Jurisprudence as Ideology
In Jurisprudence as Ideology, Valerie Kerruish asks how it is that people who are put down, let down and kept down by law can be thought to have a general political obligation to obey it. She engages with contemporary issues in socialist, feminist and critical legal theory, and links these issues to debates in jurisprudence and the philosophy and sociology of law.
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THINKING ABOUT JURISPRUDENCE AS IDEOLOGY
1 A REALIST CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY
2 THREE CONCEPTS OF LAW
3 TRADITION AGREEMENT AND ARGUMENT IN JURISPRUDENCE
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF OBJECTIVITY
5 RIGHTS FETISHISM
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