to S., and ran on that course for fifteen
minutes, the light remaining in about
the same position, and the green
light then went out of sight, and a
red light came in view, whereupon
the steamer's helm was at once ported,
and her engine stopped and reversed,
but too late to avoid the collision.

The schooner, sailing N. by E., with
the wind S. by E., made the steamer's
light directly ahead, and being un-
certain whether she was a steamer or
a sailing vessel, ported her helm, and
changed her course to NE. by N., and
kept that course till she saw that the
vessel was a steamer approaching on
a course which would run her down,
when she put her helm hard a-port,
and changed her course to E. by N.

The speed of both veesels was
about six or eight miles an hour, that
of the schooner being a little the
greater. Each vessel had her lights
properly set and burning. The
schooner was struck amidships on the
port side, and sunk instantly.

Held, That, on this state of facts,
the 15th and 18th articles of the Act
of April 29th, 1864, prescribed the
rules for the navigation of the ves-
sels;

That it was a fault in the schooner
to port her helm when she did so
first, especially when she was uncer-
tain whether the approaching light
was that of a steamer or sailing vessel;

That that fault did not contribute
to the collision;

That the fact that the position of
the light ahead did not change after
the steamer had changed her course
to the eastward, ought to have been a
clear indication to her that the
schooner was proceeding in such a
direction as to involve a risk of col-
lision, and, under those circumstances,
it was her duty to keep out of the
schooner's way;

That the steamer ought to have
ported before she did, and ought to
have stopped and backed before she
did;

That the last change of the
schooner's helm to port, being made
in the heat of danger, did not cause
the collision, nor was it faulty. The
Alhambra,
158

10. Where, on a dark night, a bark, close
hauled on her starboard tack, head-

ing S. W. by W., having proper lights
set, and making no change of her
course, was struck on her port side
by a steamer, which came from a di-
rection abaft the bark's beam:

Held, That, prima facie, the steamer
was in fault, and the burden was on
her of showing the contrary. The
Steamer Louisiana,
371

11. Where a steamer was running seven
and a half knots an hour, heading
W. by N. half N., having two men on
the lookout, an officer on the bridge,
and two men at the wheel, and a red
light suddenly came in sight, bearing
two points on the starboard bow,
and the helm was at once put hard
a-port, and her engines were slowed,
stopped, and backed, and the course
of the steamer changed a point, but
the officer finding that a collision was
inevitable, ordered the helm hard
a-starboard, with a view of lessening
its effects, but, before the order could
be obeyed, a collision took place with
a bark, the witnesses testifying that
the bark could not be seen sooner,
owing to the haziness of the night,
and the bark's lights being hid from
view by her screens, in the direction
from which the steamer approached:

Held, That it was sufficient to
show that the steamship was in fault,
that she was running seven and a
half knots an hour, on a coast where
vessels were numerous, in weather
so thick and hazy, that a red light,
which came suddenly into view, was
supposed by the officer in command
to be half a mile off, but was, in fact,
80 near, that though her engines
were immediately stopped and back-
ed, the collision occurred;

That a steamship, when approach-
ing another vessel so as to involve
risk of collision, must slacken her
speed, or, if necessary, stop and re-
verse; but it is a fault in her to
change her course, in ignorance of
the true course and position of the
other vessel;

That this steamship was in fault in
porting her helm in ignorance of the
course and position of the other ves-
sel, and that that fault contributed to
the collision;

That the bark was also in fault,
when she saw the steamship, as she
did, approaching in such a direction

12. Where a schooner, heading W.
S. W. on her starboard tack, run-
ning over from the Horseshoe shoal,
near Nantucket, toward the Cross-
Rip Light, was struck on her star-
board side by a steamer which had
come up, bound E., till near the
schooner, the steamer's helm having
been at once ported, when the
schooner was seen ahead, and kept so
till the collision occurred:

Held, That the steamer was in
fault in porting, whether it was done
willfully, or in ignorance of the
schooner's course, for, by that porting,
she followed up the schooner and
struck her;

That, on the evidence, the night
was light enough to have enabled the
steamer to discover the schooner
sooner than she did, if a good look
out had been kept, and, if it was not
light enough, the steamer was run-
ning at too great speed:

That the schooner had a light set,
and kept her course, and was not in
fault; and that the steamer was liable
for the collision. The Western Me-
tropolis,
399

W.,

13. Where a brig, sailing westward, at
night, and keeping her course, was
struck on her starboard quarter by
a steamer running S. by W.
at the rate of about seven or eight
knots an hour, the steamer having
kept a good lookout, and having, as
soon as the brig was seen, no light
being visible, stopped and backed her
engine, and having, as soon as the
course of the big was seen, put her
helm hard a starboard:

Held, That, on the evidence, the brig
did not have burning such a green
light as could be seen at the distance
of two miles, and that this fault con-
tributed to the collision;

That the burden was on the libel-
lants, the owners of the brig, to estab-
lish that the steamer was in fault;

That it was not shown that the
steamer could have seen the brig
sooner;

VOL. II.-37

14. Where a collision occurred after sun-
set between a steamer and a schooner,
and the schooner, though having no
lights, was seen from the steamer at a
distance variously estimated by her
witnesses as from three-quarters of a
mile to two miles, and the steamer
alleged as a defence that the schooner
changed her course, and it appeared
that, on seeing the alleged change of
the schooner's course, the steamer's
helm, which was then amidships, was
ported and kept hard a-port till the
collision, although the schooner was
then in such a position and so far off
that there was time for the steamer,
by a slight change of her helm to star-
board, to have avoided the collision:

15.

Held, That although the schooner
should have had her lights set, the ab-
sence of them did not contribute to
the collision;

That the schooner's course being
seen and known by the steamer, the
burden of proof was on the latter to
show that the schooner changed her
course at such a time that the steamer
could not keep out of her way;

That the porting of the steamer's
helm under the circumstances was the
cause of the collision, and was a fault.
The Queen,
533

There is no obligation on a steamer,
when there is danger of a collision
with a sailing vessel, to port rather
than to starboard her helm.

id.

Held, That the latter vessel was lia-
ble for the damage.
id:

18. Where a harbor master had, by for-
getfulness, assigned two vessels to the
same berth, and both came to the
place about the same time, and one,
in trying to get in, was swept down
by the. tide, away from the berth,
against a vessel lying at the next pier,
and the other, coming in properly and
finding the berth vacant, went into it,
it being charged that, in so doing, she
broke a line which the first vessel had
got out, and thus caused her to drift
down upon the vessel lying at the
next pier:

Held, That the second vessel was
not in fault in taking the berth, and,
on the facts, was not guilty of negli
gence in going in.

id.

19. No vessel can lay aside extraordi-
nary care, where the circumstances
are extraordinary, without making
herself liable for any damage that en-
sues in consequence. The Helen R.
Cooper and the R. L. Mabey, 67

20. Where a ship was being towed to
sea by a single tug, when floating ice
made the navigation difficult, and ran
into a vessel lying at a pier, which
she claimed was caused by the move-
ment of a ferry-boat in suddenly cross-
ing the bows of the tug and causing
her to stop, and thus causing the ship
to sheer:

Held, That as it appeared in evi-
dence, that if another tug had been
employed the ship could have been
controlled, the failure to adopt that
precaution was a fault which rendered
'her liable;

That the tug, having alleged ac's
of negligence on the part of the tow
as the cause of the collision, of which
she gave no evidence, must be held
liable also. She was negligent in at-
tempting to tow the ship alone, under
the circumstances;

That the fact, that before setting
out the tug exacted of the ship an
agreement to assume all the risk, can-
not relieve the tug from liability to
an innocent third party.

id.

21. Where a steamer, coming into New
York harbor in a fog, was anchored, by
the pilot in charge of her, about oppo-

site to the slip of a ferry, coming to
anchor there because the river was
full of vessels, and her position was
known to those on board of a boat
plying on such ferry, and she sounded
her whistle at proper intervals, and
rang a bell, and used all proper pre-
cautions to make her position known,
and, about nine o'clock the next
morning, the fog still continuing, she
was run into by such ferry-boat:

Held, That, on the evidence, it was
not a fault in the steamer, contribut-
ing to the collision, to anchor where
she did, and keep her anchorage dur-
ing the fog;

That the fact that the ferry-boat
collided, in a fog, with a vessel at
anchor, which used all proper pre-
cautions to give notice of her posi
tion, it being already known to the
ferry-boat that she was at anchor
there, was sufficient evidence that the
speed of the ferry-boat was too great,
there being no special circumstances
to justify her maintaining the speed
she did;

That the ferry-boat was, therefore,
liable for the damages. The D. S.
Gregory,

166

22. Where a vessel at anchor is struck by
one in motion, the presumption of law
is, that the collision is caused by the
negligence of the latter, unless the
former is anchored in an improper
place. The Beaver, 118; The Baltic,

452

23. Where a brig came into New York
harbor from sea, and anchored, in a
strong wind and heavy sea, about 400
feet to windward of another vessel
which was already at anchor, and
dropped but one anchor, and was left
without a sufficient watch on deck,
and, the wind and sea increasing, her
chain parted, and she drifted down
upon the other vessel, which had paid
out all the chain possible, to avoid her
as she drifted, and her other anchor
was not dropped till after she was
afoul of the other vessel:

Held, That the brig was in fault in
anchoring where she did, under the
circumstances, and in not having a
proper watch, and in not dropping a
second anchor when the wind and sea
increased; and that she was liable for
the damages. The Beaver, 118

24. Where a brig lying at anchor in the
East river, within the distance of six-
ty yards from a direct line between
the landing places of one of the ferries,
was run into by a ferry-boat in a fog
in the early morning, the ferry-boat
having previously made five trips on
the ferry that morning, on which
trips the light of the brig had been
seen, and she had been avoided, and,
on the trip in question, the ferry-boat,
after starting from her slip, slowed to
half speed, and ran on, looking for
the brig, and, not seeing her, stopped
her engine, and afterward started
ahead again, and, as soon as she got
way on her, shut off to half speed, and
ran so till she sighted the brig at a
distance of not over twenty yards,
but, not being able to stop in less
than thirty yards, was not then able
to avoid a collision:

Held, That the ferry-boat was in
fault in going at too great speed, and
that such fault contributed to the col-

lision;

That the brig was violating an or-
dinance of New York city in lying
where she was, and that such viola-
tion was a fault contributing to the
collision;

That, both vessels being in fault,
the damages must be apportioned.
The Baltic,

396

26. Where a vessel was lying at the end
of a pier which formed one side of a
ferry slip, with her stern projecting
six or eight feet into the slip, and a
ferry-boat coming into the slip was
carried by the tide against such ves-
sel:

Held, That the collision was not the
result of an inevitable accident, as the
ferry-boat might have gone further
away from the pier;

That, as the ferry-boat chose to at-
tempt to enter the slip, with the
other vessel in the position in which
she was, she must take the conse-
quences of the contingency to which
she exposed herself;

27. Where a steamship was coming
into Pier 37, in the East River, in the
harbor of New York, in tow of a tug,
and, by the order of the pilot of the
steamship, a movement of the tug was
made which caused the steamship to
swing against a schooner lying at the
end of Pier 39, so as to crush in a
canal boat which lay between the
schooner and the end of that pier:

Held, That it was the duty of the
steamship to come in at Pier 37 so as
to avoid touching the vessels at Pier
39, and that she was responsible for
the damage. The Nebraska,

CONSUL.

500

4. Certified list of creditors

for warrant,

5. Supplemental warrant, $2;

6. Certified copies schedules

canal boat, in Canada, to be carried
to New York, and was lost in a col-
lision on the Hudson River, the cur-
rency of the place of shipment being
shown to be United States gold coin,
and the cargo, in that coin, being
shown to be worth a certain number
of dollars:

Held, That the decree for damages
must be for that number of dollars;
That interest must be allowed at
the rate of six per cent. per annum.
id.

3. Where a ferry-boat was injured in a
collision, and was withdrawn for re-
pairs, her place being supplied by a
boat taken off from another ferry be-
longing to the libellants, whose place
was in its turn supplied by a spare
boat, but it was not shown that the in-
jured boat could have been chartered
for any sum for the time she was so
laid up, but proof was given of the
value of her use, based on her receipts
while running on the ferry:

Held, That the use of the ferry-boat
was valuable;

That the case of Williamson v. Bar-
rett (13 How. 112), holding that the
market value of a vessel is the crite-
rion of her value in collision cases, does
not apply where it appears that no
such thing as a market price exists;

That there being no market price,
a judgment as to her value, given by
men having experience upon the fer-
ries, founded upon their knowledge
of the business, is the natural way to
ascertain the loss. The Cayuga, 125

4. Where the owners of the ferry-boat
repaired her themselves, and charged,
in addition to the pay of the laborers,
an addition of twenty-five cents a day,
which was proved to be usually
charged for the use of tools and yard,
&c., and also made a charge for the
services of two men in superintending
the repairs:

Held, That these items were re-
coverable as part of the damages. id.

5. Where a vessel injured by collision,
was sold at auction, and afterward
repaired by the buyers: