State v. Henry (Wash.). (Kan.) 368 Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 35 691 636 State v. Spangler (Kan.). 39 State v. Superior Court of King County State v. Hickox (Kan.). State v. Hornbeck (Kan.). State v. Kelly (Or.).. State v. King (Utah). State v. Lockhart, Police Justice of City of Port Townsend (Wash.). State v. Morrison (Kan.).. State v. Neal (Wash.). State v. Nevada Cent. R. Co. (Nev.).. State v. Russell (Kan.). 636 Taylor v. Colorado Iron Works (Colo. Sup.) 218 1 Taylor, Schroyer v. (Kan.). 418, T. C. Power & Bro. v. Murphy (Mont.). Terrel, Gaumer v. (Kan.). 894 Terrell, Territory v. (Okl.). State v. Seattle Gas & Electric Co. (Wash.) 946 .1131 411 1071 503 919 923 925 503 540 .1134 544 504 546 (Wash.) State v. Superior Court of King (Wash.) 957 (Wash.) 199 Thiessen v. Worthington (Or.). 424 (Wash.) .1051 Thomas, Dunlop v. (Wash.). 909 State v. Superior Court of Spokane County Thomas, Stewart v. (Kan.). 70 (Wash.) 865 Thompson, Wilson v. (Kan.). .1133. State v. Superior Court of Spokane Coun Thornton, Holt Mfg. Co. v. (Cal.). 708. ty (Wash.) 1052 Thorp, Ash v. (Kan.). ..1067 State v. Thurman (Kan.). 1081 State v. Walker (Kan.). Thorpe v. Union Pac. Coal Co. (Utah). .1095 Thurman, State v. (Kan.).. 145. .1081 State v. Welch (Or.). State v. Wilcox (Kan.). 634 Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. McDonnell (Wash.) 890 State, Gustavenson v. (Wyo.). .1006 State, Smith v. (Kan.). 641 State Board of Equalization v. People Tobin v. Portland Flouring Mills Co. (Or.) 743- (Colo. Sup.) States v. Durkin (Kan.). Staude, Adler v. (Cal.). Steidle, Stanford Land Co. v. (Wash.).. Stevens v. Walton (Colo. App.). Stewart v. Thomas (Kan.). 70 Stewart, Farmers' Alliance Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. (Colo. App.). .1057 Stewart, Legere v. (Colo. App.). 1059 Traders' Nat. Bank, Reeder v. (Wash.).. 461 272 Stillinger v. Pablo (Mont.). Stilwell, De Mund Lumber Co. v. (Ariz.).. 543 Sup.) 284 481 Stocking, Power v. (Mont.).. 857 Trotter v. Town of Stayton (Or.). 3 405 Stocks v. Schroyer (Kan.). Stone, Rattlemiller v. (Wash.). .1130 Tucker v. Northern Pac. Terminal Co. (Or.) 426 168 Tucker v. Smith (Kan.)... 40 Stratton, Crosby v. (Colo. App.). 130 Stull, Nelson v. (Kan.). 617 Sullivan v. Callvert (Wash.). 363 55 96 Superior Court of City and County of San Ventura Land & Power Co. v. Meiners (Cal.) 818 ..1081 170 Vincent, Antlers Park Regent Min. Co. 226 694 Superior Court of King County, State v. (Wash.) 957 Superior Court of King County, State v. (Wash.) .1051 Superior Court of Spokane County, State v. (Wash.) Wallace v. Dodd (Cal.). . 693 865 .1115 Wolf, State v. (Kan.)..:. ..1133 Weinhard v. Commercial Nat. Bank (Or.) 806 Wollenberg v. Rose (Or.). 804 Weise, Towle v. (Kan.). Weishaar, Haenky v. (Kan.). 637 Woodard, Bemmerly v., two cases (Cal.)..1017 424 731 Welch, State v. (Or.).. 808 Wylie, Crystal Ice Co. v. (Kan.). ...1086 Wells v. Sutphin (Kan.). 648 Wyoming College and Normal School v. 561 362 ... ..1134 REHEARINGS DENIED. [Cases in which rehearings have been denied, without the rendition of a written opinion, since the publication of the original opinions in previous volumes of this reporter.] Alexander v. Barker (Kan.) 67 P. 829. Anderson v. Montgomery Co. Nat. Bank (Kan.) 67 P. 1110. Armstrong v. Coyne (Kan. Sup.) 67 P. 537. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Morris (Kan.) | 67 P. 837. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Potter (Kan.) 67 P. 534. Bolz v. Crone (Kan.) 67 P. 1108. Campbell v. Board of Com'rs of Sumner Coun- Carroll v. Caine (Wash.) 67 P: 993. Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. v. Sugar Loaf Tp. City of Eureka v. Ross (Kan.) 67 P. 849. Douglass v. Frazier (Kan.) 67 P. 1102. Ellinger v. Thomas (Kan. Sup.) 67 P. 529. Kelley v. McHugh (Kan. Sup.) 67 P. 1130. Knapp v. American Hand Sewed Shoe Co. (Kan. Sup.) 66 P. 996. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Heckman (Kan.) 67 P. 879. McAllister v. Houston (Kan. Sup.) 67 P. 544. McMullen v. Winfield B. & L. Ass'n (Kan.) 67 P. 892. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. O'Farrell (Kan.) Moore v. Shofner (Or.) 67 P. 511. Powers v. Scharling (Kan.) 67 P. 820. Remington v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (Wash.) 67 P. 989. Shattuck v. Board of Com'rs of Harvey Coun- German Ins. Co. v. Kirkendall (Kan. Sup.) 67 State v. Burton (Wash.) 67 P. 1097. Grant v. Robb (Kan.) 67 P. 852. Green v. McCrocken (Kan.) 67 P. 857. Hanna v. Kasson (Wash.) 67 P. 271. State v. Carlson (Or.) 67 P. 516. State ex rel. Howard v. Cole (Wash.) 67 P. State ex rel. Sheppard v. Harbison (Kan.) 67 Hirsch v. Salem Flouring Mills Co. (Or.) 67 P. Taffe v. Oregon R. Co. (Or.) 67 P. 1015. Walsh v. Wallace (Nev.) 67 P. 914. Johnson v. Portland Stone Co. (Or.) 67 P. 1013. Willard v. Bullen (Or.) 67 P. 924. REHEARINGS GRANTED. [California cases in which rehearings have been granted and in which rehearings have been disposed of, with or without written opinions, since the publication of the original opinions in previous volumes of this reporter.] Beveridge v. Lewis, 67 P. 1040; granted | Levin, In re, 63 P. 335; granted Jan. 1, 1901. March 28, 1902. City St. Imp. Co. v. Babcock, 68 P. 584; granted April 14, 1902. City St. Imp. Co. v. Reddington, 68 P. 1125; granted April 14, 1902. Davidson v. Lawson, 68 P. 101; granted April De' Prosse v. Royal Eagle Distilleries Co., 67 Dobbs v. Purington, 65 P. 1091. On rehear- Loewenthal v. Coonan, 67 P. 324, 1033. On rehearing, 68 P. 303. Miller v. Grunsky, 66 P. 858; granted Dec. 28, 1901. Elizalde v. Graves, 66 P. 369; granted Nov. Rue v. Quinn, 66 P. 216; granted Oct. 12, 21, 1901. German Sav. & Loan Soc. v. Ramish, April 23, 1902; granted May 3, 1902. Green v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 67 P. 4; granted Jan. 17, 1902. 1901. Salcido v. Roberts, 67 P. 1077; granted March 27, 1902. Southern Cal. R. Co. v. Slauson, 68 P. 107; granted April 7, 1902. Healey's Estate, In re, 66 P. 175; granted Warren v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 67 P. 1; Oct. 11, 1901. Kleckner v. Mathiason, granted Nov. 21, 1901. granted Jan. 17, 1902. Winchester v. Howard, 64 P. 692; granted THE PACIFIC REPORTER. VOLUME 68. (41 Or. 20) STATE v. KELLY. (Supreme Court of Oregon. March 24, 1902.) CRIMINAL LAW-ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO KILL INFORMATION SUFFICIENCY ALLEGATIONS OF WILLFULNESS AND MALICEVERDICT-RESTRICTION AS TO GRADE OF OFFENSE. 1. Where an information for assault with intent to kill charged that accused on a certain date, in the county of M., "then and there being armed with a dangerous weapon, did then and there feloniously assault one L. with such dangerous weapon," the information was not objectionable on the ground that the phrase "then and there being armed," etc., referred to the date of the information, and not the time when the act was alleged to have been committed. 2. Under Hill's Ann. Laws, § 1268, subd. 2, requiring informations and indictments to state the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, an information giving the date and place of the alleged offense, and stating that accused "did then and there unlawfully and feloniously assault one L. with a dangerous weapon, with intent to kill," was not objectionable as not sufficiently stating the acts constituting the alleged assault, and alleging a conclusion of law. 3. The court is committed by the rule of stare decisis to the doctrine that it is unnecessary for an information for assault with intent to kill to allege that the act was purposely and maliciously done, or with premeditation or malice aforethought. 4. Where a party was convicted of an assault with a dangerous weapon, a charge that he might be convicted of a simple assault was nonprejudicial, if erroneous. 5. Where defendant in a prosecution upon au information charging assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to kill admitted the assault, and sought to justify his act on the ground of self-defense, the jury were not restricted to a verdict of guilty as charged or not guilty, but were properly allowed to find defendant guilty of an assault with a dangerous weapon, without intent to kill. Appeal from circuit court, Marion county; George H. Burnett, Judge. John Kelly was convicted of an assault with a dangerous weapon, and appeals. Affirmed. J. E. Jeffery and M. E. Pogue, for appellant. John A. McNary, for the State. WOLVERTON, J. This is a criminal prosecution on an information of the district at68 P.-1 torney. The defendant was charged with the crime of assault with intent to kill, and convicted of an assault with a dangerous weapon. The charging part of the information is as follows: "The said John Kelly on the 15th day of June, 1901, in the county of Marion and the state of Oregon, then and there being armed with a dangerous weapon, to wit, a pistol loaded with powder and ball, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously assault one Frank Lambert with said dangerous weapon, with intent him, the said Frank Lambert, to kill with said dangerous weapon, by then and there unlawfully and feloniously shooting and wounding the said Frank Lambert, contrary to the statutes," etc. After the verdict the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, and it is now contended (1) that the information is insufficient to charge the crime of an assault with intent to kill; and (2) that the shooting having been admitted by the defendant, and he having sought to justify the act on the ground of self-defense, but one of two verdicts could have been found, namely, guilty as charged or not guilty. Touching the insufficiency of the information it is urged (1) that the venue is not sufficiently laid, for that the words "then and there being armed," etc., refer to the date of the information, and not to the time the act is alleged to have been committed; (2) that the acts constituting the alleg ed assault are not sufficiently stated, being, as stated, a mere conclusion of law, and because the words "shooting and wounding the said Frank Lambert" qualify and attend the words "to kill." rather than the allegation of assault; and (3) that it is not alleged that the assault was purposely and maliciously done. Of these in their order: It is usual, and perhaps requisite, that the time and place should qualify or be added to every alleged fact in an information or indictment for felony. Nicholson v. State (Ala.) 54 Am. Dec. 168; State v. Thurstin (Me.) 58 Am. Dec. 695. The information herein comes up to the full measure of the law. "Then and there being armed with a dangerous weapon" refers indisputably to "the 15th day of June, 1901." This is evidently the date upon which it is alleged the crime was committed, as it is subsequently averred that he "did then and there unlawfully and feloniously assault," referring back to the same language, fixing the day as its antecedent; so that the specific objection is not well taken. The second criticism is also without efficacy. The manner of the assault is alleged as being "with said dangerous weapon, with intent to kill," etc., "by then and there unlawfully shooting and wounding said Frank Lambert." The statute requires a statement of the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. Hill's Ann. Laws, subd. 2, § 1268. Measured by this standard, the indictment is not open to this criticism. People v. Ah Woo, 28 Cal. 205. The next objection is fully met by former decisions of this court. State v. Doty, 5 Or. 491; State v. Lynch, 20 Or. 389, 26 Pac. 219. By these the court is committed to the doctrine that it is unnecessary, in an indictment for a like offense to that charged herein, to allege that the act was purposely and maliciously done, or with premeditation or malice aforethought. In the latter case the majority of the court felt bound solely upon the ground of stare decisis, referring to the former; at the same time suggesting that it was not supported by the better authority. We are bound upon the same principle, if by none other, and do not feel warranted in disturbing the precedent. This brings us to the second contention. It has been determined that a person charged under section 1740, Hill's Ann. Laws, with an assault with an intent to kill, may be convicted under section 1744 of an assault, being armed with a dangerous weapon. State v. McLennen, 16 Or. 59, 16 Pac. 879. In the case at bar, however, the defendant admitted the assault, and sought to justify his act upon the ground of self-defense. He testified in his own behalf that, while he and Lambert were sitting on the steps of a store, Lambert commenced quarreling with him, and thereupon assaulted him viciously, by catching him by the shoulder with one hand and striking him in the face with the other, knocking him off the steps; that he immediately arose and started to his buggy, and, in order to avoid passing in front of or near Lambert, passed out into the street, and around a tree standing at the edge of the sidewalk, at the same time asking Lambert why he struck him; that Lambert answered, "I'll kick the lungs out of you," coupling it with an epithet, whereupon he drew his pistol and pointed it at Lambert, saying, "If you hit me again, I will shoot you;" that Lambert said, "Shoot," accompanying it with violent language, at the same time rushing at him with his left hand extended, and his right hand in his hip pocket. Another witness testified that the shot was fired when Lambert was advancing rap1dly towards the defendant, the ball taking effect in Lambert's face. The court instruct ed the jury that they could find one of four verdicts: Assault as charged in the indictment, assault with a dangerous weapon, an assault only, or not guilty. It is maintained that the court erred in this instruction, and that the verdict should be either guilty as charged or not guilty, and that, having found the defendant guilty of an assault with a dangerous weapon,-a lesser offense of the same grade,-it was tantamount to an acquittal of the higher offense, and therefore that. he should be discharged. We will not attempt to determine whether there was error in charging that the jury might find for an assault only, for, if there was, it was favorable to the defendant, he being convicted of a graver crime, and a reversal of the judgment could not be predicated thereon. The elements entering into the two crimes of assault with intent to kill, and an assault, being armed with a dangerous weapon, are aptly analyzed in State v. McLennen, supra. In the first there must be an assault coupled with an intent to kill; and in the latter the defendant must be armed with a dangerous weapon, and the assault made therewith. Now, an assault is an intentional attempt to do injury to another. 2 Whart. Cr. Law (7th Ed.) § 1241. So that an assault with a dangerous weapon is an intentional attempt to do injury to another with such weapon, and the element of intent attends the offense. We have therefore in the one case an intent to kill, and in the other an intent to do injury with the weapon used, and it was pertinent for the jury to determine with what intent the assault was made, it being admitted that it was made with a dangerous weapon; and it therefore follows that the court properly instructed them that they might find the defendant guilty of an assault with a dangerous weapon. The cases cited and relied upon by defendant do not seem to support his position as applied to a case like this. The most pertinent are State v. Doyle, 107 Mo. 36, 17 S. W. 751; State v. Maguire, 113 Mo. 670, 21 S. W. 212; and Phillips v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 36 S. W. 86. As illustrating the principle upon which these cases turn, it was said in the first cited: "If the unquestioned evidence showed that the offense charged, and no other, was committed, then a conviction could only properly be had for the one charged. The admissions of defendant show that he was guilty of a felonious assault, unless justified. Under the testimony given by defendant himself, the court properly refused to instruct on an offense less than charged." Not so in the case at bar, as the evidence is susceptible of two interpretations,-an assault with intent to kill, or an assault with a dangerous weapon, being armed therewith, with intent to injure the defendant. The intent was not necessarily to kill because a pistol was used. and the jury found otherwise. The judgment should therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered. |