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is so conducted as never to make a loss, will seldom make much profit. And sometimes these losses will be so great as to absorb a large portion of the profits of the year. The object of having a surplus fund is to provide for these contingencies, so that the usual dividend may be maintained. But when an occasion arises for making use of a portion of this fund, there is often what is called "a stormy meeting," and the shareholders walk away sulky and dissatisfied. This produces a bad effect on the minds of the directors. It is a great mistake to suppose that boards of directors are indifferent to the applauses or censures of their shareholders. As a general rule, the fact is lamentably the reverse. In some cases they have had so much dread of "the general meeting" that they could not muster courage enough to make honest reports. Had they done so in the first instance, their banks might have been saved from destruction.

Sometimes directors are in danger of being led astray by the admonitions and instructions of their shareholders.

A very prudent class of proprietors exhort the directors to practise the strictest economy. When rightly understood, this exhortation is worthy of the rounds of applause with which it is usually attended. But it is liable to be misunderstood. In banking, as in housewifery, the lowest priced article is not always the cheapest. The largest portion of the expenditure of a bank consists of salaries. Hence an exhortation to economy amounts to—“ Keep down the salaries of your officers;" and as the manager has the largest salary, he will most likely be the heaviest sufferer.

A more mischievous recommendation, when thus understood, can hardly be conceived. Next to having a dishonest manager, the greatest evil is to have one that is badly paid. If he is known to be poor, his advice will have less weight in the boardroom; the directors individually will treat him with less respect, his wealthy customers will not disclose to him their private affairs; the needy class, when refused discount, will insult him by threatening to complain to the directors, and his inferior officers will be less prompt in their obedience. But worse than all this will be the effect produced upon his own mind. He will not be, and he cannot be, so efficient a manager when badly paid, as he would be if he received a liberal remuneration. It is the besetting sin of men of business, that they never pay attention to MIND, though among no class are mental phenomena

more strikingly exhibited. The amount of his salary is the only tangible means by which a manager can judge how far his character and his services are appreciated. It is not the money alone, but the feelings, of which the money is an indication, that produces an effect on the mind. It is a law of our nature, that the kindness, liberality, and generosity of others will produce corresponding feelings in ourselves. And it is another law of our nature, that when the mind is under the influence of such feelings, it is capable of intellectual efforts of a higher order. But we forget; we were writing about pounds, shillings, and pence, and our pen has darted off into philosophy. We will now

return.

Sometimes the shareholders fly at higher game, and canvass the salaries of the directors. Such discussions are always unpleasant, as they are carried on in the presence of the parties interested. Among all the charges brought against the directors and managers of banks that have failed, we have never met with the accusation that they received excessive salaries. We are tempted to fancy that, had their salaries been higher, the banks might not have failed. As far as salary is concerned, they certainly would have had a greater interest in preventing the failure. In some banks, however, directors have paid themselves for their services in ways far more costly to the bank. Take the following instance :—

"The qualification for directors of the Northern and Central Bank was 100 shares. It was, however, ascertained that each of the original directors took 1,000 shares, and that besides these, other shares were, at later dates, distributed among the directors and their near connexions. Instead of paying the calls to the bank, the directors and their nominees were severally debited with the amount in a private ledger, locked up, and the key deposited with the chief accountant. In addition to this, each director had a current account with the bank, and many of them had overdrawn their accounts to a very large amount. Nor was this all, for it further appeared that many of them were also indebted in large sums of money on notes of hand, which being placed to the account of securities, did not appear in the books as a debit against the directors. Upon combining these several items of debt, it was ascertained that there was no less than 290,000l. due by the directors, and that there was near 14,000. due by the managers and clerks."

It is not creditable to any bank to receive the services of its directors as a matter of charity. Nor is it wise. A director who is paid for his services may justly be called to account for

neglect of duty.

In this case, too, he cannot expect payment in any other way. In his transactions with the bank he is then on the same footing as any other customer. It has been said, that the directors are such honourable men that they will attend to their duty as strictly if badly paid as if liberally paid. If so they ought to be liberally paid, as it is very desirable that such honourable men should be most closely attached to the bank. But we doubt the fact. In matters of almsgiving, men will give only what they can conveniently spare. If a director is to give his time for nothing, he will give only that portion of his time which he cannot more profitably or more agreeably employ elsewhere. In matters of business, men will apportion their services according to the return they receive for them. There is no way of securing constant punctuality of attendance on the part of directors, but by paying them liberally for that attendance. In some cases where payment has not been given, or given only to the managing directors, it is said that the government of the bank has fallen into the hands of a few persons, whose punctuality of attendance has been almost their only banking virtue. But the main advantage of liberal payment is its effect upon the minds of the directors. Every honourable man will attend to his duty with alacrity and energy, and will even make extra exertions for the benefit of the bank, when he finds that his services are handsomely and liberally appreciated.

We need hardly say, that the faults we have pointed out in the administration or constitution of joint-stock banks are by no means inherent in the system. They are accidental circumstances, arising from its establishment in a new country, by parties who had no previous opportunity of understanding its principles. The system is no longer new-its principles are now well understood-and it may reasonably be expected that the calamities of the past will never recur.

SECTION XII.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OFFICE.

In this Section we shall consider the following topics:-
I. The Arrangement of the Office.

II. The Selection and Appointment of the Clerks.
III. The proper Distribution of their Duties.

IV. The Amount of their Salaries.

V. The System of Promotion.

VI. The Rules of Discipline.

VII. The Training of Clerks for higher Offices.

I. The arrangement of the Office.

The proper situation of a bank is a matter of some importance. It should be situated in what is deemed the most respectable part of the town. If it be placed in an inferior locality, approachable only by narrow and disagreeable streets, and surrounded by buildings the seats of smoky and dirty trades, it is not likely to be so much frequented, nor to acquire so large a business, as though it were more pleasantly situated. Another point to be observed is, that the bank itself should be a handsome building. The necessary expenditure for this purpose is no sin against economy. It is an outlay of capital to be repaid by the profits of the business that will thus be acquired. A portion of the building will probably be set apart for the private residence of the manager, or of some other officer of the establishment. It is desirable that this portion should be entirely separated from the office. The communication should be only by a single door, of which the manager should keep the key. The building should be so constructed that what is going on in the private house, whether in the kitchen, or the nursery, or the drawing-room, should not be heard in the bank. The office being thus isolated, must then be fitted up in the way that will most effectually promote the end in view. And here are three points to be considered-space, light, and ventilation.

A chief consideration is space. A banker should take care that his clerks have room enough to do their work comfortably. Every accountant knows that he can often work faster if he can have two or more books open at the same time; but if his space is so confined that he must shut up one book, and put it

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away, before he can use another, he will get on more slowly. The cashiers, too, will be much impeded if they are obliged to stand too close to each other; and the public will be huddled together, and will often count incorrectly the money given to them, and thus take up the cashiers' time to put them right. Want of space will necessarily occasion errors, from the con-. fusion it produces, and from one clerk being liable to interruption from the noise or vicinity of the others. A banker should therefore take care that his office is large enough for his business; and that it will admit of being enlarged in case his business should increase. Ample space is also conducive to the health of the clerks, as there will be more air to breathe, and the atmosphere is less likely to become polluted by the burning of lamps and candles.

Another consideration is light. It is well known in every London bank, that fewer mistakes are made by the clerks in summer than in winter. Abundance of light prevents mistakes, and saves all the time that would be employed in the discovery of errors. Light is also of great importance to the cashiers in detecting forged signatures and bad or counterfeit money. Thieves are also less likely to attempt their robberies in a light office than in a dark one. Faint or illegible handwriting can be more easily read, and hence mistakes are less likely to occur. The clerks, too, perform their duties with more quickness and cheerfulness. The gloominess of an office throws a gloom over the mind; but "light is sweet, and a pleasant thing it is for the eyes to behold the sun."

The lightest part of the office should be devoted to the clerks. We have observed sometimes a violation of this principle. The entrance door has been placed in the middle of the front, with a window on each side, and the counter thrown across the room, so that the lightest part of the office has been given to the public. It is better that the entrance be placed at the right or the left corner, and the counter be made to run from the window to the opposite wall. The light will thus fall lengthwise on the counter, and the space behind the counter will be occupied by the clerks.

Ventilation.-Volumes have been written by medical men upon the advantages of fresh air, and on the unwholesome atmosphere of crowded cities. If the air that circulates in the streets of towns and cities is impure, what must be the state of

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