seems to have doubted, that the encouraging domestic manufactures was a legitimate subject for the National Legislature to have power to act upon; nor did they doubt, that in giving power to Congress to lay import duties, they were giving the power to do so for the purpose of such encouragement.

Mr. Fitzsimmons "would be against a tax on exports, to be laid immediately; but was for giving a power of laying the tax when a proper time may call for it. This would certainly be the case when America should become a manufacturing country.".

Mr. Clymer introduced an amendment to the proposed article, giving power to lay an export duty, by inserting the words "for the purpose of revenue." But this amendment was rejected with out debate.

These observations and proceedings had reference to duties upon exports; while the discussions in Congress and throughout the country, for the last few years, have been in relation to duties upon articles imported. But the principle involved, so far as it affects the question of the Constitutionality of a law adjusting a scale of duties, so as to afford encouragement to domestic manufactures, is obviously the same in either case. And the debate shows, that the subject of affording such encouragement entered into the contemplations of members of the Convention.

But the great and most difficult question before the Convention-that which more than all others during the whole session agitated and divided the minds of the members, and came near, on more than one occasion, to breaking it up, and sending home the delegates in despair of agreeing upon any plan of governmenthad reference, not so much to the particular organization of the departments of the General Government and the distribution of its powers, as to the shares and parts the respective States were to to have in it, and the relation they were to bear to it; in other words, the question of "State rights." This question arose early, and it was renewed and debated again and again in different forms, and on a variety of motions and propositions, until the general outline of the system as it now exists was finally settled.

Whether the proposed General Government was to act only upon the States as political bodies, or to act directly upon the people-whether the State Governments were to be preserved as independ

ent sovereignties, or to be made mere municipal corporations under the National Legislature, consolidated into one empire; or if preserved, whether the small states were to retain their power and votes, as coequal sovereignties, with the large States, or whether the representation and votes should be proportioned to the number of people or the wealth of the State respectivelythese were some of the forms in which this difficult and troublesome subject presented itself to the minds of the Convention. It was in the midst of an agitating debate on this question, at a time when it seemed that the proceedings were about to come to a stand, and the Convention itself break up, in the hopelessness of reconciling the conflicting views of members, that Franklin introduced his memorable proposition that they should, in this their extremity, ask counsel of the Great Governor of the universe. He prefaced the motion with the following speech, which deserves to be imprinted, in durable characters, on the hearts of all legislators.

"Mr. President: The small progress we have made, after four or five weeks close attendance and continual reasonings with each other-our different sentiments on almost every question, several of the last producing almost as many noes as yeasis, methinks, a melancholy proof of the imperfection of the human understanding. We seem to feel our own want of political wisdom, since we have been running in search of it. We have gone back to ancient history for models of government, and examined the different forms of those

republics, which, having been formed with the seeds of their own dissolution, now no longer exist. And we have viewed modern states all round Europe, but find none of their constitutions suitable to our Assembly-groping, as it were, in the circumstances. In this situation of this dark to find political truth, and scarce able how has it happened, sir, that we have not to distinguish it when presented to ushitherto once thought of humbly applying to the Father of Lights, to illuminate our understandings.

In the beginning of the contest with Great Britain, when we were sensible of danger, we had daily prayer in this room for the divine protection. Our prayers, sir, were heard and they were graciously answered. All of us who were engaged in instances of a superintending Providence the struggle, must have observed frequent in our favor. To that kind Providence, we owe this happy opportunity of consulting in peace on the means of establishing our future national felicity. And have we now

forgotten that powerful friend! Or do we imagine that we no longer need his assistance! I have lived, sir, a long time: and the longer I live, the more convincing proof I see of this truth-that God governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid? We have been assured, sir, in the sacred writings, that except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain who build it. I firmly believe this; and I also believe that without his concurring aid, we shall succeed in this political building no better than the builders of Babel. We

shall be divided by our little partial local interests, our projects will be confounded, and we ourselves shall become a reproach and by-word down to future ages. And what is worse, mankind may hereafter, from this unfortunate instance, despair of establishing governments by human wisdom, and leave it to chance, war, and conquest."

A portion of the members of the Convention were hostile to the idea of a consolidated national government, one acting upon the people directly, and not upon the States; they wished to retain the principle of the Confederation, adding a few new powers to Congress to give it efficacy. Of this sentiment were the delegation from Connecticut, a majority of that from New York, and some others. Mr. Sherman thought "the objects of the Union were few: first, defence against foreign danger; secondly, against internal disputes, and a resort to force; thirdly, treaties with foreign nations; fourthly, regulating foreign commerce, and drawing revenue from it. These, and perhaps a few lesser objects, alone rendered a confederation of the States necessary. All other matters, civil and criminal, would be much better in the hands of the people." And he thought these objects could be obtained by ingrafting amendments of a federal nature into the Articles of Confederation. So also Mr. Lansing of New York, who observed" that the true question was whether the Convention would adhere to, or depart from, the foundation of the present confederacy;" and he was of opinion that the power of the Convention was restrained to amendments of a federal nature, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being. "The acts of Congress, the tenor of the acts of the States, the commissions produced by the several deputations, all proved this. And this limitation of the power to an amendment of the Confederacy, marked the opinion of the States that it was unneces

sary and improper to go further. He was sure that this was the case with his State. New York would never have concurred in sending deputies to the Convention, if she had supposed the deliberations were to turn on a consolidation of the States and a national government." Mr. Patterson, of New Jersey, and Mr. Luther Martin, also argued strenuously on the same side. They contended that the idea of a national government, as contradistinguished from a federal one, had never entered into the mind of any of the States. On the contrary, Mr. Read of Delaware favored a strong and consolidated government. "Too much attachment," said he, "is betrayed to the State governments. We must look beyond their continuance. A national government must soon of necessity swallow them all up. They will soon be reduced to the mere office of electing the national Senate. He was against patching up the old federal system; he hoped the idea would be dismissed." Mr. Hamilton also was strenu ously opposed to the idea of attempting to amend the old Confederation. He was "fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confederation, leaving the States in possession of their sovereignty, could possibly answer the purpose. The great question," he observed, " is, what provision shall we make for the happiness of the country?" He then proceeded to enumerate and illustrate some of the great essential principles which he thought necessary for the support of government. He mentioned, first, an active and constant interest in supporting it; secondly, the love of power; thirdly, an habitual attachment of the people; fourthly, force, by which may be understood a coercion of laws or coercion of arms; fifthly, influence-" he did not mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors and emoluments which produce an attachment to the government:" that " almost all the weight of these is on the side of the States, and must continue so as long as the States continue to exist. All the passions, then," he continued, "of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most individuals and all public bodies, fall into the current of the States, and do not flow into the stream of the general government. The former, therefore, will generally be an overmatch for the general government, and render any confederacy in its very nature precarious." In proof and illustration of this position, he referred to the example of the Amphictyonic Council, the German Confederacy; and the Swiss

Cantons. After commenting on the difficulties of accomplishing the just purposes of government by means of a mere confederation of states, and the still greater dangers from two sovereignties coexisting within the same limits, remarking "that the general power, if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers, otherwise must be swallowed up by them," he proceeded to say, "What then is to be done? Here he was embarrassed. The extent of the country to be governed discouraged him. The expense of a general government was also formidable, unless there was such a diminution of the expense of the State governments as the case would admit. If they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great economy might be obtained by instituting a general government. He did not mean, however, to shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On the other hand, he saw no other necessity for declining it. They are not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities, he was aware, would be necessary. These must be distinct tribunals and corporations for local purposes. But cui bono the vast and expensive apparatus now pertaining to the States?" And he introduced a plan of government conformable to his ideas.

Other members, and a majority of the Convention, took a view of the subject different from either of the foregoing advocating a middle course, to wit, the establishment of a national gov ernment which should neither absorb and abolish the State governments on the one hand, nor, on the other, leave with them so great power and freedom from control as they had under the Confederation.

Mr. Dickinson, of New Jersey, "was for a strong national government, but for leaving the States a considerable agency in the system." He considered the combination of the State governments with the national government as politic as it was unavoidable."

Mr. Madison "differed from the member from Connecticut (Mr. Sherman), in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a national government. Those were certainly important and necessary objects; but he combined with them the necessity of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of justice. Interference with these were evils which had more, per

haps, than anything else, produced this Convention." He regarded an indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a perfect system-that is, that the national gov ernment must be supreme. And he thought "there was less danger of encroachment from the general government than the State governments; and also, that the mischiefs from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former than if made by the latter."

General Pinckney "wished to have a good national government, and at the same time to leave a considerable share of power in the States." So, also, Mr. Wilson "saw no incompatibility between the national and State governments, provided the latter were restrained to certain local purposes-nor any probability of their being devoured by the former;" on the contrary, he wished to keep them from devouring the national government.

The

Mr. Mason said :-" Whatever power may be necessary for the national government, a certain portion must necessarily be left with the States. It is impossible for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the United States, so as to carry equal justice with them. State Legislatures ought also to have some means of defending themselves against encroachments of the national government." Other members expressed similar opinions; while Mr. Bedford thought there was no middle course between a perfect consolidation and a mere confederation of the States; that the first was out of the question, and in the latter they must continue, if not perfectly, yet equally, sovereign.”

The particular practical question which oftener than any other brought out these expressions of opinion, was the difficult one concerning the rule of representation and of voting in the national Congress. The conflict here was mainly between the large and the small States, the former contending that the representation should be proportioned to the number of the population or the quotas of contribution among the States respectively-that this was the only fair and rational mode of representation-that the allowing each State to have an equal vote under the Confederacy was no precedent for them to follow, it having been adopted and submitted to on the part of the great States only from necessity-that it was unreasonable that a State with a large population and great wealth should have no more influence in the national councils

than a small and poor State-that the vote of an individual man living in a large State ought to have as much influence as that of one living in a small State, which would not be the case unless there were a proportional representation.

On the contrary, it was insisted with great zeal and earnestness on the part of the smaller States, that the States were all alike independent sovereignties, and were therefore all equal, and entitled to an equal vote in the general Congress; that this was just, and according to the principles of international law-that this principle was adopted into the Confederacy, not from necessity, as had been said, but from a sense of its inherent justice, the same reason which had established it among the elements of the law of nations--that "there was no more reason that a great individual State, contributing much, should have more votes than a small one, contributing little, than that a rich individual citizen should have more votes than an indigent one "that if the large States contributed more to the general government, so they had more to be protected by it, than the small States--that if the large States were allowed an influence in proportion to their magnitude, they would control the affairs of the whole country, appoint the officers, and destroy and defeat the independence of the small States -that the small States "would sooner submit to a foreign power, than submit to be deprived, in both branches of the Legislature, of an equality of suffrage, and thereby be thrown under the dominion of the larger States."

On this matter Doctor Franklin remarked characteristically: "The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a proportional representation takes place, the small States contend that their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be put in its place, the larger States say their money will be in danger. When a board table is to be made, and the edges of plank do not fit, the artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint. In like manner here, both sides must part with some of their demands, in order that they may join in some accommodating proposition." He then suggested a compromise. A compromise, as is well known, was afterwards agreed upon, by which the States were to retain an equality of representation in one branch of the national Legislature, while the representation was to be proportioned to the number of people in the States respectively in the other.

Thus in these great questions of the shares which the respective States were to have in the general government, and the relation they were to stand in to itwhich so much agitated and divided the minds of the members, and threatened at times to defeat the whole plan of a national government--the Convention happily hit upon and pursued a just middle way, unattempted before in the history of nations. They proposed to themselves and solved the great problem of a Republic, embracing a vast extent of territory, reconciling an effective, self-sustaining national government, with the individuality, independence and reignty of the respective States.

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After the form of the constitution had been agreed upon, and it was ascertained that no further material amendments or modifications could be carried, it became an object to have those members who dissented from its provisions, sign the Constitution, in order that it might go forth to the country bearing on its face the unanimous approval of the Convention. Those members who finally objected to it, and who expressed their objections as insuperable, wished, nevertheless, that another Convention might be called, fresh from the people, with ample powers, thinking that, in that mode a government might be formed more acceptable and more beneficial to the country, than was to be obtained from the present Convention. But the majority thought otherwise; they believed that if a Constitution was not now formed, it never could be, and that the one before them, though not the precise plan which any one member would have preferred in all its parts, was, nevertheless, as a plan of compromises, the best that could be adopted, and was on the whole, a practicable and beneficial form of united government for the country. Various arguments and persuasions were addressed to the dissentient members, to prevail on them to accept and recommend to their respective constituencies the proposed form, trusting to time and future amendments for such alterations as they might desire. Dr. Franklin confessed there were several parts of the Constitution he did not then approve, but he was not sure he never should approve them-for in his long life, he had experienced many instances of being obliged by better information or fuller consideration, to change his opinions on important subjects. "In these sentiments, he agreed to the Constitution, with all its faults, if they were faults, be

cause he thought a general government necessary for us, and there is no form of government, but what may be a blessing to the people if well administered; and he believed further, that this was likely to be well administered for a course of years, and could only end in despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people shall become so corrupted, as to need despotic government, being incapable of any other." After saying that he "consented to this Constitution, because he expected no better, and because he was not sure it was not the best," he concluded by urging "every member who still had any objections to it, with him on that occasion, to doubt a little of his own infallibility, and to make manifest their unanimity by putting his name to the instrument." Mr. Gouverneur Morris said, "that he too had objections; but considering the present plan the best that was to be attained, he should take it with all its faults. The majority had determined in its favor, and by that determination he should abide. The moment this plan goes forth, all other considerations will be laid aside, and the great question will be, shall there be a national government or not? and this must take place, or a general anarchy will be the alternative." Mr. Hamilton “ expressed his anxiety that every member should sign. A few characters of consequence, by opposing or even refusing to sign the Constitution, might do infinite mischief, by building the latent sparks that lurk under an enthusiasm in favor of the Convention, which may soon subside. No man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his were known to be; but is it possible to deliberate between anarchy and convulsion on one side, and the chance of good to be expected from the plan on the other." Other members urged similar considerations to persuade to unanimity, but without avail. The dissentient members found their objections insurmountable. These members were Mr. Randolph, the mover of the original resolutions, Mr. Mason and Mr. Gerry-two of the delegates from New York, Messrs. Lansing and Yates, having previously withdrawn from the Convention. Mr. Randolph "admitted that in refusing to sign, he took a step, which might be the most awful of his life; but it was dictated by his conscience, and it was not possible for him to hesitate, much less to change. He repeated also his persuasion, that holding out this plan, with a final alternative to the people of accepting or re

jecting it in toto, would really produce the anarchy and civil convulsions, which were apprehended from the refusal of individuals to sign it." Mr. Gerry described the painful feelings of his situation, but was obliged "to declare on this occasion, his fears that a civil war might result from the present crisis of the United States. In Massachusetts, particularly, he saw the danger of this calamitous event. In that State, there are two parties, one devoted to democracy, the worst, he thought, of all political evils; the other, as violent in the opposite extreme. From the collision of these, in opposing and resisting the Constitution, confusion was greatly to be feared."

After the Constitution had been signed by all the members who yielded it their assent, it was resolved, that the journals and other papers of the Convention should be deposited in the hands of its President, and "that he retain them subject to the order of Congress, if ever formed under the Constitution," and the Convention then dissolved itself by an adjourn ment sine die. Madison relates, that "whilst the last members were signing, Dr. Franklin, looking towards the President's chair, at the back of which a rising sun happened to be painted, observed to a few members near him, that painters had found it difficult to distinguish in their art a rising from a setting sun. 1 have, said he, often and often in the course of the session, and the vicissitudes of my hopes and fears as to its issue, looked at that behind the President, without being able to tell whether it was rising or setting: but now at length, I have the happiness to know, that it is a rising and not a setting sun."

Thus closed the labors of the most important and memorable assembly of lawmakers, that has been convened in any country at any time. They gave to their country a Constitution, which, notwithstanding the fears and misgivings of the most sanguine of its authors, has worked admirably, and has become a model to nations. Its faults, so far as an experiment of upwards of half a century has developed them, are fewer and less important, and its excellences and the blessings it has conferred upon the increasing millions who live and thrive under its ample protection, are infinitely greater than any of its framers anticipated. That it may continue to bless and protect forever the generations who live under it, should be the morning and the evening prayer of every American heart.