... as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding - Page 81by John Locke - 1823Full view - About this book
| John Locke - Philosophy - 1722 - 640 pages
...Senfe. But as I call the other Senfation, fo I call this REFLEC1'ION, the /(&<« it affords being fuch only as the Mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within it felf. By REFL ECT1ON then, in the following part of this Difcourfe, •! would be underftood to... | |
| John Locke - Knowledge, Theory of - 1768 - 418 pages
...Senfe. But as I call the other Senfation, fo I call this REFLECTION ; the Ideas it affords being fuch only, as the Mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within itfelf. By REFLECTION then, in the following Part of this Difcourfe, I would be underftood to mean,(that... | |
| John Locke - Knowledge, Theory of - 1801 - 340 pages
...fenfe. But as I call the other Senfanon, fo I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being fuch only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itfelf. By REFLECTION, then, in the following part of this difcourfe, I would be underftood to mean,... | |
| John Locke - 1801 - 950 pages
...fenfe. But as I call the other Senfatton, fo I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being fuch only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itfelf. By REFLECTION, then, in the following part of this difcourfe, I would be understood to mean,... | |
| John Locke - Knowledge, Theory of - 1805 - 554 pages
...sense, as having nothing to do with external qbjects, yet it • is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the...reflection then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner... | |
| 1810 - 326 pages
...reflection ; by the first we acquire the knowledge of external objects, and by the second, " such ideas as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself." There can be little doubt that this excessive generalization. of the sources of all our knowledge proceeded... | |
| Dugald Stewart - Philosophy - 1811 - 590 pages
...objects, yet it is very like it, and " might properly enough be called internal sense. But as "Icallthe other sensation, so I call this REFLECTION; (• the...'' reflecting on its own operations within itself. These " two, I say, viz. external material things, as the objects " of sensation, and the operations... | |
| John Locke - 1815 - 454 pages
...not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation, so I call this HEFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations... | |
| Dugald Stewart - Philosophy - 1816 - 644 pages
...every man has wholly in himself; and though it " be not sense, as having nothing to do with exter" nal objects, yet it is very like it, and might pro" perly..." gets by reflecting on its own operations within it" self. These two, I say, viz. external material " things, as the objects of sensation, and the opera"... | |
| John Locke - 1817 - 556 pages
...not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation, so 1 call this REFLECTIoN, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on it»... | |
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