The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective
Why has antitrust legislation not lived up to its promise of promoting free-market competition and protecting consumers? Assessing 100 years of antitrust policy in the United States, this book shows that while the antitrust laws claim to serve the public good, they are as vulnerable to the influence of special interest groups as are agricultural, welfare, or health care policies. Presenting classic studies and new empirical research, the authors explain how antitrust caters to self-serving business interests at the expense of the consumer.
The contributors are Peter Asch, George Bittlingmayer, Donald J. Boudreaux, Malcolm B. Coate, Louis De Alessi, Thomas J. DiLorenzo, B. Epsen Eckbo, Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Roger L. Faith, Richard S. Higgins, William E. Kovacic, Donald R. Leavens, William F. Long, Fred S. McChesney, Mike McDonald, Stephen Parker, Richard A. Posner, Paul H. Rubin, Richard Schramm, Joseph J. Seneca, William F. Shughart II, Jon Silverman, George J. Stigler, Robert D. Tollison, Charlie M. Weir, Peggy Wier, and Bruce Yandle.
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PublicChoice Theory and Antitrust Policy
Part One In Search of the PublicInterest Model of Antitrust
The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws 1966
A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement 1970
The Economic Determinants of Antitrust Activity
Part Two The Positive Economics of Antitrust Enforcement
Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?
The Employment Consequences of the Sherman
Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges
Monopolies and Mergers Commission Merger
Part Four Public Choice and the Origins of Antitrust
Antitrust before the Sherman Act
Part Five Retrospect and Prospect
The Unjoined Debate
List of Contributors
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abnormal returns agencies analysis anticompetitive antitrust activity Antitrust Division antitrust enforcement antitrust laws antitrust policy average behavior benefits Bittlingmayer Bork Bureau cartels challenge Chicago Clayton Act coefficient collusion Committee competition complaints concentration conclusion congressional consumers costs Court decision Department of Justice Econ economists efficiency empirical equation estimate evidence example explain favor Federal Trade Commission filed FTC's gains Gordon Tullock horizontal mergers hypothesis important increase indicates industry interest issue labor legislation manufacturing marginal marginal probability market share measure ment merger guidelines monopoly negative NIRA outcome output percent period political positive Posner predatory pricing price fixing production profit rate public-choice public-interest railroads regression regulation regulatory rent seeking reported rival firms Robert Tollison sample Senate Sherman Act Shughart significant Standard statistical Stigler stock prices supra note tion Tollison U.S. Steel unemployment United Unjustified variables vote welfare losses