show the kind and character of the possession, and if she failed to do so, the legal presumption is, that she either holds under the petitioner, and is his tenant by lease and entry, or that she is a mere tort feasor, without any shadow or pretext of right, and in either event she is not entitled to the privilege of opposing the confirmation." [It is not necessary that the purchaser should be in the actual occupation in order to file a bill for confirmation of his title.1 In Hunt v. McFadgen,2 it was held, that when a purchaser bids off a certain tract of land for the taxes, and refuses to pay the same, whereby the collector is compelled to offer the land again, and the same purchaser bids off a larger quantity of the same tract for the same taxes, a court of equity will not confirm his title by the second purchase, as it would be a fraud on the rights of the owner. But if he purchased the same quantity at the second as at the first auction, it seems the purchase will be confirmed. A proceeding upon such a statute, when instituted in a State court, and removed into the circuit court, conformably to the act of Congress, constitutes a case over which the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction; and the petition to remove such a case from the State court must allege that the petitioners were "citizens" of some other State; an allegation that they were "residents" is not sufficient.3 The proceedings under this statute are governed by the ordinary rules of chancery practice.*] Bonnell v. Roane, 20 Arkansas, 114. 2 20 Arkansas, 277. 3 Parker v. Overman, 18 Howard, U. S. 137. CHAPTER XX. OF THE LOCATION OF THE LAND SOLD. IN sales of this character the law requires a specific location, and certain description of the land sold, in all cases where a less quantity than the entire tract offered, is struck off. In some instances, the officer making the sale is authorized to elect in what part of the tract the quantity shall be located, and announce his election to the bidders previous to the sale, Thus, in the Illinois statute of February 19, 1827,1 it is provided, that "the sheriff shall proceed to sell said property, or so much of it as shall bring the amount of the tax and cost, and the officer selling, shall, previous to the sale, designate in what part of the tract the part sold shall be located, and shall give his certificate and make his deed accordingly." In other instances, the law itself locates the land sold, without the intervention of any agency whatever. This was the case in the Illinois statute of February 26, 1839,2 which declared that "when a portion of the tract shall have been struck off on any such bid, it shall be taken off the east side of said tract, extending the whole length on the east side, and so proportioned in width as to embrace the number of acres sold as aforesaid." In the States of North Carolina and Kentucky, the law authorized a sale of the least number of acres without designation in terms, or authorizing the officer selling to locate the part sold, but directing the officer to execute a certificate of the quantity sold, which constituted the authority of the county surveyor, to make a location of the 1 Gale's Statutes, 566, secs. 24 and 25. 2 Sec. 35. part sold by actual survey; and upon the return of the survey, the officer who made the sale was required to convey to the purchaser, according to the metes and bounds of the survey thus made and returned.1 Where a conveyance is made of a certain number of acres, without locating it in any particular part of the tract, the conveyance confers no election upon the grantee to locate the quantity purchased, but the deed must be held void for uncertainty. [Thus, a deed of "10 acres in lot 26, in the 11th. range, in the town of Columbia" is void for uncertainty.3] The present statute of Illinois provides, that when a less quantity than a whole tract shall be sold, the part purchased shall be located on the east side of the tract. In Spellman v. Curtenius, the description of the land offered for sale was: S. W. and S. E. 9, T. 8, N. R. 8 E., and the sale was of one acre off the east side of the two parcels; the two quarters were fractional, ran to a point on the east, and therefore, strictly speaking, had no eastern side. By the court: "The intention of the law is, where less than the whole tract is sold for taxes, that the quantity sold shall be taken from the eastern part of the tract, and a line is to be drawn due north and south, far enough west of the most eastern point of the tract of land sold, to make the requisite quantity. The law must have a practical effect, and because a tract of land does not happen to be in a form, so as to have, strictly speaking, an east side, it is not to be presumed the legislature intended such tract to be exempt from this general provision of the revenue law. To give it such a construction, would be emphatically sticking in the bark." 1 Currie v. Fowler, 5 J. J. Marshall, 145; Jones v. Gibson, 2 Taylor (N. C.), 41. 2 Erwin v. Helm, 13 Sergeant & Rawle, 151; Haven v. Cram, 1 New Hamp shire, 93; Jackson v. De Lancy, 11 Johnson, 373; s. c. 13 Johnson, 551; Jackson v. Rosevelt, 13 Johnson, 97. The opposite doctrine is asserted in Coxe v. Blanden 1 Watts, 533; but it is so utterly repugnant to the general principles of law, that it cannot be sustained. 3 Harvey v. Mitchell, 11 Foster, 575. 12 Illinois, 409. But upon the same identical state of facts, the tax deed was held void, in Ballance v. Forsyth.1 McLean, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "In these two fractional sections, there appear to have been about 150 acres. It is not said in what form the acre is to be surveyed. Certainty in such a case is necessary to make the sale valid, for on the form of the acre its value may chiefly depend. And there is nothing on the face of the deed, or in the proceedings previous to the sale, which supplies this defect." It may be added, that the same want of specific locality of the land sold, which would render void the anterior proceedings, will also establish the invalidity of the deed. 113 Howard, U. S. 18. CHAPTER XXI. OF THE AMENDMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS. Ir may be laid down as a general rule, that the power to correct an error committed in the progress of a proceeding, exclusively belongs to courts of justice, and has no application whatever to the proceedings of ministerial officers. The common law, independently of any statutory provision upon the subject, recognizes the power of the courts in all cases, in furtherance of justice, to amend their proceedings while in paper; that is, until the judgment is signed and perfected, by its record and that of the anterior proceeding; but no amendment was allowable, according to the strict rules of the common law, after the ending of the term in which the judgment was pronounced. Prior to that time, the proceedings were regarded as in fieri only, and consequently subject to the control of the court. But by the English and American statutes of amendment and jeofail, the power of the court to amend the record of their proceedings, has been greatly enlarged, and amendments may now be made where the justice of the case requires it, after a motion in arrest of judgment, upon writ of error, and even after execution has been issued, executed and returned. This power of amendment belongs to superior. courts of record alone. No inferior court possesses it. No ministerial officer is permitted, according to the principles of the common law, to exercise such a power, where the rights of third persons are concerned, for the simple reason that he possesses no legislative or judicial power. To the latter departments of government the power of amendment alone attaches. The executive officers of the law act at their peril in every in |