matter carried farther at present; but if the practice were repeated, he should certainly move for the punishment of the individual.

VICE CHANCELLOR'S BILL.] Lord Castlereagh moved the order of the day for the House going into a Committee on the Vice-Chancellor's Bill. On the question for the Speaker's leaving the chair being put,

Mr. Leach, in rising to oppose this mo tion, said he must admit the extent of the evil against which it was the declared intention of the Bill to provide, and that the evil demanded an immediate remedy. He was perfectly aware that some decisive measure was imperiously called for to counteract the inconvenience which, under the present system, was experienced, but to that now before the House he had the strongest objections. He opposed it because it appeared to him to tend in its consequences to disengage the Lord Chancellor from a great portion of his judicial functions, and to render an office which was primarily judicial and secondarily political, primarily political and secondarily judicial. He opposed it, too, because there was another and an adequate remedy to which no objection could be made.

In stating that it would have a tendency to disengage the Chancellor from a great portion of his judicial functions, there were two things to be established. It would be necessary, therefore, to enquire, 1st, whether it would be an evil if the measure were to be attended with such consequence; and then, 2dly, whether it would be followed with such consequences? It seemed to be pretty gene. rally admitted in the former debate on the Bill, that there would be a manifest evil in such a change of the office. He would, however, shortly state the views which he himself entertained on the character of the evil of such a change. Every gentleman who heard him, whether a lawyer or not, was well acquainted, that in all modern trials in Chancery the judicial duties of the Lord Chancellor were not only satisfactorily, but splendidly discharged; but that they would be performed with equal benefit if the proposed alteration were to take place was a proposition to which he could by no means accede. Besides this part of the functions of the Lord Chancellor, there was another which, in his conviction, was of the utmost importance, and which he thought

had not hitherto been sufficiently attended to in the discussion on this Bill. As the head of the law of this country, the Lord Chancellor was the patron in some sort of judicial appointments. His recommendation had, it was known, great weight in the nomination of the puisne judges, and the appointment to various offices of the courts of justice, which were termed ministerial, were materially influenced by his opinion. The manner in which the various Lord Chancellors had exercised this authority and influence was the main reason, why, down to the present period, such offices had been held by men of integrity so sound and legal knowledge so extensive. Our seats of justice had been hitherto filled with persons of a learning and character unknown in other countries. That this patronage had been always hitherto so splendidly executed, could not be the effect of accident, for accident was attended with one consequence to-day and another to-morrow, whereas this state of superiority had been regular and invariable. The inherent source must be in the character and constitution of the office. He would, therefore, ask, what was it? The Lord Chancellor was always one of the most eminent lawyers of his day: and why? because the great and important duties of his office necessarily required that he should be so. He had always filled the seats of justice with persons of merit, integrity, and legal learning; because, having lived all his life with lawyers, his knowledge and feelings as well as his honour prompted him to attend only to legal merit in his selection of individuals to fill the subordinate, although not less important offices of the law, and his recommendation of them to appointments. If this was true, did they not, by the alteration in question, hazard a change in these results? Surely, it behoved the House to enquire if the advantages which the country had heretofore derived from the existing character and constitution of this great law officer would or would not be put in jeopardy by the present measure. If the Chancellor's situation were, as he contended it ought to be, considered as primarily political, and secondarily judicial, would not the judicial seat be likely to be conferred on those who had most ap❤ titude for the primary duties? If the choice were thus to be directed by political consequence and political connection, the effect would be, that when a lawyer saw that it was not legal eminence but other talents

and other qualities which led to the judicial seat, all persons of talent would be drawn from the law to seek after political distinction. Lawyers observing that eminence was to be obtained, not, as heretofore, by professional learning and skill, but by other qualities, would withdraw themselves from the acquisition of legal knowledge, and apply themselves to the attainment of political science, character, and influence. Thus would a most material change be affected in the whole judicial constitution of the country, a change which all must allow would be a very serious evil. The Court of Chancery, as an appellant court, would lose its consequence in the eyes of the country. If the Chancellor did not live with lawyers; if he was himself a politician, would he not be apt to make choice of politicians rather than lawyers for judges? The magnitude of the evil, therefore, was, as he had already said, nothing less than a change in the whole of the judicial constitution of the country.

Having shown that such would be the evil resulting from the disengagement of the Lord Chancellor from a great portion of his judicial duties, he would proceed to enquire, whether, in point of fact, it was likely that the Bill before the House would so disengage the Lord Chancellor, and lead to the evils which he had anticipated? The Bilt bore to be framed on the principle, not to render the duties of the office less laborious, but to provide an assistance for the dispatch of that increase of business which the labour of the Chancellor could not possibly perform. It was not to make the Chancellor of the present times less engaged than the Chancellors of former times, nor to detach from the office any of those duties which had hitherto pertained to it, but to provide for the increase of business which had since taken place. The Bill was calculated to relieve the public rather than to relieve the Lord Chancellor. The great objection which he had to the measure was, that thus professing merely to provide the means of getting rid of that increase of business which the Lord Chancellor was unable to transact, it tended to afford him an opportunity of disengaging himself from a great portion of his judicial duties, and of that business which he was able to transact, and which he had hitherto transacted. The first question to be considered was, what was the extent of the increase? In very recent times, 16 or 20 years ago, the person who was Lord Chancellor was

not only adequate to discharge the judicial but the political duties of his office. By political duties he meant merely his duties as Speaker of the House of Lords, and a cabinet minister, and not as. Presi dent of the Court of Appeal. Now, if he were to suppose that the business of the Court of Chancery had been even doubled since that period, it by no means followed that if another judge were to be appointed, that judge would not have the whole of his time occupied, because the Chancellor had formerly a great part of his time occupied by the discharge of political duties, and consequently if it had not been for these duties must have been able to dis patch a great deal more of Chancery bu siness. But to say the business was doubled within the last twenty years was a proposition so utterly extravagant as not to be entertained for a moment. Should they state the increase at one half? This was a supposition, when compared with the fact, almost as extravagant as the other. But say it amounted to one half? what would be the quantity of time unemployed? There was first the time occupied in the political duties, and then half the rest of the time. But there was something like a measure to estimate the amount of the increase by-he said something like a measure, for from the nature of the subject it was obvious, that no precise measure could be obtained. The actual quantity of the accumulation was known, and by dividing it into years, beginning with the year when the excess first happened, they would have the measure of the excess from year to year. If the period, for instance, was 20 years, it would be exactly the measure of 20 years' increase, provided that the pressure of business did not lead to extraordinary exertions on the part of the Lord Chancellor. But it was impossible that there could be any extraordinary exertion; for the year was wholly occupied by ordinary exertion. He meant that the extraordinary exertion could not be to any considerable degree

because, in August last year, the present Chancellor was occupied a fortnight more than any of his predecessors; but then the additional time withdrawn for the addition to his political duty was an abatement more than equal to the other. If, therefore, the actual accumulation (incapable of being kept down by the Chancellor) was the measure of the increase of business, the question was how long it had proceeded? Had it proceeded for 20, or

10 years? On this subject the documents on the table were by no means satisfactory. All was conjectural in them. For his part, he was disposed to think that the accumulation had existed for a period longer than that of which the House was aware. That it had existed for only ten years would, however, be sufficient for his argument, and he would assume that, therefore, to be the fact; consequently, the present accumulation represented the increase of ten years. Now, how long would a judge be occupied in reducing it, supposing him to apply himself solely to that task? It appeared from the reports upon the table, that there were at present undecided 270 Appeals in the House of Lords, and 130 original causes in the Court of Chancery, besides 60 or 70 which were not original, making in all 470 causes. This was the number set down for hearing; but it would not be fair to consider them as the number actually to be heard, as many of them were set down in the mere current of business. Therefore, allowing 70 for the current business of the Court, the arrear might be taken at 400 causes. How long then, he repeated, taking the existing accumulation at 400 causes, would a single judge be in subduing it? If a single judge could subdue this arrear in one year, then would the dispatch of the same increase of business in future oc

cupy only one tenth part of the time of that judge. Viewing the matter as he did, he was persuaded that it would not take above one year of the labour of a single judge to dispatch the whole of the arrear, provided that judge sat on every juridical day. Of such days there were 200 in the twelve months, and so, at the rate of two causes in the day, the whole arrear of 400 causes would be disposed of in one year. But it ought to be recollected that even these 400 causes could not all be efficient. A great many of them proceeded from no other object than delay; as, wherever an accumulation began to take place, it naturally fed itself, and an arrear of legal business naturally led to an augmentation of arrear. Of the 400, he could not suppose that fewer than 50 were for delay, the number to be determined was consequently only 350. It was, as he had already said, his opinion, that a single judge could subdue the accumulation all in one year. This however, was only his private opinion. But, he asked, had the House no mode by which to determine how far this opinion was or was not likely

to be well founded? Had they no standard by which to estimate the number of causes that a judge could hear in a given period? Unquestionably they had. By the documents on the table it appeared, that on the average of the years 1810 and 1811, the Master of the Rolls had heard in each year, 370 litigated causes, and of petitions not of consent had settled 670, which were equal to twice 30 causes. But taking them as being equal only to 30 causes, this made up 400 causes decided by the Master of the Rolls within one year. But, it was proved by evidence before the House, that the Master of the Rolls had a great part of his time occupied in other business besides that of equity. In how many juridical days did the House suppose the Master of the Rolls disposed of those 400 litigated causes? In 120 juridical days. The Master of the Rolls sat in equity no greater number of days in the course of the year. The days that be did sit too, were improperly termed days; they were but the fractions of days. He sat, in reality, but 20 juridical days in the course of a year, and the other days on which he did sit were but fractions of a day, namely, from six to ten in the evening. Then, in how long a period would a judge, sitting juridical days, subdue this arrear? The Chancellor's regular juridical day consisted of six hours; 200 juridical days of the Lord Chancellor, there fore, were equal to 300 of the Master of the Rolls days; and, of course, a person sitting 200 juridical days of six hours each, would decide three times the number of causes now decided by the Master of the Rolls within the year; that is to say, 1,200 causes of the same nature, with the 400 at present decided by him. But in answer to this, it might be said the causes so decided by the Master of the Rolls were not of the same difficulty with the causes now in arrear, that they were neither so important and complicated as the Appeals before the House of Lords, nor in their nature so weighty and momentous as those heard in the Court of Chancery, and that therefore this assumption did not hold good. He would grant the argument to a certain length; but suppose three, however, to be only equal to one, and thus reduce the 1,200 to one third, still, on the principle now laid down, the same judge might within the year dispose of 400 difficult causes. Suppose also that the present increase had been produced in ten years, and that one year would be

sufficient to bring up the arrear, it followed that the assistant judge would in future render all the aid to the Lord Chancellor, which, by the present Bill, it was meant he should afford, in the tenth part of each year; and, when the increase which had already accumulated, was subdued, that only one tenth part of the time of such assistant judge would be necessary for the dispatch of the business which he would have to execute. He would allow, however, that this was an exaggerated view of the subject, and would for argument's sake admit that even one fourth part of the time of this assistant judge should be employed: he asked, was not this likely to lead to the evil to which he had already alluded? Would not three-fourths, or say one half of his time, after the discharge of the ar rear, be unemployed, unless he were to devote it to the execution of those duties which had hitherto employed the Lord Chancellor in the Court of Chancery. Was it not to be expected, that some other part of the ordinary business of the Lord Chancellor would be thrown upon him? Gentlemen might say, this was not a legitimate argument, and that it was not fair to say, that there must be, because there might be abuse. He allowed that the argument might not be legitimate merely as such, but the question here to be considered, was, if the convenience of the use expected to be produced, might not be outweighed by the inconvenience of the abuse of which the proposed measure was susceptible? And, in his opinion, the latter infinitely outweighed the former. It was asked, also, how it could be supposed that the Lord Chancellor would be guilty of a neglect of his duty or an abandonment of his judicial labours; but he would ask in return, whether the principle of all law was not contrary to this blind confidence in personal character? The law did not presume that a man would do his duty, because he might do it: it rather took care to provide that he should do it. If it was to be supposed that a man would do his duty, there was no law on the subject wanted. Here a case arose in which the Vice-Chancellor employed on the increase which existed in Chancery, would have a considerable portion of time on his bands. His time was placed at the command of the Chancellor, vested with the power to instruct his deputy in the performance of his duty in his place. The Chancellor had the functions of a burthenspme office to discharge; he had also other

services of a different description, which were occasionally required of him. In these circumstances, considering the strong temptation placed before him by the creation of such an office, was it not possible that he might feel inclined, at times, to yield to the pressure, and employ the Vice-Chancellor in what ought properly to be executed by himself? Might not the House naturally conclude that the purest and best of men might occasionally sink into the indulgence presented to his acceptance. But it was said by the advocates of the Bill on the other side, the eye of the public would be upon him, so that no change of the kind was to be dreaded. This he did not question. He did not expect any violent change; and it was true that the public observation might restrain him from any sudden or great alteration; but the innovation would not be of that nature. What he anticipated was, that the practice would creep in imperceptibly, and that the proper duties of the Chancellor would, one by one, be transferred over to the Vice-Chancellor, till it should in time be forgotten that there ever was a Chancellor with those duties. And this, too, would be the case even where the Chancellor was effective and the ViceChancellor was not. This, however, was not all. There was another view of the case in which it appeared most important that the duties now performed by the Chancellor should not be transferred over to the Vice-Chancellor. If there existed any jealousy with respect to this officer, there might be a safeguard; but when he was invested with the same legal trust, the safeguard of public jealousy disappeared, and the Chancellor might, in obedience to higher commands, become involved in the mazes of political intrigue, to the abandonment of all duties except his appellant ones. When it appeared to those who had the command over the Chancellor, that there was an assistant who had sufficient time on his hands to ease him of part of his judicial duties, was there not reason to dread that he would be involved still deeper than he had hitherto been in political business, and in intrigue not known to belong to his office? No rational man could look at the present measure with attention, and not see, that if adopted, the Chancellor would, at some time or other, and, he presumed to think, at no great distance too, be withdrawn from all except bis appellant duties; and would not that lead to all the evils to which he had allud

ed, as likely to result in respect to all our other judicial situations?

Among the arguments used by the supporters of the Bill, there were none which excited in his mind more surprize as addressed to a deliberative assembly than that which maintained that gentlemen had no right to object to the present measure unless they had something better to propose in place of it. Surely no proposition could be more unreasonable in principle, or in its application to this particular case. On a subject of such a nature how few even of the members of that House could be supposed adequate to form an exact opinion of the evil, or bring their minds to an investigation of all its branches and bearings; and, if there were not probably more than six gentlemen in the House who had maturely considered the subject, and were aware of the evil, how could they be supposed to have found a remedy? But suppose that he, as a person who had applied his mind to its consideration, thought some system as an adequate remedy to the evil complained of, was to be found in a person of eminence already holding a judicial situation, how was he, an unauthorized individual, to come with it matured for the approbation of the House? No man could come without au thority with a matured plan for the consideration of the House; but any man might come forward and state his opinion on such plan as was submitted for their consideration. It might be, that he had revolved a plan-it might be, that he conceived that one learned judge had more time than was necessary to the discharge of his peculiar duties, and might beneficially assist in the removal of the evils complained of in another court; yet to suppose that he or any other person, under those circumstances, could bring forward a perfect plan for adoption, was to suppose what did not belong to the nature of the subject. Without assuming, therefore, more than belonged to the circumstances that attended the examination of the question before them, he should suggest to the House a remedy, which, he was satisfied, would be found fully equal to meet the evil in its broadest extent. There was an office created for no other purpose but to assist the Lord Chancellor, and when that judge wanted more assistance, was not their attention naturally directed to the office so created? The office of the Master of the Rolls was such office, and the question was, could the

House, by a different distribution of the business, make him more effective for the end for which he was constituted? As he had only 20 effectual juridical days, and only 100 fractions of days at present occupied, so it followed that he had one half of his time unappropriated. But an hon. and learned friend of his had said, that though the Master of the Rolls had less of his time occupied in court, he had many other important duties to discharge; for his part, he did not understand what was meant by the word attached to the office-he did not understand any duty to be attached to an office unless it entered into its constitution and specially belonged to it. Those duties described to be attached to the office of Master of the Rolls were Prize and Plantation Appeals. He however, contended, that the Master of the Rolls had no more to do with those causes than any other privy counsellor. He had his (the Master of the Rolls) own words for saying so, for he, five years ago, withdrew from them for 15 months. Could any man conceive that this great and excellent officer would have withdrawn himself from those causes, if it had been his duty to have attended to them. What censure would not he have subjected himself to, if, for the gratification of his private feelings, he had withdrawn himself from the duties of his office? Such, however, was not the case; but it was a mere voluntary occupation of his unemployed time. And should the House not rather call on this great officer to do that for which he was created, rather than suffer him, because he was not sufficiently occupied in that, to employ his time in what was not his duty? It became the House not to appoint two assistants to the Chancellor, when the business of equity could be done with one, the supposition, then, that the Master of the Rolls were withdrawn from the Cockpit, the question was, could he give the assistance required to the Lord Chancellor and meet the evil of the accumulation they were desirous of removing? If he were to assert at random, that he knew the Master of the Rolls had time enough for the purpose, he might not get credit, and might be met by an assertion of an opposite tendency; but he professed to state, with actual and positive precision, the grounds on which his opinion was founded. To decide this question, let it be seen how much of his honour's juridical time was employed in matters of

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