ter 211, providing a method whereby an incorporated city, town or municipal corporation may surrender its charter and disincorporate, as this does not relate to the same matters as Chapter 40, and does not displace it or conflict with it. (State v. School Dist. No. 3, 188.) Schools and School Districts-Boundaries-Change of.
6. Article IV, Section la, of the Constitution, declares that the initiative and referendum powers are reserved to the legal voters of every municipality and district, in and for their several munici- palities and districts. Article XI, Section 2, declares that corpora- tions may be formed under general laws, and that no charter of any municipality, city, or town shall be amended or repealed by the legislature, but that the legal voters may enact or amend their char- ters. Section 4021, L. O. L., provides for changing the boundary of school districts by the district boundary board. This statute was in force prior to the adoption of Article XI, Section 2, of the Constitu- tion. Held that, as the statute which was part of the general law formed the charter, if there was one, of the school district, changes might be made by the district boundary board according to the stat- ute without submitting the matter to the electorate; the change not being made by the legislative assembly. (School Dist. No. 35 v. Holden, 267.)
Schools and School Districts-Contracts-Construction of Buildings- Liability.
Plaintiff contracted with defendant to build a school building for a specified sum, and agreed that no extras should be added ex- cept upon the signed order of the architect. The defendant had been authorized to issue bonds in the sum of $50,000 to pay for the improvement. After deducting the sum of the plaintiff's original contract, there was less than enough money remaining from the sale of the bonds to pay for the contracts entered into in the con- struction and for extras ordered by the architect of the plaintiff. Held, that plaintiff could recover for the extras furnished, since he had a right to rely on the school board's keeping further ex- penditures, aside from his contract, within the appropriation, and as his contract was valid when executed, action of the board in exceeding the appropriation in other details could not prevent his recovery. (Rush v. School District No. 5, 435.)
Schools and School Districts-Removal of Teacher.
8. Laws of 1913, Chapter 37, page 69, providing for the employ. ment of school teachers, for the creation of a permanent list of teach- ers, and for their removal after written notice and a hearing, taken in connection with Laws of 1913, Chapter 172, pages 299, 304, Sec- tion 1, subdivision 22, authorizing school boards to dismiss teachers only for good cause, limit the power of dismissal to reasonable causes. (Richards v. District School Board, 622.)
Power of School Boards to Enlarge Statutory Contract.
9. A school board has not authority to add to a teacher's con- tract of employment provisions as to the term or conditions of service beyond those found in the statutes defining the powers of the board. (Richards v. District School Board, 622.)
Schools-Marriage as Reason for Dismissing Teacher.
10. The dismissal of a teacher because of becoming married is an arbitrary and capricious act, in violation of a statute giving school
boards the right to dismiss teachers for reasonable cause. (Richards v. District School Board, 622.)
SESSION LAWS OF OREGON.
See Table in Front of this Volume.
Setoff and Counterclaim-Query, Right to Separate Claim of Codefend- ant.
1. Plaintiff having joined as defendants both the pledgors and the mortgagors, the latter not having been injured and no allegation be- ing made that plaintiff was insolvent, it is doubtful whether the pledgors can set up an alleged conversion as a counterclaim, in view of Section 401, L. O. L., providing that the counterclaim of the defendant must be one upon which suit might be maintained by de- fendant against the plaintiff. (First Nat. Bank v. Seaweard, 567.) See Replevin, 3.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Specific Performance — Parol Contract for Sale of Land
1. The taking possession of real estate pursuant to an oral contract for the sale thereof is such part performance as will take the contract out of the statute of frauds unless the relation of affinity or consan- guinity exists between the vendor and purchaser, in which case the making by the purchaser of valuable improvements in addition to the taking of possession is essential to specific performance of the con- tract. (Stalker v. Stalker, 291.)
Specific Performance-Parol Contracts-Evidence--Sufficiency.
2. Evidence held to justify a finding that a husband orally con- tracted to convey land to his plural wife, and that she took possession of the land relying on the contract and made valuable improvements thereon authorizing her heirs to compel specific performance. (Stalker v. Stalker, 291.)
Specific Performance—Oral Contract-Weight and Sufficiency of Evi- dence.
3. In an action for the specific performance of an alleged oral con- tract for the sale of land, the terms of the agreement must be shown by full, complete and satisfactory proof; but proof beyond a reason- able doubt is not required. (Goff v. Kelsey, 337.)
Contracts Enforceable - Possession and Im-
4. In such case, where the son-in-law took possession of the prem- ises with the intention of carrying out the contract, and, because of the contract, made valuable permanent improvements, a court of
equity would be warranted in enforcing the contract. (Goff v. Kelsey, 337.)
Specific Performance—Sufficiency of Evidence—Oral Contract.
5. Evidence, in an action for specific performance of a contract to sell an interest in land when an irrigation ditch was completed, and to credit plaintiff with any money advanced or any work done on the construction of the ditch, held not to clearly establish the terms of the contract, or that plaintiff's possession and work was referable to any contract for the sale of the land. (Goff v. Kelsey, 337.)
Statute of Frauds-Authority of Agent Agreement.
1. Section 804, L. O. L., declares that no estate or interest in land, nor any trust or power concerning such property can be created, transferred or declared except by operation of law, or by a convey- ance in writing subscribed by the party or by his lawful agent under written authority, Section 808 provides that agreements for employ- ment of a broker to sell land shall be void unless in writing, and that agreements relating to land shall be void unless in writing signed by the party to be charged or his duly authorized agent whose authority shall be in writing. A written agreement, authorizing an agent to sell land did not empower him to agree to restrictions on the remain- ing property of the vendor, but in plain terms reserved to the vendor the right to modify the prices, terms and conditions. Held, that as the purchaser was bound at his peril to ascertain the agent's author- ity, an agreement by the agent that the remaining property of the vendor should be subject to the same restrictions imposed on the property conveyed is void. (Roberts v. Lombard, 100.)
Statute of Frauds-Requisites of Memorandum-Sale-Price.
2. In an agreement of sale the memorandum must contain the full terms of the contract, and state the price, though if it recites that the price has been received, or if no price is named in the contract, or if the property has been sold for what it is reasonably worth, a statement of the price is unnecessary. (Taggart v. Hunter, 139.) Statute of Frauds-Requisites of Memorandum-Consideration.
3. The memorandum required by the various subdivisions of the statute of frauds (Section 808, L. O. L.) is not the contract itself, but is only evidence of the contract, showing the terms and parties, and if the law imports a consideration for a contract within the statute, no consideration need be stated in the memorandum. (Tag- gart v. Hunter, 139.)
Statute of Frauds Interest in Land-Relationship.
4. Under an oral contract to sell an interest in land to a son-in- law, proof of his possession under such contract was not enough, of itself, to avoid the statute of frauds as between relatives. (Goff v. Kelsey, 337.)
Statute of Frauds-Parol Evidence of Contract to Pay for Property in Particular Way.
5. Where evidence established the fact that one defendant had con- tracted in writing for the purchase of certain property from the maker of the note sued on and as a part of the purchase price assumed pay. ment of said note, the statute of frauds did not prevent the intro- duction of parol evidence to show that he acted for himself and two others jointly in the transaction; the agreement whereby he assumed such payment being a contract to pay for the property in a particular way, and not a contract to answer for and pay the debt of another. (Riddle State Bank v. Link, 498.)
1. The title of Laws of 1907, page 293, entitled an act to amend enumerated sections of the Code and statutes and providing for liens in favor of any person performing labor on or furnishing ma- terials or supplies for the operation of any mine, and regulating the priority of such liens, and of Laws of 1911, page 193, entitled "An act to amend" Section 7447, L. O. L., "to provide for the priority of mortgages and for the posting and recording of the same," are sufficient, within the Constitution, to justify provisions in the body of the acts making liens superior to mortgages. (Haines Commercial Co. v. Grabill, 375.)
Statute Misbranding-Validity-Certainty.
Pure Food Law (Laws 1915, p. 568), Section 35, subdivision 3, defining misbranded foods, is not indefinite and uncertain because it cannot be determined whether it refers to food or drugs, since the language of such section, when read in connection with Section 20 (page 564), is broad enough to cover both food and drugs. (Hoefler v. Mickle, 399.)
Statutes-Construction When Followed and Acquiesced in by the Legislature.
3. The act creating the State Industrial Accident Commission, ap- pointing three commissioners at a salary of $3,600 per annum, payable from a fund provided for by the act, is not in violation of Article IX, Section 7, of the Constitution, for the reason that the act is not an appropriation bill in the sense that bills providing for general current expenses or salaries of the constitutional officers of the state are such. From the year 1860 to the present time, similar laws to the instant act have been passed and a uniform construction of this sec- tion of the Constitution in other states having identical or similar provisions in their constitutions, is that it will not prevent the legislature from passing an act for a particular purpose, and in the same act to provide and appropriate the necessary funds to carry the object of the act into effect. (Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 503.)
Statutes Constitutional Provisions as to Reading Legislative Bills. 4. Under Article IV, Section 19, of the Constitution, requiring all bills to be read by sections on three several days in both the House and Senate, does not require the whole bill, as amended during its
progress through the legislature, to be so read, and such has never been the practice in this state. (Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 503.)
Statutes-Schools-Removal of Teachers.
5. All the provisions of a statute must be given effect if possible, under a reasonable construction; for example, Section 1 of Laws of 1913, Chapter 37, page 69, gives the board of directors of every school district the power to remove and discharge all teachers as it may deem necessary; Section 4 provides that teachers employed in a dis- trict as regularly appointed teachers for not less than two successive years shall be placed upon the list of permanently employed teach- ers; Section 5 that such teachers shall serve until dismissed, subject to the board's rules which shall be reasonable; Section 6 that before dismissal, any teacher on the permanent list shall receive written notice stating the cause, a copy of any charges filed, and, on request, shall be entitled to a hearing before the board; and Section 11 re- pealed all acts in conflict therewith. These sections must all be read with reference to each other, and mean that the school board has the power to dispense with the services of all teachers, but must proceed in the manner pointed out by the statute-it has no power to remove without a hearing, and for an arbitrary or capricious reason. (Rich- ards v. District School Board, 622.)
Statutes-Title and Subject Matter-Validity.
6. The legislature of 1913, Laws of 1913, page 663, passed an act creating the office of state highway engineer, and prescribed what his duties were. The county court of Clatsop County and plaintiffs en- tered into a contract whereby the latter agreed to build and did con. struct certain roads, such contract specifying that the state highway engineer was to make a final estimate of the work performed there- under and the value of said work, and that after approving the esti mate so prepared the county was to pay for the work. After the contract was entered into, and before the completion of the work, the legislature of 1915, Laws of 1915, page 537, passed a law entitled, "An act abolishing the office of state highway engineer," etc., and provid- ing that the duties performed by such officer be transferred to the state engineer, and further providing for the appointment of a deputy state engineer by the chairman of the state highway commission, and that such deputy shall be qualified and versed in scientific road build- ing, and shall perform the duties prescribed by the state highway com- mission, and fixes his salary and provides for expenses. Held, that Laws of 1915, page 537, Section 3, was void as being repugnant to the title of the act, under Article IV, Section 20, of the Constitution. (Peterson v. Lewis, 641.)
Statutes-Construction of a Partial Invalid Statute.
7. In construing a statute, the rule is to give such a meaning, if possible, as will render it valid and effectuate the will of the legisla ture, and where a part of an act is valid and conforms to the policy and intent of the legislature, it is not rendered unconstitutional by a later section that is repugnant and void to this policy and intent, and in such a case the statute is void only as to that section. (Peter- son v. Lewis, 641.)
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