parts of the res gestæ, which manifest the intention or acceptance. In like manner the presumption of a delivery may be rebutted and overcome by proof of a contrary intention, or of acts and declarations from which the contrary presumption arises: Price v. Hudson, 125 Ill. 284; Hall v. Hall, 107 Mo. 101; Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257; 46 Am. Dec. 315; Lady Superior v. McNamara, 3 Barb. Ch. 375; 49 Am. Dec. 184; Colee v. Colee, 122 Ind. 109; 17 Am. St. Rep. 345.

While evidence of assent would show a valid delivery, if the evidence also shows that the grantor's object in making the deed was to place his property beyond the reach of creditors, and that he retained the deed after it was recorded, the deed is ineffective for want of delivery: Weber v. Christen, 121 Ill. 91; 2 Am. St. Rep. 68. The acceptance of a deed by a grantee or trustee is presumed from its delivery, unless he renounces it. This presumption is not rebutted by the fact that he, acting as a notary public, took and certified the deed: Bowden v. Parrish, 86 Va. 67; 19 Am. St. Rep. 873. If acceptance is not proved, and the facts do not justify the presumption that the grantee has accepted, the title will not pass: Moore v. Flynn, 135 Ill. 74. The court may instruct the jury to find a delivery, if the whole testimony shows a state of facts from which delivery is a positive inference of law; but, if the testimony is conflicting, the question of delivery should be left to the jury, under proper instructions: Jones v. Swayze, 42 N. J. L. 279; Cocks v. Simmons, 57 Miss. 183; Crain v. Wright, 114 N. Y. 307; Cummings, v. Glass, 162 Pa. St. 241; Whitman v. Shingleton, 108 N. C. 193; Lutes v. Reed, 138 Pa. St. 191. Intervening claims, however, should be regarded in determining the question of delivery, where delivery is not made at the time the deed is signed. Thus, while a deed signed, sealed, and recorded, but not delivered to the grantee, nor accepted by him until long afterward, may, as between the grantor and grantee, take effect from the date when it was left for record, yet, as against attaching creditors, it takes effect only from the time of delivery to, and acceptance by, the grantee: Bell v. Farmers' Bank, 11 Bush, 34; 21 Am. Rep. 205. The sending of a deed to be recorded is not a valid delivery against an intervening attachment, unless the recorder receives it as the agent of the grantee, or unless some other act of acceptance by the grantee is shown: Derry Bank v. Webster, 44 N. H. 264. So, as the registry of a deed by the grantor, without the grantee's knowledge or consent, does not, of itself, constitute a delivery, the subsequent ratification and acceptance of the deed by the grantee do not relate back so as to cut out an intervening judgment lien: Cravens v. Rossiter, 116 Mo. 338; 38 Am. St. Rep. 606.

Recording of Deed as a Delivery.-The acknowledgment or recording of a deed is not delivery, but only evidence of it; and such evidence is merely presumptive, not conclusive, evidence of delivery. The deed does not transfer title until delivery to the grantee. In other words, delivery of a deed by the grantor, and its acceptance by the grantee, is essential to vest title in the grantee. The placing of a deed on record by the grantor is strong presumptive evidence, but not conclusive proof, of delivery, and this presumption may be rebutted by proof of a contrary intent on the part of the party responsible for such recording: Chess v. Chess, 1 Pen. & W. 32; 21 Am. Dec. 350; Bullitt v. Taylor, 34 Miss. 708; 69 Am. Dec. 412; Wellborn

V. Weaver, 17 Ga. 267; 63 Am. Dec. 235; Glaze v. Three Rivers etc. Ins. Co., 87 Mich. 349; Hendricks v. Rasson, 53 Mich. 575; Tobin v. Bass, 85 Mo. 654; 55 Am. Rep. 392; Deere v. Nelson, 73 Iowa, 186; Stevens v. Castel, 63 Mich. 111; Metcalfe v. Brandon, 60 Miss. 685; Walsh v. Vermont etc. Fire Ins. Co., 54 Vt. 351; Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 95 Ill. 267; 35 Am. Rep. 166; Burke v. Adams, 80 Mo. 504; 50 Am. Rep. 510; Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560; 7 Am. Rep. 554; Alexander v. Alexander, 71 Ala. 295; Hutton v. Smith, 88 Iowa, 238; Davis v. Davis, 92 Iowa, 147; Barns v. Hatch, 3 N. H. 304; 14 Am. Dec. 369; Gilbert v. North American Fire Ins. Co., 23 Wend. 43; 35 Am. Dec. 543; Colee v. Colee, 122 Ind. 345; 17 Am. St. Rep. 345; Davis v. Garrett, 91 Tenn. 147; Helms v. Austin, 116 N. C. 751; Saffold v. Horne, 72 Miss. 470; Doorley v. O'Gorman, 6 App. Div. (N. Y.) 591; Jourdan v. Patterson, 102 Mich. 602; Sullivan v. Eddy, 154 III. 199; Parrott v. Avery, 159 Mass. 594; 38 Am. St. Rep. 465; Barnes v. Barnes, 161 Mass. 381.

Mere directions, or a desire, to have a deed recorded, on the part of a grantor, do not amount to a delivery: Stone v. French, 37 Kan. 145; 1 Am. St. Rep. 237; Provart v. Harris, 150 Ill. 40. Evidence tending to show that a deed, though recorded, was not actually delivered is admissible in an action of ejectment for the land described in the deed: Bush v. Genther, 174 Pa. St. 154. The delivery of a deed to a recorder for registry is not a delivery to the grantee; and registry of a deed by the grantor, without the grantee's knowledge or consent, does not of itself constitute a delivery: Cravens v. Rossiter, 116 Mo. 338; 38 Am. St. Rep. 606. If a father executes and records a deed to his minor son, it is prima facie a delivery, although there is no manual delivery and he retains possession of the deed: Tobin v. Bass, 85 Mo. 654; 55 Am. Rep. 392. The presumption that a duly recorded deed has been delivered is not rebutted by proof merely that, after it was acknowledged but before it was recorded, it was in the possession of the president of a corporation, which was the grantor: Estes v. German Nat. Bank, 62 Ark. 7. A deed not delivered and accepted, though recorded, is invalid and passes no estate: Herbert v. Herbert, Breese, 354; 12 Am. Dec. 192. The recording of a deed, although not conclusive as to its delivery, is strong evidence thereof in the hands of an innocent purchaser: Blight v. Schenck, 10 Pa. St. 285; 51 Am. Dec. 478. The placing of a deed in the hands of one of the grantees with the understanding that it shall be returned to the grantor, if he should call for it, but, if not, it was to be placed upon record upon his death, does not constitute a delivery: Wilson v. Wilson, 158 Ill. 567; 49 Am. St. Rep. 176. If a deed confers substantial rights on the grantee, acceptance on his part will be inferred from very slight circumstances, but such presumptions may be overthrown by direct and negative proof: Metcalfe v. Brandon, 60 Miss. 685. While a deed, duly recorded, is recognized, in Laughlin v. Calumet etc. Dock Co., 65 Fed. Rep. 441, as prima facie evidence of delivery by the grantor to the grantee, it is there held to be conclusive evidence of delivery, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, as between them and a purchaser for value, who relies upon the deed, unless he had, or was chargeable with, notice of its nondelivery. The delivery of a deed is not effected by signing, acknowledging, and recording it, without the knowledge

or assent of the grantee, if he is an adult, unless it is shown that the grantor intended thereby to give effect and operation to, and to relinquish all control over, such deed, and that the grantee, on being informed, assented. A deed signed, acknowledged, and placed on record, without any intent to part with the deed or the land (the grantors retaking possession of the deed as soon as recorded, and ever thereafter retaining such possession, and the grantees having no knowledge of the deed at the time, nor any possession or control of the deed at any time) is not delivered, nor is the title of the grantors divested thereby: Weber v. Christen, 121 III. 91; 2 Am. St. Rep. 68.

It has been held, however, that the recording of a deed by the grantor, for the supposed benefit of the grantee, and without the latter's direction or knowledge, is not of itself evidence of acceptance, nor does it raise a presumption that it was ever accepted: Rittmaster v. Brisbane, 19 Colo. 371; Jefferson Co. etc. Building Assn. v. Heil, 81 Ky. 513; Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 Wall. 636.

And, in some jurisdictions, the recording of a deed, or having it recorded, is regarded as equivalent to a delivery thereof, or as sufficient, if not conclusive, evidence of delivery. At least, if the deed is placed on record with the intent that it shall pass the title to the grantee, it constitutes a good delivery, for this is in harmony with the pervading principle of the law of deeds that delivery is a question of intention: See Gordon v. Trimmier, 91 Ga. 472; Moore v. Giles, 49 Conn. 570; Levy v. Cox, 22 Fla. 546; Elsberry v. Boykin, 65 Ala. 336; Sheffield etc. Coal Co. v. Neill, 87 Ala. 158; Swiney v. Swiney, 14 Lea, 316; Parrott v. Baker, 82 Ga. 364; Lady Superior v. McNamara, 3 Barb. Ch. 375; 49 Am. Dec. 184; Compton v. White, 86 Mich. 33; Lee v. Fletcher, 46 Minn. 49.

When the deed is recorded with such intent, especially when it runs from parent to child, actual manual delivery and formal acceptance are not essential to the validity of the conveyance: Issitt v. Dewey, 47 Neb. 196; Palmer v. Palmer, 62 Iowa, 204. A recorded deed is complete and valid and delivered, although the grantee never had it in his actual possession: Snider v. Lackenour, 2 Ired. Eq. 360; 38 Am. Dec. 685; and it is found among the grantor's papers at his death: Scrugham v. Wood, 15 Wend. 545; 30 Am. Dec. 75. The delivery of a recorded deed is, of course, sufficient, where the grantee assents: Boody v. Davis, 20 N. H. 140; 51 Am. Dec. 210; Cooper v. Jackson, 4 Wis. 537. The delivery of a deed to the recorder for the grantee, and as the latter's deed, is a sufficient delivery, where the grantee agreed to accept the deed before its execution: Hoffman v. Mackall, 5 Ohio St. 124; 64 Am. Dec. 637. If by agreement, the grantor delivers a deed for record, his delivery is good, when ratified by the grantee, as, in such a case, the grantor acts as the grantee's agent: Cooper v. Jackson, 4 Wis. 537. The acknowledgment of a deed for the purpose of registration is delivery: Newlin v. Osborne, 4 Jones, 157; 67 Am. Dec. 269. In the absence of a contrary intention, the delivery of a sheriff's deed for record is a delivery to the grantee: Lewis v. Watson, 98 Ala. 479; 39 Am. St. Rep. 82. If a deed is drawn up by the grantee, and sent to the grantor to be executed, with directions to record it, the recording officer, when the deed is delivered to him pursuant to such directions, becomes the

agent of the grantee, and such delivery gives the deed full force: Prignon v. Daussat, 4 Wash. 199; 31 Am. St. Rep. 914.

But the recording of a deed cannot cut out intervening rights. Thus, if a son in one state sells land to his father, who lives in another state, and sends a recorded deed to his father by mail, there is no delivery of the deed, in a legal sense, until the deed is received and accepted. Hence, an attachment levied on the land before the receipt of the deed creates a paramount lien: Deere v. Nelson, 73 Iowa, 186. So, a deed of gift of real and personal property contained this clause: "This deed will be delivered to a friend for safekeeping, with directions to deliver at such time as I may direct." The directions accompanying it instructed the receiver to deliver it to the county recorder for registration on the grantor's death. The deed was held subordinate to a deed of gift delivered to other grantees, and accompanied by possession, although not recorded until after the former: Davis v. Cross, 14 Lea, 637; 52 Am. Rep. 177.

Illustrations of a Sufficient Delivery.—Any acts or words which clearly manifest an intention on the part of the grantor to consummate and complete his deed, and to part absolutely and unconditionally with it, and all control over it, are sufficient to give legal existence to it as a deed, and to constitute a sufficient delivery, where the deed is received by the grantee under circumstances indicating an acceptance of it, or from which an acceptance may be implied: Rushin v. Shields, 11 Ga. 636; 56 Am. Dec. 436; Hayes v. Boylan, 141 Ill. 400; 33 Am. St. Rep. 326; Byington v. Moore, 62 Iowa, 470; Lowd v. Brigham, 154 Mass. 107; Reorganized Church etc. v. Church of Christ, 60 Fed. Rep. 937; Miller v. Meers, 155 Ill. 284; Orr v. Clark, 62 Vt. 136; Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N. C. 134; Myrover v. French, 73 N. C. 609; Hubbard v. Cox, 76 Tex. 239.

The delivery of a deed by one or more of several heirs, to the grantee, intending thereby to convey his or their interest in the land, passes the title and divests them of such interest, notwithstanding a condition imposed by the grantor that, if the other heirs refuse to sign, the deed shall become void: Stanley v. White, 160 Ill. 605. The retention of possession by the grantor in a deed providing that he shall receive the rents for life, is not inconsistent with delivery of the deed: Williams v. Evans, 154 Ill. 98. If a grantor delivers a duly executed deed to a grantee, with the understanding that it shall take effect upon the payment of certain liens and the execution of a mortgage by the grantee, the deed operates at once and passes title absolutely to the grantee: Richmond v. Morford, 4 Wash. 337.

Illustrations of an Insufficient Delivery. If a grantor does not evince an intention to part presently and unconditionally with his deed, and, of course, to pass title to the land at once according to the terms of the deed, there is no delivery. There is no delivery where it is apparent that the conveyance was not intended to be made as a consummated transaction: Hicks v. Goode, 12 Leigh, 479; 37 Am. Dec. 677; Van Amringe v. Morton, 4 Whart. 382; 34 Am. Dec. 517; Tisher v. Beckwith, 30 Wis. 55; 11 Am. Rep. 546; Rogers v. Carey, 47 Mo. 232; 4 Am. Rep. 322; Bernheim v. Horton, 103 Ala. 380; Beardsley v. Hilson, 94 Ga. 50; Farmers' etc. Bank v. Haney, 87 Iowa, 101; Wellington v. Heermans, 110 Ill. 564; Bank of Healdsburg v. Bailhache, 65

Cal. 327; Donnel v. Bellas, 11 Pa. St. 341; Moody v. Dryden, 72 Iowa, 461; Hutton v. Smith, 88 Iowa, 238; Woolcut v. Lerdell, 78 Iowa, 668; Ireland v. Geraghty, 15 Fed. Rep. 35; Cressinger v. Dessenburg, 42 Mich. 580; Davis v. Williams, 57 Miss. 843; Vaughan v. Godman, 94 Ind. 191; Donnelly v. Rafferty, 172 Pa. St. 587; Ruckman v. Ruckman, 33 N. J. Eq. 354; Paddock v. Potter, 67 Vt. 360; Miller v. Lullman, 81 Mo. 311; Foley v. McNamara (Iowa), February 4, 1895.

If a grantor in a deed hands it to the grantee, telling him to "take this deed and put it in our box at the bank," without doing any other act showing an intention to formally deliver the deed, and himself retaining possession of the land granted, this does not constitute a present delivery of the deed to the grantee, but a mere employment of him, as agent of the grantor, to do an act for the grantor whereby the latter could retain the custody of the deed: Hayes v. Boylan, 141 Ill. 400; 33 Am. St. Rep. 326. Handing a deed to counsel for the grantees does not constitute a delivery: Donnelly v. Rafferty, 172 Pa. St. 587. If the grantor, under circumstances showing that he does not intend to execute a deed at the time, reserves the right, after signing it, to examine it on the next day, and it is agreed that, if it is found incorrect, corrections shall be made, and the grantee, while the paper is lying upon a table, takes it up and gives it to his clerk with instructions to put it in his vault, there is no delivery: Stokes v. Anderson, 118 Ind. 533. If a deed on its face is not complete, but requires some further act to execute it, delivery of it to the party to whom it is to be made is not absolute, and it remains in his hands subject to the performance of the act: Hicks v. Goode, 12 Leigh, 479; 37 Am. Dec. 677. If a deed has been executed by all but one of several grantors, and left with a notary for the purpose of securing the signature of the remaining grantor, but upon the condition that it is not to be delivered until the consideration agreed upon is ready to be passed, the notary is the agent of the grantors, and is bound to hold the deed for them, even after its completion, until he is directed by them to deliver it to the grantee. The grantee, by procuring the uncompleted deed from the notary and placing it upon record, obtains no rights thereunder: Healy v. Seward, 5 Wash. 319. To render a deed effectual, it must be delivered with the knowledge and consent of the grantor, so that if the grantee, by some trick or other means, obtains possession of a deed not intended to be delivered to him, there is no delivery and no title passes: Allen v. Ayer, 26 Or. 589; Golden v. Hardesty (Iowa), January 30, 1895. The mere execution of an undelivered deed conveys no interest in the premises to a grantee who has no legal right to demand a conveyance; but, if the deed is subsequently delivered, the grantee's title dates from such delivery: Paddock v. Potter, 67 Vt. 360. The mere execution of an undelivered deed, unaccompanied by any other acts or circumstances showing an intention to pass the title, will not be construed to be a delivery of the deed, especially where the grantor retains possession of the property: Wood v. Ingraham, 3 Strob. Eq. 105; 51 Am. Dec. 671; Benneson v. Aiken, 102.111. 284; 40 Am. Rep. 592; Lang v. Smith, 37 W. Va. 725; Hayes v. Boylan, 141 Ill. 400; 33 Am. St. Rep. 326; Cazassa v. Cazassa, 92 Tenn. 573; 36 Am. St. Rep. 112; Porter v. Woodhouse, 59 Conn. 568; 21 Am. St. Rep. 131; Stone v. French, 37 Kan. 145; 1 Am. St. Rep. 237.