may be joined in the same complaint, as failure to return a worker's papers, or refusal to give a testimonial or recommendation, so essential for re-employment. Employers occasionally enter suit for damages caused by a worker, or for failure to abide by his contract.

Procedure in these courts is very simple. Notice to the defendant is sent by mail or by the clerk of the court. If there is no appearance, a default judgment may be allowed. If both parties appear, the president attempts to settle the dispute forthwith. Should he fail, the case is set for trial and assessors familiar with the particular trade or business will hear the parties, and render their decision at once, or in any event within three days, which is final if less than $25 is involved. Lawyers are not permitted to practise in these courts. Local statutes regulate the procedure, but most disputes are settled immediately, the parties appearing voluntarily. In some jurisdictions there are no fees charged; in others the fee is fixed according to the amount involved. In Berlin if the demand does not exceed $5 the fee is 25 cents; from $5 to $12, 35 cents for every $25 additional the fee increases 75 cents, but never exceeds $7.50. About half the cases are for less than $5, and more than 90 per cent are under $25. It follows that the average fee is 35 cents for a case. Allowance is made to the winning party for loss of time and for witnesses, as the president may determine.

The most important public service rendered by these courts consists in formulating opinions and giving advice upon industrial questions for the benefit of the authorities in their respective districts. Local officers have the right to demand opinions for their guidance. For example, the chief of police may request the court's view as to industries and conditions which would allow him to make exceptions in relation to the Sunday rest law.

The decision of the industrial court is of special value in that it is the result of thorough discussion between employers and workers, presided over by an impartial third party. It is the duty of the president to be informed of labor and

trade conditions, and, if a strike or lockout is threatened, to cite the parties before the section having charge of the particular industry, to avoid trouble and to adjust the matters in dispute. It appears that workers are more anxious than employers to avail themselves of the industrial court as an arbitration board. In the German Empire in 1908 there were 140 applications, of these 136 came from the workers; and it is said that in Berlin "no case has ever occurred in which the workmen have refused to concur with the employers in a request for intervention." The court has been highly successful in settling disputes, and in preventing strikes. Of course, there is a difference of opinion as to the value of industrial courts; but the supporters and friends of this system declare that the law establishing these courts is "the Magna Charta of the German workman.' Jastrow in his Sozialpolitik und Verwaltungswissenschaft, Vol. 1, page 405, says: "The labor world has for the first time found an effective instrument for the prevention of strikes, wage reductions, and violations of labor contracts. There is no state institution to which the workmen cling with more love or with greater admiration."

There is no doubt that in a highly developed industrial nation these tribunals are of the utmost importance. If a carpenter has a dispute involving his employment or work, it is certainly more satisfactory to have his case submitted to a court composed of master carpenters and workers in that line than to call in a jury at haphazard, none of whom may have any knowledge of carpentry. In fact, these courts are composed of an impartial judge and a special jury selected from a certain trade or industry.

Statistics for 1908 show that in the German Empire 106,269 cases were brought by workers and 5,672 by employers, or in all about 112,000 cases, in one year. Nearly one half were settled and withdrawn; only 267 cases were pending for a longer period than three months. Out of that large number, 587 were appealed, or one case in about 200, which is certainly a remarkable record when it is remembered that the jurisdictional amount is unlimited.

Whether with us these courts would be acceptable or popular with the class of people they are especially designed to serve, is very doubtful. We dislike class distinction and class legislation. In England an attempt was made to establish such tribunals in 1824, but the act was abrogated; no practical results were obtained. Pennsylvania enacted a law in 1883 for courts to adjust labor disputes. Apparently the plan failed, for in 1893 the act was repealed.

However, it is desirable, in view of the severe criticism often heard of our judicial system, that we examine the methods of other countries. It required nearly a century to introduce and establish these industrial courts successfully in Germany,-a nation which would be more likely to succeed in imposing a new scheme upon its people than a republic.

Nearly everyone dislikes a radical change in governmental or business affairs. An illustration is the difficulty in amending constitutions, or even city charters, or in obtaining a general adop

tion of the meritorious metric system. Everyone would rather worry along with the old and tried than to submit to the inconvenience and uncertainty of a new plan, especially if it be exotic. Our industrial population is increasing rapidly.

Statesmen will have to solve many problems, but none is greater or more worthy than to provide a proper and speedy method of settling private disputes between employers and workers, and particularly to establish a tribunal that may also satisfactorily adjust labor troubles to avoid strikes and disturbances.

The ancient Emperor who boasted that he "found Rome of brick but left it of marble" conferred only a trifling boon upon humanity as compared with him who devises a successful plan to adjudicate private and public differences between employer and worker.

Fred H.Peterson

fashioned lawyer,

The lawyer that wrote with a quill,

A quill gently plucked from a goose or a gander,

And furtively jabbed in his ink jug to fill?

The old-fashioned lawyer whose quill was his weapon,

His weapon offensive, defensive as well, With which he assaulted his rival in battle,

From Dan to Beersheba, from Hebronwell,

the regions,

The regions above, where strife is unknown,

But with him he carries his old-fashioned weapon,

And clings to it fondly around the white throne.

Then rest to the soul of the old-fashioned lawyer,

And peace to his ashes that fill

An oblong in earth where no conflict or battle

E'er calls for the use of his quill.

J. Wilson Jones.

lem. This law creates an Industrial Commission of three members, and confers upon it several broad industrial powers having to do with the administration of the workmen's compensation law, with the enforcement of all labor laws, with the general investigation of labor questions, and the inspection and fixing of standards of safety. The law then imposes upon the Commission the general voluntary duty of promoting conciliation in industrial disputes. This is § 27, which reads as follows:

"The Commission shall do all in its power to promote the voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation of disputes between employers and employees, and to avoid the necessity of resorting to strikes, lockouts, boycotts, blacklists, discriminations, and legal proceedings in matters of employment."

ditions of employment with respect to wages or hours, or on account of the dispute do, or be concerned in doing, directly or indirectly, anything in the nature of a lockout or strike, or a suspension or discontinuance of work or employment; but the relationship of employer and employee shall continue uninterrupted by the dispute, or anything arising out of the dis

pute; but if either party uses this or any other provision of this act for the purpose of unjustly maintaining a given condition of affairs through delay, such party shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars."

Our law is in a large measure a copy of the Canadian act. Sections 56 and 57 of the Canadian act are substantially identical with §§ 29 and 30 of the Colorado law, except that the Canadian act applies only to public utilities, while the law seems to have a broader application; at least the Commission has so construed it, and has made it apply to every employer of four or more persons. It has been said that the state of Massachusetts has a law similar to the Canadian and Colorado law affecting industrial disputes, but an examination of that law shows several differences that must be considered. The Massachusetts law does not provide for compulsory investigation of industrial disputes, with the added feature of restraining either side from going on a strike or lockout during investigation; but it does contain the feature of the compulsory investigation to fix the blame as to who started the strike without just cause. In brief, the Colorado law operates in the following manner: The employees of a manufacturing plant desire a raise in wages, or Under the old system, shorter hours. they could or could not give notice to their employer, as they might desire. They could go on a strike without a warning, and they could be locked out

without any warning. There was no central body to appeal to, no one to investigate the dispute or find out the actual merits; there were charges and countercharges, rumors and accusations, and more or less chaos and anarchy generally; the plant tied up, the men idle and their families suffering, bitterness increasing every hour; importation of strike breakers, disorder, and often terrible consequences. This is not the history of every strike, but of many strikes. Under the operation of the Colorado law, the first step is for the employees to notify the employer of any change of wages or hours which they desire. This is made in writing, and a copy goes to the employer and to the Commission. The notice is for thirty days under the statute; during which period the Commission may permit the two sides to privately negotiate with each other, or, if they do not want to do so, the Commission will get them together and endeavor informally to adjust the dispute. If these informal efforts fail, the Commission may, upon its own motion or upon request of either side or both sides, start a formal investigation. The investigation is held, witnesses are subpoenaed and put under oath, complete and exhaustive testimony is taken as of all matters in dispute. When the investigation is completed, the Commission makes its findings. These findings, or the award as it is called, are not binding upon either side, although either or both sides may accept the findings, either before the investigation begins or at its conclusion, in which event the award is binding. The only restraint upon the two sides is that, prior to and during the investigation, the employer cannot lock his men out, or change the conditions of employment, and the men cannot go on a strike. The status quo is preserved; the men must remain at work at the usual scale of hours and wages until the Commission makes its findings. After the findings have been made, either side is free to do as it chooses. The old weapons of industrial warfare may be resorted to, there may be strikes and lockouts or any other legal act along lines of force and coercion. The four valuable results from the operation of this law are:

(1) The law provides a cooling-off period, and avoids hasty and precipitant action.

(2) The operation of the law compels collective bargaining.

(3) The law provides a public body with power to ascertain the facts in any industrial controversy in an impartial and authoritative manner.

(4) The law provides a way by which the facts, when once gathered, are given to the public, so that public opinion may operate to compel the acceptance of the award.

When a notice is received by the Commission, the first step is to get in touch with both sides, and find out what has been done or is being done toward negotiations. If the two sides are in touch with each other and are negotiating, the Commission stands aloof and watches negotiations. If the two sides are not negotiating, the Commission calls them into conference and endeavors to start negotiations. It is sometimes the best policy to call both sides in at the same time before the Commission; in other cases, it is the best policy to call in each side separately. Often more can be accomplished by working with the opposing sides in private conference than can be accomplished with them together. If there is any past history or ancient bitterness, it is sometimes better to allow these differences to be thoroughly talked out before the two sides settle down to the actual consideration of the terms of a constructive agreement.

In addition to this work in bringing two sides together, the Commission has had one capital and labor banquet, attended by a large number of representatives of both sides of the industrial world and by many prominent public officials.

The first situation arising under the new law occurred soon after it went into force. Early one morning the managers of a large cracker factory employing 225 people in Denver began calling in their employees one by one and reducing their wages. News of this spread rapidly over the plant, and within an hour the entire force was on a strike. No Union existed among the employees of the factory. The Commission at once got in touch with

both sides and called them in for separate private hearings. While the Commission had the right to request the district attorney to proceed criminally against both sides, the Commission felt that the law being new, they should first be given a chance to obey it. The law was read and each side asked if they were willing to obey it. Both sides agreed at once to obey the law, and the next morning the entire force went back to work, the incident was closed, and nothing has ever occurred in that plant since that time.

In the machinist strike, the machinists gave the usual thirty days' notice, and, following the failure to secure a conference with their employers, the Commission arranged a number of informal conferences. These had progressed to a point where a settlement seemed assured, when the employing machinists' representative made a bitter speech in the presence of both sides that aroused all of the ancient passions and bitterly inflamed both sides. After this meeting, an agreement by informal conference was impossible. The union machinists asked for a

formal investigation, which was granted and held. Some of the employing machinists refused to attend the hearing. The Commission stood ready to vindicate its authority, but the union machinists requested that we hear them without attempting to test our powers. The Commission rendered its decision, and, after further conference between the men and their employers, a strike was called. This strike lasted less than ten days, and the final adjustment was made on the basis of the Commission's findings or award.

In the tailor dispute, all the journeymen tailors in Denver were organized into a Union; general conditions in the tailor trade had been chaotic for years. The tailors asked for a formal investigation, which was granted by the Commission, and, after an extensive hearing, rendered its findings, which were substantially in favor of the demands of the union tailors. Within two days after the findings were announced, every merchant tailor in the city, but one, had agreed to accept the findings of the Com

mission and put the wage schedule into force.

One day without any warning 700 smelter men walked out of the Arkansas Valley Smelter in Leadville, one of the great mining camps of Colorado. Only 100 men were left in the plant. The men had not been organized, and there had not been the slightest intimation that trouble was threatened. The men's grievances included contract system of labor, assignment of wages, and a demand for increased wages. The Commission went at once to Leadville and found a hopelessly confused situation. The strikers were composed almost entirely of recent arrivals from the Balkan States. Out of the entire several hundred, there were probably not a dozen men who were naturalized American citizens, or who knew anything of our language, institutions, or laws. The men had no real leader, and were simply out, after being informed of the law, in stubborn defiance of the law and because of conditions, which they found it difficult to properly describe. The Commission felt that it was not a case where there

should be prosecution of the men. Their ignorance of the law and general lack of understanding of American institutions all contributed to cause the Commission to deal leniently. The Commission met the men in a mass meeting, and explained to them through interpreters what the requirements of the industrial law were. The men at first protested, but reason gradually asserted itself, and within a week the entire force had returned to work. The Commission then began an investigation of the grievances of the

men.

The smelter company offered to adjust every grievance of the men, except wages, on any terms which the Commission thought best. The smelter managers have already adopted measures to prevent the contract system and assignment of wages, and the adequacy of these measures is now being considered by the Commission.

The Commission will not halt until these grievances are absolutely eliminated. The Commission saw that the question of wages was a very broad one, involving numerous factors affected by conditions throughout the nation. The preliminary plans were