mind that the execution of a contract or other instrument is not a voluntary act of the maker. The most that complainant could say was, that when the first contract was made she was greatly exercised over the children being taken away from her and for that reason was not in a condition of mind to do business. Her cousin, Alta Brayfield, who was with her, said that she refused to sign the papers unless she got the children back, and that was what Biby testified to. She was contending for possession of the children, but neither Alta Brayfield nor anyone else saw any difference in her from her general mental state. When the second contract and deed were made the cousin and her husband were both with her, and neither of them heard any threat or saw anything done to indicate oppression of any sort. There was no evidence from any source of any threat made by the defendant, and the only thing which the complainant claimed had any effect on her was the fact that the defendant had possession of two of the children and she did not know where they were. That did not constitute duress, and if she was influenced by it in making the preliminary contract it could have had no possible effect several days afterward, because the children were delivered to her as soon as the preliminary contract was signed.

The chancellor found, according to the allegations of the bill, that the final contract and deed were made without the knowledge, consent or acquiescence of the complainant and through the fraud of the defendant. The evidence was that the contract was written in duplicate, and one copy was handed to the complainant and the other was held and read by Layman, the attorney; that the attorney said to the parties that if there was anything in the papers that did not suit them and if they were not satisfied, then was the time to say so, and neither party made any objection; that the deed of the farm was handed to the complainant, and she looked it over and said she did not like the deed, and at first refused to sign it unless the deeds to the defend

ant were made in the same way; that she said she wanted to have the deeds to her husband made the same as the one to her, and that she afterward signed it. She testified that Biby told her she was getting more than the law would give her if she went to law, which might have been an honest judgment, free from fraud. It was stipulated at the trial that the farm of 320 acres was worth $32,000; that the personal property on the farm was of the fair cash market value of $5000; that the other real estate owned by the defendant was worth $18,000, and that he had other personal property worth $6000 and had a gross income of rentals amounting to $75 per month. It was not so unreasonable to believe that the division of the property,which was made for the support of the complainant and children and which protected the children against a disposal of the fee by the complainant, the proceeds of which might be dissipated or lost,-was as much as a court would give, that an opinion to that effect would indicate fraud.

In the argument in support of the decree counsel recite and lay great emphasis upon the treatment of the complainant when the defendant assaulted her and drove her from their home because she refused to sign the deeds, but what he did at that time did not tend to prove duress when the contract and deed were made and is of no importance in determining whether they were procured by fraud. It would be material in a suit for separate maintenance to show that the complainant was living separate and apart from the defendant without her fault and it would subject him to punishment, but this suit is not for the purpose of punishing him, and the chancellor could not properly administer punishment for the assault by setting aside the contract and deed.

The evidence did not sustain the finding and decree. The complainant assumed an obligation to maintain the minor children, but this case does not involve any question concerning the rights of the children, as against the defend

ant, in case there should be any deficiency in the income of the farm for their support and maintenance. Their rights are not affected.

The decree is reversed and the cause is remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

THE SANITARY DISTRICT OF CHICAGO, Appellant, vs. THE CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed February 17, 1915-Rehearing denied April 7, 1915.

1. SANITARY DISTRICTS-damages on condemnation by district not limited to actual value of property taken. The fact that the Sanitary District of Chicago may have been organized under the police power of the State for the purpose of protecting the public health, does not, in case the district condemns a right of way for a channel across the property of a railroad company, limit the company's damages to the value of the property actually taken.

2. SAME a railroad company not compelled to pay for bridge over a channel to be constructed by sanitary district. Neither by the common law nor by statute is a railroad company obliged to construct, at its own expense, a bridge over an artificial channel which the Sanitary District of Chicago is proposing to construct across the railroad right of way, but the cost of such bridge is properly allowed as damages in a proceeding by the district to condemn the right of way for such channel.

3. SAME statute construed requiring railroad company to "restore" any canal, stream or water-course. Clause 5 of section 19 of the general Railroads act, requiring a railroad company constructing its road across any stream, water-course, highway or canal to "restore" the same to its former state so as not to impair its usefulness, has reference to streams, water-courses, highways and canals in existence at the time the railroad was constructed.

4. SAME-Sanitary District act contemplates that district shall be accountable for all damages in condemning land. The Sanitary District act clearly shows an intention on the part of the legislature to hold the Sanitary District of Chicago to a strict accountability for all damages inflicted by it upon any property, whether

owned by private interests or the public, and to require it, in case of condemnation, to pay full compensation for property actually taken and damages to the remainder.

5. SAME what properly allowed as compensation to a railroad company in condemning right of way for channel. In a proceeding by the Sanitary District of Chicago to condemn a right of way across the tracks of a railroad company for a channel proposed to be constructed by the district, it is proper to allow as compensation the value of the property actually to be taken, together with damages, consisting of the cost of building a suitable bridge across the channel, the cost of necessary raising of the grade of the tracks, the capitalized cost of maintenance and repair of the bridge, and the expense of diverting traffic during the period of construction.

6. SAME when railroad company not entitled to recover cost of a four-track bridge as damages. In estimating the damages a railroad company is entitled to for bridging a channel proposed to be constructed by the Sanitary District of Chicago it is not error to limit the amount to the cost of a two-track bridge, notwithstanding it is stipulated that the proper use of the defendant's property requires four main tracks across such channel, where the defendant company does not have a four-track railroad at that point and there is no proof that it has plans for a four-track road there.

7. SAME-police power of the Sanitary District of Chicago depends upon the act creating it. The police power of the Sanitary District of Chicago depends upon the charter powers granted by the legislature in the act creating the district.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JESSE A. BALDWIN, Judge, presiding.

EDMUND D. ADCOCK, JAMES S. HANDY, and OSCAR H. OLSEN, for appellant.

WINSTON, PAYNE, STRAWN & SHAW, (SILAS H. STRAWN, and WALTER H. JACOBS, of counsel,) for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal by the Sanitary District of Chicago from the judgment of the circuit court of Cook county in a condemnation proceeding brought by said district against

the Chicago and Alton Railroad Company and others, to condemn a right of way and easement for a channel for said district crossing the railroad right of way of said railroad company. The case was tried on a stipulation of facts before the court without a jury, and a judgment was entered in behalf of appellees for $53,476.

Under the authority granted to it by the legislature, the Sanitary District of Chicago has laid out and established a right of way for a channel extending from a point on the Little Calumet river, near Blue Island, Cook county, Illinois, to the main channel of the district at or near the Sag. The proposed channel intersects the right of way of the Chicago and Alton Railroad Company near Lambert station, in the same county. The right of way of the district at that point is approximately two hundred feet in width, and the record shows that the district intends to construct a channel which at the point of the proposed crossing is one hundred feet in width. So constructed, the channel will occupy permanently about that width of the right of way, necessitating the construction of a bridge to carry the railroad tracks .over said channel and the elevation of the railroad right of way on each side of the bridge to the grade necessary to allow the crossing of the bridge above said channel. When the channel is completed it will connect Lake Michigan, through the Little Calumet and Grand Calumet rivers, with the main channel of the sanitary district. The Calumet feeder of the Illinois and Michigan canal extends from the Calumet river near Blue Island to the Illinois and Michigan canal at or near the Sag, and is practically parallel with the proposed Sag channel of the sanitary district. Where said feeder crosses the Alton right of way the railroad bridge maintained by said railroad is about three hundred feet from the point where the Sag channel will cross said railroad right of way. When said sanitary district channel is completed it will entirely drain the Calumet feeder and the territory tributary thereto, and