CHAP. VI.

Meaning of

to s. 2.

a payment in violation of that which the statute was passed to prohibit." In the Bradford case1 Baron Martin said, as to the effect of this word, as follows: "The section draws a distinction between a payment before and a payment after the vote has been given it says that if you give money to a man to vote before an election, that is ipso facto bribing ; but if the money is given after a man has voted, you must show that it was done corruptly. What is the exact meaning of the word corruptly?" It means a thing done with an evil mind and intention; and unless there be an evil mind or an evil intention accompanying the act it is not corruptly done. Corruptly' means an act done by a man knowing that he is doing what is wrong, and doing it with an evil object."

3

Fifthly, as to the meaning of the proviso at the the proviso end of section 2, it was distinctly stated by Willes, J., in his judgment in the Coventry case, that "it relates merely to the expenses of the candidate, and not to the expenses of any other persons. It does not relate to the expenses of voters. To pay the expenses of voters on condition of their voting or abstaining from voting is unquestionably bribery.”3 But in Cooper v. Slade, Watson and Bramwell, BB., stated that, in their opinion, this proviso was

4

5

1 10. & H. 37. See also observations of O'Brien, J., in the Carrickfergus case, 1 O. & H. 267.

2 In the Bewdley case, 1 0. & H. 19, speaking of the word "corruptly" as used in s. 4, Blackburn, J., quoting the judgment of Willes, J., in Cooper v. Slade, 6 H. L. C. 773, said: "Corruptly there does not mean wickedly or immorally, or dishonestly, or anything of that sort, but with the object and intention of doing that which the legislature plainly means to forbid." In the Stroud case, 2 O. & H. 185, Bramwell, B., said: "I rather think that word 'corruptly' would not apply to any case where the payment was merely on account of the voting, unless there was some other reason for giving the money. See further as to this word as used in s. 4, post, p. 168; see also Brecon case, 2 O. & H. 44, and Kidderminster, ib. 177.

3 Coventry case, 10. & H. 101; Horsham case, 3 0. & H.

at P Cooper v. Slade, 6 H. L. C. 764.

5 Ib. p. 766.

intended to exempt cases where a candidate had CHAP. VI. paid, or had agreed to pay, the various legal expenses incurred at elections, such as printing, messengers, &c., before the election, to keep the voter in good-humour, or, in other words, to induce him to vote. So the whole proviso may well read thus : "Every person who shall promise, &c., money, &c., in order to induce any voter to vote shall be guilty of bribery, provided that this enactment shall not extend to any money paid, or agreed to be paid, for, or on account of any expenses bonâ fide incurred at, or concerning, any election, and provided such expenses are not illegal, on some other ground than this prohibition.”

1

travelling

legal.

We may here observe that the question of the Payment of legality of paying for conveyances for voters in expenses, county elections and elections for the Universities, how far East Retford, Shoreham, Cricklade, Much Wenlock, Aylesbury, and Galway, is set at rest by the enactment of 21 & 22 Vict. c. 87, s. 1,2 which enables any candidate, or his agent duly appointed in writing, to provide conveyance for any voter for the purpose of polling at an election; but no money, or valuable consideration,3 may pass to the voter. But In borough in all boroughs in Scotland and Ireland, " ments of travelling expenses, either to the voter

4

1 In their judgment in the Court below, the judges, of whom Bramwell, B., was one, had treated this proviso as of no weight, and merely as a superfluous provision ex majori cautelâ, 6 E. & B. 458. But in his judgment in the House of Lords, Bramwell, B., said with regard to this part of his former judgment: "I incline to think that is wrong. It is not right to hold any part of an enactment nugatory or needless if a meaning or purpose can be given to it." 6 H. L. Cases, p. 765. 2 App. lvii.

3 In the Bolton case, 2 O. & H. 145, it was argued that the payment of the travelling expenses of voters to whom a certain letter (therein set out) had been sent, was a valuable consideration within the meaning of the Corrupt Practices Act, s. 2, but Mellor, J., held that it was not. See also Horsham case, 3 0. & H.

4 By the Parl. El. and Corrupt Practices Act, 1880, s. 36 of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, is repealed, so that such payments are no longer illegal in English boroughs.

elections.

CHAP. VI. himself, or to any other person, are now illegal payments within the meaning of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1854.1

Other pay

illegal by statute.

There is also another class of payments which are ments made made illegal by statute, namely, payments on account of chairing, cockades, ribbons, or marks of distinction, or on account of any bands of music, or flags, or banners, and any person providing cockades, ribbons, or marks of distinction is liable to forfeit the penal sum of two pounds for every such offence.3

Uncondi

tional pay

5

The case of Cooper v. Slade cannot be said to ments when have brought within the statute all unconditional not bribery. payments unless they tend of themselves to create such a bias as to affect the character of a vote. Thus, merely subscribing to institutions, whether political or religious or to a fund formed for defraying the expenses of a particular candidate, or profuse hospitality, or giving money out of mere charity, although it be to a voter, or paying for the admission of freemen," or lavishly expending money in a town with a view of gaining influence and influencing an election,10 or over-paying an

(Scotland) 31 & 32 Vict. c. 48, s. 25; App. lxxiii. (Ireland) 31 & 32 Vict. c. 49, s. 12; App. lxxix.

6

2 Consequently no creditor could recover for cockades, &c., in an action, if he knew to what purpose they were to be applied; Richardson v. Webster, 3 C. & P. 128; Ribbans v. Crickett, 1 B. & P. 264.

3 17 & 18 Vict. c. 107, s. 7, App. liv. The Irish Act as to cockades, viz., 35 Geo. III. c. 29, s. 19, is not expressly repealed by 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, but it was held by O'Brien, J., in Youghal case, 1 O. & H. 297, that this section is repealed by implication, and it may be remarked that it is not repealed by the repealing schedule of the Ballot Act, App. cxxxiii. 4 Belfast, 1 0. & H. 282.

5 Westbury, ib. 49, and see South Huron case, 4 Canada Com. Law Rep. 488.

6 Coventry, ib. 104; Belfast, ib. 285.

7 Windsor, ib. 3; Brecon, 2 O. & H. 43.

8 Windsor, 1 0. & H. 2; Youghal, ib. 294; Boston,

2 0. & H. 161.

9 Beverley, ib. 145.

10 Hastings, ib. 218. In the Stroud case, 2 O. & H. 182,

agent,' have not been held to be bribery within CHAP. VI. the meaning of the 2nd section of the Corrupt Practices Act. Neither was it the intention of the Legislature to prevent actions, which are good and kind in themselves, being done to persons merely because they have a tendency to make those persons favourable to the persons doing them. For instance, the Legislature does not intend to prevent liberal conduct on the part of an employer towards his workmen. If a master were to say to his men, "If you choose to make a holiday on the following day you shall not lose money by it whatever your colour is," that would not be bribery." But what the Legislature intended to prohibit was "acts done with the specific object of influencing the mind of the individual voter to whom they had relation by the particular temptation held out to him," therefore "a promise or offer to cause a workman to be no loser by his coming to vote (for instance, that if he will come and vote for a particular person, he shall not lose his day's work) comes within the meaning of the Corrupt Practices Act, and is an act of bribery and corruption." Bona fide and unconditional refresh- Refreshments supplied to committeemen and others who are engaged in carrying on the work of the election have also been held lawful, upon the above principles; but, though not invalidating the election, they are illegal if supplied on the day of nomination,

"3

4

Bramwell, B., said, "The Act does not say that liberal conduct towards your men, or such a thing as putting up a drinking fountain or what not, although it be done very much to influence voters, is bribery.'

1 Youghal, ib. 296.

2 Per Bramwell, B., Stroud, 2 O. & H. 184.

3 Staleybridge case, 1 O. & H. 67.

4 Bradford case, 1 O. & H. 36; Tamworth case, 1 0. & H. 83; Westminster case, 10. & H. 91; Norfolk case, 10. & H. 243. It is clear that to supply refreshments, or to promise refreshments in futuro on condition that a voter votes in a particular way, may be bribery within the 2nd section of Corrupt Practices Act, as well as corrupt treating within s. 4; Bodmin, 1 O. & H. 124.

ments.

CHAP. VI.

Payment of rates.

or of polling. This is under the 23rd section, which prohibits the giving, or causing to be given, refreshments or money, or tickets of refreshment, to any voter on the day of nomination, or of polling, on account of such voter having polled, or being about to poll, under a penalty of forty shillings for each offence. Again the payment of rates, if unconditional, is not within the statute. It has been decided that the payment of rates by third parties, without the knowledge of the persons from whom such rates were due, is not such a payment by the latter as to entitle them to be put on the burgess list; and Lord Denman, in deciding the point, took occasion to suggest that such payments might be made the means of "enormous bribery." In Great Britain no person can now be registered as a voter whose rates are in arrear;3 and it is enacted, as to Great Britain, that any person, either directly or indirectly, corruptly paying any rate on behalf of any ratepayer, for the purpose of enabling him to be registered as a voter, thereby to influence his vote at any election-and any candidate or other person, either directly or indirectly, paying any rate on behalf of any voter for the purpose of inducing him to vote, or refrain from voting-shall be guilty of bribery, and punishable accordingly; and any person on whose behalf, and with whose privacy, any such payment is made, shall also be guilty of bribery, and punishable accordingly. In order, therefore, to bring a person paying the rates of another within the penalties of this enactment it must be distinctly proved that the payment was corruptly made," and in order to make a candidate liable for the consequences of the

1 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, s. 23; App. liv.

2 R. v. Bridgenorth, 10 A. & E. 66. But see Worcester, C. & D. 173; and Cook v. Luckett, 2 C. B. 648.

330 & 31 Vict. c. 102, ss. 3, 6; 31 & 32 Vict. c. 48, ss.

3, 6.

4 (England and Wales) 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, s. 49; App. lxxi. (Scotland) 31 & 32 Vict. c. 48, s. 49; App. lxxvii. 5 Oldham case, 1 O. & H. 164.