Bitcoin: A Game-Theoretic AnalysisThe definitive guide to the game-theoretic and probabilistic underpinning for Bitcoin’s security model. The book begins with an overview of probability and game theory. Nakamoto Consensus is discussed in both practical and theoretical terms. This volume:
This book is intended for students or researchers wanting to engage in a serious conversation about the future viability of Bitcoin as a decentralized, censorship-resistant, peer-to-peer electronic cash system. |
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ASICs assume attack attempt backwards induction become Bitcoin Bitcoin mining block reward block subsidy blockchain blockspace bribe c₁ cartel CBMG centralization Charlie choose compliant strategy compute consider corporations cost counterobjection create decentralized default compliant determine difficulty adjustment double-spend e₁ economic majority equation event example exploit fee rate fee-undercutting function game theory hash hashpower hashrate hyperbitcoinization incentive larger longest chain market fragility hypothesis mempool Mildly compliant mining pool Mixed strategies Nakamoto consensus Nash bargaining Nash bargaining solution Nash equilibrium nation-state nations negotiation nodes Non-compliant nucleolus number of blocks offer option outcome output parties payments petty compliant miners Player possible probability probability space produce profit proof protocol random variable regime reorg risk Schelling point security budget selfish mining smart contracts soft fork solution concepts solve split store of value strategic miners Suppose takeover transactions undercutting UTXO valid winning coalition