be made to the human race; consequently, when any one asserts that he is a divine prophet, his pretensions are examined. The faithful Christian disbelieved in Mahomet; the trusting Arabs believed in his mission, and fought for their creed. They, like orthodox divines of to-day, refused to use their reason in things divine, and to cavil at a revelation.

Unable to agree, the followers of Jesus, and those of Mohammed, fought, the latter almost annihilating the former for a time, thus proving the value of their faith. Both parties had a firm belief-the one in the prophet of Nazareth, the other in the prophet of Arabia; and no reasoning could have convinced either that his trust was misplaced; nor, to this day, has reason convinced the Mahometans that Jesus was superior to Mahomet, or the Christian that the Arab sectarian was a prophet at all; and it is singular that both parties call in reason in attestation of their respective creeds.

Is, then, the sturdy English theologian to be content to leave the followers of Islam alone, because they have faith? or, must he still endeavour to convert them by the use of reason? Can the Christian adopt the belief that Mahometan and Mormon are both orthodox because they have faith? and that the Jew must still be dear to Jehovah, inasmuch as he still clings closely by faith to the revelation given to Moses and the prophets? If this cannot be done, how can the follower of Jesus hope to convert others to his belief, unless by the use of reason? If, then, the theologian uses reason as a weapon against heterodoxy, upon what ground can he object to its being employed by another? Latter-day saints have made many proselytes in Christendom, and a Mahometan floored in debate the late pious Missionary, Henry Martyn, whose propositions were met by counter ones, and every one of whose arguments was taken up and retorted, the names only of the persons spoken of being changed. "I know," said the one, "that

God spoke to us by Christ Jesus"-"I know," said the other, "that Allah spoke to us by Mahomet." "You are wrong, my friend," said one, "Allah has not spoken to man since the last Apostle died." "You are wrong," said the other, "God has spoken to us long after that. You may call Mahomet an apostle, if you like; we call him a prophet of Allah, and know that he was one." And so controversy goes on now where there is faith without reason.

It is clear, then, that truth cannot be established by any number of people thundering out "I believe it," and by their victoriously fighting for it. The argument, therefore, which I may be accused of omitting, is of no value at all; it is sheer nonsense-a windbag, or, perhaps, it may best be compared to a boomerang, which, when badly used, recoils upon the person of him who threw it. Of such arguments theology is builded up.

CHAPTER XII.

Honesty. A question propounded. Are "divines" honest? Meaning of the word. Learners and teachers-their relations to each other. Honesty expected in a professor. Teachers of religion are trusted-they are bound to be faithful. Political rights of men in respect of the clergy of the Established Church. Right to see that religion is not adulterated. Man's right to truth. What truth is not. Assertions required at "ordina tion." Canonical Scriptures. Verbal inspiration. Doubts of laity. Two schools-those who will and those who will not inquire. Rev. Dr Colenso. Rev. Dr Browne. Precious stones and "paste." How should a doubt be tackled-by inquiry, or by ignoring it? An analogy. Compass and bible. If compass wrong, why steer by it? Passenger and captain-one appeals to stars, the other to his owners and the seamen under him. Precision of Colenso-his words falsified so as to be con. futed: this is not honesty. Is Bishop Browne honest in controversy! Tabernacle, temple, doors, &c. The Speaker's Commentary not an honest book. Papal falsehoods; false decretals; false letter from Prester John. Pious frauds. Influence of dishonest teaching on education. The point involved in sectarian discussions. Lying miracles-are they promulgated honestly? Is it honest in religion to promulgate that which we know to be wrong, or which we dare not inquire into for fear of consequences? Do Papal authorities believe in the annual miracle at Naples? The Protestant Church judged by a ruler of Siam. Bigotry, by not inquiring, does not establish truth. Each man who is deceived has a propensity to deceive others. The masses agree to be deceived. Mr Gladstone on education. His proposition that inquiry is bad if it leads to change of religious opin. ions. Anecdotes of stupidity. Sailing in search of truth. Captains who avoid the right course. The condition of society when the schoolmaster overrides the ecclesiastic. Reason and education ought to precede faith. Result of honesty. Divines recoil from the honest truth. Parsons in their pulpit preach what their week-day precepts oppose. Honesty in ecclesiastical matters is not the best policy. Divines and the silversmiths of Ephesus. Examples. An honest parson is persecuted by his fellows: this insures mediocrity and bigotry. If an author cannot be persecuted he is avoided. Ecclesiastics persecute their colleagues, but do not prove them wrong. Excommunication easier than refutation. What an honest merchant and divine should do when they discover a diamond to be paste. Ought the divine to be less honest than the merchant? The Author's challenge. Conclusion.

I AM now about to propound a question which I have heard mooted in quiet by many, but for which publicity seems to be

dreaded by all-viz., "Is there honesty amongst Christians, and especially amongst the hierarchy of the Churches of England and Rome?"

No one can doubt the importance of the subject; there is not a thoughtful person who does not, in words at least, scorn to build up his everlasting belief upon a fable, and who does not affect to be disgusted with everyone who is deliberately untruthful. I speak not now of those time-servers who regard every artifice to be fair in love, war, and theology; but only of those earnest minds who are anxious to seek out and to hold fast that which is true, and who, under all circumstances, resolve to be honest with themselves. That there may be no doubt as to the sense in which I use the word, the following may be regarded as, in my opinion, the synonyms which are properly given in Webster's Dictionary-" Integrity, probity, uprightness, trustiness, faithfulness, honour, justice, equity, fairness, candour, plain dealing, veracity." To this may be added-"not bearing false witness."

Presuming that English scholars agree in this definition, let me now inquire whether "we"-by which term I mean the non-theological class by profession-have a right to expect "honesty" amongst our teachers-be they Roman, Anglican, Hibernian, Scottish, Unitarian, Wesleyan, or of any other body? and, in the next place, whether we get that to which we are entitled? Presuming that it is necessary to begin with the foundation, let us first inquire into "our rights," and whence they are supposed to be derived.

The positions of a learner and a teacher-or a disciple and a master-are, in some cases, different to what they are in others; for example, I need not, unless I think it desirable, learn astronomy, chemistry, the art of telegraphing, or that of ship-building; but if I do elect to learn any of these matters, and engage a man to instruct me, I have a legal claim upon him for his services. There is, indeed, a contract between us

-he engaging to teach me, and I agreeing to pay him for his labour. In my selection of a professor, it is quite possible that I have not chosen the best; nay, seeing that I require to be taught, it is nearly certain that I cannot assume the position of a judge as regards the superiority of one teacher over another. But when the agreement is once entered into, each of the parties is bound to perform his part of the contract to the best of his ability. If, for example, I bargain with a master to teach me Spanish, and I, being wholly ignorant thereof, am instructed in Portuguese, I have a definite legal claim for redress.

If, on the other hand, the law, or the custom of the country, compels me to take a certain class of teachers, whether they are competent or worthless, I, as one of the community, am justified in investigating the intellectual power of the professors, individually and collectively, in every way in my power.

At one period, when autocracy, or tyranny, was supreme, this right was denied, and the legislators made it a criminal matter for any one to call in question the nature of the instruction which was given to the people in matters of politics, religion, and other things, wherein the government was concerned. At the present time there are few, if any, states whose ruling powers demand from the people such an abject submission.

But, although a republic may allow unlimited latitude of opinion in matters of political economy, there may be a religious section within it, which consists of those who consent to be led, in matters of faith, by certain individuals, who, on their parts, are declared to be, by some power that the laity are disposed to submit to, the only persons competent to conduct persons to a happy eternity.

Every individual in such a family is associated with the rest by voluntary ties. He may, if he chooses, inquire into the