In our last article we brought the history of Prussia down to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle-the famous Treaty which suspended war, but so far from removing the causes of war, left undressed those wounds, which festered in silence. Yet with every counteractive, Christian Europe had, in all its extent, relations and population, progressed in melioration; though in political and military points of view, that fine section of the earth was divided into two great factions. One included, as the most powerful nucleus, Austria with part of Germany, Russia, Great Britain, Holland and Sardinia; the other, France, Spain, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Prussia and Sweden. We state these two great combinations as general, only. Diversity of national interest, language, position, and what still had great influence politically, religion, prevented either unity of views or concert in action. Suspicion reigned with more or less force over Europe, and delayed only to render war more general and inveterate. Without extending our views to Spain and Italy, too weak, divided, and distant from Prussia, we must confine our views to those states with which the Prussian monarch had relations more intimate, or rivalries more imminent.

France, in all the elements of power and advance in civilization, stood at the head of Europe; and its most vital interest called the French nation to support the King of Prussia. Louis XV,, still in the flower of his age, might and ought to have been the arbiter of Europe; but, careless rather than weak, and with a court whose policy was pleasure and object wealth, national and foreign interests were neglected, and of course misunderstood, he was consequently inefficient in war, and unsafe and changeful in alliance and in peace.

Great Britain, from insular position, freedom of the people, extended commerce, and rising arts, was, in proportion to extent of territory and population, the most powerful European state, and had, more than any other state of Europe, the means to choose peace or war. Interests of every kind, and the family alliance of their monarchs, rendered the connection

of Great Britain and Prussia natural as that of family; but the hatred of George II. to his brother-in-law, Frederic William, was extended to Frederic II., and prevented any cordiality between either the nations or their rulers.

The great rival of Prussia, Austria, with wounds not yet staunched, received in the two recent Silesian wars, though possessed of resources too vast to sink, needed repose and renovation; and the young and energetic female sovereign seemed to breathe her spirit over the whole empire. The first interest of all states, the finances, had to recover from the dilapidations of war, and a system more uniform to be established over an empire so heterogeneous in its political and national organization. This was effected, and in the interval between the close of the second Silesian war, and the commencement of that of seven years, a most rapid augmentation was plished in the finances of Austria.

accom

At that time Austria possessed one of those men who only appear when needed

Leopold Count Daun-cool, calm and collected as Fabius, and as keen to avail himself of every fault of an enemy as Cæsar. To him after the Treaty of Aix-laChapelle, was confided the arduous and necessary task of reorganizing the Austrian army. Composed of Germans, Bohemians, Hungarians, Italians, Croats, and other nations of less note, all brave and war-like, but differing not only in language, but each having their own military habits, it was no ordinary task to reduce them, even when united into one army, to any effective system; and though much was done in the intermediate time, the organization of the Austrian military force was, until about the close of the French Revolution, far behind that of Prussia.

Count Kaunitz-Rietberg was in the cabinet what Daun was in the fieldan able diplomatist, truly Austrian in inflexibility, with an appearance of levity. Possessing, perhaps, more general political knowledge than any other man of his time; the real rival of Frederic in conceiving and counteracting the designs of other cabinets, and mortal personal enemies of each other, Kaunitz and Fred

eric were respectively the master-spirits which raised and guided the coming

storm.

To gain France to their party was the culminating policy of both Prussia and Austria, and history records no other instance of political folly worse than France perpetrated in throwing her weight into the Austrian scale. To show on what petty and unworthy trifles depends the fate of nations, we present the reader with the following, from Paganel: "Repulsed at Aix-la-Chapelle, the plan of an alliance with France was not abandoned by Maria Theresa, and, warmly urged by Kaunitz, every available measure was adopted to accomplish the object. To succeed, it was necessary to extinguish that inveterate hatred which, since the times of Francis I. and Charles V., had animated the houses of Bourbon and Hapsburg, and also to excite and magnify fears of the aggrandizement of Prussia, and the ambition of its king. Never was an enterprise pursued with more craft and perseverance. Among the means employed to obtain the ends, history reproaches Maria Theresa with her guilty complaisances, and letters shamefully adulatory, and in which she did not blush to give a Marquise de Pompadour the title of FRIEND. What did it cost a pious princess, and chaste wife, to descend to so degrading a

course?"*

What a contrast with Frederic! whose caustic outpourings of contempt, however, cost him dear, though securing lasting honor to his name. While the Empressqueen was courting the favorite, Frederic forbade his ambassador, Baron de Knyphausen, to see her. The resentment of the all-powerful Marquise was vented indirectly on France. It may be noted as among the characteristic circumstances in the career of Frederic, that while admired as he generally was by even his enemies, he gained the mortal hatred of the two most worthless, though powerful, ministers in Europe-Count Bruhl in Saxony, and Bestuchef in Russia. In France he had the nation to encounter, against its every interest, to gratify the mistress of the king and people, Madame de Pompadour. Some of his satirical remarks, too true not to be felt, cost the Prussian king the enmity of the Empress of all the Russias,

Elizabeth, who had too much of her father, Peter the Great, in her composi tion, to admit her resentment to be contemned. To the list of his personal and inveterate enemies, again, might be added the Empress-queen of Hungary, Maria Theresa. Of the Empress of Germany, however, Frederic always spoke respectfully as to the others, if he deigned to notice them, it was in terms which went to the heart. But to return to matters of more importance.

The attempts of Austria to gain an offensive and defensive alliance with France, we have noticed—an object also sought, but with far less ardor, by Prussia. The real interest of France at the time was neutrality, and her power, morally directed, would have preserved the peace of Europe. The intricate condition of state policy prevented Frederic from any immediate renewal of his alliance with France, but rather inclined him to seek a closer connection with Great Britain. The Treaty of Versailles expired in May, 1756, and in the same month and year the first treaty of defensive alliance was concluded between France and Austria. Frederic-from whose vigilance no great movement could be concealed, however secretly planned-almost invariably anticipated his enemies both in diplomacy and war. Perfectly aware that war between France and Great Britain was inevitable and imminent, and that he could not form a defensive treaty with one without being embroiled with the other, he chose the English side, and on the 16th January, 1756, entered into a defensive treaty with George II.

The false position of France at this eventful crisis is thus noticed by Heeren: "Thus in this treaty, (that between France and Austria,) truly extraordinary, Austria stipulated in her favor all the advantages which could accrue; and conceded none to France, if it may be excepted, the very little honor to which the latter might pretend in its concurrence in the ruin of an enemy, and the future concurrence with its ally in the domination of Europe. Setting these calculations aside, the great error of France on this occasion did not consist so much in signing a treaty, leaving to her only the consequent expenses, as in consenting to give a public recantation of policy which had

These were the opening scenes of a series, which Heeren most emphatically and truly observes, "that the history of the campaigns of Frederic during the course of the war of seven years, was, without doubt, one of the most interesting and instructive, at once for the historical reader or tactician, which ever occurred. Ordinary political interest, and the negotiations of cabinets, were in great part suspended during this period. But a spectacle of an infinitely higher interest fixed the attention of Europe -a sovereign of a comparatively small nation, struggling almost alone against all the surrounding states, supporting reverses with firmness, and neglecting no means to obtain compensating victory." The occupation of Saxony, and the victory at Lowositz, roused the feelings of jealousy against Prussia so artfully excited by Austria, whose influence brought France into activity, and drew with their joint power Sweden and the German Circles into the coalition; and at the opening of the great campaign of 1757, Germany had to sustain, at least, three hundred thousand men in hostile array, without including the menaced invasion from Sweden.

Happily for Prussia, France attacked England in Hanover, and the British Cabinet had the rare good fortune or wisdom to commit the defence to an able German general-a disciple, friend and devoted admirer of Frederic-Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. This choice was not made, however, until defeat taught the necessity. The French army entered Hanover, in July, 1757, under the command of Marshal d'Estrées, and on the 26th of the same month defeated the English and Hanoverians at Hastenbeck under the Duke of Cumberland; who also most shamefully surrendered his army on the 8th of September following, by the convention of Closter Seven. These disasters secured the command of the English and their German allies to Prince Ferdinand, who very rapidly changed the course of vic

torv.

Though rather accessory than really allied, the campaigns of Prince Ferdinand had great effect in securing a final triumph to the King of Prussia. One extended frontier of Prussia was thus protected, and a large part of the French army diverted from invading Prussia itself. Ferdinand took the command of the army late in 1757, and maintained a winter campaign, 1757-8-disregarded the con

vention of Closter Seven, repulsed the French from Hanover, crossed the Rhine early in 1758, gained the battle of Creveldt on the 23d of June. In 1759, he defeated the French under Marshal Centades at Minden, on the first of August. In fine, he maintained in his sphere the superiority through 1760 and 1761. This rapid sketch of the operations under the Duke of Brunswick is given, as necessary to explain the effect of the quasi alliance between the governments of Great Britain and Prussia on the issue of the Seven Years' War. We now return to the operations of Frederic.

With all the advantages secured to the King of Prussia by the successful movements and victories of the united English and German armies, under the Duke of Brunswick, his situation in the early part of 1757 was perilous in the extreme. To more than three-fold their numbers, the Prussians could only oppose one hundred and eighty thousand men along the vast line from Bohemia to Prussian Poland. On the side of Prussia were, however, two inappreciable advantages: first, unity of design, and second, a leader rendered firm by misfortune-a leader whose equanimity of mind remained unaltered in victory or defeat. Against him stood an immensely superior physical force, but a force disunited in views and interests as much, if not more, than nationally, though nominally united by treaties.

The Austrian armies under Marshal Brown, commander-in-chief, and the able and wily Daun, had never been before so numerous, well disciplined, or, in any near degree, as ably commanded. Another great change in favor of Austria, was its new and vigorous cabinet, at the head of which was, in reality, the young, energetic, and fearless Maria Theresa. To gratify her husband, the empress nominally put at the head of the Austrian army his brother Charles, but availed herself of the first opportunity which gave fair excuse to give the supreme military direction to Brown, and after his death to Daun.

Thus opened 1757; and though far inferior in number to the masses opposed to him, the King of Prussia gained by rapid and skillful movements what was wanting in physical force. With a well-concerted plan of operations, and complete mutual understanding of their respective movements, the Prussians, in March, 1757, entered the north-western side of Bohemia,

In their respective evolutions, Prague seemed a common focus of attraction to both armies, as through the month of April they gradually concentrated near that city, up to the 6th of May, when the great battle was fought, known as "the battle of Prague." In this remarkable_conflict, though inferior in number, the Prussians gained a complete victory on the field; but in its consequences, the advantages were, if not balanced, very doubtful as to which side they preponderated. Prince Charles of Lorraine assumed the command in chief on the 30th of April, with eighty thousand men against sixty thousand under Frederic, and was out-generaled and defeated. The Em press-queen, who seemed never to have had any very great confidence in the military talents of her brother-in-law, took advantage of the occasion, and deprived him of the command in chief, and raised to that important post Leopold Count Daun, the only general who was ever opposed to Frederic, who could in point of military talents approach, to any near comparison, his great opponent.

The battle of Prague was remarkable, besides its immense political consequences, for the death of the seconds in command of both armies. On the side of the Prussians, Marshal Schwerin was killed on the field; and on that of the Austrians, Marshal Brown was mortally wounded, and died in Prague a few weeks after the battle. Daun, now at the head of the Austrian army, took position at Kollin, about twenty miles east of Prague, concentrated the various Austrian corps, and was there, in a camp fortified by nature and art, on the 18th of June, 1757, attacked by the Prussians under Frederic in person. Here, for the first time in his military career, Frederic sustained a severe defeat.

The value set by Maria Theresa on the victory at Kollin, may be estimated by the following: "It was to perpetuate the remembrance of this victory, that the Empress-queen instituted the order of MARIA THERESA. In the excess of her joy, she personally visited the Countess Daun, to

announce the victory of her husband; wishing thus to bestow unusual honors on the man who was the first to triumph over the redoubtable Frederic."

These great honors were really more due to the vanquished than to the victor, and the event rendered the defeat of the Prussians rather beneficial than detrimental. To ultimately maintain himself in Bohemia was hopeless, and the battle of Kollin hastened what must have been inevitable, and perhaps altogether ruinous in the end.

The blockade of Prague was raised, and the Prussian army fell down the Elbe towards the borders of Saxony, and there awaited ulterior operations.

At very nearly the same moment of the balancing operation in Bohemia, between the Austrians and Prussians, aserious danger threatened the latter on the opposite side of Germany. The Duke of Cumberland, still at the head of the English and German combined army, was, on the 6th of July, after the battle of Kollin, attacked and defeated by the French, commanded by Maréchal D'Estrées. Intrigues in Paris paralyzed the able general at the head of the French in Germany, and rendered null the effects of the battle of Hastenbeck. D'Estrées was recalled, and the infamous Richelieu put in his place a man who, thoughexecrable as an individual, was not devoid of military talent; and had the French power been in any serious manner exerted, the ruin of Prussia was inevitable.

Neither the defeat at Kollin nor at Hastenbeck was the most serious disaster which now clouded the fortunes of Frederic. Large detachments under his brother William were destroyed or dispersed in the month of July, 1757; and, in this disastrous conjuncture, everything seemed to conspire to the ruin of this devoted king. By the invasion of Bohemia-in the field-and by other destructive effects of war, more than half the Prussian army was no more.. The Russians, under Marshal Apraxin, entered Polish Prussia, and defeated, on the 30th of August, 1757, the Prussian army under Marshal Schwald, at Grosjagerndorf. The Swedes invaded Prussian Pomerania, but were, however, soon repulsed. one of the best Prussian generals, was defeated and mortally wounded at Goritz. Lusatia, for the moment, was lost. The whole force of Austria poured on Silesia, and to completely fill the cup of misfor

Winterfeldt,