pri the benent:: ,) and as authorizing any amendments y be made in any personal action pendsh v. People, 79 Ill. 521,) its provisions. held to authorize the allowance of an I would, in effect, be the levying of a tax which no tax had ever been legally levmith, supra; People v. Carr, 231 Ill. 502;) given such a construction. The manner of levy is pointed out in section 26 of the act. It is the adoption by the drainage of the resolution provided for in section 26 tes the levy of the assessment to be spread ids of the district. (People v. Carr, 265 Ill. lassification of the lands is provided for by 40. Section 26 must be construed together 21 and 40 as to the amount of tax which each must bear, and the amount of tax each land pay is determined by the proceedings taken ree sections. As said in People v. Schwank, "It is the classification of the lands which derights and liabilities of the land owners." A e part of the commissioners to classify part of uld not be corrected or supplied by an amendclassification roll made on the hearing of obxes, any more than the tax levy provided for .6 of the act could be supplied. It was for the ers, and not the court, to make the proper classithe lands in the district as well as levy the tax. ason we think the court erred in permitting the roll to be amended on the hearing by inserthe figures "$1200" on the classification roll the s "12/75" as representing the rate of claslands of appellant. her insists that since the error in the claslands of appellant was one which might ted at the meeting to hear objections to receive, was no classification whatever of appellant's lands. Such classification was a necessary and material part of the proceedings to levy the tax. The appellee insists that the designation by the drainage commissioners of $1200 as the proportion of the cost of the improvement which the appellant's property should bear was but an error on the part of the tax-levying authorities, which could be corrected by the court under the provisions of section 191 of the Revenue act. With this contention we do not agree. The statute requires that the classification of the lands in the district shall be made before the tax is levied and the special assessment or tax list made out. Section 191 confers no authority upon the court to amend the classification roll or to make a classification of lands where no classification of the same has been made by the commissioners. Said section provides that in proceedings for the collection of taxes and special assessments "all amendments may be made which, by law, could be made in any personal action pending in such court, and no assessment of property or charge for any of said taxes shall be considered illegal on account of any irregularity in the tax lists or assessment rolls, or on account of the assessment rolls or tax lists not having been made, completed or returned within the time required by law, and no error or informality in the proceedings of any of the officers connected with the assessment, levying or collecting of the taxes, not affecting the substantial justice of the tax itself, shall vitiate or in any manner affect the tax or the assessment thereof." And it is further provided in said section that any omission or defective act of any officer or officers connected with the assessment or levying of such taxes may be, in the discretion of the court, corrected, supplied and made to conform to law by the court, or by the person, in the presence of the court, by whose neglect or default the same was occasioned. While the provisions of this statute are to be liberally construed, (People v. Smith, 149 Ill. 549,) and as authorizing any amendments which could by law be made in any personal action pending in court, (Walsh v. People, 79 Ill. 521,) its provisions have never been held to authorize the allowance of an amendment which would, in effect, be the levying of a tax upon property on which no tax had ever been legally levied, (People v. Smith, supra; People v. Carr, 231 Ill. 502;) nor.can they be given such a construction. The manner of making the tax levy is pointed out in section 26 of the Farm Drainage act. It is the adoption by the drainage commissioners of the resolution provided for in section 26 which constitutes the levy of the assessment to be spread against the lands of the district. (People v. Carr, 265 Ill. 220.) The classification of the lands is provided for by sections 21 and 40. Section 26 must be construed together with sections 21 and 40 as to the amount of tax which each tract of land must bear, and the amount of tax each land owner must pay is determined by the proceedings taken under all three sections. As said in People v. Schwank, 237 Ill. 40: "It is the classification of the lands which determines the rights and liabilities of the land owners. A failure on the part of the commissioners to classify part of the lands could not be corrected or supplied by an amendment to the classification roll made on the hearing of objection to taxes, any more than the tax levy provided for by section 26 of the act could be supplied. It was for the commissioners, and not the court, to make the proper classification of the lands in the district as well as levy the tax. For this reason we think the court erred in permitting the classification roll to be amended on the hearing by inserting before the figures "$1200" on the classification roll the fractional figures "12/75" as representing the rate of classification of the lands of appellant. Appellee further insists that since the error in the classification of the lands of appellant was one which might have been corrected at the meeting to hear objections to the classification roll and appellant had due notice of such hearing, it is now precluded from raising any question as to the correctness of the classification roll as adopted at such meeting. While the rule undoubtedly is that where lands have been classified by the commissioners and due notice given the land owner of the time and place of the hearing a land owner failing to appear at such meeting is precluded from thereafter raising any question as to the correctness and propriety of the classification roll as finally, adopted by the commissioners, (People v. Chapman, 127 Ill. 387; People v. Sullivan, 238 id. 386;) this rule has no application to a case such as the one at bar, where the objection is not to the rate of classification but that no classification whatever has been made of the lands of the property owner in the manner required by the statute, and, consequently, there is no valid tax or assessment. Where no classification is, in fact, made, the land owner does not waive his right to urge such failure to classify his lands, on application for judgment, by his failure to appear and urge such objection at the meeting to hear objections to the classification of the lands as made by the commissionUntil his lands have been duly classified at some rating on the graduated scale, as required by the statute, there is no classification or rating to which the property owner can appear and urge objections. A property owner cannot well be said to have waived his right to object to the rate of classification of his lands until there has, in fact, been a rating and classification of his lands made as to which he might appear and urge objections. ers. The second objection should have been sustained, and as the tax must be abated for this reason it will not be necessary to consider or pass upon the other objections raised. For the reasons given, the judgment of the county court of Will county will be reversed. Judgment reversed. Aaron Dalbey, Appellant, vs. WILLIAM S. HAYES et al. Appellees. Opinion filed April 22, 1915. 1. APPEALS AND ERRORS—when a claim that a fiduciary relation existed cannot be considered by the Supreme Court. A claim that a fiduciary relation existed between the parties to the transaction sought to be set aside cannot be considered by the Supreme Court where no such claim appears to have been made in the trial court, in the pleadings or the proof. 2. EQUITY-when a deed will not be set aside. The facts that the grantor was old and in feeble health and that he had hardening of the arteries and a poor memory do not justify setting aside his deed, and if the weight of the evidence sustains the finding of the chancellor that he was mentally competent to make the deed and contract in question, that he gave the orders as to their contents to the attorney who prepared them and had to be convinced of their correctness before he would sign them, a decree sustaining the deed will be affirmed. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. M. W. THOMPSON, Judge, presiding. C. E. PILE, O. M. JONES, and W. J. BOOKWALTER, for appellant. ISAAC A. LOVE, REARICK & MEEKS, and ACTON & ACTON, for appellees. Mr. JUSTICE WATSON delivered the opinion of the court: The bill in this case was filed by Fred Dalbey, as next friend for Aaron Dalbey, and alleged that said Aaron Dalbey was eighty-two years of age; for five years prior to the filing of the bill, because of feeble physical condition as well as feeble mental condition, he had been unable to transact the ordinary business affairs of life, and for said period Pearl E. Wiggins, a banker of Homer, Illinois, had conducted his business for him; said Dalbey was the owner of and resided upon a tract of land consisting of seventy |