will to pay the legacy as soon as possible.' 2 Wms. Exrs. 1424. See also 2 Redf. Wills, 465, 471; 1 Swift, Dig. 455. There are some exceptions to this general rule. One is where a legacy is given in satisfaction of a debt. Another is where a legacy is given to the testator's minor child, or to one to whom the testator is in loco parentis, and there is no other provision for the maintenance of the legatee. Another is where the legacy is an annuity; and still another, where the bequest is of the residue of the testator's estate, or of some aliquot part thereof, in trust to pay the interest or income to the legatee for life, with remainder over at his death. In all these cases the rule is to allow interest from the death of the testator. But no one of these exceptions to the general rule applies to the case under consideration. It is claimed, however, that the legacy, being given to a third person to pay the income to the beneficiary during her natural life, is in the nature of an annuity, and that so the rule in relation to annuities should apply. The language of the bequest is as follows: "To pay the income arising therefrom, or such parts thereof as he [the trustee] may consider best, and at such time as he sees fit, to my grand-daughter during her natural life." This bequest grants discretionary power to the trustee to pay to the beneficiary such portion of the income as he may consider best. He may pay over the whole, or any portion thereof, or none at all, according to his discretion. The time of payment, too, is left wholly to the discretion of the trustee. The bequest has but few of the elements of an annuity, which is a yearly payment of a certain sum of money granted to another in fee, or for life, or for a term of years, charging the person of the grantor only.' 2 Wms. Exrs. 809. In the case of Booth v. Ammerman, 4 Bradf. 129, the court says: "The income or interest of a certain fund is not an annuity, but simply profits to be earned, and, although directed to be paid annually, that relates only to the mode of payment, and does not change the character of the bequest. In such a case it does not become the duty of the executor to invest the principal fund until the end of a year, and the interest does not become payable until the end of the second year." Redfield on Wills, vol. 3, 186, says: "In the case of an annuity bequeathed, it begins from the death of the testator, and the first payment becomes due in one year thereafter; but when the interest or net income of a certain sum is given, it will not begin to run till the end of the first year from the death of the testator, and the first payment consequently becomes due in two years from that date." Lord Eldon, in Gibson v. Batt, 7 Ves. 96, drew the distinction between an annuity and a legacy for life, which has been cited in every thoroughly considered case since. He says: "If an annuity is given, the first payment is payable at the end of the year from the death; but if a legacy is given for life, with the remainder over, no interest is due till the end of two years. It is only the interest of the legacy; and till the legacy is payable there is no fund to produce interest." We think it is clear that the legacy in question cannot be regarded as an annuity. The trustee further claims that the clause in the will which declares that "the legacies as aforesaid are to be paid within one year from my decease, at the convenience of my executors, and said executors are authorized to pay the same in stocks and bonds belonging to my estate at their cash value or in cash as may be preferred," shows that the testator intended that the legacy in question should be paid at some period or periods during the year, and not after the expiration of the year. He thus presents the point in his brief: "The period of payment within the year was to be governed by the convenience of the executors, and, as bearing upon that convenience, payment in the bonds and stocks of the testator was distinctly authorized. The case as submitted shows that, after payment of all debts and other legacies, there existed in the hands of the executors interest-bearing and dividend-paying bonds and stocks largely in excess of the sums necessary to create the trust fund. Can it be said that the testator intended that the interest and income of these stocks and bonds should be retained by the executors and added to the corpus of the estate until the last day within the year after his death, and then that the fund should be paid to the trustees in those stocks and bonds or in cash? We submit that, fairly construed, it indicates an intent that the cestui que trust should enjoy the interest and income of the trust fund before the expiration of the year.' Still the will expressly gave the executors one year after the death of the testator in which to pay the legacy to the trustee. Payment on the last day or last hour of the year would be within the will. That payment may be made at the convenience of the executors can make no difference. They were to be judges of their convenience. Whenever they should make payment within the year, it would be presumed that then was the convenient time for payment. They were only restricted to the year. But the will declares that payment may be made in bonds and stocks at their cash value at the time payment shall be made within the year. The bonds were interest-paying bonds, and the stocks were dividend-paying stocks. The cash value of such bonds and stocks, at any particular time, is made up of their value as representing principal or capital, and the accruing interest or dividend. The value thus varies with the nearness or remoteness of the time when the next dividend will be declared or the next interest become payable. But the will takes no notice of this enhancement of value. The payment of $1,000,000 may be made in their cash value at the time of such payment; no more and no less. And if payment shall be made in cash on the last day of the year after the death of the testator, the payment shall be of the sum of $1,000,000; no more and no less. The will declares that such payment in either mode shall be full payment of the bequest. How, then, can interest be claimed by the terms of the will? This would seem to be a full and complete answer to the further claim of the trustee, that a proper construction of the bequest in question shows it to be a bequest for the maintenance of the grand-daughter of the testator, and that so the bequest carries interest from the death of the testator, not by presumption of law, but by the will itself. The answer is that, if the trustee is right in his claim, that the will itself shows the bequest to be given for the maintenance of the grand-daughter, still the will itself declares that the payment of $1,000,000 in cash, or in stocks and bonds at their cash value, at APPEAL by defendant Cole from a judg any time within one year from the death of the testator, shall be full payment of the bequest, not full payment of the principal sum, leaving the interest unpaid, but full payment, principal and interest, if there could be any interest. Surely the testator had the right to say how large the bequest should be which he left for the maintenance of his grand-daughter, if the trustee is correct in his construction of the will. But is he correct in that construction? He bases his claim upon the word "best," in the bequest. He presents the point thus: "The will provides, whether the ability of the father to furnish maintenance for his daughter should exist or not, that some part of the income shall, during the infancy of the daughter, as well as afterwards, be paid to that daughter. It is to be such portion as that father shall consider best. Best for whom? Not best for the trustee, to diminish his own natural liability, but best for the infant. What else could be best for such infant but education and maintenance? But many other things might be best. It might be best to withhold rather than to pay. Manifestly, the great concern of the testator, in bequeathing this very large sum of money, the interest of which would be $60,000 per year, was the welfare of his young granddaughter, who was just entering into womanhood. There was greatly more danger that her father, the trustee, would pay her too much of this vast income during her minority than that he would pay her too little; and during such time it seems to be clear that the word "best," as used by testator, had more reference to withholding the income than to paying it. The plain meaning is, pay her only what you think best. We think the trustee's construction of the bequest is not correct. We therefore advise the Superior Court that the plaintiff is not entitled to interest till the end of one year from the death of the testator. In this opinion the other Judges concurred. Ernest M. PEASE V. Charles H. COLE et al. 1. In the case of a commercial or trading partnership each acting partner is a general agent, and commercial paper executed by one partner in the name of the firm, presumptively binds the firm. 2. In the case of a nontrading partner ship, as one formed to conduct a theater, no such presumption exists, and in or der to establish the liability of such firm upon a bill or note executed by one of its members in its name, a course of conduct or usage or other facts sufficient to show that such member had author ment of the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County in favor of plaintiff in an action by an indorsee on a note given in a partnership name. Reversed. The case was tried in the court below before Calhoun, J., who found the following facts: In July, 1883, the defendants, Charles H. Cole and Daniel McCarthy, formed a copartnership for the purpose of conducting the Capital Theatre in the city of Hartford. The copartnership was to continue four years. The partnership agreement was by parol. The defendants were equal partners. The defendants commenced business early in August, 1883, and afterwards on the 24th day of August, 1883, the defendant McCarthy borrowed of his father, J. B. McCarthy, $750, for which he gave the note in suit. The weekly expenses of the theatre were about $350. For a time each partner paid bills as they were presented, but no amount of capital stock was agreed upon, nor was any sum paid in as such by either of the partners. McCarthy advanced about $666 in the payment of bills, and Cole about $3,200. McCarthy was an actor, and performed on the stage, and was worth in cash, when the copartnership was formed, about $700 or $800, and this was known to Cole. Cole had been a theatrical manager and was a man of some means. He resided in Bridgeport, Connecticut. Neither partner had any express authority to execute notes in the firm name, and the note in suit was the only one given in the firm name. Cole did not know that this note had been given until the plaintiff had purchased it, nor did he know that his partner had borrowed money of J. B. McCarthy. When this note was given the firm owed about $900 for chairs. There was no evidence to show that the money borrowed by McCarthy was applied for copartnership purposes, nor in what way it was used by him. The plaintiff bought this note of J. B. McCarthy, the father, for $700, November 20, 1883, and it was indorsed by said McCarthy to the plaintiff. About ten days before November 20, 1883, J. B. McCarthy applied to the plaintiff for a loan on the note. This the plaintiff refused. Afterwards on the same day the plaintiff inquired of the defendant McCarthy if the note was good, telling him that his father wished to borrow money on it. McCarthy told the plaintiff that the note was all right and was a firm note. Trusting to this statement the plaintiff bought the note of the payee as before stated. After J. B. McCarthy applied for a loan on the note, and before November 20, 1883, the plaintiff saw Cole, but made no inquiry of him respecting the note. This failure to inquire of Cole did not arise from a belief that such an inquiry would result in finding the note invalid, and the plaintiff had no express notice of any defect in the note. The plaintiff purchased the | agricultural purposes or others of a similar note in good faith, without notice of any de- character. fect therein. The plaintiff knew that this note was in the handwriting of Daniel McCarthy, and of the relation between him and J. B. McCarthy, and the nature of the business carried on by Cole & McCarthy, and that Cole was the only one of the partners of any pecuniary responsibility. The plaintiff had occasionally loaned money to the firm to pay bills, before November 20, 1883, at the request of the defendants' manager. The largest sum so loaned was $70. Except in one instance these loans were made by cashing Cole's checks. Upon these facts the defendant Cole claimed as matter of law, (1) that the defendant McCarthy had no authority to execute the note in suit; (2) that the plaintiff was not a bona fide holder of the same, and that he had both express and implied notice that the note was a fraud on the defendant Cole. The court overruled these claims and rendered judgment for the plaintiff against both of the defendants for the amount of the note. The defendant Cole appealed to this court. Messrs. George G. Sill and Henry S. Sanford, for defendant Cole, appellant: Ulery v. Ginrich, 57 Ill. 531; Hunt v. Chapin, 6 Lans. 139. One partner in a nontrading firm cannot bind his copartner by a bill or note, drawn, accepted, or indorsed by him in the firm name, even though it be for a debt of the firm, unless either he has express authority therefor from his copartner, or the giving of such instruments is necessary to the carrying on of the partnership business, or is usual in similar partnerships; and the burden is upon the party suing on such note or bill, to prove such authority, necessity, or usage. Smith v. Sloan, 37 Wis. 285. The fact that a partnership is engaged in a particular trade being known, is sufficient notice to third persons of the limitations which the nature and customs of that trade place upon the power of each partner; and third persons. dealing with a partner, in matters outside the scope of its usual business, to charge the firm therein, must show him to have possessed special authority so to act. Pars. Partn. p. 99. Messrs. Samuel F. Jones and Lewis E. Stanton, for plaintiff, appellee: A partnership note is conclusively presumed to be for partnership purposes until the contrary is shown. The making and offering such a note is nothing more than a representation that the money is wanted for the use of the company, and as they confide in the individual they will be bound by his acts. See Etheridge v. Binney, 9 Pick. 274, 275. also Carrier v. Cameron, 31 Mich. 373; Littell v. Fitch, 11 Mich. 525; Barrett v. Swann, 17 Me. 180; Le Roy v. Johnson, 2 Pet. 197 (27 U. S. bk. 7, L. ed. 396.) Partners engaged in the following various pursuits and professions have been held as nontrading firms: Attorneys (Hedley v. Bainbridge, 3 Q. B. 316; Levy v. Pyne, Car. & M. 453; Forster v. Mackreth, L. R. 2 Exch. 163; Garland v. Jacomb, 28 L. T. N. S. 877; Smith v. Sloan, 37 Wis. 285); doctors (Crosthwait v. Ross, 1 Humph. 23; Lewis v. Rilly, 1 Q. B. 349); taverners (Cocke v. Branch Bank, 3 Ala. 175); farmers or planters (Greenslade v. Dower, 1 M. & R. 640; S. C. 7 Barn. & C. 635; Kimbro v. Bullitt, 22 How. 267 (63 U. S. bk. 16, L. ed. 317); Prince v. Crawford, 50 Miss. 344; Mc- The above is true although the partnership Crary v. Slaughter, 58 Ala. 230; Davis v. Rich-be limited to a particular business, such as conardson, 45 Miss. 499); miners (Dickinson v. tracts to build sections of a particular railroad. Valpy, 10 Barn. & C. 128; Judge v. Braswell, Holmes v. Porter, 39 Me. 157. 13 Bush. (Ky.) 67; Ricketts v. Bennett, 4 C. B. The partnership being admitted, the pre686; Bult v. Morrell, 12 Ad. & El. 745); mil-sumption of law is that a note made by one lers (Lanier v. McCabe, 2 Fla. 32; Graves v. partner in the name of the firm was given in Kellenberger, 51 Ind. 66); in establishing and the regular course of partnership dealing, until carrying on water works (Broughton v. Man- the contrary is shown on the part of the dechester & S. Water Works, 3 Barn. & Ald. 1); fendants. gas works (Bramah v. Roberts, 3 Bing. 963); publishing (Pooley v. Whitmore, 10 Heisk. 629); sugar refining (Livingston v. Roosevelt, 4 Johns. 251); owning a ship (Williams v. Thomas, 6 Esp. 18); digging tunnels (Gray v. Ward, 18 Ill. 32); laundry (Neale v. Turton, 4 Bing. 149); liverymen (Levi v. Latham, 18 N. C. 509); stevedores (Benedict v. Thompson, 33 La. Ann. 196); brokers (Third Nat. Bank v. Snyder, 10 Mo. App. 211); stage coach owners (Walcott v. Canfield, 3 Conn. 194). To render one liable as a partner on a promissory note, made by one partner in the firm name, it must appear that it was made in partnership business and for purposes of the partnership. Ditts v. Lonsdale, 49 Ind. 521. The rule which authorizes one member of a partnership to bind the firm by commercial paper is only applicable to business of a trading or commercial nature, or to the ordinary business of buying or selling for a profit. has no application to partnerships formed for It Doty v. Bates, 11 Johns. 546. Limitations upon the authority of one partner to represent his copartners may also be imposed by the nature and usages of particular trades. The fact that a partnership is engaged in a particular trade being known, is sufficient notice to third persons of the limitations which the nature and customs of that trade place upon the power of each partner, etc. Pars. Partn. marg. 99, note y. Partners may, when it is their custom to borrow money, be bound by firm note (Lea v. Guice, 13 Smedes & M. 656); so of partners in the business of farming and coopering (McGregor v. Cleveland, 5 Wend. 475); so also of partners for the mere purpose of selling territory for the enjoyment of a particular patent right (Barrett v. Flint, 45 Vt. 44). Even in a nontrading partnership the power does exist if there be either necessity or usage for it, as shown by the practice of the firm. Davis v. Richardson, 45 Miss. 508; Gray v Ward, 18 Ill. 32. It is binding if it is according to the usual | all such implication is wanting, but that the course of their business. Livingston v. Roosevelt, 4 Johns. 279, note. A partnership, the object of which was to get out lumber and bring it to market, had an agent who gave several notes to workmen for labor and services. Held, that the notes were binding. Tappan v. Bailey, 4 Met. 529. Even if one partner has no right as against his copartner to make or issue a firm note, or if he misapplies the proceeds, yet the note is binding in the hands of a third person who is ignorant of the defect or fraud. Mix v. Muzzy, 28 Conn. 189, 190; Moriarty v. Bailey, 46 Conn. 592; N. Y. Firemens Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 5 Conn. 579; Blodgett v. Weed, 119 Mass. 215, 220; Hayıcard v. French, 12 Gray, 456, 457; Onondaga Co. Bank v. De Puy, 17 Wend. 47. When the partner offers the note in the usual course of the business there is the requisite authority, and his misapplication of the funds or fraud constitutes no defense. Winship v. Bank of U. S. 5 Pet. 529, 563–565 (30 U. S. bk. 8, L. ed. 216, 228, 229); Onondaga Co. Bank v. De Puy, 17 Wend. 47. Loomis, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The question involved in this case is, whether one member of a copartnership formed for the purpose of conducting a theatre in Hartford, could, under the circumstances mentioned in the finding, bind the other member by executing a negotiable promissory note in the name of the firm for money borrowed. The finding in terms excludes all express authority of the other partner, and even all knowledge of the matter on his part; so that any conclusion that the note is the note of the firm rather than of the member executing it, must necessarily rest on an authority to be implied. But here again the facts found so circumscribe the range of inquiry as to exclude all the ordinary sources of such authority. The circumstances from which an authority may be implied are identical with those involved in a question of ordinary agency, for each partner is regarded as the accredited agent of the rest. In many cases the decisive fact is found in the customary course of dealing, but not so here, for it is found that the note in question was the only note ever given in the name of the firm. The copartnership first commenced business in August, 1883, and on the 24th of the same month the note in suit was given. There was therefore very little time for a course of conduct or usage of any sort to grow up, giving any apparent authority. The finding traces the money borrowed only into the hands of McCarthy, the partner who signed the firm name, and no fact appears showing directly or presumptively that the act was necessary for any of the purposes of the partnership. The only remaining source from which an authority may be derived by implication must be sought in the nature and scope of the partnership, and in the nature of the act. And here, if we examine the legal principles that are applicable, it will be found not only that presumption is directly against the authority assumed. The weight of authority in the United States and the uniform tenor of the authorities in England will be found to establish a controlling distinction in respect to implied authority between commercial or trading and nontrading partnerships. Story, Partn. 6th ed. § 102, a; 1 Lind. Partn. 4th ed. by Ewell, p. 266, and note 1 and cases there cited; 1 Coll. Partn. 648, 658; Met. Cont. 121, and cases cited in the notes. In a commercial partnership each acting partner is its general agent, with implied authority to act for the firm in all matters within the scope of its business, and the presumption of law is that all commercial paper which bears the signature of the firm, executed by one of the partners, is the paper of the partnership, for the reason that the giving of such notes would be within the usual course of mercantile transactions. But when we pass to nontrading partnerships the doctrine of general agency does not apply, and there is no presumption of authority to support the act of one partner. Hence, in order to subject the firm upon a bill or note executed by one partner in its name, a course of conduct, or usage, or other facts sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the acting partner had been invested by his copartners with the requisite authority, must appear, or that the firm has ratified the act by receiving the benefit of it. That the partnership in question belongs to the nontrading class seems so obvious as to need no discussion. The brief in behalf of the defendant Cole cites many cases, and gives a long list of pursuits and professions which those cases establish as of the nontrading class, and although the conduct of a theatre is not there mentioned, yet the analogies manifestly include it. To show the existence of the distinction con tended for and its application, we select from a multitude of authorities the following in addition to those previously referred to: In Judge v. Braswell, 13 Bush (Ky.), 67, the defendants were partners under an agreement to engage in mining business upon lands then leased or which might be thereafter acquired. One of the members of the firm purchased, without the others' consent, and took conveyances of mining land in the name of the firm,` and gave the bills of the firm therefor. In an action by the payee of the bills against the firm, a defense was made by the other partners that the purchase was without their consent or ratification, and in the plea they renounced all claim to the lands purchased. The court held that the firm was not liable on the bills, saying that the power of one partner to bind his copartners rests alone on the usage of merchants, and does not amount to a rule of law in any other than commercial partnerships. In noncommercial partnerships one who seeks to hold the firm bound upon a contract made by a single member, must be able to show either express authority, or that such is the customary usage of the particular branch of business in which the firm is engaged, or such facts as will warrant the conclusion that the partner had been invested by his copartners with the requisite authority. note, who sues upon it, to prove such authority, necessity, or usage.' In Hedley v. Bainbridge, 3 Q. B. 316, the de- | fendants were attorneys in partnership, and one of the partners gave a note in the name of the In Ulery v. Ginrich, 57 Ill. 531, the partnerfirm to the plaintiffs for the balance of advance- ship was for farming purposes, and the note in ments made to one partner who was acting in suit was given by one in the name of the firm behalf of the firm; the advances were to be laid for money borrowed. It was held to be a nonout on mortgage by the firm. Lord Denman,trading firm, and the same principles were Ch. J., in giving the opinion said: "No doubt adopted as in the cases previously cited. a debt was due from the firm; but it does not follow that one partner had authority to give a promissory note for that debt. Partners in trade have authority, as regards third persons, to bind the firm by bills of exchange, for it is the usual course of mercantile transactions so to do; and this authority is by the custom and law of merchants, which is part of the general law of the land. But the same reason does not apply to other partnerships. There is no custom or usage that attorneys should be parties to negotiable instruments; nor is it necessary for the purposes of their business. *** Upon the whole we think that the implied authority is confined to partners in trade." In Dickinson v. Valpy, 10 Barn. & C. 128, the plaintiff was an indorsee for value of a bill of exchange drawn and accepted in the name of a mining partnership by order of its regular di rectors. It was held incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that the directors had authority to bind the company, and that it was necessary for the purpose of carrying on the business of the company, or usual for other similar mining companies to draw or accept bills of exchange. Opinions were given by Lord Tenterden, Ch. J., and Judges Bailey, Littledale, and Parke, and the same distinction was made as in other cases between trading and nontrading partnerships. See also Greenslade v. Dower, 7 Barn. & C. 635. In Hunt v. Chapin, 6 Lans. 139, it was held, Miller, P. J., giving the opinion, that the rule which authorizes one member of a copartnership to bind the firm is only applicable to business of a trading nature, and has no application to partnerships for agricultural purposes, or others of a similar character. See also Kimbro v. Bullett, 22 How. 256 [63 U. S. bk. 16, L. ed. 313]; Graves v. Kellenberger, 51 Ind. 66; Third Nat. Bank v. Snyder, 10 Mo. App. 211. In Chalmers' "Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Cheques," 2d ed. pp. 68, 69, the following propositions are laid down as well-settled rules: "Art. 77. A partner in a trading firm has prima facie authority to bind the firm by drawing, indorsing, or accepting bills in the firm name for partnership purposes; and if the bill get into the hands of a holder for value without notice, the presumption of authority becomes absolute, and it is immaterial whether it were given for partnership purposes or not. Art. 78. A partner in a nontrading partnership has prima facie no authority to render his copartners liable by signing bills in the partnership name. The holder must show authority, actual or ostensible.' Many more authorities equally pertinent might be cited, but these will suffice to show that the distinction relied upon is strongly supported both in England and in the United In Lery v. Pyne, tried before Baron Alder-States. son, 1 Car. & M. 453, it was held, that "if a bill of exchange or promissory note be drawn, accepted, or indorsed, by one of two persons who are partners in a business which is not a trade (e. g. as attorneys), in the name of the firm, the plaintiff must give evidence of the authority of the other partner to draw, accept, or indorse in the name of the firm; but in the case of a commercial firm this is not necessary, as there is a general authority." See also Richards v. Bennett, 1 Barn. & C. 223; Garland v. Jacomb, L. R. 8 Exch. 218. In Smith v. Sloan, 37 Wis. 285, the court, by Lyon, J., after an able and exhaustive review of the authorities, adopted the following proposition as fully sustained: "We gather from all the authorities that the distinction between a trading and nontrading partnership, in respect to the power of a partner to bind his copartner by negotiable instruments, is not limited to a mere presumption of such authority in one case and the absence of such presumption in the other, as the learned counsel for the plaintiff argued; but we think, and must so hold, that one partner in a nontrading partnership cannot bind his copartner by bill or note, drawn, accepted, or indorsed by him in the name of the firm, not even for a debt which the firm owes, unless he have express authority therefor from his copartner, or unless the giving of such instruments is necessary to the carrying on of the firm business, or is usual in similar partnerships; and the burden is upon the holder of the While we feel constrained to adopt the distinction between the two classes of partnership so far as the presumption of authority or the want of it is concerned, we do not deem it necessary for the purposes of this case, or even quite reasonable, to carry its application so far as to deny absolutely, as some of the cases do, the right to recover on a note given by a nontrading firm, for money borrowed for the firm, and appropriated to its use, or on a note given in payment of its debts. Some authorities ig nore the test of liability referred to, but adopt another which is equivalent in result. Chancellor Kent, in his chapter on Partnerships, vol. 3, 7th ed. p. 44, omits the use of the terms "trading" and " 'nontrading," and makes the distinction between partnerships, in respect to the power of one partner to bind the firm, depend on the single test of the usual scope of the business in connection with the subjectmatter of the contract. This rule was adopted in Crosthwait v. Ross, 1 Humph. 23, where it was held that one part ner in the practice of medicine could not bind the firm by drawing a bill or note on which to raise money, because it was not within the scope of the partnership business. Though under a different name the real distinction here taken is between partners in trade and partners in an occupation. Afterwards the same court, in the case of Pooley v. Whitmore, 10 Heisk. 629, in a most able and elaborate opinion held that the liability of a partnership firm of the nontrading class |