measure of arresting and deposing the late monarch; and though. it is not declared to be official, the information is evidently such as could have been derived only from persons who were privy to that extraordinary proceeding. To the nations of Europe at large, no exposition of the King's folly and incapacity was necessary: but to the Swedes, blinded by a slavish press, and attached to a family which numbers in its succession such illustrious heroes, a declaration in the style of this book was probably requisite. The task appears to have been performed with a moderation. similar to that which marked the measures attendant on the King's personal arrest; since the narrative is a plain and circumstantial detail of political and military occurrences, without any mixture, as far as we can perceive, of exaggeration or misrepresentation.

The account is carried back to the year 1805, when the third coalition against France broke out. A residence of eighteen months in Germany had been rendered subservient by Gustavus to preparations for that object; and the part which he had to act in the coalition was the invasion of Hanover, and subsequently of Holland, at the head of an united force of Swedes, Russians, and Hanoverians. His jealousy of Prussia prevented him from assuming this command, and fortunate did it prove; since the time that he passed in the direction of his own troops, short as it was, manifested that he was wholly incapable of the trust. He had the folly to perplex himself by going into the minutest details; and the unavoidable conse quence was the commission of errors in matters of importance, his soldiers being frequently ordered to take up their quarters in villages which existed only on paper. Though the failure of the coalition soon induced our cabinet to dissuade him from continuing the war, his implacable hatred to Bonaparte prevented all negociation; and, ascribing the French Emperor's triumphs altogether to chance, he longed for an opportunity of measuring their mutual talents. When the British subsidy was passing through Sweden to Russia, he adopted the extraordinary measure. of detaining 80,cool., the amount of an old claim of Sweden on Russia, without considering the offence thus given to both his allies. At another time, on the state of his finances being represented to him, his answer was, "That the disorder was so great as to make it needless to think about them at all." It will scarcely be believed that, when the King of Prussia was driven, in 1807, to his last province, Gustavus still insisted that he should carry on the war with France for the restoration of the Bourbons; and, about the same time, (June 1807,) he invited General Brune, commanding the French army on the frontier of Pomerania, to a conference, in REY. MARCH, 1813.

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which he had the vanity to think that he could bring over that officer to the interest of the exiled family. The following are a few of the questions and answers which passed in this singular conversation, taken from the published report of Gustavus himself: had the choice of serving your lawful King, or continuing in the cause which you have adopted, what would you do? answer me honestly."

King. "If

you

• General. — (Laying his hand upon his forehead) "That is a question which requires deliberation.”

"King." I think you cannot require long time for deliberation; answer me, therefore, Will you return to your duty, or defend your present principles ?"

General." To this it is easy to answer, Yes: I shall defend my present principles, and do my duty."

The General began to speak of Buonaparte's talents, and said that none of the Bourbons had ever possessed so great a mind.

• King." When fortune favors us, we want no other knowledge than how to make use of the advantage."

To this the General appeared to assent.

• King. d'Enghien!"

• General.

"What a horrid affair was the death of the Duc

"I was then at Constantinople, and cannot speak upon the subject.""

It would be tedious to recapitulate the various extravagancies of which Gustavus was guilty in refusing peace with France, and eventually with Russia. He discovered an habitual indifference to the sufferings of his people, and an obstinate determination to run all risks rather than relinquish his absurd projects:

His character, naturally severe and unbending, was rendered more so by his religious tenets. His education had enabled him to judge superficially, and to discover insignificant distinctions; but nature had denied him the comprehensive mind necessary for a King. Captivated and occupied with trifies, he betrayed childish satisfaction in the invention of a new uniform, a passion for ceremony, and in particular for military parade, in which he supposed the whole art of war to consist.

To his own misfortune, and that of his country, the King had become acquainted with a commentary on the Revelations of St. John, which had been published in Germany, and translated into Swedish. Although not addicted to study, it now became his greatest pleasure to read the Revelations and the Commentary; and it is not unlikely that mysteries, which have always the strongest effects on the weakest minds, may in that respect have perverted his understanding. Some idle calculators had discovered that the letters in the name of the French Emperor composed the number 666, which the Evangelist says is that of the beast. Gustavus Adolphus easily persuaded himself that Napoleon was that beast in the Revelations, whose dominion

should

should be of short duration, and for whose discomfiture he himself was appointed by Providence.'

The calculation, by which the Emperor's name expressed the number 666, required that it should be written Neapoleon Buonaparte, which spelling the King in his letters always carefully observed.'

Under these impressions, he was confident of success, without any scrupulous calculation of the adequacy of his means. He was wonderfully pleased with our attack on Copenhagen, and equally dissappointed at our subsequent abandonment of it. Before the return of our fleet and army, he was offered (p. 81.) the retention of the Hanoverian legion, 10,000 strong, but declined it, probably from an apprehension of difficulty in finding provisions for them during the winter. Early in the next year, the Russian invasion of Finland began, and the loss of this province is in a great measure to be attributed to his ridiculous inactivity. Instead of defending his frontier, he speculated on the conquest of Norway; an attempt in which some progress was made, but which was soon relinquished for the favourite scheme of an attempt on Copenhagen. To this object he would gladly have directed a body of 10,000 men, sent to him at this time by the English ministry under the command of General Sir John Moore. Before their embarkation, our government had stipulated that they should remain distinct from the Swedish army, under the command of their own officers, and subject to recall at the pleasure of our court. These limitations were so unacceptable to Gustavus, that he refused to permit the troops to land on his territory, and they were accordingly obliged to lie two months in transports in the roads of Gottenburgh. During this time, the King made repeated efforts to procure the command of the troops, and to prevail on Sir John Moore, who had come personally to Stockholm, to co-operate in the long-cherished project against Copenhagen: but the General stedfastly refused his consent. Another plan of the King was to land the English in Finland, in the rear of the Russians; a step which, unsupported as they would have been, must in all probability have led to the surrender of the whole or a great part as prisoners of war. Failing in these propositions, the King next recommended the invasion of Norway by the English. On this subject, we have the following letter from Sir John Moore:

Letter from Lieut.-Gen. Sir JOHN MOORE, to His Britannic Majesty's Envoy at the Court of Stockholm, Mr. EDWARD THORNTON.

Stockholm, 22d June, 1808. It does not become me to conjecture his Majesty's motives for such a proposal, against the wisdom and possibility of which he so

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lately expressed himself. It is enough for me to observe, that, supposing every exertion to be made, the Swedish army cannot possibly be assembled on the frontiers of Norway, and prepared for an undertaking of so much consequence, before the beginning of the month of August. During all that time, the British troops, which have already been confined two months to their ships, must remain on board; as his Majesty, without paying any attention to the communication made by Baron Ehrenheim to you, declared to me personally, that he never would allow the English troops to land in Sweden. His Majesty seemed even to consider the proposal as an insult, and said that he hoped that affair would never again be mentioned to him.

In such circumstances, I think you must be of my opinion, that nothing now remains for me, but to obey the instructions which have been lately sent to me "to return to England immediately with the troops, should the smallest opposition be made to their landing." • Extract of a Letter from Mr. THORNTON to the Swedish Ministers Baron EHRENHEIM, dated Stockholm, 22d June, 1808.

His Majesty the King of Sweden had been pleased to request through me, both personally and officially, and frequently by his minister in England, the military assistance of Great Britain; but without appointing any particular service for the troops, or proposing any plan of co-operation. As soon as the arduous contest in which Great Britain was engaged permitted a part of her strength to be employed for such a purpose, the King, my master, destined a body of ten thousand men for the service of Sweden, under certain conditions. As the Swedish minister in London could not presume to promise his Swedish Majesty's acceptance of these conditions, the King was contented with a formal and official undertaking, that the troops should be received in Sweden in the most hospitable manner. Such, Baron, are the circumstances which occasioned the arrival of British troops in the harbour of Gothenburgh.- On the arrival of Col. Murray, who had been sent before to treat of conditions, and concert a common plan of operation, his Majesty the King of Sweden was pleased to write a letter to the Commander of the British force, proposing some alterations in the conditions, but without giving orders for the landing of the troops. General Moore, confined by his instructions, which entirely corresponded with the conditions, referred the proposed alterations to the consideration of his Majesty. Col. Murray, who was sent to England for that purpose, returned with an acquiescence in the alterations, but his Majesty, at the same time, expressed his surprize and displeasure that the British troops had not been allowed to land. During the whole of Colonel Murray's absence, the troops had remained on board their transports, and there they still remain, notwithstanding the frequent representations which I have had the honour to make to you on that subject. Baron, I learn with the deepest regret from your letter of the 18th, that the landing of the British troops in Sweden is not to be permitted, and that notwithstanding all the concessions of the British Government, In such circumstances, the King of Sweden remains inexorable. Baron, there is no choice left to the Commander of his Majesty's

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forces. His orders are positive, and I have the honour to annex the copy of a letter which I received from him this morning, in which he expresses his intention of returning to Gothenburgh, and of immediately departing for England, with the troops under his command, &c.'

These letters aggravated greatly the displeasure which was already conceived by Gustavus against Sir John Moore, and induced the former to propose a conference, the report of which he flattered himself would be all-powerful in inducing his Britannic Majesty to disavow the conduct of his General. It took place accordingly in presence of two Swedish officers, and has been the subject of so much curiosity in this country that we shall extract a considerable portion of it;

Extract from the Minute of the Conversation between the King of Sweden and General MOORE, in the Palace of Stockholm, 23d June,

1808.

After General Sir John Moore, and Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, were called in, his Majesty was pleased to address himself as follows to the General :

"I understand, General, from a letter which you have written to the English minister at my Court, which has been communicated to me, that you intend immediately to return to England with the troops under your command. I have, therefore, been anxious to read to you a translation of your letter, in order to receive explanations on two important matters." His Majesty began to read, and stopped at the words " he so lately expressed himself," upon which he made the following remark. I ought to remind you General, that I have expressed my opinion of the impolicy, but not of the impossi bility, of an attack on Norway. I have said that while I had any expectation that your troops would co-operate with mine, in attacking Zealand, that plan ought to have had the preference to any attempt on Norway."

General." I perfectly understood the reasons which your Ma jesty gave for declining to invade Norway, and I can never forget them. They are the same which your Majesty expressed to Colonel Murray, that the undertaking was difficult, and that even were it successful it would be of little advantage to Sweden from the poverty of the country,"

King."Yes, that was when the expedition against Zealand was in contemplation."

"General." I perceive that I have been mistaken; and now understand your Majesty's real sentiments."

The King proceeded in reading the General's letter, and stopped at the words "to land in Sweden," and said, "I am astonished, General, how you can assert me to have said, that I never would permit English troops to land in Sweden, I have said, indeed, that I never would permit foreign troops to land in my territories, unless they were under my command. As an attack might be made immediately, I wished to spare you the trouble of a new embarkation, particularly

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