one, but limited by the words and spirit of the Constitution, and the principles of natural justice. Under the Federal Constitution, all revenue bills must originate in the popular branch of Congress; direct taxes must be apportioned among the States, according to their respective numbers, to be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons (including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed), three-fifths of all other persons; taxes can be laid only for the purpose of paying the debts, and providing for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; no direct tax can be levied unless in proportion to the enumeration of persons as contained in the census, directed to be taken by the Constitution. In . some of the States, all, and in others many, of the following limitations are imposed upon the taxing power. No tax can be levied, under any pretence whatever, without the consent of the people or their representatives. Revenue bills must originate in the lower branch of the legislature. Taxes can be levied and collected only for public purposes; this is also implied from the very definition of a tax. The levy must be a reasonable one. The mode of levying the tax is directed to be by valuation, so that every person shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his estate. In order to produce equality in the assessments, new valuations of property shall be taken at stated periods. No one species of property shall be taxed higher than another of equal value. In some of the States by constitution, in others by ordinance or compact, the lands of non-resident proprietors cannot be taxed higher than lands belonging to residents of the State; and it has been held by the Supreme Court of Alabama, that the clause in the Federal Constitution, which declares that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States," forbade the legislature of that State from imposing a higher tax upon the property of non-residents than, by the general laws, were imposed upon residents. To 1 Wiley v. Parmer, 14 Alabama, 627. prevent the moneys raised by taxation from being squandered, and thereby create the necessity for a new levy, it is declared that no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and that the people may keep watch of their agents, it is further provided that accurate statements of the public receipts and expenditures shall be attached to and published with the laws, at the end of each session of the legislature. Such are the positive restrictions which the people, in the exercise of their inherent sovereignty, have seen proper to impose upon the taxing power of their representatives. By compact made between the Federal Government and some of the new States, it is expressly stipulated that bounty lands, granted, or to be granted by the United States for military services, shall, while they continue the property of the soldier or his heirs, be exempt from taxation for the term of three years from the date of the patent; and that all lands sold by the United States, shall be exempt from taxation for the period of five years from and after the day of sale. Restrictions imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the taxing power of the States, may be noticed in this connection. The public domain of the United States cannot be taxed by the States in which they lie; nor can lands, purchased by the Government of the Union, with the assent of the State, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, mints, post-offices, court and custom-houses, and other needful buildings, which may be necessary in carrying into effect the powers intrusted to the Federal Government. This would be taxing the means employed by the General Government in the execution of its acknowledged powers. Besides, "exclusive legislation is granted to Congress by the Constitution, over all such places as may be ceded by the States to the General Government, or may be purchased by the latter, with the consent of the States. The last class of limitations upon the taxing power, as to the manner of levying the tax, are those which 14 Wheaton, 316; 9 Wheaton, 738. have their foundation in natural justice. That such exist is clearly established by the authorities.1 It is a fundamental principle in our government and laws, that individuals are protected in the enjoyment of their property, except so far as it may be taken in one of two ways, viz: as a public tax, upon principles of just equality, or for public use, with a just compensation, ascertained according to the provisions of the Constitution. As money is property, the collection of every tax is taking property from the citizen, and to be legal, must be referable to one of the two modes above mentioned. The principle of just equality is, therefore, the governing one by which the validity of every tax levied by the legislature, is to be determined. This equality can be secured only by uniformity in levying the tax, and a periodical valuation of the estate of every citizen. If the tax is laid to raise a revenue for the expenses of the State, it should be laid equally upon all the property in the State. The legislature have not the power to exact from a single individual, or class of citizens, or a single county, city, or town, the means of defraying the entire expenses of the State; for if this could be done, the constitutional prohibition could be evaded in all cases, and the legislature could take private property for public use, without compensation, under the vague and indefinite pretence of taxation. The distinction between constitutional taxation, and the taking of private property for public use, by legislative power, may not be definable with perfect precision. But it is clear, that whenever the property of a citizen shall be taken from him by the sovereign will, and appropriated, without his consent, for the benefit of the public, the exaction should not be considered as a tax, unless similar contributions be made by that public itself; or rather, shall be exacted by the same public will, from such constituent members of the same community generally, as own the same kind of property. This is 1 5 Dana, 31; 9 Dana, 516; 4 New Hampshire, 556; 6 Harris & Johnson, 382, 383; 6 Barbour, 209. in accordance with the well-known maxim, that a common burden shall be sustained by a common contribution. The ascertainment of the value of all the property in the State or district where the tax is to be levied, is essentially necessary, to enable the taxing power to make such an assessment as the wants of the State or district may require, to apportion it among all the citizens of the State or district, and compel all to share equally in the common burden. Such are the principles by which the legislative power in this country is controlled in the levy of taxes, as laid down by all of the authorities. The difficulty seems to lie in their application to the facts of each particular case. We shall content ourselves with a reference to the adjudged cases, without attempting to reconcile them with each other. Thus, in the language of Chancellor Kent: "It is not sufficient that no tax can be imposed on the citizens but by their representatives in the legislature. The citizens are entitled to require that the legislature itself shall cause all public taxation to be fair and equal in proportion to the value of property, so that no one class of individuals, and no one species of property, may be unequally or unduly assessed." 2 Before treating of the rules which govern the courts in the construction of a class of statutes by which rights of property are affected, it may not be deemed inappropriate to consider the principles by which legislative power is controlled in this country. These principles are to be found in our written constitutions, and are deducible in a three-fold manner. 1. From the declared ends of government. 2. From the particular provisions of the Constitution. 3. From the structure of the government itself. In discussing this subject we shall refer to the Constitution of Illinois, because it is more familiar to us, while at the same time, it is substantially like that of every other State in the Union. The thirteenth article of that in 1 6 Barbour, 209; 5 Dana, 31; 9 Dana, 516; 6 New Hampshire, 556; 6 Harris & Johnson, 382, 383; 4 Comstock, 419. 2 2 Kent's Com. 331. 11 strument, in order "that the general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free government may be recognized and unalterably established," proceeds to declare: 1. "That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, and of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness." 2. "That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness." It will be seen, on a critical examination of these provisions, that seven great and essential principles are declared: 1. That all men are created free and independent. 2. That they possess the rights of life, liberty, reputation, and property, independent of human laws. 3. That these rights are indefeasible in their nature. 4. That all power is inherent in the people at large. 5. That human government is founded upon their authority. 6. That government is instituted for their security. 7. That the only end of government is the preservation and perpetuation of these inherent powers and rights. They all affirm the great truth, that "rights are from nature, while titles and remedies are the invention of society." 1 The Hon. Edward Bates, now Judge of the Land Court in St. Louis, in his argument in the case of Hamilton v. The St. Louis County Court, thus enforces this position: "What is a Constitution, and what are its objects? It is easier to tell what it is not, than what it is. It is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government; it is not the cause, but consequence of personal and political freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience, designed for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers which they possessed before the constitution was made; it is but the frame-work of 1 Judge Pope, in Arrowsmith v. Burlingame, 4 M'Lean, 497. |