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be removed or placed in a safe condition, when considered dangerous; to regulate and prevent the carrying on of manufactories dangerous in causing and prompting (promoting) fires; to prevent the deposit of ashes in unsafe places, and to cause all such buildings and enclosures as may be in a dangerous state to be put in a safe condition.
“Sixty-sixth—To regulate the police of the city or village, and pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances.
"Seventy-eighth-To do all acts, make all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease.”
It must be apparent that no such power is granted by clause 63. That clause deals only with the construction and condition of buildings and the apparatus used in and about them. It contains no grant to regulate the personal relations between master and servant and contains no authority to require an employer to train his employees to escape most expeditiously and safely from a burning building. This clause is designed to prevent conditions that are liable to cause fires, whereas the sections of the ordinance involved are designed to deal entirely with a situation which arises after a fire is in progress.
The scope of clause 66 has been clearly defined in numerous decisions of this court. We have held that this clause is not a delegation of all the police powers of the State, and that municipalities, in the exercise of the police power, must be confined within the scope of municipal functions and to the subjects designated in their charters. (City of Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel Co. supra; City of Chicago v. Mandel Bros. supra; People v. City of Chicago, 261 III. 16.) The legislature has specifically enumerated a great number of subjects in regard to which police powers have been conferred upon the municipalities of the State. The express enumeration in the various clauses of said section i of article 5 of the Cities and Villages act of the subjects with reference to which a city may exercise the police
power is, under a well defined canon of construction, the exclusion of all others. (City of Cairo v. Bross, 101 Ill. 475; People v. City of Chicago, supra; City of Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel Co. supra.) Defendant in error has not pointed out, nor are we able to find among the subjects enumerated in the statute with reference to which a city is authorized to exercise police power, any which authorizes a city to require an employer to train his employees to avoid the dangers from fire by such means as fire drills. Section 47 of the ordinance is not authorized under said clause 66.
Clause 78 deals solely with the physical condition of the inhabitants of the municipality. This clause gives the undoubted right and power to a city to compel any employer or owner of a building to keep it in a sanitary condition. Section 47 of the ordinance does not pretend to require the classes of buildings therein designated to be kept in a healthful condition, but makes requirements entirely without the scope of clause 78. Authority to pass this section of the ordinance was not granted the city by clause 63, 66 or 78.
Section 53 of the ordinance provides for a fire alarm system, which, it is apparent, is merely incidental to the conduct of the fire drills and the work of fire brigades required to be maintained. It is wholly dependent upon section 47 for its efficiency, and it cannot be said that the council would have enacted this section standing alone. Without passing upon the right of the city to require the installation of proper fire alarm systems in the classes of buildings enumerated in section 47, that section being invalid, section 53, because of the relationship it bears to it, must necessarily fall with it. The judgment of the municipal court is reversed.
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FREDERICK B. TownsEND, Appellant, vs. A. D. Gash et al.
Opinion filed April 22, 1915. I. STATE Highway COMMISSION—the commission has express power to purchase materials for State aid roads. The statute appropriating funds to the State Highway Commission for the building of State aid roads, and the Roads and Bridges act of 1913, giving the commission power to let all contracts for the construction of such roads or in a certain event to construct the same through its own agencies, and to perform all other duties prescribed in the act or reasonably inferable therefrom, confer upon the commission full and express power to purchase such road-building materials, tools, implements and machinery as may be needed, from time to time, for such purpose, and, in the discretion of the commission, to estimate and anticipate the needs in that respect and prepare therefor by contracting for materials.
2. SAME-power to purchase materials for construction not excluded by power to purchase for repair. The power of the State Highway Commission to purchase materials for the construction of State aid roads is not excluded by the grant of power to purchase materials for the repair of such roads or the grant of power to obtain materials by condemnation of land, nor is such power confined to those instances in which the commission may construct State aid roads through its own agencies.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of DeKalb county; the Hon. Mazzini SLUSSER, Judge, presiding.
FAISSLER, FULTON & ROBERTS, and KNAPP & CAMPBELL, (John R. Cochran, of counsel,) for appellant.
P. J. LUCEY, Attorney General, GEORGE P. RAMSEY, and DUNCAN & O'Conor, for appellees.
Mr. JUSTICE Watson delivered the opinion of the court:
On June 20, 1914, the appellant filed his bill in the circuit court of DeKalb county praying the annulment of a certain contract made by and between the State Highway Commissioners and the Marquette Cement Manufacturing Company, and also praying for an injunction against said highway commissioners restraining them, and each of them, from purchasing cement or other material for the construction of State aid roads, and also from issuing any order or in any other manner directing the Auditor of Public Accounts to draw his warrants upon the State Treasurer for the payment of any public moneys on account of cement furnished under said contract, or otherwise, for the construction of State aid roads, and that upon final hearing the injunction be made permanent. Later an amended bill was filed by agreement of the parties, and it will be hereinafter called the bill. A demurrer was filed to the bill, and a stipulation was made to the effect the decision of the court on demurrer should be final and be followed by a decree granting the relief prayed or dismissing the bill for want of equity. The demurrer, which was general, was sustained, and thereupon the appellant declined to plead further, and the court entered its decree dismissing the bill for want of equity and giving judgment against the appellant for the costs of suit. An appeal was allowed and perfected and the case taken to the Appellate Court for the Second District. Objection being made that the real party in interest is the State of Illinois and not the highway commissioners, the Appellate Court held the State is a party in interest and ordered the cause transferred to this court, as is provided by law.
But one question is presented for decision, says appellant, and in his brief he thus states the question: Have the State Highway Commissioners the power to purchase materials for the construction of State aid roads? The theory of appellant's bill is the commissioners do not have this power. The circuit court held otherwise. By four assignments of error appellant challenges the correctness of the holding
Briefly stated, the bill alleges appellant is a citizen and a resident tax-payer of DeKalb county and as such brings this suit; that the appellees A. D. Gash, S. E. Bradt and James Wilson are the State Highway Commissioners; that said commissioners, assuming to act under and by virtue of the act approved June 27, 1913, commonly known as the Tice Road law, advertised for bids to be submitted to them for the furnishing of the cement required in the construction of all State aid roads in the State during the year 1914; that on April 1, 1914, numerous bids were submitted to said commissioners for the furnishing of said cement, and on April 8 said commissioners without any authority attempted to, and did, award the Marquette Cement Manufacturing Company the contract for the furnishing of the cement required in the construction of State aid roads in ninety-four counties in the State during the year 1914; that subsequent thereto said commissioners executed an instrument in writing purporting to be a contract, obligating the State of Illinois and said commissioners to purchase from said company all the cement required in the construction of State aid roads in said ninety-four counties; that said commissioners have directed the preparation of specifications for the construction of State aid roads, providing therein that the cement required will be furnished by the State at certain prices therein specified, and inviting bids for the construction of State aid roads and for the furnishing of all materials, except cement, required therefor; that the necessary steps have been taken in many of the counties, as provided in said act, for the construction of State aid roads, and that large quantities of cement will be required for the construction of said roads; that said commissioners have publicly advertised in a number of counties in the State for bids to be submitted to them on July 1, 1914, for the construction of State aid roads in said counties, and that on said date said bids will be opened and the contracts awarded for the construction of State aid roads in said counties; that under the specifications for the construction of said roads for which bids are to be submitted