7. From the comprehension of those that are in reputation; as, What I did, such and such have done the same, who, nevertheless, are good men.

8. From comparison with such as have been falsely accused, or wrongfully suspected, and, nevertheless, found upright.

9. From recrimination; as, The accuser is a man of ill life, and therefore not to be believed.

10. From that the judgment belongs to another place, or time; as, I have already answered, or am to answer elsewhere to this matter.

11. From crimination of the crimination; as, It serves only to pervert judg

ment.

12. A twelfth, which is common both to crimination and purgation, and is taken from some sign; as, Teucer is not to be believed, because his mother was Priam's sister. On the other side, Teucer is to be believed, because his father was Priam's enemy.

13. A thirteenth, proper to crimination only, from praise and dispraise mixed: as, To praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise in many words, and blame with effectual ones; or to praise many things that are good, and then add one evil, but a great one.

14. A fourteenth, coming both to crimination and purgation, is taken from the interpretation of the fact; for he that purgeth himself interpreteth the fact always in the best sense; and he that criminates always in the worst; as when Ulysses said, Diomedes chose him for his companion, as the most able of the Grecians, to aid him in his exploit; but his adversary said, He chose him for his cowardice, as the most unlikely to share with him in the honor.

XV. OF THE NARRATION

HE narration is not always continued and of one piece; but sometimes, as in THE demonstratives, interrupted and dispersed through the whole oration.

For there being in a narration something that falls not under art, as, namely, the actions themselves, which the orator inventeth not, he must therefore bring in the narration of them where he best may. As, for example, if being to praise a man, you would make a narration of all his acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you will find it necessary afterwards to repeat the same acts again, while from some of them you praise his valor, and from others his wisdom; whereby your oration shall have less variety, and shall less please.

'Tis not necessary always that the narration be short. The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open.

In the narration, as oft as may be, 'tis good to insert somewhat commendable in oneself, and blamable in one's adversary; as, I advised him, but he would take no counsel.

In narrations, a man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion, indignation in the hearer besides the purpose; as, Ulysses in Homer, relating his travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long in it, that it consists of divers books: but when he comes home, tells the same to his wife in thirty verses, leaving out what might make her sad.

The narration ought also to be in such words as argue the manners; that is, some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be not expressed; as, "setting his arms a kenbold,* he answered," etc., by which is insinuated the pride of him that so answered.

* For "akimbo"; a phonetic perversion.

In an oration a man does better to show his affection than his judgment: that is, 'tis better to say, "I like this," than to say, "This is better.» For by the one you would seem wise, by the other good. But favor follows goodness, whereas wisdom

procures envy.

But if this affection seem incredible, then a reason must be rendered, as did Antigone. For when she had said she loved her brother better than her husband or children; she added, "for husband and children I may have more; but another brother I cannot, my parents both being dead." Or else a man must use this form of speaking; "I know this affection of mine seems strange to you, but nevertheless it is such." For 'tis not easily believed, that any man has a mind to do any thing that is not for his own good.

Besides in a narration, not only the actions themselves, but the passions, and signs that accompany them, are to be discovered.

And in his narration a man should make himself and his adversary be considered for such, and such, as soon, and as covertly as he can.

A narration may have need sometimes not to be in the beginning.

In deliberative orations, that is, wheresoever the question is of things to come, a narration, which is always of things past, has no place: and yet things past may be recounted, that men may deliberate better of the future: but that is not as narration, but proof; for 'tis example.

There may also be narration in deliberatives in that part where crimination and praise come in: but that part is not deliberative, but demonstrative.

XVI. OF PROOF, OR CONFIRMATION, AND REFUTATION

ROOFS are to be applied to something controverted.

PROOFS

The controversy in judicial oration is, whether it has been done; whether it has been hurtful; whether the matter be so great; and whether it be just, or no. In a question of fact, one of the parties of necessity is faulty (for ignorance of the fact is no excuse), and therefore the fact is chiefly to be insisted on.

In demonstratives, the fact for the most part is supposed; but the honor and profit of the fact are to be proved.

In deliberatives, the question is, Whether the thing be like to be, or likely to be so great; or whether it be just; or whether it be profitable.

Besides the application of the proof to the question, a man ought to observe whether his adversary have lied in any point without the cause. For 'tis a sign he does the same in the cause.

The proofs themselves are either examples or enthymemes.

A deliberative oration, because 'tis of things to come, requireth rather examples, than enthymemes.

But a judicial oration, being of things past, which have a necessity in them, and may be concluded syllogistically, requireth rather enthymemes.

Enthymemes ought not to come too thick together, for they hinder one another's force by confounding the hearer.

Nor ought a man to endeavor to prove everything by enthymeme, lest like some philosophers, he collect what is known from what is less known.

Nor ought a man to use enthymemes, when he would move the hearer to some affection: for seeing divers motions do mutually destroy or weaken one another, he will lose either the enthymeme, or the affection that he would move.

For the same reason, a man ought not to use enthymemes when he would express manners.

But whether he would move affection, or insinuate his manners, he may withal use sentences.

A deliberative oration is more difficult than a judicial, because 'tis of the future, whereas a judicial is of that which is past, and that consequently may be known; and because it has principles, namely the law; and it is easier to prove from principles than without.

Besides, a deliberative oration wants those helps of turning to the adversary; of speaking of himself; of raising passion.

He therefore that wants matter in a deliberative oration, let him bring in some person to praise or dispraise.

And in demonstratives he that has nothing to say in commendation or discommendation of the principal party, let him praise or dispraise somebody else, as his father, or kinsman, or the very virtues or vices themselves.

He that wants not proofs, let him not only prove strongly, but also insinuate his manners; but he that has no proof, let him, nevertheless, insinuate his manners. For a good man is as acceptable as an exact oration.

Of proofs, those that lead to an absurdity please better than those that are direct or ostensive; because from the comparison of contraries, namely, truth and falsity, the force of the syllogism does the better appear.

Confutation is also a part of proof.

And he that speaks first, puts it after his own proofs, unless the controversy contain many and different matters. And he that speaks last, puts it before.

For 'tis necessary to make way for his own oration, by removing the objections of him that spake before. For the mind abhors both the man, and his oration, that is damned beforehand.

If a man desire his manners should appear well (lest speaking of himself he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtrectation; or speaking of another, he seem contumelious, or scurrilous), let him introduce another person.

Last of all, lest he cloy his hearer with enthymemes, let him vary them sometimes with sentences; but such as have the same force. As here is an enthememe: "If it be then the best time to make peace when the best conditions of peace may be had, then the time is now, while our fortune is entire.» And this is a sentence of equal force to it: "Wise men make peace, while their fortune is entire.»

XVII. OF INTERROGATIONS, ANSWERS, AND JESTS

THE HE times wherein 'tis fit to ask one's adversary a question are chiefly four. 1. The first is, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, he has already uttered one; and we would by interrogation draw him to confess the other. 2. The second, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, one is manifest of itself, and the other likely to be fetched out by a question; then the interrogation will be seasonable; and the absurd conclusion is presently to be inferred, without adding that proposition which is manifest.

3. The third, when a man would make appear that his adversary does contradict himself.

4. The fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as these; in some sort 'tis so, in some sort 'tis not so.

Out of these cases 'tis not fit to interrogate.

not is thought vanquished.

For he whose question succeeds

To equivocal questions a man ought to answer fully, and not to be too brief.

ΙΟ

To interrogations which we foresee tend to draw from us an answer, contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our answer, presently give an answer to the objection which is implied in the question.

And where the question exacteth an answer that concludeth against us, we must, together with our answer, presently distinguish.

Jests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse; and grave discourse is deluded by jests.

The several kinds of jests are set down in the art of poetry.

Whereof one kind is irony, and tends to please oneself.

The other is scurrility, and tends to please others.

The latter of these has in it a kind of baseness; the former may become a man of good breeding.

XVIII. OF THE PERORATION

THE HE peroration must consist of one of these four things. Inclining the judge to favor yourself, or to disfavor your adversary. For then, when all has been said respecting the cause, is the best season to praise or dispraise the parties.

Of amplification or diminution. For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to show how great or how little that good or evil is.

Or in moving the judge to anger, love, or other passion. For when it is manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it will be opportune to excite the judge.

Or of repetition, that the judge may remember what has been said.

Repetition consisteth in the matter and the manner. For the orator must show that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his oration, and how: namely, by comparing his arguments one by one with his adversaries, repeating them in the same order they were spoken.

Complete. From the text of Bohn.

JOHN LOCKE

(1632-1704)

OHN LOCKE, one of the greatest thinkers of modern times, was born in the county of Somerset, England, August 29th, 1632. His father was an opponent of royal prerogative, "a strict but genial Puritan," and his influence had much to do, no doubt, with making Locke the champion of the idea that the governed are the true source of all political power, and that government to be just must be representative. He was educated at Westminster School and at Oxford. His essay "Concerning the Human Understanding," which was written during the intervals of nearly twenty years, appeared in 1690. Supplementing the essay on "Toleration » (1689), it exerted a revolutionary influence on the thought of the civilized world. The essay, "On the Conduct of the Understanding," was originally intended to conclude the essay "Concerning the Human Understanding," but Locke withheld it, and it did not appear until after his death, which occurred October 28th, 1704.

T

REMEDIES OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS

NO REMEDY the defects of speech to some degree, and to prevent the inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the observation of these following rules may be of use, till somebody better able shall judge it worth his while to think more maturely on this matter, and oblige the world with his thoughts on it. REMEDY TO USE NO WORD without an Idea.— Firstly, a man should take care to use no word without a signification, no name without an idea for which he makes it stand. This rule will not seem altogether needless to any one who shall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such words, as instinct, sympathy, and antipathy, etc., in the discourse of others, so made use of as he might easily conclude that those that used them had no ideas in their minds to which they applied them; but spoke them only as sounds, which usually served instead of reasons on the like occasions. Not but that these words, and the like, have very proper significations in which they may be used; but there being no natural connection between any words and any ideas, these, and any other may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by men, who have no ideas in their minds to which they have annexed them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessary they should, if men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone.

TO HAVE DISTINCT IDEAS ANNEXED TO THEM IN MODES.-Secondly, it is not enough a man uses his words as signs of some ideas: those he annexes them to, if they be simple, must be clear and distinct; if complex, must be determinate, i. e., the precise collection of simple ideas settled in the mind with that sound annexed