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Opinion of the Court.

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clarifying the permissible practice in such cases persuaded us to grant certiorari, limited to one question of procedure on which there was disagreement in the court below. Our order stated the issue for consideration:

“... The sole question for review is: Was the charge of contempt, as and when certified, one which the accusing judge was authorized under Rule 42 (a) ... to determine and punish himself; or was it one to be adjudged and punished under Rule 42 (b) only by a judge other than the accusing one and

after notice, hearing, and opportunity to defend ?” 9 The certificate of contempt fills sixty pages of our record and incorporates, by reference, the 13,000 pages of trial record. The certificate in full 10 and summary of relevant evidence have been reported below. Because our limited review does not require or permit reexamination of the facts, no purpose would be served by detailed recitals. It is relevant to the questions of law to observe that the behavior punished as a result of the Court of Appeals' judgment has these characteristics: It took place in the immediate presence of the trial judge; it consisted of breaches of decorum and disobedience in the presence of the jury of his orders and rulings upon the trial; the misconduct was professional in that it was that of lawyers, or of a layman acting as his own lawyer. addition, conviction is not based on an isolated instance of hasty contumacious speech or behavior, but upon a course of conduct long-continued in the face of warnings that it was regarded by the court as contemptuous. The nature of the deportment was not such as merely to offend personal sensitivities of the judge, but it prejudiced the expeditious, orderly and dispassionate conduct of the trial.

In

9342 U.S. 858.
10 182 F. 2d at 430–453.

Opinion of the Court.

343 U.S.

We have taken no issue as to the statute which confers power on a federal court to punish for contempt," but only as to the regularity of the procedure under Rule 42,12 designed to provide for the manner of exercising

11 18 U.S. C. $ 401, "Power of court," provides:

“A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as

“(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;

“(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;

“(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command."

18 U. S. C. $ 402, "Contempts constituting crimes," provides for criminal contempt prosecutions of acts which are in themselves criminal as well as contemptuous, but adds:

“This section shall not be construed to relate to contempts committed in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, nor to contempts committed in disobedience of any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command entered in any suit or action brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States, but the same, and all other cases of contempt not specifically embraced in this section may be punished in conformity to the prevailing usages at law."

12 Rule 42, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., "Criminal Contempt," reads:

“(a) SUMMARY DISPOSITION. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.

"(b) DISPOSITION UPON NOTICE AND HEARING. A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in

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Opinion of the Court.

row one.

that power. The issue we accepted for review is a nar

Petitioners do not deny that they might have been summarily punished for their conduct without hearing under Rule 42 (a) if the trial judge had acted at once upon occurrence of each incident. But it is contended that this power of summary punishment expired by reason of two circumstances: (1) that the trial judge awaited completion of the trial, at which time its progress could no longer be obstructed, and hence, it is said, summary action had become unnecessary; and (2) that he included in the certificate a charge that the contemptuous instances were the result of agreement between counsel which, if it existed, was not made in his presence. Therefore, it is argued that petitioners could not be convicted or sentenced except after notice, time for preparation of a defense, and hearing, probably before another judge, as provided in Rule 42 (b).

Rule 42 obviously was intended to make more explicit "the prevailing usages at law” by which the statute has authorized punishment of contempts. 18 U. S. C. SS 401, 402. No legislative history sheds light on this issue. Practice of District Judges has not been uniform when they have deemed resort to the power necessary.

A variety of questions concerning contempt powers, limitations

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which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment."

13 In Hallinan v. United States, 182 F. 2d 880, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952, defense counsel was summarily adjudged in contempt under Rule 42 (a) and sentenced to six months' imprisonment while the trial was still in progress. The trial judge's power to do so was sustained over the objection that he had delayed overnight and that part of the conduct specified was that of four and five days earlier. In MacInnis v. United States, 191 F. 2d 157, cert. denied this date, 342 U. S. 953,

Opinion of the Court.

343 U.S.

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and procedures have been considered by this Court, but none construed this Rule, which was promulgated by this Court in 1944 and became effective March 26, 1946. Cases prior to it grew out of facts so distinguishing that their decisions are of little value as precedents.

Summary punishment always, and rightly, is regarded with disfavor and, if imposed in passion or pettiness, brings discredit to a court as certainly as the conduct it penalizes. But the very practical reasons which have led every system of law to vest a contempt power in one who presides over judicial proceedings also are the reasons which account for it being made summary. Our criminal processes are adversary in nature and rely upon the selfinterest of the litigants and counsel for full and adequate development of their respective cases. The nature of the proceedings presupposes, or at least stimulates, zeal in the opposing lawyers. But their strife can pervert as well as aid the judicial process unless it is supervised and controlled by a neutral judge representing the overriding social interest in impartial justice and with power to curb both adversaries. The rights and immunities of accused persons would be exposed to serious and obvious abuse if the trial bench did not possess and frequently exert power to curb prejudicial and excessive zeal of prosecutors. The interests of society in the preservation of courtroom control by the judges are no more to be frustrated through unchecked improprieties by defenders.

defense counsel was adjudged in contempt for conduct the day before. Filing of the certificate of contempt was delayed more than three weeks, and it was announced that the fixing of the punishment would be deferred until the end of the trial. When the trial was concluded two months after the contempt, counsel was immediately sentenced to three months' imprisonment. The trial judge's power to do so was upheld.

14 Among them: Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289; Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517; Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33; Pendergast v. United States, 317 U. S. 412; In re Michael, 326 U. S. 224.

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Opinion of the Court.

Of course, it is the right of counsel for every litigant to press his claim, even if it appears farfetched and untenable, to obtain the court's considered ruling. Full enjoyment of that right, with due allowance for the heat of controversy, will be protected by appellate courts when infringed by trial courts. But if the ruling is adverse, it is not counsel's right to resist it or to insult the judgehis right is only respectfully to preserve his point for appeal. During a trial, lawyers must speak, each in his own time and within his allowed time, and with relevance and moderation. These are such obvious matters that we should not remind the bar of them were it not for the misconceptions manifest in this case.

The Rule in question contemplates that occasions may arise when the trial judge must immediately arrest any conduct of such nature that its continuance would break up a trial, so it gives him power to do so summarily. But the petitioners here contend that the Rule not only permits but requires its instant exercise, so that once the emergency has been survived punishment may no longer be summary but can only be administered by the alternative method allowed by Rule 42 (b). We think "summary” as used in this Rule does not refer to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but refers to a procedure which dispenses with the formality, delay and digression that would result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial. The purpose of that procedure is to inform the court of events not within its own knowledge. The Rule allows summary procedure only as to offenses within the knowledge of the judge because they occurred in his presence.

Reasons for permitting straightway exercise of summary power are not reasons for compelling or encourag

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