When a community thinks it needs a railroad, it is very likely to let any one build it who will, withThe naturally progressive extension of their busi-out questioning the future too closely, and some ness by commercial corporations beyond the limits Jacob always has a mess of pottage ready for needy

It should be borne in mind that from the point of view of the public, the primary element of danger in the corporate idea is the exchange of individual for corporate responsibility, and that to whatever THE SUICIDE CLAUSE IN LIFE INSURANCE extent the public surrenders the right of supervision and control over these great business machines which it has created, by just so much is the danger from unrestrained and irresponsible activity increased.

I. The majority of whose stock-or perhaps a pathologists and alienists relative to morbid mental less proportion is owned or controlled, or whose business is controlled, directly or indirectly, by or in the interest of another non-resident corporation. 2. Unless it is actually and in good faith carrying on the principal business for which it was formed and maintaining its corporate headquarters and principal commercial office in the State of its origin.

There is no better way to gain a clear conception of any question of historic development than to go back to its origin and trace its rise and growth and change. And so we shall go back to the earliest reported case where the suicide clause was construed by a court of justice, the case of

3. Unless it is authorized by its charter to carry Borradaile v. Hunter (5 M. & G. 637 [Court of

far insane that he did not know the moral wrong of the act he was committing. But even so, the plaintiff would not have been entitled to recover, for the jury found the act was voluntary. In other words there was a controlling mind - the means were adapted to the end, and the death was the logical consequence of a thought. As we proceed it will be seen that some courts have deviated far from this position, holding in effect that the thought of a diseased mind is no thought at all, and that a voluntary act cannot come from a mind insane, however well it may know the physical consequences of that act — it must know the moral effects and consequences.

Common Pleas]). This is an English case which was tried in 1841. Borradaile threw himself into the Thames river and was drowned. His life was insured and a suit was begun to recover on the policy. In the policy it was provided that if "the assured should die by his own hands or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel," it should be void. The jury found that "he voluntarily threw himself into the river, knowing at the time that he would thereby destroy his life, and intending thereby to do so, but that at the time of committing the act he was not capable of judging between right and wrong." The court held there could be no recovery on the policy. J. Erskine, before whom the case was originally tried, said: "I thought that, as the words of the proviso, according to their ordinary acceptation were large enough to include all intentional acts of selfdestruction, whether criminal or not, if the deceased was laboring under no delusion as to the physical consequences of the act he was committing if he knew that it was water into which he was about to throw himself, and that the consequence of his leaping from the bridge would be his death — and if he voluntarily threw himself from the bridge into the river, intending by so doing to drown himself - the question whether he had been thereby guilty of a crime, as felo de se, or whether he had at that time destroyed the life of another instead of his own, he was in a state of mind to be morally and legally responsible for his acts, was irrelevant to the question before the jury that the state of mind of the assured was only material for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act of self-destruction was a voluntary and willful act for the purpose of destroying life. *Looking simply at that branch of the proviso upon which the issue was raised, it seems to me that the only qualification that a liberal interpretation of the words, with reference to the nature of the contract is, that the act of self-destruction should be the voluntary and willful act of a man, having at the time sufficient power of mind and reason to understand the physical nature and consequence of such an act, and having at the time a purpose and intention to cause his own death by that act; and that the question whether he was capable of understanding and appreciating the moral nature and quality of his purpose, is not relevant to the inquiry, further than as it might help to illustrate the extent of his capacity to under-sane when he committed the act. Chief Justice stand the physical character of the act itself."

The above is what is commonly known as the English doctrine. It will be noted the jury found Borradaile did the act voluntarily. The act was done at the dictate of the mind. The mind is the man. It may have been that Borradaile was so

In the later case of Cleft v. Schwabe (3 M., G. & S. [Common Bench], 437), the judges indulged in a lengthy discussion of the word "suicide," and they decided that the word should be taken in its ordinary and popular meaning, that it meant the mere conscious physical act of taking one's own life, and not in the sense that the act constituted the perpetrator a felo de se. The insured took sulphuric acid voluntarily under circumstances which indicated his mind was unsound. The policy provided that if the insured 'should commit suicide" it should be void. The defendant pleaded that the insured committed suicide and the judge instructed the jury that to maintain that defense it must be shown that the insured committed the act as a result of his own volition, and that he was able to distinguish between right and wrong. But in any case the jury must assume he was sane. The jury gave a verdict for the defendant. The Exchequer Chamber on appeal reversed the court below and Baron Parke, in giving the decision, said if the deceased voluntarily killed himself, it was immaterial whether he was sane Bliss on Life Ins., 2d Ed. 381. So much for the English decisions and the foundations of future theories of law.

or not."

The earliest case decided in the United States is that of Breasted v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company. In the policy it was provided that if the insured should "die by his own hand" the policy shall be void. It went up first on demurrer in 1843 (4 Hill, 73), and on appeal was again decided in 1853 (4 Seld. 299). Comfort, the insured, though his name would indicate he was a happy man, drowned himself in the Hudson river, and there was evidence going to show he was in

Nelson in delivering the opinion of the court upon the hearing on the demurrer, said: "Self-destruction by a fellow-being bereft of reason can with no more propriety be ascribed to the act of his own hand, than to the deadly instrument that may have been used for the purpose. The drowning

of Comfort was no more his act, in the sense of to destroy his own life. In such a case, suicide is the law, than if he had been impelled by irresistible the willful and voluntary act of a person who underphysical power; nor is there any greater reason for stands its nature, and intends by it to accomplish exempting the company from the risk assumed in the result of self-destruction. He may have acted the policy, than if his death had been occasioned from an insane impulse which prevented him from by such means. Construing these words, there-appreciating the moral consequences of suicide; fore, according to the true, and, as I apprehend, but, nevertheless, he may have fully comprehended universally received meaning among insurance offi- the physical effect of the means which he used to cers, there can be no doubt that the termination take his own life, and the consequences which of Comfort's life was not withing the saving clause might ensue to others from the suicidal act. It of the policy. Suicide involves the deliberate ter- is against risks of this nature. the destruction of mination of one's existence while in the possession life by the voluntary and intentional act of the and enjoyment of his mental faculties. Self-party assured that the exception in the proviso slaughter by an insane man or a lunatic is not an is intended to protect the insurers. The moral act of suicide within the meaning of the law." On responsibility of the act does not affect the nature the appeal the judgment of the court below was of the hazard. The object is to guard against a affirmed. loss arising from a particular mode of death." See, also, Cooper v. Mass. Ins. Co. (102 Mass. 227).

It will be observed that the reasoning in this case and the holding of the court do not at all agree with that in the English case of Borradaile v. Hunter (supra). Here mere insanity regardless of the power of the insured to comprehend the physical consequences of his acts, is held sufficient to warrant recovery on the policy in case of the suicide of the insured.

A different rule was established in the State of Massachusetts in 1862 in the case of Dean v. American Mutual Life Ins. Co. (4 Allen, 96). It was provided in the policy that it should be void if the insured "shall die by his own hand." He took his own life by cutting his throat. It was pleaded that he was insane. But Chief Justice Bigelow said in his opinion: "A person may be insane, entirely incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and without any just sense of moral responsibility, and yet retain sufficient power of mind and reason to act with premeditation, to understand and contemplate the nature and consequences of his own conduct, and intend the result which his acts are calculated to produce. Insanity does not necessarily operate to deprive its subjects of their hopes and fears, or the other mental emotions which agitate and influence the minds of persons in the full possession of their faculties. On the contrary, its effect is to stimulate certain powers to extraordinary and unhealthy action, and thus to overwhelm and destroy the due influence and control of the reason and judgment. Take an illustration, a man may labor under an insane delusion that he is coming to want, and that those who look to him for support will be subjected to the ills of extreme poverty. The natural effect of this species of insanity is to create great mental depression, under the influence of which the sufferer, with a view to avoid the evils and distress which he imagines to be impending over him and those who are dependent upon him for support, is impelled

The rule laid down in the case above does not at all conform to the rule in the New York case of Breasted v. Ins. Co., and comes very nearly being in harmony with the English rule established in the Borradaile case (supra).

An important case is that of Estabrook v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. (54 Me. 224), decided in 1866. Chief Justice Appleton in his decision said among other things: "When death is the result of insanity, it is equally the result of disease for which the insane is in no respect responsible. It is a wellsettled physiological principle that disturbed intelligence has the same relation to the brain that disordered respiration has to the lungs and pleura. Death, then, by an insane suicide, is as much death by disease as though it were death by fever or consumption. Death by accident or mistake, though by the party's own hand, is not within the condition. Death by disease is provided for by the polInsanity is a disease. Death, the result of insanity, is death by disease. The insane suicide no more dies with his own hand than the suicide by mistake or accident. If the act is not the act of a responsible being, but is the result of any delusion or perversion, whether physical, intellectual or moral, it is not the act of the man."

icy.

The rule of law established in New York by the Breasted case was destined to be changed by the decision in the case of Van Zandt v. Mut. L. Ins. Co. (55 N. Y. 169), and the rule of law in New York is now practically the same as in Massachusetts. The decision is in substance that though the mind of the insured may have become so morbidly diseased on the question of insanity as not to appreciate its moral wrong, yet if the insured be in possession of his will and his ordinary mental faculties necessary for self-preservation and in this state of mind takes his life, the policy is avoided. The condition ought to be construed as to exclude

where there is no motive to secure benefits to the family of the insured or to escape from earthly ills.

only those cases such as accident and delirium, for the certificate was this provision: "I also hereby agree that should I commit suicide, then and in that case only the amount paid by me into the mutual aid fund on my certificate shall be In the case of Fowler v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (4 paid to the beneficiaries mentioned in my beneLans. 202 [N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep.]), it was held that | ficiary certificate." Suit was brought in Peoria a letter written by the assured immediately before county for recovery for the full amount of the cercommitting suicide telling his brother he had tificate. Judgment was given for the plaintiff. It feared becoming insane and had concluded to end appeared from the testimony that the assured came his sufferings, together with proof of a disease to his death by suicide, and there was testimony which tended to produce a morbid mental state, going to show his insanity. Justice Boggs, in deand that he was a Spiritualist and seemed some- livering the opinion of the court, said: "It is bewhat excited and absent-minded and morose, is lieved there is a substantial concurrence of -judisufficient to establish that his suicide was a deliber-cial decision in America on the proposition that if, ate act designed to take life, which would invali- at the time of the suicidal act, the assured was not date a policy containing a condition against death by his own hand. See, also, Clevenger's Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, 418.

The court in rendering an opinion in the case of Blackstone v. Ins. Co. (74 Mich. 592) (see 610), said that under a policy of life insurance containing a provision against recovery in case of self-destruction in order to work a forfeiture the insured must have sufficient mental capacity not only to understand that the act will destroy his life, but also to distinguish its moral quality and consequences the right and wrong of it. But in the 90 Mich. 177, in the case of Sabin v. Senate of the Nat. Union, the Supreme Court of Michigan said: "One who has sufficient intelligence to employ a rope, adjust it, and commit suicide by hanging, cannot be said to be so unconscious of the natural physical result of his acts as to prevent the operation of the law of a benefit association, of which he is a member, prohibiting the payment of any benefit upon the death of a member who commits suicide, whether sane or insane at the time of its commission" and there can be no recovery. The case of Streeter v. Society (65 Mich. 199), is cited with approval.

Some attention to the law, and the decisions of this State may interest us more than those in other States, though there do not seem to be as many well-reasoned opinions on the subject under discussion as in some of the other States referred to above.

so affected with insanity as to be unconscious of the act or of the physical effect thereof, or was driven to its commission by an insane impulse which he had not the power to resist, the act of self-destruction is regarded as though it were the result of accident or some irresistible external force, and the proviso of a policy framed as the one at bar, or where other phrases denoting selfdestruction are used, will not attach, but the insurer will be held liable.

"There is much conflict of opinion and authority as to the effect of the condition or proviso of the policy when insanity has so far overcome the consciousness of the assured that he is unable to appreciate the moral wrong involved in the act of taking his own life, though he had mind enough to intend the act and was aware of the physical effect. The Supreme Court of the United States is committed to the doctrine that in order to relieve the insurer from liability because of a proviso of the character here involved, there must have been sufficient mental understanding to realize the moral turpitude of the act of self-destruction."

The opinions handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States are all consistent in their holdings, and there are several leading cases which it will pay us to consider. The first case on this point which seems to have come under the consideration of that body is that of Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mary Terry (82 U. S. 236 [1872]). The action was brought to recover the amount of $2,000 on a policy of insurance on the life of one Terry.

his own hand *

The Appellate Court in the case of New Home Ins. Co. v. Hagler (29 Ill. App. 437 [1888]), said The that involuntary self-destruction is not self-destruc- policy contained the provision, "If the said person tion at all and does not come within the meaning | whose life is hereby insured * * * shall die by of the provision against suicide in a policy of inthis policy shall be null surance. This question is also alluded to in the and void." Terry died from the effects of poison case of Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith (39 Ill. administered by his own hand. Evidence was App. 569). given to show his insanity and also to show his sanity at the time of committing the act of suicide. Justice Hunt in giving his opinion considers to some extent a number of decisions in the State courts, some of which we have already examined.

The meaning of the provision against recovery in case of death by suicide of the insured was squarely raised in the case of Grand Lodge I. O. M. A. v. Wieting (168 Ill. 408). In the application