wise serve as a precedent for the determination of the case at bar.

There is no error in the judgment of the corporation court, and the same must be affirmed.

INSURANCE-APPLICATION-ABSENCE OF.-Where an insurance policy is issued without any application or written request describing the interest of the insured in the property, and it does not appear that any actual representation of any kind was made by the assured, it will be presumed that the policy was written upon the knowledge of the insurer and was intended to cover in good faith the interest of the assured in the property: Western etc. Pipe Lines v. Home Ins. Co., 145 Pa. St. 346; 27 Am. St. Rep. 703, and note. An applicant for insurance is not required to show the exact condition of his title to the property sought to be insured, unless he is requested to do so, and if his application is oral and no deceit is practiced, his failure to mention encumbrances, where no inquiry concerning encumbrances is made, is immaterial: Hall v. Niagara etc. Ins. Co., 93 Mich. 184; 32 Am. St. Rep. 497, and note.

INSURANCE-INTEREST OF INSURED-ENCUMBRANCES.A condition in a policy of insurance that it shall be void in case the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership, has reference only to the quality of the estate or interest, and is not avoided by any sort of an encumbrance: Caplis v. American etc. Ins. Co., CO Minn. 376; 51 Am. St. Rep. 535, and note. INSURANCE CONDITION AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES, WHEN NOT VIOLATED.-Where the insured when applying for the insurance, informs the insurer of the amount of encumbrances then existing upon the property, and the latter issues the policy with knowledge of such encumbrances, the condition against encumbrances is not violated if their amount never exceeds the amount stated: Gould v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 134 Pa. St. 570; 19 Am. St. Rep. 717.

FIXTURES.-MACHINERY CONSTRUCTED and placed in a mill to be used in and as a part of it, and which would pass by a grant of the mill, is part of the real estate upon which the mill is situated and not personal property: Havens v. Germania etc. Ins. Co., 123 Mo. 403; 45 Am. St. Rep. 570, and note. To the same effect see Feder v. Van Winkle, 53 N. J. Eq. 370; 51 Am. St. Rep. 628, and note. And see, also, the note to Lansing Iron etc. Works v. Walker, 30 Am. St. Rep. 491.

STROUTHER V. COMMONWEALTH.

[92 VIRGINIA, 789.]

LARCENY-JURISDICTION.-IF GOODS ARE STOLEN IN ONE STATE OR COUNTRY, and taken by the thief into another the courts of the latter have not jurisdiction to try him for his offense, unless such jurisdiction has been expressly conferred by statute.

J. M. Steek, for the plaintiff in error.

Attorney General R. Taylor Scott, for the commonwealth.

790 HARRISON, J. The question raised in this case is, whether or not one who steals property at a place beyond the

jurisdiction of this state, and brings the same into this state, can be lawfully convicted of the larceny in our courts.

The attorney general relies on section 3890 of the code as furnishing legislative authority for taking jurisdiction in such cases. This section was only intended to define the jurisdiction of our courts to try the offenses arising under certain special statutes, and has no application here.

The case of Commonwealth v. Gaines, 2 Va. Cas. 172, is also relied on as a precedent to support this conviction. That case turned on the construction of a statute which disappeared from our laws in 1819, and, it may be fairly presumed, 791 was repealed because the legislature preferred that the rule in Virginia should continue as at common-law.

There being no statute in this state, and no decision of this court to which we can look for an answer to the question here raised, we must turn to the common law for the rule that is to govern us. It has been a settled principle of the common law, from an early day, in England, that where property is stolen in one county, and the thief has been found, with the stolen property in his possession, in another county, he may be tried in either. This practice prevailed notwithstanding the general rule that every prosecution for a criminal cause must be in the county where the crime was committed. The exception to the general rule grew out of a fiction of the law; that, where property has been feloniously taken, every act of removal or change of possession by the thief constituted a new taking and asportation; and, as the right of possession, as well as the right of property, continues in the owner, every such act is a new violation of the owner's right of property and possession. There is no principle, in respect of larceny, better settled than this, and it has received repeated sanction in this state: Commonwealth v. Cousins, 2 Leigh, 708.

This rule of the common law, however, was never extended farther than to counties. Where goods were stolen in one country and brought by the thief into another country, the latter country, by the English common law, has no jurisdiction: Wharton's Criminal Law, 9th ed., sec. 291; Stanley v. State, 24 Ohio St. 166; 15 Am. Rep. 604; Commonwealth v. Uprichard, 3 Gray, 434; 63 Am. Dec. 762.

This question has arisen in a number of the states. Some hold to the view that the states, being all under one general government, stand in the relation of counties, and that, therefore, the common law, by analogy, applies. We think, however, that the weight of authority sustains the view that the states are

separate and independent; that in the administration 792 of criminal law, they are sovereign, and, in their respective jurisdictions and the laws which regulate their internal police, they are as foreign to each other as each state is to foreign governments; and, therefore, except in those states where statutory provision is made for the punishment of crimes committed in another jurisdiction, the common-law rule prevails, which, we have seen, furnishes no warrant for the conviction in this state of one who steals property in another state and brings it within our borders: State v. Brown, 1 Hayw. (N. C.) 100; 1 Am. Dec. 548; Lee v. State, 64 Ga. 203; 37 Am. Rep. 67, and other cases.

A perpetual extradition treaty exists between the states, it being provided in the constitution of the United States, article 4, section 2, that "a person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and shall be found in another, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime."

Under this provision of the constitution there is no need for the guilty to escape. We sustain no relation to the accused when arrested here, charged with stealing in a place beyond the jurisdiction of this state, except that of detaining him temporarily, as a fugitive from justice, until the requisition provided for can be secured to return him to the jurisdiction where his crime was committed.

A number of states have enacted laws for the punishment of crime in cases like this. Virginia has not, and the arguments for and against the policy of such laws may, with propriety, be addressed to the legislature. Courts must administer the law as it is.

For these reasons, we are of opinion that the corporation court of the city of Winchester was without jurisdiction to try the plaintiff in error for the crime charged in the indictment; 793 and its judgment is, therefore, reversed, annulled, and set aside.

LARCENY TAKING STOLEN GOODS INTO ANOTHER STATE.-A person may be prosecuted and punished in Texas for larceny committed by stealing property beyond its boundaries and bringing it into that state: McKenzie v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 795, and note with the cases collected.

CASES

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

WASHINGTON.

LA SELLE V. WOOLERY.

[14 WASHINGTON, 70.]

CONFLICT OF LAWS.-THE DOCTRINE OF COMITY, by which rights given as to property of a certain nature in one state are enforceable in another, does not extend to property subsequently acquired in this state, though of the same nature, and is totally inapplicable to real property.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.-REAL PROPERTY is exclusively subject to the laws of the country of which it is a part, and title therein can only be acquired or lost agreeable to those laws.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-COMMUNITY PROPERTY.-A debt incurred in another state, where it is the individual debt of the husband, and enforceable only against his separate estate, retains the same character after it is removed to this state, and therefore the community property of himself and his wife afterward acquired in this state cannot be taken for its satisfaction.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.-THE FORM OF REMEDIES and the order of judicial proceedings are to be according to the law of the state where the action is instituted, without regard to the dom-. icile of the parties, the origin of the right, or the country of the act.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY, FOR WHAT DEBTS ANSWERABLE.-The community real property is not liable for the separate, or individual, debts of the husband, whether contracted in this state or elsewhere.

Suit to enjoin the sale of real property situate in the state of Washington, standing in the name of Marian E. La Selle, and conceded to be the community property of herself and her husband, William. The property had been levied upon under an execution based upon a judgment recovered in the same state against the husband. This judgment had been entered in an action brought upon another judgment rendered against the husband in the state of Wisconsin. He and his wife were then liv

ing together as such in that state, and the indebtedness upon which the original judgment was founded consisted of a liability against him incurred in the prosecution of his business as a contractor and builder and as proprietor of a sash and door factory. It appeared from the statutes of Wisconsin, "set out in the answer, that in that state there is no such thing as community property as understood here, nor is there any such thing as separate property of the husband as defined by our laws. The wife alone could own separate property, and the provisions in relation to its acquisition were substantially the same as in this state. other property was that of the husband, whether it was acquired in such a manner as to make it, under our laws, his separate property or that of the community. And all of his property under the laws of that state could be subject to the payment of debts incurred by him alone." The first decision of the supreme court in this case was rendered in March, 1895, and in it the court then held that as the debt, when incurred in the state of Wisconsin in a business prosecuted by the husband was for the benefit and support of his family, and was there enforceable against all property acquired by the joint labors of husband and wife, though such property might there be designated as separate property of the husband, such debt might be enforced in Washington against the community property. After this decision a rehearing was granted.

Shank & Smith, for the appellants.

Remington & Reynolds, for the respondents.

70 GORDON, J. This cause was heard and decided by this court at the January term, 1895: La Selle v. Woolery, 11 Wash. 337. Respondents' petition for rehearing having been allowed and the cause reargued, a majority of the court are of the opinion that a wrong conclusion was reached at the former hearing. The case is fully stated in the former opinion, in the course of which opinion the court said: "If a certain right is given in one state as to property of a certain nature, comity would require that those rights should be enforced in another state as to property of the same nature."

71 Upon further consideration, we think that this is extending the doctrine of comity too far. While comity might require that rights so acquired, against personal property merely, should be enforced in this state as against such property (Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 289; Wharton's Conflict of Laws, sec. 324), we do not think it ought to be extended to property subsequently acquired in this state, although of the "same nature," and this