river would set in to where the Oneota lay. They allege further, and make it a prominent part of the defense, that the Oneota was in an improper place, and that she had and detained alongside a stage or float, which could and should have been removed. It appears in evidence that, at twelve o'clock at noon, the steamboat Chelsea was at or near the Navy Yard, and in an eddy outside of the current of the river, where she took in tow the schooner Louisa of two hundred tons burthen, and making fast his tow upon the starboard side of the Chelsea, put on steam for pier No. 9, down East river at flood tide running up East river, that when the Chelsea with her tow struck the tide, she was heading on her proper course down East river, but not being on strong headway, the tide struck her, turning her head up East river, out of her proper course; and to bring her back, the wheels of the Chelsea and the Louisa were put hard astarboard. The flood tide proved too strong and was rapidly carrying the Chelsea and the Louisa upon the long pier above the Oneota, and to prevent this, and to save the Chelsea and Louisa from this disaster, the Chelsea ported her wheel to wear round, and pass the pier upon her larboard side. But the scanty room and the strong tide, operating together, the Chelsea with her tow, were taken directly upon the Oneota, and her float produced the damage set forth in the libel. Substantially these are the facts and the case is to be decided by the law arising on these facts. It is a controversy regarding the law, rather than a controversy as to the facts of the case. Then, according to the rules of law, where is the fault? The only fact about which there can be said to be any serious dispute, is as to the position of the Oneota at the time of the collision. The answer alleges, as has already been stated, that her position was an improper one; but the weight of the evidence establishes beyond doubt that she was in a proper place, a usual place for steamboats to be made fast for repairs and for other purposes, and the court so finds the fact. The Oneota then was not in fault. The damage was incurred by the Chelsea, but whether she is responsible depends on another inquiry. Was the collision the result of inevitable accident, or the force of the tide, without any want of skill or mismanagement on the part of the master of the Chelsea? If so, then there can be no claim for damage in this case. This is the principal inquiry, and in order to dispose of this question satisfactorily, it will be necessary to recur to the position of the Chelsea before she weighed her anchor, to the state of the tide and current, the knowledge of their power upon a vessel at its full strength, and then the manoeuvring of the Chelsea up to the time of the collision. The Chelsea was at anchor in the Wallabout bay, with the schooner Louisa made fast upon her starboard side; she was destined with her tow down East River to pier No. 9. The master of the Chelsea was an experienced pilot, accustomed to pilotage on the East River, and must be presumed to know the course and power of the tides and currents in the immediate vicinity of his steamboat. And the court is not left in doubt as to this knowledge, because, in the answer it is alleged and sustained by the oath of the party, "that at the time the tide was running strong flood, and from the formation of the docks there, setting vessels bound up the river into where the Oneota lay." On this point the evidence stands uncontradicted; that the Chelsea left her moorings at about twelve o'clock at noon, at flood tide, with her heavy tow on her starboard side, and pushed into this strong flood tide rnnning up the East River; and heading the Chelsea down the river, this strong flood tide struck her bows, and sheared her up the river in spite of her steam, and her helm hove hard to starboard. From the knowledge which every skilful pilot should possess of these influences, it must be deemed imprudent and unskilful in the master of the Chelsea to have left her moorings at that time, and in that state of the tide, particularly with so little headway on his boat. His boat thereupon became unmanageable. Sound judgment should have dictated a much safer course in waiting for a change of the tide, or of adopting the other alternative of getting up more steam and headway before throwing his boat into this strong flood tide. Then it is quite evident that the Louisa should have been taken in tow on the larboard side of the Chelsea, where the tide would have had much less power upon her, driving both out of their course. The next error committed by the Chelsea was in attempting to wear around by putting his wheel aport, after coming into the strong flood tide, setting his boat up the river. A much more safe and judicious movement should have been ordered by the master of the Chelsea, and that was, to have steered his boat up the river until she could have reached an easy point in the river, where he might have wore the ship to the larboard. Had this been adopted, the master would have sufficient headway on his boat to have regained his intended course in the direction of pier No. 9. But this was not done, and the master of the Chelsea ported his wheel to wear round to regain his intended course down the river. He assigns as a reason for this manœuvre, that he might have run foul of the end of the long pier, and injured, and perhaps sunk, his own boat. This was an insufficient reason; first, because by any proper skill, the Chelsea might have been carried up the river past the pier; and if his wheel had been kept hard astarboard she would have gone clear, with very little loss of time; and second, the reason was insufficient, because no man has a right to destroy his neighbor's property in saving his own. It is not only illegal, but immoral, to avoid an impending disaster, and throw it upon another. Suppose the Chelsea had, in that critical moment, yielded to this law of morality, and permitted herself to run foul of the pier, when, according to the convictions of her master, this was inevitable, what would have been the consequences? The Oneota would have been saved, and the Chelsea would have received the damage. It is believed that such a result might have been quite as consistent as to have shifted the misfortune from the wrong doer to an innocent party. To save the Chelsea from this disaster, she is rounded to, by order of the master, for that avowed object, when the consequences of a collision with the Oneota were even to him certain. It would have been more magnanimous, and I think much more just, for the Chelsea to have taken the risk of running foul of the pier herself; but even that might have been avoided if the master, instead of rounding to, had kept up the river, and saved both. But there is still another error, too manifest to be passed over. The moment the Chelsea found herself unmanageable, with these difficulties in her way, she should have let go her anchor, and that of the schooner also, and remained until the tide should favor her escape from hazard to herself and danger to others. This was neither done nor attempted. But it is said on the defense, that these were only errors in judgment, and that by the laws of the sea, a master is not required absolutely to adopt such course as to avoid the danger, but will be justified in doing that which at the time he honestly believes will be best; and to sustain this position, the case of Jonathan Crocket vs. the steamboat Isaac Newton, has been cited. The steamboat Isaac Newton in that case was justified, because the master of the schooner pushed her out into the tide without any wind to fill her sails, so that being entirely helpless, through the unskillful and imprudent conduct of the master of the schooner, the collision took place. That case, in principle, is like the present, and so far from aiding the defense, sustains most fully the libel in this case. As in that, there was want of prudence and skill in the master when she left a place of safety at such a time of tide and no wind to give his vessel steerage way, so in this there was want of prudence and skill in going into the tide at such a time. This was the first great error of the Chelsea, and as this was followed up by the subsequent errors, which, in my judgment were palpable errors, she must be deemed in fault, and the decree must be for libelants with an order of reference. LIBEL IN REM FOR WAGES. Robert J. McKenzie vs. the brig Richmond.-The libelant bring this suit to recover of the respondent as owner of the brig Richmond, five months' wages as master, to wit: From November 4th, 1847, to April 4th, 1848, at the rate of $50 per month $260 00 87 00 Balance..... $167 00 Wages as mate of the same brig at $30 per month, from April 4th, 1848, to November 14th, 1849, 19 months and 10 days.. $580 00 Wages as mate of the same brig from May 27th, 1850, to January 28th, 1851, 8 months, at $30.. $240 00 Wages as mate of the same brig from January 28th, 1851, to April 9th, 1851, at $35 per month, 2 months and 12 days... $83 94 $903 94 60 75 Total.. Deduct the credit.. This is the amount of the claim, and interest to be added..... $843 19 Means & Clark, of Boston, owners of the brig Richmond, come in and defend the claim, and they admit in their answer that the libelant hath demanded of them payment of this claim, as alleged in the libel, and that payment was refused, but the respondents deny all knowledge of the services charged against their brig; and they allege if services were performed as master or mate, that the same were rendered on the personal credit of William McKenzie, the former owner of the brig, and father of the libelant, and that no credit whatever was, by the libelant, ever given to the brig, and that no services were, by the libelant, performed for the brig or on her account. It is further alleged in the answer, that William McKenzie, of the State of Maine, while building this brig, received advancements in money to enable him to build said brig, and said advancements were made at the request, and with the knowledge of this libelant, to his father, William McKenzie; and that on account of such advancements to William McKenzie, he did, in the month of September, 1847, execute and deliver to Means & Clark a bill of sale of half of the said brig; and afterwards, to wit, on the 13th of May, 1850, said William McKenzie executed and delivered to Means & Clark a bill of sale of the other half of said brig, all of which was then well known to this libelant. The proof in the case, to sustain the libel, comes from the father of the libelant, William McKenzie, whose deposition has been read in evidence, and this deposition, uncontradicted and unexplained, goes far to sustain the allegations in the libel, and indeed supports it at all points. But the court cannot overlook the circumstances and proofs which counteract the influence of that testimony. These circumstances and proofs satisfy the court that the demand set up in the libel is an unjust demand. The legal presumption is that the wages have been paid by the freight money earned on the several voyages performed by the brig. It is an equitable presumption also that the wages are not due. The libelant was agent of the father who procured the advancements to be made to him by Means and Clark to build the brig, and there has been satisfactory proof in the case that the earnings of the brig were to be paid over to Means & Clark, in the reduction of these advancements. This has not been done. The libelant was privy to that arrangement, and being master or mate of the brig, and constantly engaged in all matters with regard to the brig, with his father, it is fair to presume that this libelant was performing his services for the father to carry out the stipulations and understandings of the parties, that the earnings of the brig should be applied to reduce the debt of Means & Clark. This idea is strongly confirmed by the fact that when each bill of sale was executed by William McKenzie to Means & Clark, that no mention was made by this libelant that he held a claim on the vessel. It is a general principle, founded on law and equity, recognized by all courts, that when a person stands by and witnesses the transfer of property from one man to another, and withholds all information of a claim of his own, he loses his right to the property thus transferred. He is bound, in such a case, to give notice of his claim, that the purchaser may not be deceived by his silence. In the present case, the libelant is the agent to procure the respondents to advance their money to his father on the credit of the brig; he undertakes, with his father, to aid in paying off this money, and then he stands by and sees the father transfer the brig to Means & Clark, without intimating any claim in his own behalf, and they take the brig as security for their debt. It is too late for the libelant to set up a prior right to that which he has himself aided, and as may be truly said, has been the principal instrument in placing on the brig, while he has permitted his own claim to lay dormant until the vessel passes into the hands of an innocent purchaser without notice. The father and son have so demeaned themselves, in regard to the claimants' rights, that it would be a fraud now to seek to divert the claimants of their title to the vessel. The libel must be dismissed with cost. LETTERS OF CREDIT. A case was recently determined in the Lord Mayor's Court, (London,) involving a case of great commercial importance. The subjoined statement of the case is copied from the London Times: An American gentleman bought for cash a circular letter of credit from a mercantile firm in the city, addressed to their agents on the Continent, and this document authorized the various houses to whom it was addressed to honor his drafts. Shortly afterward a house at the West-end, which had some disputed accounts with him, lodged an attachment with the London firm on the funds which they had thus received for the sale of the letter, upon the plea that the transaction was a simple deposit, and that the money so attached still belonged to the person who had paid it to them, and that they, the garnishees or issuers of the credit, incurred no responsibility until they came under acceptance. It was also contended that after the attachment was lodged, the garnishees could not accept and pay the defendant's bills, except in their own wrong. The garnishees, on the other hand, maintained that the sum handed them was the purchase-money for the letter of credit; that it was as complete a sale as if the article bought had been goods; that there is no essential difference between giving an acceptance at once for the amount and an engagement to accept and pay whenever called upon, and hence that the money ceased to be the accredited. party's, directly he received the garnishees' engagement in exchange. Three points were submitted by the Recorder to the jury, all of which were decided in favor of the garnishees, but the only one of any public interest was the finding by the jury that the money passed absolutely to the garnishees in exchange for their credit; that it simultaneously ceased to be the defendant's, and consequently was not attachable. This result is very satisfactory, since, if the suit had gone the other way, it would then be held that the article acquired, and the money paid for it, both remained the property of the purchaser-that an engagement to accept and pay is only binding if a subsequent claimant does not step in-and that a person who fancies he has a demand can, by a simple affidavit of debt, make the issuers of the credit break their engagement to the accredited party. Under circumstances of this kind, moreover, a traveler might find himself at the other end of Europe with his funds suddenly cut off, through the agency of a court which takes no cognizance of the justice or injustice of the claim. The decision, in short, harmonizes with the practice of bankers who issue these documents. Any other interpretation would put an end to such credits, since no one abroad would advance upon them. It would also tend to lessen traveling, as people would have to carry all their money about with them, exposed to the chances of loss or robbery. BILL OF LADING, QUANTITY, RIGHT TO PAY FREIGHT ON OVERPLUS WHEN CARGO IS NOT DAMAGED. For the subjoined decision, which is of some importanee to the grain and shipping trades, we are indebted to the Mercantile Journal, one of the best conducted commercial papers published in the United Kingdom. The case (Barker vs. Ballentines) was decided in the Londonderry Assizes. This was an action of assumpsit, brought before Chief Justice Monahan by the plaintiff, a ship owner in North Shields, against the defendants, corn merchants in Derry, to recover a balance of £284 5s. 10d., freight and demurrage of a vessel called the Penelope. The defendants pleaded to general issue as to those counts of the declaration which claimed demurrage, and a tender of £246 1s. 1d. to those for freight. The ship had been chartered by the Messrs. Ralli, of London, to bring a cargo of Indian corn from Odessa to a safe port in the United Kingdom, calling at Cork or Falmouth for orders; forty-five days allowed for loading and unloading, and ten additional days for demurrage, at £5 per day under the charter party. The defendants were assignees of the bill of lading, which, referring to the charter party, computed the amount of the cargo at 2,325 qrs. in good order, mentioning also that twenty-seven days were consumed in loading, and containing before the captain's signature the words "quantity and quality unknown." The vessel, on her arrival in Cork, was ordered by the defendants to Derry, which she reached on the 24th April last; and on the following morning, at nine P. M., the captain gave notice to the defendants that the ship was cleared at the custom house, and that "this was the first of her lay days, having only eighteen running days to go," and expressing a hope that the defendants would not keep her beyond her time. The ship accordingly commenced unloading on the 7th, but whether before or after twelve o'clock was left rather in doubt by the evidence; and the plaintiff, therefore, gave up that day as one of the running days. The ship was finally discharged on the 27th of April, the captain having given notice in writing to the defendants on the 24th that the lay days had expired on the 23d, and that he would claim for demurrage. The plaintiff's right to this demurrage was one of the questions in the case, and a good deal of conflicting evidence was offered on the one side to show that the delay in unloading was caused by the plaintiff, and on the other that it was the fault of the defendants. The chief justice, on this part of the case, left it to the jury to say whether the cargo might have been discharged in the eighteen days, and by whose fault the additional days were required. On this point the jury found for the defendants. They also found for the defendants on the plea of tender, on which the most conflicting evidence was offered. Two tenders were relied on for the defendants. One alleged to be made by defendant offering his check to plaintiff's son, and which he swore the latter consented to receive if made in gold. The other a tender in gold, made subsequent. ly by the defendants' attorney, to Mr. Nesbitt, as representing the plaintiff's attorney, but which his lordship decided to be bad, thinking that a tender even to the plaintiff's attorney before action would be bad, as to a person having no authority to receive it. The main question was, as to the sufficiency in amount of the tender. On this part of the case it was proved for the plaintiff that the quantity of the cargo really amounted to 2,385 quarters, being 60 quarters in excess of the bill of lading, 27 quarters of this surplus being admittedly damaged; and it was urged that both from the fact of the bill of lading containing the words "quantity and quality unknown," and also by the custom of the port of Londonderry, which was for the first time distinctly proved, the plaintiff was entitled to recover full freight on all the corn delivered in good order, and half freight on that which was damaged, but still saleable. This, deducting payment by defendants on account, made the plaintiff's demand for freight, without demurrage, £258 10s. 3d., exceeding the defendants' tender by £11 9s. 2d. To meet this case the defendants contended that they were not bound to pay the freight for more than the quantity in the bill of lading; and they also produced evidence to show |