its turn became a sufferer; and that each class applied to this House for relief. We all remember what the summer of 1817 was. And any hon. gentleman who will take the trouble of turning back to the journals of this House, will see with what hundreds of petitions our table was loaded, in the years 1819, 1820, and 1821, when the agricultural interest was suffering from the extraordinary fluctuation of prices. The extreme difference of prices during the period for which this system was in operation, that is, from 1815 to 1822, was no less than this-on the one hand, 112s. per quarter (this was in the year 1817)--on the other hand, 38s. (this was in the year 1822), a fluctuation being no less then seventy-four shillings per quarter!-Corrected Report of the Speech delivered by the Right Hon. G. Canning, &c. &c. on the Corn Laws. 1827. pp. 14 to 18.

Now the prices in the period referred to by Mr. Canning were the following, taking the highest week of each month; which highest price it is necessary to take, in order to show the operation of the proposed plan, which rests on weekly averages:—

It is plain from this enumeration of prices, that if, during this period, instead of the six-weeks' averages and the absolute prohibitiontill prices reached 808. (then "the assumed point of protection,") a scale of duties had existed, by which the importation would have been made profitable whenever the price exceeded that sum ; the only difference would have been, that the ports would have been practically open in August, September, and October, 1816; in November and December, 1817; and in January, 1818-when, as Mr. Canning tells us, they were shut; and shut in January and half of February, 1819, when Mr. Canning tells us they were open.

Now that the effect of the closing of the ports during those months could not have been material, a very little reflection suffices to show. As to the first period, Mr. Canning attributes importance, not to the three months themselves, but to the circumstance, that after these three months had elapsed, the navigation of the Baltic was impeded by the season. Now is it possible to conceive that, when it was well known in August that the crop was most defective, and with the certainty that the ports would be opened in November, duty free; the merchants, whose business it is to attend to the state of the demand, and who do not require to be told that the Baltic freezes in winter, did not bring corn to the warehouses of this country for the winter supply, almost as readily as if the ports had been actually open? Besides,

what is wanted when a crop fails, is not corn for immediate consumption; (for the failure must be dreadful indeed, if it leave not a half-year's supply,) but for the few months preceding the harvest. And in illustration of this, we see that the price was much higher in June 1817, long after the supply from the Baltic had commenced, than in December 1816, when it was for a time stopped. It is evident too, that if, no matter how, prices had been lower in the autumn of 1816, and the consumption had consequently been greater than it actually was, the scarcity would have been still greater in the spring of 1817, than in spite of all the foreign supply it was found to be.

As to the second period, Mr. Canning himself lays no stress on it; and it is apparently as clear to him as it must be to any one else, that the temporary closing of the ports was then of no consequence.

As to the third period, the facts amount to this, that the ports were open for about six weeks, when the scale of duties would have excluded imports. But that the imports in that short time could not have much affected prices, is proved by the fact, that in the two months after, the price was only 28. and for the whole year only 78. below the assumed point of protection."

We have here taken for granted, that the effect of the scale of duties would have been, to have permitted importation whenever the average was above " the assumed point of protection ;" and in quantities sufficient to bring the price constantly down towards this point. But if we suppose that it would have shackled and lessened importation when the prices were thus high, the evil of dearth, which Mr. Canning justly complains of, would have been felt in a still greater and indeed intolerable degree, in 1816, 1817, and 1818, "when the introduction of foreign grain was loudly called for;" and one class of the community would have been a greater sufferer than it was, without rescuing the other from the evils which in its turn it fell under.

From February 1819, the ports were closed under the law of 1815. They would have been but shut under the new plan. If we have proved that the new plan could have had no operation differing from the old in time of dearth, unless, perhaps, for the worse, it could have had no operation in any degree differing from it in the time of low prices which followed.

The alteration of the assumed point of protection is certainly of importance; but this alteration might have been as well made by a simple modification of the old law. Beyond this alteration all is pretence and deception; probably unintentional, but not the less pernicious; as the farmer is led to believe that the new measure is different from that of which he has experienced the evils, and against which his experience, in the want of some better guard, furnished him with some sort of security.

The adoption by the ministers of such a plan as that which we have described, with the experience before them of the effects of a scheme nearly similar to it, (the mischief of which they did not attempt to under-rate,) is an example of a kind of compromise by no means uncommon in our legislation, though it is seldom that an opportunity occurs of effecting it on so important a subject as the trade in grain. After the premises are admitted which should lead to the adoption of

one line of policy, that concession is followed up by the adoption of measures directly opposed to it. It seems as if both parties were to be satisfied by this false logic in politics, the reason being conceded to one side, the law to the other.

In the whole of Mr. Canning's speech there was not the least attempt to define with distinctness the objects that were to be aimed at in a law to regulate the trade in grain, or even to ascertain what circumstances rendered any artificial regulation on the subject necessary. After two years' preparation and pretension, it was surely proper that the ministers should tell what they thought on these points. What cause has given rise to the difference of the price of grain in this and other countries? Is it the greater expense of cultivation, in consequence of the inferior quality of the soil to which we are obliged to have recourse, or of the greater burthen of taxes thrown upon the cultivators, or both these circumstances combined? or is it the difference of the value of money here and in the countries of the continent of Europe? and what causes have given rise to this difference?

It is not from idle curiosity that we should desire a minister to give us information on these subjects. Unless he has made up his mind upon them, he is not competent to propose a plan with rational confidence; for it is on the judgment which he forms on them, that the objects which he has to aim at, ought to be determined.

If, for instance, the cause of the dearth of corn in this country be the poverty of the soil to which we are driven to have recourse, the extent of tillage is a serious injury to the nation, and a waste of national wealth, which only some clear and countervailing advantage should induce us to continue, and which, in the absence of that advantage, we should seek to diminish as rapidly as possible.

If, on the other hand, the cause of the dearth be the difference of the value of money, in this and other countries, as some contend; and if that difference arise from the system of restrictions, by which the import of all commodities, except gold and silver, has been impeded, it might happen that a free importation of grain might lead to injury to the growers, and a diminution of the cultivation at home, without any permanent benefit to the country, and even, perhaps, with some injury to them from a change in the value of the currency. But whether he and his colleagues had formed any, or what opinions on these points, Mr. Canning has not given us the least room to conjecture.

The same want of clearness in investigation, and we had almost said of sense, is apparent in the talk about equalization of prices. The fluctuation of the prices of grain, are without discrimination talked of as evils which it is the object of a legislation to remove by artificial means, instead of being (what they in a great measure are) the natural and necessary accompaniments of the uncertainty of produce, with which all a wise legislator can do is to avoid to aggravate them.

If it be supposed necessary, for the sake of the agriculturists, to keep grain at a higher average price here than on the continent, we cannot hope, in this artificial state of things, to attain greater steadiness than would exist under a free trade, and we have seen in the examination of the effects of the present law, and of the new plan, that

the result of both of these attempts to obtain a steady average, is to create gluts which the farmer cannot get rid of without a depression of price (below that which he is taught to consider as the average), out of proportion to any fall which could take place, if the price of grain were allowed to equalize itself by a free commerce.

But if Mr. Canning considered what the object which might legitimately be aimed at was, viz. the same degree of steadiness which exists under a free trade, he would find that it was produced by impor tation in years of scarcity, from countries where the scarcity was less, and by importation in years of abundance, to countries where the abundance was less; and that every plan which should admit of relief to the consumer in one year, should admit of relief to the grower in another. This is the only equalization of prices not inconsistent with remuneration to the grower.

This degree of equalization can be only effected by imposing a fixed duty on importation equivalent to the difference which it is desired to maintain, between the price of grain in this country and on the continent, permitting importation at all times, subject to the payment of this duty, and by giving a bounty to the same amount on the exportation of British grain-permitting exportation at all times, aided by this bounty. Let us suppose this duty and bounty to amount, each of them, to 158., the growers of British corn has an advantage of 158. over the foreign grower, as well abroad as at home; and, with the exception of this difference, which, upon the supposition, it is desirable to maintain, the trade is perfectly free, and the commerce in grain goes on as if no artificial regulation existed.

It is possible, that the short-sightedness, alarm, and avidity of the landholders, may have contributed to prevent the execution of some such plan as this-because they have desired to grasp at so high a duty, that the grant of a bounty on exportation equal to it, would appear monstrous. They have preferred to be deluded with the prospect of a monopoly-while they obtain, in reality, a monopoly which is to be broken in upon whenever its continuance could be useful to them; and to be secure only, when the glut at home renders the absence of foreign competition of little consequence.

We are anxious, in conclusion, to preserve a few more of Mr. Canning's words. Very nearly the same prediction was uttered as to the probable effect of the law of 1815, by one of his colleagues, who certainly cannot be reckoned among the prophets. If the prophecy of Mr. Canning be fulfilled, he will have an indisputable claim to the character of inspiration, for his judgment is certainly not founded either on reason or experience.

"I think this project will tend to equalize the prices, and keep that equalization of prices steady. The market will indeed assume such a steadiness, that, instead of a fluctuation between one hundred and twelve shillings at one time, and thirty-eight shillings at another, the vibrations will probably be found to be limited within the small circle of from about fifty-five shillings to about sixty-five shillings."

SIR WALTER SCOTT AND THE WAVERLY NOVELS.

WHEN Sir Walter Scott at a public dinner lately declared, apropos to nothing, that he was the man who had so long concealed his features under the mask of the author of Waverly, all the world stared, not so much at the unexpectedness of the disclosure, for it was virtually well known before, but that the declaration should be made at that particular moment, when there appeared no reason for exploding the quasi secret. A document we have lately seen, however, explains the circumstance, and puts to flight many sage conjectures. The unfortunate position of the affairs of Constable and Co. and of Ballantyne and Co. with the latter of which firms Sir Walter Scott was connected, has rendered it necessary that their accounts should not only be looked into, but exposed to the creditors. The transactions recorded there, show explicitly enough who was the author of Waverly ;-we not only find Sir Walter Scott receives payment for these works, but we find him stipulating for the purchase-money of works then unconceived, and of which he is hitherto undelivered. We find him, moreover, not only yielding up every stiver or its worth which he could command, but actually pledging future labours akin to former ones, for the liquidation of his debts. These and a variety of other particulars are to be found in the excerpts of the sederunt book of the meetings of Messrs. Ballantyne's creditors, a copy of which has lately been in private circulation. Hence the sudden, and, it must be added, rather awkward avowal of the authorship on the part of Sir Walter. As he was well aware that the circumstances would soon make their way through the press, he determined to catch at some little eclat, while yet there was time-some little credit for disclosing that himself, which all the world were soon to learn from others.

These are items from the accounts.

VALUE OF SIR WALTER SCOTT'S LITERARY PROPERTY.

1. Copyright of published works, estimated at the rate obtained from Constable and Co. for similar works:

2. Eventual rights to works sold to Constable and Co. for which bonds to the extent of 7,800l. are granted, but for reasons above stated, no value can be rated in this state.t

3. Works in progress. As none of these are completed, no value put on them at present beyond what is before stated as due to Ballantyne

* This price is that given for the subsequent editions after the first of 10,000.

It is a condition of these bonds, that if they are not paid, the copyrights revert to the author; so that, in spite of the failure of the granters, it is supposed they will be paid.

This alludes to the Life of Napoleon.