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different sides attack the convoy at army. The siege must be raised; one and the same time. To further Moravia must be abandoned; marthe execution of this project, M.Daun shal Daun must have the honour of himself approached the Prussian ar- freeing his country, and driving my, and directed all his motions as away such an adversary as the King if he intended to give them battle. of Prussia, from a conquest deemed However, the King was too great certain; all was performed without a master in the game of generalship, a battle, by a series of the most re. which was now playing, to be defined and vigorous manoeuvres that ceived by this feint. He detached ever were put in practice. a considerable party under general Ziethen to support his convoy, which was already about 7000 strong. Be fore this detachment could come up, the convoy was attacked, but the Austrians were repulsed. But M. Daun, who provided for every thing, quickly reinforced his parties, who renewed the engagement the next day. They first suffered the head of the convoy to go unmolested; but as the centre was still embarrassed in a dangerous defile, they easily cut off the head from the rest, and then they attacked the centre with the greatest fury. The Prussians made as good a resistance as the nature of the ground would suffer. General Ziethen did every thing which could be expected from an accomplished of.

ficer;
but in the end they were en-
tirely routed; all the waggons in
that division were taken; the rear
was pushed back towards Troppau;
the head alone with great difficulty
arrived at the Prussian camp.

This was a fatal stroke, because it came at a time when it was im possible to repair it. The siege of Olmutz had been all along attended with great difficulties; and now the news which every day arrived, of the nearer and nearer approach of the Russians, called the King loudly to the defence of his own dominions. Already the Cossacks and Calmucks made incursions into Silesia, and by their ravages and cruelties, announced the approach of the great

When the King of Prussia saw that the unprosperous situation of his affairs obliged him retreat; he took a resolution, such as vic. tory inspires in others. He took advantage even of the excellent movement of M. Daun, by which that able general had advanced his quarters to Posnitz, and placed him. self so as to support Olmutz in the most effectual manner; by this movement, however, he was ob liged to uncover the frontiers of Bohemia. The King of Prussia, whom nothing could escape, was sensible of this advantage; and therefore, instead of falling back upon Silesia, which step would im mediately have drawn the Austrian army into his dominions, he determined to retreat from one part of the enemy's territories into another. The day before the siege was raised the firing of the Prussians continued as brisk as ever, and shewed no sort of sign of an intention to depart; but in the night the whole army took the road to Bohemia in two columns, and gained an entire march upon the Austrians. So that notwithstanding the utmost efforts which the enemy could make to overtake and harass the King upon his march, he advanced into Bohemia with little molestation, seized upon a large magazine at Lieutomissel, defeated some corps of Austrians, who had attempted to disturb him in his progress, and

July 1.

arrived

arrived at Konigsgratz, one of the most important posts in Bohemia, with all his sick and wounded, with all his heavy baggage, all his heavy artillery, and military stores com. pleat. This place he possessed, after driving from it a body of 7000 Aus. trians who were entrenched there. He immediately laid this city, and several other districts, under contribution; but this plan not admitting any further operations on that side, he took no other advantage from that momentous post. He soon re. entered Silesia, and marched with the most amazing diligence to en. counter the Russians, who had at this time united their divided corps under Brown and Fermer, and fixed the long fluctuating plan of their opetions, by entering the New Marche

of Brandenburg, and laying siege to Custrin. The reduction of this place could leave them but a few days" march to Berlin; Count Dohna was not in a condition to oppose their progress; the King was still at a great distance. But it is necessary to break our narrative of his affairs, however interesting, to take a view of the operations of the armies on the Rhine. We leave the King of Prussia in full march to give one body of his enemies battle, after executing a retreat from the other, in a manner that did his military genius the greatest honour; so that, on the whole, it is difficult to say which gained the greatest glory, the King of Prussia by his retreat, or M. Daun by the measures which obliged him to it.

CHA P. X.

Allies pass the Rhine. Battle of Crevelt. Action at Sangershausen. Action at Meer. Allies repass the Rhine.

it

PRINCE FERDINAND had not in his power to cut off the retreat of the French over the Rhine; but he pressed them closely, and prepared himself to cross that river in pursuit of them. His design was to carry the war beyond the Maese, and thereby oblige the Prince de Soubise to abandon the enterprize he was preparing against Hesse Cassel. His highness executed the passage of June 1. the Rhine at Hevern with the corps immediately under his command; then he sent the bridge, with which he served him self so well, up the river to Rees: the rest of the troops passed there: the whole army were over before the 7th of June. The flattery of the last age saw with astonishment a passage of the Rhine by a French

monarch, unopposed, at the head of a mighty army; we saw that river passed by the enemies of France, in the presence of an army of 50,000 of that nation: it was an action which did not need the exaggerations of rhetoric.

The French army retired as the Prince advanced, and took an advantageous camp, which threatened to retard the operations of the allies: their right was under Rhineberg; but the Prince, by his well judged motions, turned their left flank to. wards the convent of Campe; by which the French found themselves obliged to quit their advantageous post, and to retire into Meurs: they still kept towards the Rhine. The Prince advanced on the side of the Maese.

It was evident, that whilst the French continued only to retire, it would prove impossible for them to hinder the allies from executing the plan they proposed; they there. fore thought it adviseable to change their countenance: they had fallen back as far as Nuys: they now returned on their steps, and advanced as far as Crevelt, within a few miles of Prince Ferdinand's camp. The Prince made the dispositions for a battle with his usual vigour and prudence: he carefully reconnoitred the situation of the enemy: he found that their right was at a village called Vischelon; their left extended towards Anrath, where it was covered with a wood: Crevelt, which was in the front of their right, was occupied by a party of their troops. His highness resolved upon three attacks. The first and real attack was on the flank of the enemies' left wing; the other two were designed to divert their attention, and prevent their succouring the object of his principal attack; for which purpose he recommended to his generals to make the best use of their heavy artillery, and not to advance too far, unless they were perfectly assured of the success of the main operation.

Having made these wise dispositions, and perfectly learned June 23. the best routes by which the enemy might be approached, his highness put himself at the head of the grenadiers of his right wing, and advanced on the side of Anrath in two columns. A cannonading, violent and well supported, opened the action. The Hanoverian artillery was greatly superior to that of the French; but though the French lost many men, they lost no ground in this way; and their position in the

wood made a close attack absolutely necessary. The hereditary Prince of Brunswick put himself at the head of the first line of foot, and with his usual spirit advanced with the whole front directly to the wood. Here a furious fire of small-arms commenced, which continued with out the smallest intermission for two hours and a half. All the Hanoverian battalions threw themselves into the wood. Two ditches, well lined with infantry, were opposed to their fury they were forced one after another. The enemy's battalions were pushed back; they were entirely broken, and fled out of the wood in a disorder which was irreparable. Their cavalry, who kept the best countenance possible, in spite of the terrible fire of the Hanove rian artillery, and in spite of the vigorous attempts of the Hanoverian horse, who had by this time found means to gain the plain, covered the retreat of their scattered infantry, and saved them from utter ruin. The right wing and the centre, though they suffered grievously by the cannonading, were no where broken, but retreated towards Nuys in the most perfect order.

Seven thousand of their best troops were killed, wounded, and taken prisoners; but there was nothing in this battle so grievous to France, and so affecting even to the enemy, as the fate of the Count de Gisors. This young nobleman, the only son of the Duke de Belleisle, not above twenty-five years of age, newly married to the heiress of an illustrious house, himself the last hope of a most noble family, was mortally wounded at the head of his regiment, which he brought up with the most heroic courage, and inspired by his example to make

incredible efforts. He had been educated with all the care an excellent father could bestow on a son of an uncommon genius, who was alone able to support the reputation of his family. To the purest morals he had united the politest manners; he had made a great proficiency in learning; he knew many branches of it, and loved all; he had seen every part of Europe, and read courts and nations with a discerning eye; and wanting nothing to fulfil all hope, and to make him a perfect and lasting ornament and support to his country, but a knowledge in the military art, he entered that course of glory and danger, and fell in his first campaign. The unhappy father and minister saw his private misfortunes keep pace with the public calamities, and the tears of his family mingled with those of

his country.

Prince Ferdinand gained a victory at Crevelt, which did the greatest honour to his military capacity and to the bravery of his troops. But it was a victory neither entire nor decisive. The French army on their own frontiers was quickly and strongly reinforced; so that they were not only in a condition in some sort to make head against the allies, but were enabled to detach a considerable reinforcement to the army of the Prince de Soubise on the other side of the Rhine.

Although the Prince had reason to imagine that he should not be able to keep his ground on this side of the Rhine for any considerable time, this did not hinder him from improving to the utmost the advantage he had obtained. Whilst the French, disabled by their late de. feat, were in no condition to oppose him, he passed the Rhine with a large detachment, and appeared on

the 28th of June before Dusseldorp, a city advantageously situated on the river, and belonging to the Elector Palatine. A severe bombardment obliged it to capitulate on the 7th of July. The garrison, consisting of 2000 men, marched out with the honours of war. Prince Ferdinand placed here three battalions of Hanoverians, and threw a bridge of boats across the river; by that means he multiplied his posts and communica tions on both sides of the Rhine; and threw a new, and no small impediment in the way of the French, to retard their progress, in case he should find himself compelled to retire. After this, the army of the allies and that of France, spent several days in making various marches and countermarches, as if they both proposed to bring on an action, to which however it does not appear that either party was very strongly inclined.

Prince Ferdinand still retained his hopes that the Prince of Ysenburgh, who commanded the Hessian troops, would find the Prince of Soubise employment for some time. He had originally laid his plan in such a manner, that by passing the Maese, and transferring the seat of war into the enemy's country, he might draw the French from the Rhine, and perhaps oblige the Prince of Soubise to come to the assistance of the main army under M. de Contades, who commanded in the room of Count Clermont, being now the fourth commander of the French troops since they entered Germany. But whilst Prince Ferdinand pleased himself with those hopes, and still continued to act as far as circumstances would admit in pursuance of this plan, he

received

received an account which disconcerted all his measures.

The Duke de Broglio, supported by the corps of the Prince de Soubise, with a much superior force, attacked and defeated the July 23. Hessian army of seven thousand men near Sangershausen. This opened to them the possession of the Weser. They might act in Westphalia on which side soever they pleased, and it was to be feared, that if they availed themselves of the advantages they had, they might be able to intercept the British troops. These troops having been landed at Embden, were now on their march under the command of the Duke of Marlborough to reinforce the allied army. The Prince, in this situation of affairs, had no option left but an engagement with the French army, or a retreat over the Rhine. The former was not easy to compass, as the French industriously declined a battle, and it became extremely dangerous to remain long in a position with the enemy's army on his left, and the strong fortress of Gueldre on his right. In this situation his subsistence became every day more difficult. To repass the Rhine, had its difficulties too; the roads which led to that river were rendered almost impassable by the heavy rains; the river itself was so swelled with them, that the bridge at Rees had been for some time useless.

These disagreeable circumstances of the allied ariny did not escape the penetration of Monsieur de Chevert, one of the ablest commanders among the French. He formed a plan upon them, which, if it had succeeded, must have put the allies into the greatest perplexity. This general had some

time before passed the Rhine, with an intention of making him self master of Dusseldorp, and he had prepared all things with great ability for that enterprize. The rains, unusually heavy for that season, and some other cross accidents, had frustrated his intentions. But perceiving that the same accidents which defeated his design, proved also unfavourable to the enemy, he resolved to turn his dis appointment into an advantage, and from the ruins of his first project to build another of yet greater importance. Baron Imhoff was posted to the right of the Rhine in a strong situation near Meer. He was to cover the bridge at Rees; to secure a considerable magazine; and to keep open communication between the English reinforcements and the main army. The plan of Monsieur Chevert was to dislodge Ima hoff, to burn the bridge at Rees, to make himself master of the magazine, and to render the junc tion of the English troops with the

Hanoverians impracticable. To execute this judicious scheme, he united several detachments from the garrison of Wesel, to a considerable corps which he in intended to have employed in the siege of Dusseldorp. The whole made near 12,000 men. The troops under Imhoff were but six battalions, and four squadorns, hardly 3000 in all.

When that general was apprized of the designs and motions of the French, he saw it was in vain to expect succours from the army of Prince Ferdinand. The swell of the river had rendered all relief impossible; all his hopes were therefore in his own genius and the bravery of his troops. He considered that though the

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