In such cases, the bankers always pay the value of the note on receiving a respectable indemnity.

Bankers may be compelled to pay whole notes that have been lost or stolen, provided the holder has given actual value for them.

The stamp duty on country notes is as follows:

Country banks are allowed to compound for the stamp duties on their notes, at the rate of three shillings and sixpence per cent. upon the half-yearly amount in circulation, and to include, on the same terms, their bills drawn on London at twenty-one days after date. But whether a country banker compounds for the stamp duties or not, he must make a return to the Government of the amount of his notes in circulation every Saturday night. These returns are consolidated, and the result published in the London Gazette.

I am not aware that we have any authentic details of the rise and progress of country banking in England. It is generally understood that very few country banks existed previous to the American war-that they rapidly increased after the termination of that war-that they received a severe check in the year 1793, when twenty-two became bankrupt, and that they increased with wonderful rapidity after the passing of the Bank Restriction Act. Since the year 1808 every bank that issues notes has been compelled to take out an annual licence-and since 1804, the notes have been subject to a stamp duty. This duty was increased in 1808, and again in 1815.

In the year 1775 bankers were prohibited by Act of Parliament to issue notes of a less amount than 20s. And in 1777 they were prohibited to issue notes of a less amount than 57. But after the passing of the Bank Restriction Act in 1797, the last restriction was removed, and the country banks commenced issuing notes of 17. and 27. And in 1822 the permission to issue such notes was continued until the expiration of the Bank

Charter in 1833. But after the memorable panic of 1825, the Government refused to issue any more stamps for notes under 57., and it was enacted that all such notes already stamped should cease to be issued by the bankers after the

year 1829. The speculations that preceded the panic of 1825 were attributed by the Government of the day to a wild spirit of speculation fostered by the country banks. To guard against the recurrence of similar evils, not only were notes under 51. abolished, but two other measures were introduced. Banks of issue, consisting of more than six partners, were permitted to be formed at a greater distance than sixty-five miles from London; and the Bank of England was induced to open branches in the provinces.

And here it will be proper to notice a peculiarity in the county of Lancaster, and particularly in Manchester and Liverpool. In these places there were no country notes, and but a small proportion of Bank of England notes. The circulation consisted mainly of bills of exchange, which passed from hand to hand like bank notes, having the endorsement of all the parties through whose hands they had passed. In Liverpool large notes were required to pay the duties at the Custom House; and in Manchester small notes were required to pay wages. These were obtained from the Bank of England in London: but the transactions between manufacturers and dealers were transacted by bills of exchange; and as these bills were all made payable in London, bank notes were not required in Manchester and Liverpool, even for the payment of these bills.

The measures adopted by the Legislature in the year 1826 led to the establishment of branches of the Bank of England in Manchester and Liverpool. From this period the circulation of bills of exchange declined, and was superseded by Bank of England notes. This was accelerated by the circumstance that the joint-stock banks formed in these places did not issue their own notes, but those of the Bank of England. This establishment had offered to discount for the jointstock banks at 1 per cent, less than they charged to the public, and the joint-stock banks thought it more for their interest to obtain the notes of the Bank of England on these terms than to issue notes of their own. The circulation of the country now consisted of notes of the branches of the Bank

of England, notes of the joint-stock banks, and notes of the private bankers; and as many of the weak private banks had ceased to exist, and as others had merged into jointstock banks, and as all notes under 57. were abolished, it was supposed that the country had now obtained the advantage of a secure circulation.

But in the latter end of the year 1836 another panic arrived, when it was discovered that the country circulation was again at fault. But the charge now was, not that it was unsafe, but that it was excessive; and this charge of having issued to excess was more especially directed against the joint-stock banks.

Here it may be observed, that in the panic of 1825 the amount of country notes in circulation was unknown. No returns at that time were made to the Government, and the amount of notes in circulation could only be calculated, and that very imperfectly, from the number of stamps, of different denominations, issued from the Stamp Office. But in the year 1833, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Althorp, obtained an Act (3 & 4 William IV. c. 83) which required all banks issuing promissory notes to make returns to the Stamp Office of the average amounts of notes in circulation in the quarters ending the first day of January, April, July, and October in each year. The quarterly average was to be formed from the amount in circulation at the end of each week. These quarterly returns were afterwards published in the London Gazette.

From these returns it was evident that the country circulation had increased by the beginning of the year 1836; and as a general spirit of speculation prevailed at the same time, it was inferred that the country circulation was the cause of this speculation; and as by the end of the year the speculations had ended in panic, the country circulation was the cause of this panic.

Another panic occurred at the end of the year 1839, and here, again, blame was cast on the country notes. But the complaint now was not that the country circulation was unsafe or excessive, but that it was ill-regulated. An opinion had been adopted by some distinguished political economists that the country circulation, as well as that of the Bank of England, ought to correspond at all times with the amount of gold in the Bank of England. It is true that the circulation of the Bank of England did not fluctuate in exact accordance with this amount of gold; but the country circulation did not correspond

even with that of the Bank of England. And as the fluctuations in the country circulation did not correspond with the fluctuations either of the gold of the Bank of England or with the notes of the Bank of England, it was assumed that the country circulation was ill-regulated; and, being ill-regulated, it was assumed to be the cause, or at least one cause, of the panic that occurred at the end of the year 1839.

To examine into the truth of these opinions, a Committee of the House of Commons was appointed in the year 1840, to consider the state of the law with reference to Banks of Issue. The Committee examined witnesses during the sessions of 1840 and 1841; but the only practical result was that an Act was passed requiring weekly returns of their circulation from every bank of issue.*

Before proceeding farther, it may be fair to state the replies which the country bankers at various times gave to these severe accusations.

In reply to the charge that the currency was unsafe, from the number of failures which occurred among the country banks of issue, they state in their memorial to Earl Grey, in the year 1833, "the number of London bankers that have failed is believed to be relatively greater, and the amount of their debts relatively larger, than that of country banks."

In reply to the charge that they had by an excessive issue of their notes promoted speculation, they state:

"All experience shows that great fluctuations have originated in the speculations of influential merchants, and never originated in the channels to which the issues of country bankers are confined; their source is in great mercantile cities, and they are promoted by the issues of the Bank of England. That this is the invariable course which fluctuations resulting in excess and derangement take, is proved by the evidence of Mr. Ward and others, before the Bank Charter Committee, and is fully explained by the speeches of the King's Ministers in the year 1826. The debts of a few speculative merchants who failed in a single year in the town of Liverpool, where country bankers' notes never circulated, amounted to between seven and eight millions sterling, and their bills were either lodged in the Bank of England for loans, or were current in all parts of the country, stimulating circulation and promoting excess."

* 4 & 5 Victoria, c. 50.

In reply to the charge that they had turned the foreign exchanges against this country, they reply:

"Your memorialists are prepared to prove that the issues of country bankers have less tendency to promote fluctuations in the country than those of the Bank of England; and that their effect in throwing the exchanges against the country is comparatively insignificant. The slightest attention to facts would indicate the truth of these positions. It has been established by parliamentary evidence that the issues of country bankers fluctuated much less between the years 1817 and 1826 than those of the Bank of England; and it is indisputable that adverse exchanges, which endanger the bank, always succeed great importations of foreign produce, and that they never can be occasioned by large exportations of domestic productions. Now, it is notorious that the circulation of country bankers acts almost exclusively in promoting these productions: and that, when it is in an extended state, the direct and proper influence, even of an alleged excess of that circulation, would be to provide the means of paying for the importations of foreign produce, without causing so great an export of gold as to derange and endanger the monetary system of the country."

In reply to the charge that they had not governed their issues of notes by the foreign exchanges, they reply that such system is not applicable to the nature of a local circulation.

"Then with respect to miners and manufacturers, any system which would bring them into immediate contact with the operation of the bank for regulating the foreign exchanges, without that protection and defence from those convulsive changes which the local circulation afford, would be a system pregnant with indescribable hazard."

The Laws of the Currency with reference to the Country Banks.-These are thus stated in the article previously quoted (p. 438), in the Foreign and Colonial Review: '

"It will readily occur to every reader, that the laws which regulate the circulation of these country banks must be different from those which regulate the London circulation of the Bank of England. They do not pay the public dividends; they cannot issue their notes in purchasing bullion, or Government stock, or Exchequer bills, as all these operations take place in London, where their notes do not circulate. They are also