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ter 211, providing a method whereby an incorporated city, town or
municipal corporation may surrender its charter and disincorporate,
as this does not relate to the same matters as Chapter 40, and does
not displace it or conflict with it. (State v. School Dist. No. 3, 188.)
Schools and School Districts-Boundaries-Change of.

6. Article IV, Section la, of the Constitution, declares that the
initiative and referendum powers are reserved to the legal voters
of every municipality and district, in and for their several munici-
palities and districts. Article XI, Section 2, declares that corpora-
tions may be formed under general laws, and that no charter of any
municipality, city, or town shall be amended or repealed by the
legislature, but that the legal voters may enact or amend their char-
ters. Section 4021, L. O. L., provides for changing the boundary of
school districts by the district boundary board. This statute was in
force prior to the adoption of Article XI, Section 2, of the Constitu-
tion. Held that, as the statute which was part of the general law
formed the charter, if there was one, of the school district, changes
might be made by the district boundary board according to the stat-
ute without submitting the matter to the electorate; the change
not being made by the legislative assembly. (School Dist. No. 35
v. Holden, 267.)

Schools and School Districts-Contracts-Construction of Buildings-
Liability.

7.

Plaintiff contracted with defendant to build a school building
for a specified sum, and agreed that no extras should be added ex-
cept upon the signed order of the architect. The defendant had
been authorized to issue bonds in the sum of $50,000 to pay for the
improvement. After deducting the sum of the plaintiff's original
contract, there was less than enough money remaining from the
sale of the bonds to pay for the contracts entered into in the con-
struction and for extras ordered by the architect of the plaintiff.
Held, that plaintiff could recover for the extras furnished, since
he had a right to rely on the school board's keeping further ex-
penditures, aside from his contract, within the appropriation, and
as his contract was valid when executed, action of the board in
exceeding the appropriation in other details could not prevent his
recovery. (Rush v. School District No. 5, 435.)

Schools and School Districts-Removal of Teacher.

8. Laws of 1913, Chapter 37, page 69, providing for the employ.
ment of school teachers, for the creation of a permanent list of teach-
ers, and for their removal after written notice and a hearing, taken
in connection with Laws of 1913, Chapter 172, pages 299, 304, Sec-
tion 1, subdivision 22, authorizing school boards to dismiss teachers
only for good cause, limit the power of dismissal to reasonable causes.
(Richards v. District School Board, 622.)

Power of School Boards to Enlarge Statutory Contract.

9. A school board has not authority to add to a teacher's con-
tract of employment provisions as to the term or conditions of
service beyond those found in the statutes defining the powers of the
board. (Richards v. District School Board, 622.)

Schools-Marriage as Reason for Dismissing Teacher.

10. The dismissal of a teacher because of becoming married is an
arbitrary and capricious act, in violation of a statute giving school

boards the right to dismiss teachers for reasonable cause. (Richards
v. District School Board, 622.)

See Statutes, 5.

SECONDARY EVIDENCE.

See Evidence, 3.

SESSION LAWS OF OREGON.

See Table in Front of this Volume.

SETOFF AND COUNTERCLAIM.

Setoff and Counterclaim-Query, Right to Separate Claim of Codefend-
ant.

1. Plaintiff having joined as defendants both the pledgors and the
mortgagors, the latter not having been injured and no allegation be-
ing made that plaintiff was insolvent, it is doubtful whether the
pledgors can set up an alleged conversion as a counterclaim, in
view of Section 401, L. O. L., providing that the counterclaim of the
defendant must be one upon which suit might be maintained by de-
fendant against the plaintiff. (First Nat. Bank v. Seaweard, 567.)
See Replevin, 3.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

Specific Performance — Parol Contract for Sale of Land

formance.

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1. The taking possession of real estate pursuant to an oral contract
for the sale thereof is such part performance as will take the contract
out of the statute of frauds unless the relation of affinity or consan-
guinity exists between the vendor and purchaser, in which case the
making by the purchaser of valuable improvements in addition to the
taking of possession is essential to specific performance of the con-
tract. (Stalker v. Stalker, 291.)

Specific Performance-Parol Contracts-Evidence--Sufficiency.

2. Evidence held to justify a finding that a husband orally con-
tracted to convey land to his plural wife, and that she took possession
of the land relying on the contract and made valuable improvements
thereon authorizing her heirs to compel specific performance. (Stalker
v. Stalker, 291.)

Specific Performance—Oral Contract-Weight and Sufficiency of Evi-
dence.

3. In an action for the specific performance of an alleged oral con-
tract for the sale of land, the terms of the agreement must be shown
by full, complete and satisfactory proof; but proof beyond a reason-
able doubt is not required. (Goff v. Kelsey, 337.)

Specific Performance

provement.

Contracts Enforceable - Possession and Im-

4. In such case, where the son-in-law took possession of the prem-
ises with the intention of carrying out the contract, and, because of
the contract, made valuable permanent improvements, a court of

equity would be warranted in enforcing the contract. (Goff v. Kelsey,
337.)

Specific Performance—Sufficiency of Evidence—Oral Contract.

5. Evidence, in an action for specific performance of a contract
to sell an interest in land when an irrigation ditch was completed,
and to credit plaintiff with any money advanced or any work done
on the construction of the ditch, held not to clearly establish the
terms of the contract, or that plaintiff's possession and work was
referable to any contract for the sale of the land. (Goff v. Kelsey,
337.)

See Statutes, 8.

STATE ROADS.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Statute of Frauds-Authority of Agent Agreement.

1. Section 804, L. O. L., declares that no estate or interest in land,
nor any trust or power concerning such property can be created,
transferred or declared except by operation of law, or by a convey-
ance in writing subscribed by the party or by his lawful agent under
written authority, Section 808 provides that agreements for employ-
ment of a broker to sell land shall be void unless in writing, and that
agreements relating to land shall be void unless in writing signed by
the party to be charged or his duly authorized agent whose authority
shall be in writing. A written agreement, authorizing an agent to
sell land did not empower him to agree to restrictions on the remain-
ing property of the vendor, but in plain terms reserved to the vendor
the right to modify the prices, terms and conditions. Held, that as
the purchaser was bound at his peril to ascertain the agent's author-
ity, an agreement by the agent that the remaining property of the
vendor should be subject to the same restrictions imposed on the
property conveyed is void. (Roberts v. Lombard, 100.)

Statute of Frauds-Requisites of Memorandum-Sale-Price.

2. In an agreement of sale the memorandum must contain the full
terms of the contract, and state the price, though if it recites that
the price has been received, or if no price is named in the contract,
or if the property has been sold for what it is reasonably worth, a
statement of the price is unnecessary. (Taggart v. Hunter, 139.)
Statute of Frauds-Requisites of Memorandum-Consideration.

3. The memorandum required by the various subdivisions of the
statute of frauds (Section 808, L. O. L.) is not the contract itself,
but is only evidence of the contract, showing the terms and parties,
and if the law imports a consideration for a contract within the
statute, no consideration need be stated in the memorandum. (Tag-
gart v. Hunter, 139.)

Statute of Frauds Interest in Land-Relationship.

4. Under an oral contract to sell an interest in land to a son-in-
law, proof of his possession under such contract was not enough, of
itself, to avoid the statute of frauds as between relatives. (Goff v.
Kelsey, 337.)

Statute of Frauds-Parol Evidence of Contract to Pay for Property
in Particular Way.

5. Where evidence established the fact that one defendant had con-
tracted in writing for the purchase of certain property from the maker
of the note sued on and as a part of the purchase price assumed pay.
ment of said note, the statute of frauds did not prevent the intro-
duction of parol evidence to show that he acted for himself and two
others jointly in the transaction; the agreement whereby he assumed
such payment being a contract to pay for the property in a particular
way, and not a contract to answer for and pay the debt of another.
(Riddle State Bank v. Link, 498.)

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1. The title of Laws of 1907, page 293, entitled an act to amend
enumerated sections of the Code and statutes and providing for
liens in favor of any person performing labor on or furnishing ma-
terials or supplies for the operation of any mine, and regulating the
priority of such liens, and of Laws of 1911, page 193, entitled "An
act to amend" Section 7447, L. O. L., "to provide for the priority of
mortgages and for the posting and recording of the same," are
sufficient, within the Constitution, to justify provisions in the body
of the acts making liens superior to mortgages. (Haines Commercial
Co. v. Grabill, 375.)

Statute Misbranding-Validity-Certainty.

2.

Pure Food Law (Laws 1915, p. 568), Section 35, subdivision
3, defining misbranded foods, is not indefinite and uncertain because
it cannot be determined whether it refers to food or drugs, since the
language of such section, when read in connection with Section 20
(page 564), is broad enough to cover both food and drugs. (Hoefler
v. Mickle, 399.)

Statutes-Construction When Followed and Acquiesced in by the
Legislature.

3. The act creating the State Industrial Accident Commission, ap-
pointing three commissioners at a salary of $3,600 per annum, payable
from a fund provided for by the act, is not in violation of Article IX,
Section 7, of the Constitution, for the reason that the act is not an
appropriation bill in the sense that bills providing for general current
expenses or salaries of the constitutional officers of the state are
such. From the year 1860 to the present time, similar laws to the
instant act have been passed and a uniform construction of this sec-
tion of the Constitution in other states having identical or similar
provisions in their constitutions, is that it will not prevent the
legislature from passing an act for a particular purpose, and in the
same act to provide and appropriate the necessary funds to carry the
object of the act into effect. (Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Com.,
503.)

Statutes Constitutional Provisions as to Reading Legislative Bills.
4. Under Article IV, Section 19, of the Constitution, requiring all
bills to be read by sections on three several days in both the House
and Senate, does not require the whole bill, as amended during its

progress through the legislature, to be so read, and such has never
been the practice in this state. (Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc.
Com., 503.)

Statutes-Schools-Removal of Teachers.

5. All the provisions of a statute must be given effect if possible,
under a reasonable construction; for example, Section 1 of Laws of
1913, Chapter 37, page 69, gives the board of directors of every school
district the power to remove and discharge all teachers as it may
deem necessary; Section 4 provides that teachers employed in a dis-
trict as regularly appointed teachers for not less than two successive
years shall be placed upon the list of permanently employed teach-
ers; Section 5 that such teachers shall serve until dismissed, subject
to the board's rules which shall be reasonable; Section 6 that before
dismissal, any teacher on the permanent list shall receive written
notice stating the cause, a copy of any charges filed, and, on request,
shall be entitled to a hearing before the board; and Section 11 re-
pealed all acts in conflict therewith. These sections must all be read
with reference to each other, and mean that the school board has the
power to dispense with the services of all teachers, but must proceed
in the manner pointed out by the statute-it has no power to remove
without a hearing, and for an arbitrary or capricious reason. (Rich-
ards v. District School Board, 622.)

Statutes-Title and Subject Matter-Validity.

6. The legislature of 1913, Laws of 1913, page 663, passed an act
creating the office of state highway engineer, and prescribed what his
duties were. The county court of Clatsop County and plaintiffs en-
tered into a contract whereby the latter agreed to build and did con.
struct certain roads, such contract specifying that the state highway
engineer was to make a final estimate of the work performed there-
under and the value of said work, and that after approving the esti
mate so prepared the county was to pay for the work. After the
contract was entered into, and before the completion of the work, the
legislature of 1915, Laws of 1915, page 537, passed a law entitled, "An
act abolishing the office of state highway engineer," etc., and provid-
ing that the duties performed by such officer be transferred to the
state engineer, and further providing for the appointment of a deputy
state engineer by the chairman of the state highway commission, and
that such deputy shall be qualified and versed in scientific road build-
ing, and shall perform the duties prescribed by the state highway com-
mission, and fixes his salary and provides for expenses. Held, that
Laws of 1915, page 537, Section 3, was void as being repugnant to
the title of the act, under Article IV, Section 20, of the Constitution.
(Peterson v. Lewis, 641.)

Statutes-Construction of a Partial Invalid Statute.

7. In construing a statute, the rule is to give such a meaning, if
possible, as will render it valid and effectuate the will of the legisla
ture, and where a part of an act is valid and conforms to the policy
and intent of the legislature, it is not rendered unconstitutional by
a later section that is repugnant and void to this policy and intent,
and in such a case the statute is void only as to that section. (Peter-
son v. Lewis, 641.)

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