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itself. Grace in body is as necessary as grace in language. Too much attention is paid to the direct preparation of the youth for public speaking, and too little for conversation. A million words are uttered in ordinary co sation where one is uttered on the platform. The influence of individuals over each other in conversation has always been many fold greater than the influence on the platform. So these elements in an education must be given their proper place, and must enter into the pupil's knowledge of what is required of him.

1.5. On written work.

All teachers in secondary and high schools know how shamefully negligent of the simplest requirements in the preparation of manuscripts are a great majority of the candidates for admission to their classes. It simply shows that teachers in the lower grades do not exalt this point, in estimating the work of their pupils, as they should. Nothing but careful, constant attention to the penmanship, the punctuation, the spelling, the capitalization, the paragraphing, and the neatness of the manuscript in every subject studied, will secure the needed reform. I know that many teachers pretend to consider these things everywhere, but too frequently the pupil does not discover that it means anything

There is nothing new in all this, and yet it may serve to remind some one that his ideal of the recitation is too low, and that he ought to join with us more vigorously in fixing upon higher standards for estimating the work of pupils.

The noting of these points in criticising the essays which pupils may present occasionally, is not enough. I insist that the language or the rhetoric class is not the only class where these points should enter into recitation estimates. Scholars are not made in any such manner. They are the products of intelligent effort in daily drill through a long series of years. Reliable, thoughtful, graceful scholarship is not born of a day, but of a life. Its distinguishing characteristic is quality, not quantity. Quality is not supplied on demand, but comes of loving toil and patient waiting.

The necessity for placing well-defined ideals before the minds of the pupils, and of arousing continued effort at their realization, is not more true anywhere else than for the work in the recitation. As fast as pupils are able to comprehend them, these points should be presented and required. Each individual subject should have the work required as carefully outlined from time to time.

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Perhaps no terms in pedagogy are more unfortunate than “criticism," “practice-teaching," and "model school." Unless they can be removed by substitution we must patiently plod through the long, slow process of raising a term once perverted to a correct scientific meaning. This devolves upon every writer or speaker the necessity of constant definition.

“( 'riticism" as commonly understood on the outside is a process chanical nature by which a novice in the art of teaching has his mistakes, real or imaginary, pointed out to him by some one who is supposed to know just how the thing is done or should be done. It consists in Miss A's visitation of Miss B's class, for a period of from one to ten or twenty minutes, Miss A is the critic-teacher, Miss B the trembling neophyte, in terror lest she reveal the fact that she does not know whether to teach her pupils to "answer in complete sentences," "to sit, or stand when they recite,” to say “2 times 3 are 6," or "2 times 3 is 6; ”; or whether the subject of a sentence shall be defined as “that of which,” or “that which represents that of which"; or whether the child shall be compelled to follow the particular "outline of the plan," or whether he may be permitted to suggest that the river of his home is as good as the little stream in the sand-box before him, and so forth and so forth, to hundreds of such trivial nothings,) followed at a later period with a personal interview on the work done.

Whether this criticism be helpful, harmful, or indifferent, depends upon the conjunction of a few easily-defined factors. If the critic-teacher herself knows her problem, if she has the ability to make another know the problem, and is capable of quick and accurate sensing of things; if the pupil-teacher be of sufficient maturity, scholarship, and pedagogical knowledge to be intelligently guided, something of value may be had from the criticism work. It is quite superfluous to remark that the results are far below what they should be. After such a study of the problem as I have been able to make, after a practical contact with it of eighteen years, I am led to the following conclusions:

1. The first requisite of a critic-teacher is a philosophic cast of mind. This may seem strange to those who sneer at any reference to philosophy in a teacher; but it is true, nevertheless. Not a mind possessed of Day's Psychology, or Haven’s, or Hamilton's, or of Kant, or Plato even, but of the qualities of mind that appeared in highest form in Plato. An introspective mind, a mind having a trend toward “true being,” away from mere "opinion,” &

mind dwelling in the sphere of the real, rather than the phenomenal, a mind to which the phenomena of the mental world are more actual than of the material world. No one can ever become a true scientist to whom the invisible and imponderable atoms are not as actual as the mountains or the planets ; as firmly grasped by the insight of the soul as the latter by the physical eye. So with the mind of the true critic-teacher in respect to the data of the mental world. This quality is less common in America than it will be a century hence, though much more common than a century ago. Few men, and almost no women, possess it. I believe I am correct in saying that the history of philosophy contains no woman's name. The later centuries will, I trust,

, change this record.

A critie-teacher will always reveal himself in a ten-minutes conversation with one who can identify him when he sees him.

2. Another fact growing out of this, is the total lack of “fruit ” as tested by the standard of Bacon. His unanswerable criticism against the scholastic philosophy and science was its lack of fruit. This result, or lack of result, must ever appear under any system of empiricism; the moment an empiric reaches the limit of the enumerated instances in experience, he is absolutely helpless. He has no general principles out of which may perpetually spring new directive energies for new conditions. Topic-books, filled with the records of Oswego methods, or Albany methods, or Whitewater methods, will prove of no value. The poor empiric will find to his amazement that the given elements of his own problem are not found in terms of his topic-book-unless, perchance, he may be so blind as to deal out his abstracts and plans of lessons in regular order as so many recipes might be read out of a cookbook, I have known this to be done.

The only thing that can relieve our normal-school work from such harmful absurdities is to rationalize the work of training. The critic-teacher must formulate a theory of knowledge. If he does not accept Fichte's, he may form a better one; but he is valueless as a guide in rational criticism until this is done. His pupils must leave him without the power to know or apply principles to new phenomena, and so after a short time, having sprung up quickly, they wither away, having “no depth of earth.”

3. These considerations suggest the final answer to the problem. This is not difficult to state; it is hard to realize.

Criticism work consists of two parts: (1) The familiarizing of the pupilteachers with the best means and appliances of instruction and control. (2) Interpreting each in the light of a rational purpose in education.

The first half of this work the normal schools have been for the past halfcentury faithfully trying to do. For the most part, the second half of the work is untried. Nor are we to look toward chairs of pedagogy for help, as up to the present time they have not contributed anything of much value to the rationalizing of educational processes.

As one looks over the field of educational appliances, devices and “methods,” he can but reflect that we have been engaged as a people in inventing the machinery of school-work, and have not fully appreciated the more dificult task of producing the machinist; or, to restate the thought, we have busied ourselves upon means for external application to the mind of the student rather than upon a rationalizing of the modes of mental structure.

So loag as this state of things continues, “criticism” must be of value as a means of stimulating imitation only, a result of value to the mind incapable of eyni prehension of principles, but dwarfing and pernicious in its effects upon other minds. We do not want less attention given to educational appliances: we do want more insight into the purpose of each. “Criticism” might well be defined as the process of making a pupil-teacher rationally conscious of the category of purpose.

4. To undertake to define the modus operandi of “criticism” is like carry. ing coals to Newcastle. For the person who comprehends its rationale is elfdeterminative in its sphere, and one who is an empiric in thought has not the elements needful out of which to formulate a definition. However, a suprestion or two may not be inappropriate. I would have the critic-teacher hold close to comprehensive laws rather than the specific instance. Subsume the special under its proper genus in all cases. Let criticism be directed more to a class than to the individual. This will prevent that too personal criticism which tends towards imitation as its law, destroying the personality of the teacher. I would hold the pupil-teacher to a strict account as to the purpose of his work, both for the day, the grade, and the future. For this reason he must know subjects comprehensively, that he may know parts in their true relations. An example in arithmetic may need to be seen in its relation to the whole circle of mathematical concepts in order to its full comprehension. This view of subject-matter is all too uncommon on the part of critic-teachers themselves. I would have the critic-teacher familiar with the history of educational ideas, and with mental science as a conscious possession. This alone can give him the ability to recognize and classify the facts of the various subjects of instruction as data in consciousness, without which ability he must ever grope blindly in the field of empiricism. I would have the critic-teacher separate sharply between the empiric art process in instruction, and the rational. This will keep distinct in the mind of the pupil-teacher the line marking the division of the categories of means and purpose.

The blanks and plans of work I have examined into in use in the normal schools of America suggest little attempt at a division. But to attempt any process of criticism without an adequate theory of the art of knowing, is like trying to cure dyspepsia with plasters and liniment. As pedagogical seminaries, standing as the representatives of the best thought in education, normal schools in their applied science — for such the criticism work really is — must rise to a higher plane. They must become the seats of the educational philosophy of the coming century, and this result will first make itself felt in the criticism work of the training-schools.

MENTAL EFFECTS OF FORM IN SUBJECT-MATTER. An Inquiry into the Nature and Character of the educational effects which sys

tems of subject-matter, and forms in which it is taught, have upon the mind of the pupils in the primary grades – the first three years of school-life, beginning

at five years of age. This theme may be restated thus: An inquiry into the effects which form in subject

matter has upon the form of mental activity of the pupils who learn the subject-matter.


I. Form in subject matter means the shape, figure, conformation, mould, fashion, appearance, phenomenon, under which the subject-matter is held, maintained, borne, supported, seized, known, cognized. Subject-matter includes anything and everything that is to be done, worked, accomplished, or that exists; nothing exists, or is done, without form. Each and every subjectmatter exists under a form which is peculiar to itself: e. g., (1) This apple (a crab-apple) exists under its peculiar form of sonorousness, of touch, of taste, of color, of smell; it can be cognized by five senses -i. e., one of its qualities (color) exists in that peculiar form which is cognized by the eye, another quality (odor) exists in that form which is cognized by the sense of smell, another form (smoothness) is cognized by the sense of touch, another peculiar form of quality (sonorousness) is cognized by the ear, and another form (sourness) is cognized by the sense of taste; these five forms of qualities constitute the unit form that is known as this crab-apple; (2) This sunshine exists under its peculiar form of matter, i. e., it can be cognized by the senses of sight and touch, but not by the senses of hearing, smell, and taste; (3) Subjective phenomena ( forms of subject-matter) are cognized by self-consciousness: e. g., joy is cognized by self-consciousness.

Some kinds of subject-matter exist in forms that are fixed by the innate constitution of the things; these forms are called the natural forms of the things: e. 9., (1) The form of this apple (a Greening) is natural to this object; (2) The form of this horse ("Tom") is natural to himself; (3) The form of this tree (a pine) is natural to itself; (4) The form (characteristics) of this rock is natural; (5) The form of this flower (a sunflower) is natural to itself. Thus it is with all natural objects.

Other kinds of subject-matter exist in forms that are controlled wholly, or in part, by the agency of man. These forms are artificial; they include (1) material products (as piano, silk thread); and (2) mental products, as these thoughts, those words, these feelings, these volitions — also all those subjects which are constituted of “mental contents” (Überweg ), as history, science, mathematics.

II. System of subject matter is a “complex whole, put together;" it is subject matter elaborated into form by students, teachers, authors, inventors, when they arrange the parts in an order of succession, the procedure being guided by some theory of relationship of part to part and of part to the

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