pression "realty," as thus applied is descriptive of a class of business in which the parties hereto are engaged. Such term, therefore, cannot be a part of a technical trade name, but its use, in the same locality, subsequent to the plaintiffs' adoption of the word, tends to constitute unfair competition in that, as the testimony discloses, owners of real property have been led to believe that the term related to the plaintiff's assumed name and by this means the defendant may have been and, unless restrained, will be enabled. to obtain the benefit of the goodwill which his rivals have built up. It will be remembered that the defendant, having no partner in the real estate business, adopted as a part of his trade name the word "company," which indicates that he had formed, with other individuals, an association or partnership: Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 598, 602 (32 L. Ed. 535, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166). The employment by the defendant of the word "company," when there was no other member, evidences a purpose to simulate the plaintiffs' assumed name, and particularly so when, after the defendant was notified. of the prior legal adoption of such word as a part of his rivals' trade name, he persisted in taking advantage of the term, thereby indicating a deliberate intention to continue such use without reference to the plaintiffs' right: Hygeia Distilled Water Co. v. Consolidated Ice Co. (C. C.), 144 Fed. 139; Regis v. H. A. Jaynes & Co., 185 Mass. 458 (70 N. E. 480). But, however this may be, it has been held that, in a suit to enjoin the infringement of a trade name, it is not necessary to prove that there was a fraudulent intention to deceive: Viano v. Baccigalupo, 183 Mass. 160 (67 N. E. 641); Saxlehner v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 179 U. S. 42 (45 L. Ed. 77, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16). It appears from the testimony that several persons wrote to the defendant upon matters pertaining to real estate dealings when they supposed they were addressing their communication to the plaintiffs, and that by the use of the name referred to the public was deceived, thereby substantiating the fact of unfair competition. It follows from these considerations that the decree should be affirmed, and it is so ordered. AFFIRMED. REHEARING DENIED. MR. JUSTICE BEAN, MR. JUSTICE EAKIN and MR. JUSTICE MCBRIDE concur. Argued September 24, affirmed October 13, rehearing denied November 16, 1915. STATE EX REL. v. SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 3. (152 Pac. 221.) Schools and School Districts-Dissolution of Districts-Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. 1. Session Laws of 1915, page 54, Section 2, providing for the dissolution of union high school districts by a vote of the voters of the districts forming the union school district and prescribing the procedure to be followed, does not violate Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution, providing that the legislative assembly shall not enact, amend or repeal any charter or act of incorporation for any municipality, city or town, and that the legal voters of every city and town are thereby granted power to enact and amend their municipal charter, since this provision does not extend to school districts which have no charters, but depend for their existence upon the general laws of the state. Constitutional Law-Legislative Powers. 2. The legislature is invested with legislative power to the fullest extent except so far as limited expressly or by necessary implication in the state and federal Constitutions, and in considering the constitutionality of an act the question is not as to the extent of the power delegated by the people to the legislative assembly, but as to the extent of the limitations the people have imposed upon that body. [As to when statute is to be declared void as conflicting with the Constitution, see note in 48 Am. Dec. 269.] Schools and School Districts-Dissolution of Districts-Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. 3. There is nothing in the Constitution prohibiting the legislature from passing a general law providing the manner whereby a quasi municipality, such as a school district, may be dissolved. Schools and School Districts-Dissolution of Districts. 4. A quasi municipality, such as a school district, can be dissolved only in the manner prescribed by law, and its inhabitants are powerless to dissolve it, unless this be done as the law directs. Schools and School Districts Dissolution of Districts Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. 5. Laws of 1915, page 54, Section 2, relative to the dissolution of union high school districts, does not violate Article IV, Section la of the Constitution, providing that the initiative and referendum powers are thereby reserved to the legal voters of every municipality and district as to all local, special and municipal legislation, and that the manner of exercising such powers shall be prescribed by general laws, except that cities and towns may provide for the manner of exercising such powers as to their municipal legislation, since it is in accordance with the spirit of this provision for the legislature to provide the method by which a school district or other quasi municipal corporation may vote upon a matter of purely local concern. Schools and School Districts-Dissolution of Districts-Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. 6. Laws of 1915, Chapter 40, Section 2, relative to the dissolution of union high school districts, is not repealed by Laws of 1915, Chapter 211, providing a method whereby an incorporated city, town or municipal corporation may surrender its charter and disincorporate, as this does not relate to the same matters as Chapter 40, and does not displace it or conflict with it. From Clatsop: JAMES A. EAKIN, Judge. Department 2. Statement by MR. JUSTICE BEAN. This is a suit in the name of the State of Oregon, upon the relation of B. W. Otto, against School District No. 3 of Clatsop County, Oregon. The facts are as follows: In 1915 the legislature of the State of Oregon passed an act providing for the dissolution of union high school districts: Laws 1915, pp. 52-55. In August of the same year the regular electors of school districts Nos. 3, 10, 15, 36 and 37, comprising Union High School District No. 1 of Clatsop County, filed with the dis trict boundary board their written petitions, asking for the holding of a special election on September 9th, in order to vote on the question of whether or not Union High School District No. 1 should be dissolved. The district boundary board of Clatsop County thereupon gave the various districts notice, as required by law, fixing September 9, 1915, as the day of this special election. The regularity of these various proceedings is not questioned upon this appeal. Plaintiff instituted this suit to restrain the district officers and the district boundary board of Clatsop County from considering or carrying into effect the result of such election. The Circuit Court sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff brings this appeal. AFFIRMED. REHEARING DENIED. For appellant there was a brief over the names of Mr. C. W. Mullins, District Attorney, and Messrs. Norblad & Hesse, with an oral argument by Mr. A. W. Norblad. For respondents there was a brief over the names of Mr. George C. Fulton and Mr. A. C. Fulton, with an oral argument by Mr. George C. Fulton. MR. JUSTICE BEAN delivered the opinion of the court. 1. Plaintiff claims that the act under which the election was held is unconstitutional, for the reason that the power to repeal charters of municipal corporations, either by special or general laws, has been withdrawn from the legislature by the amendment to Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, which provides: "The legislative assembly shall not enact, amend, or repeal any charter or act of incorporation for any mu nicipality, city, or town. The legal voters of every city and town are hereby granted power to enact and amend their municipal charter, subject to the Constitution and criminal laws of the State of Oregon." Plaintiff further claims that the legal voters of municipalities have no power to repeal their municipal charters by vote, as such power rests exclusively in the entire electorate of the state. Defendant expressly waives all questions as to procedure, and submits that the Constitution does not require that the question of the dissolution of a union high school district, road district, or the life, be submitted to the electors of the whole state, but that the legal voters of a district may dissolve a union high school by proceeding in accordance with the general statute mentioned. The act for consideration is an amendment to Section 4194, L. O. L. Section 1 provides for the organization of a union high school district by uniting contiguous school districts for high school purposes upon a prescribed petition therefor to the district boundary board, and the submission to the legal voters of the school districts or parts of districts proposed to be consolidated, if a majority of all votes cast on the subject is in favor of uniting such school districts for high school purposes, provided, however, that the majority of all votes cast in a majority of the districts shall be in favor of the proposition. That part of Section 2 of the act deemed necessary to mention directs: "Whenever it is desired to dissolve a union high school district that has been regularly formed, a petition from the majority of the districts within the union district shall be presented to the district boundary board requesting said boundary board to direct the school board of each district in said union high school district to state in the notice for the next annual or special meeting or election that |