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Opinion of the Court.
Finally, in 1916, when Congress did revise the Articles of War so as to extend the jurisdiction of courts-martial to include civilian offenders in the status of petitioner, it expressly preserved to "military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals” all of their existing concurrent jurisdiction by adding a new Article which read in part as follows:
"Art. 15. Not EXCLUSIVE.—The provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial
time of war. That Act incidentally recognized a concurrent jurisdiction over such crimes in military commissions:
"Sec. 30. .. in time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, murder, assault and battery with an intent to kill, manslaughter . . . shall be punishable by the sentence of a general court-martial or military commission, when committed by persons who are in the military service of the United States, and subject to the articles of war; and the punishments for such offences shall never be less than those inflicted by the laws of the state, territory, or district in which they may have been committed.” (Emphasis supplied.) 12 Stat. 736.
In the codification published as the Revised Statutes of 1874, the incidental reference to military commissions was omitted. Article of War 58 at 234. Petitioner attaches substantial significance to the omission. It seems clear, however, that regardless of what effect, if any, may attach to that omission in its relation to the jurisdiction of military commissions over persons in the military service, it has no effect on the jurisdiction of military commissions over civilians not “in the military service.” This section of the Act of 1863 was enacted so as to place soldiers who committed certain nonmilitary crimes under the jurisdiction of military courts. See Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U. S. 376. The section did not relate to the jurisdiction of courts or commissions over civilians not in the military service. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 988, 1256, 1377, 1384 (1863). For discussion of the phrase "in the military service" as used in Articles 58 and 60, see Gen. Crowder's testimony. S. Rep. No. 229, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 104.
Opinion of the Court.
shall not be construed as depriving military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by the law of war may be lawfully triable by such military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals.” 39 Stat. 651, 652, 653.97 Article 15 thus forestalled precisely the contention now being made by petitioner. That contention is that certain provisions, added in 1916 by Articles 2 and 12 extending the jurisdiction of courts-martial over civilian offenders and over certain nonmilitary offenses, auto
17 In 1920, Article of War 15 was reenacted with the addition of "by statute or” before the words “by the law of war.” 41 Stat. 790, 10 U. S. C. § 1486. It was in that form in 1949 and 1950. It was again reenacted May 5, 1950, as the present Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, effective May 31, 1951. 64 Stat. 115, 145, 50 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 581. The hearings, in 1949, on the latter legislation are of some significance here. They disclosed that the United States Military Government Courts in Germany were then exercising, in the occupied territory, criminal jurisdiction over United States civilians accompanying the Armed Forces. Attention even was called to the recent case of Wilma B. Ybarbo. Like petitioner in the instant case, she was a civilian dependent wife of a member of the United States Armed Forces in Germany, charged with the murder of her husband in violation of the German Criminal Code. She was convicted by the United States Military Government Court for the Third Judicial District. The Court of Appeals of the United States Military Government Courts, March 14, 1949, upheld her conviction, on a lesser charge, and sentenced her to five years' imprisonment. In its opinion, the latter court reviewed the basis for its jurisdiction. United States Military Government v. Ybarbo, 1 U. S. M. G. Court of Appeals 207. See also, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services on H. R. 2498, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 876, 975, 1061. With this practice before them, the Committees of both Houses of Congress recommended the reenactment of Article of War 15 as Article 21 of the new code. They said, “This article preserves existing Army and Air Force law which gives concurrent jurisdiction to military tribunals other than courts martial.” S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 13; H. R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 17.
Opinion of the Court.
matically deprived military commissions and other military tribunals of whatever existing jurisdiction they then had over such offenders and offenses. Articles 2 and 12, together, extended the jurisdiction of courts-martial so as to include "all persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States ... The 1916 Act also increased the nonmilitary offenses for which civilian offenders could be tried by courts-martial.19 Article 15, however, completely disposes of that contention. It states unequivocally that Congress has not deprived such commissions or tribunals of the existing jurisdiction which they had over such offenders and offenses as of August 29, 1916. 39 Stat. 653, 670. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1.
18 The 1916 Act substituted, for Article 63 (see note 15, supra), a new Article 12 which provided that "General courts-martial shall have power to try any person subject to military law for any crime or offense made punishable by these articles, and any other person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals: (Emphasis supplied.) 39 Stat. 652, 41 Stat. 789, 62 Stat. 629, 10 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1483. A new Article 2 then defined “any person subject to military law” so as to include
“(d) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and in time of war all such retainers and persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States in the field, both within and without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, though not otherwise subject to these articles;
(Emphasis supplied.) 39 Stat. 651, 41 Stat. 787, 10 U. S. C. § 1473 (d).
19 In 1916, new Articles 92 and 93 expanded the jurisdiction of courts-martial over murder and certain other nonmilitary crimes so as to cover their commission by any “person subject to military law.” That phrase, through Article 2, included civilians in the status of petitioner. See note 18, supra. For Articles 92 and 93, see 39 Stat. 664, 41 Stat. 805, 62 Stat. 640, 10 U.S. C. (Supp. IV) $$ 1564, 1565. See note 16, supra, for the substance of Article 30 of the Articles of War of 1863 and of Article 58 of the Articles of War of 1874.
Opinion of the Court.
The legislative history strengthens the Government's position. During the consideration by Congress of the proposed Articles of War, in 1916, Judge Advocate General of the Army Crowder sponsored Article 15 and the authoritative nature of his testimony has been recognized by this Court. In re Yamashita, supra, at 19 note, 67-71. Before the Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs he said:
“Article 15 is new. We have included in article 2 as subject to military law a number of persons who are also subject to trial by military commission. A military commission is our common-law war court. It has no statutory existence, though it is recognized by statute law. As long as the articles embraced them in the designation ‘persons subject to military law,' and provided that they might be tried by courtmartial, I was afraid that, having made a special provision for their trial by court-martial, it might be held that the provision operated to exclude trials by military commission and other war courts; so this new article was introduced: ....
“It just saves to these war courts the jurisdiction they now have and makes it a concurrent jurisdiction with courts-martial, so that the military commander in the field in time of war will be at liberty to employ either form of court that happens to be convenient.” S. Rep. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 40.20
20 In explaining like provisions to the House Committee on Military Affairs in 1912, General Crowder previously had said:
"The next article, No. 15, is entirely new, and the reasons for its insertion in the code are these: In our War with Mexico two war courts were brought into existence by orders of Gen. Scott, viz, the military commission and the council of war. By the military commission Gen. Scott tried cases cognizable in time of peace by civil courts, and by the council of war he tried offenses against the laws of war.
The council of war did not survive the Mexican War period, and in our subsequent wars its jurisdiction has been taken over by the Opinion of the Court.
The concurrent jurisdiction thus preserved is that which "by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.” (Emphasis supplied.) 39 Stat. 653, 41 Stat. 790, 10 U. S. C. $ 1486. The "law of war" in that connection includes at least that part of the law of nations which defines the powers and duties of belligerent powers occupying enemy territory pending the establishment of
military commission, which during the Civil War period tried more than 2,000 cases. While the military commission has not been formally authorized by statute, its jurisdiction as a war court has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. It is an institution of the greatest importance in a period of war and should be preserved. In the new code the jurisdiction of courts-martial has been somewhat amplified by the introduction of the phrase 'Persons subject to military law.' There will be more instances in the future than in the past when the jurisdiction of courts-martial will overlap that of the war courts, and the question would arise whether Congress having vested jurisdiction by statute the common law of war jurisdiction was not ousted. I wish to make it perfectly plain by the new article that in such cases the jurisdiction of the war court is concurrent.
“... I was influenced to propose the article  largely, perhaps, by experience during our second intervention in Cuba. It was not very long after that intervention had been inaugurated until two soldiers were charged with homicide of some natives. There was no civil court of the United States having jurisdiction. Plainly the court-martial could not try them, as the condition was not war. There were two courses open: First, to surrender them for trial before a Cuban court ... the second course was to utilize the extraordinary authority which inhered in the office of the provisional governor and which extended to the making of laws, to promulgate a special decree creating a provisional court for the trial of these men. This second course was followed, and the accused soldiers were tried by a court composed of officers of the Army, which administered the provisions of the Spanish criminal code. Should we be confronted again with the necessity of intervention, that situation is likely to repeat itself.” S. Rep. No. 229, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 53, 98-99.