Railroad Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257; 46 L. ed. 1151; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900."

The case of Louisville and Nashville Railway Co. v. Central Stock Yard Co. 212 U. S. 132, and the other cases cited by appellant, are not in conflict with this view. The former case is fully discussed in Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, supra, and will not, therefore, require further discussion here.

The views herein expressed as to the right of the legislature to regulate and control the side-tracks, spurs and industrial connections of intra-State railroads are in full accord with the previous decisions of this court. Thus, in Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity, 115 Ill. 155, we held that side-tracks, spurs and industrial connections, whether constructed by the railroad or by private individuals and connected with the railroad lines, were in legal contemplation and to all intents and purposes a part of such railroad line with which they were connected, and when thrown open to public use, indiscriminately, became impressed by such public use with a public character and subject to public regulation and control. And in Railroad and Warehouse Commission v. Vandalia Railroad Co. 258 Ill. 397, we held that a railroad company, in switching cars within the city's limits between industries on its lines or to make connections for delivery to industries on other lines, acts as a common carrier, the same as when engaged in moving cars between stations on its own lines, and is subject to the jurisdiction of the commission in the matter of the regulation of its rates and charges for such service. And such is the trend of all of the cases upon the question. It may be added, however, that there is a marked distinction between the ,turning over of the use of the tracks and terminal facilities of one railroad to another and the regulating of the switching charges for services rendered by the operating railroad. One would permit a railroad to operate its trains and cars over and upon the tracks and into the terminals of the

other, while the other would only fix the charges which might be made by the operating railroad for such services in receiving and transporting cars or freight of the other railroad from connecting points to place of destination over its lines without giving any right to the other railroad to enter upon its tracks or into its terminals at all. Such is the situation here.

It is further insisted that the rate established by the Lowery tariff is unreasonable and for that reason the order should be reversed. We would be inclined to inquire into the subject matter of this contention if it were properly presented and we could do so understandingly, which we cannot do in the present state of the record. The rates which were kept in force by the order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission were, as we have pointed out, the result of a reciprocal agreement among the different railroads and appellant and those who pay the freight from which the railroads derive their profits. It would be impossible to do justice in the matter without going into the whole subject and considering the rights and interests of all the parties. While the coal carrying roads are interested in having appellant deliver coal to the users of that commodity located along appellant's lines in that part of the Chicago switching district covered by it, there can be no doubt that appellant is equally interested in having the coal carrying roads perform the same service as to the car-load lots of grain and other commodities which it brings to Chicago over its tracks from the immense territory which it serves and switching these cars to points within the switching district which are served by the coal carrying roads. As to how the latter roads fared in this arrangement we are not fully advised from the record, but it is plain that the object of the Lowery tariff was apparently to make an adjustment of rates satisfactory to all shippers, wherever situated within the Chicago district, and we must assume that the appellant company had good reasons for agreeing

to those rates, and while its contention may be true that it is switching coal cars under the present arrangement at a loss, it may well be true that the other railroads are switching appellant's cars at an equal loss, by reason of which fact the appellant receives larger profits on through freight for which it is the initial carrier. The Lowery tariff was a reciprocal switching rate or charge established by agreement between all the parties interested, including appellant, only after the most deliberate and careful investigation, involving conferences lasting many months and a consideration of conditions by experts of great knowledge and experience in such matters, and before it is set aside or overturned, all interested parties should be given notice of the hearing and a chance to present their side of the case. No attempt was made to do that in this case. Appellant knew then, as well as it knows now, that if any change was to be made in the switching rates established by the Lowery tariff all other railroads having switching connections with it would be affected by such change in rates and were necessary parties to the proceedings. Appellant did not ask to have them made parties, but proceeded with the hearing to its final adjudication without complaint. Under these circumstances we think appellant is in no position to urge that the commission erred in not entering an order affecting the rights of the parties over which it at the time had no jurisdiction, and one which, on the record before it, it had no lawful authority to make. It would be manifestly unfair to do so. It is further to be observed that most of the evidence introduced by appellant related to a time prior to the adoption of the Lowery tariff. This tariff the appellant accepted without objection, with full knowledge of substantially all of the facts which it now urges against the tariff as making the same unrcasonable and oppressive. If such is true, it is a condition brought about by appellant's active co-operation and approval. If it seeks relief from it, it should institute the

kind of a proceeding contemplated by the statute. Until this is done neither the courts nor the commission can afford it any relief. When that is done it will be time enough to consider that question. For the present it is sufficient to say the matter of rate regulation is essentially one of legislative control, and that when such regulation has been made it will be only reviewed by the courts in so far as it is necessary to determine whether or not the rate established is so unreasonable and unjust as to work a practical destruction of property rights or amount to a confiscation of the property. (Inter-State Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 222 U. S. 541; Regan v. Farmers, etc. 154 id. 362; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. State Railway Commission, 85 Neb. 618; State v. Public Service Commission, 137 Pac. Rep. 132; People v. Railroad Co. 53 App. Div. (N. Y.) 61; Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. United States, 204 Fed. Rep. 986.) In this State the statute has confided the matter of rate regulation to the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, with ample power to investigate and decide such matters. The Railroad and Warehouse Commission has the power to fix reasonable rates and charges between points. wholly within the State and to determine the matters involved in this suit. (Railroad and Warehouse Commission v. Vandalia Railroad Co. supra.) Such regulation does not interfere with inter-State commerce. Minnesota Rate cases, 230 U. S. 352.

We think that the evidence in this record falls far short of showing that the rate established is so unreasonable or unjust as to amount to a confiscation or deprivation of appellant's property or call for judicial interference.

For the reasons given, the judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon county will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

THE CENTRAL INVESTMENT COMPANY, Defendant in Error, vs. JESSIE MELICK, Admx., Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed April 22, 1915.

1. RES JUDICATA-when judgment is res judicata as to validity of lease. A judgment for rent in a forcible detainer proceeding in which the validity of the lease was attacked, which judgment is subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Court, is conclusive, as between the same parties, as to the validity of the lease when a claim for unpaid rent is subsequently filed.

2. LEASES provision is valid that a tenant shall remain liable for rent to end of term notwithstanding re-entry for breach. A provision in a lease to the effect that the lessor shall have a right of re-entry after the lessee's default without forfeiting the lease or the rights of the lessor thereunder is valid, but in such case the amounts accruing after re-entry are more properly regarded as damages agreed upon for a breach of the covenants of the lease than as rent.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Branch "B" Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. H. STERLING POMEROY, Judge, presiding.

ROBERT D. MELICK, for plaintiff in error.

GAIL E. DEMING, for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the court: The Central Investment Company, the defendant in error, filed a claim for $2007.16 in the probate court of Cook county against the estate of Josephine King, deceased. Upon a hearing the probate court allowed $1826.26 of the claim and rendered judgment for that amount. Jessie Melick, as administratrix, prosecuted an appeal to the circuit court of Cook county, and a hearing was there had before the court, which resulted in a judgment for $1814.80 in favor of defendant in error. From that judgment the administratrix appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed