40

30. Bouvier L. D. [cit 2 Holdsworth Hist. Eng. L. 392]. See also Conservator ante p 522.

[a] Crime as treason.-"Such offenses are declared to be treason, and such officers are appointed in every port, to hear and determine such cases, according to the ancient maritime law then practiced in the admiral's court as may arise upon the high seas, and with two associates to determine those arising upon land.'" Bouvier L. D. [quot 4 Blackstone Comm. 69].

31. Conservatory writ: Proceedings under statute to obtain see Sequestration [35 Cyc 1395]. Use of sequestration as see Sequestration [35 Cyc 1388].

32. New Idea Pattern Co. V. Whitner, 215 Pa. 193, 196, 64 A

518.

[a] "Conserve the best interests of the agency."-It has been held that this phrase as used in an agreement by the proprietors of a department store to act as agents for plaintiffs in the sale of patterns on the ground floor, to give proper attention to sale, etc., to at all times "conserve the best interests of the agency," "must necessarily be regarded as delegating to [the proprietors] a discretion in determining what from time to time, will, all things considered, conduce to the best interests of the 'agency.' It would hardly do so if the public were to be discouraged from visiting the store by a failure to offer a selection which experience may have shown to be desirable." New Idea Pattern Co. v. Whitner, 215 Pa. 193, 195, 65 A 518.

33. Standard D. 34. Standard D.

35. 284.

Treat v. Peck, 5 Conn. 280,

36. Robin v. Duguay, 27 Can. S. C. 347, 351, 353 (where it was held, per Gwynne, J., dissenting, in construing a will, that the charge of preserving the estate-"conserver le fonds"-imposed on the testamentary executor could not be construed as imposing the same obligation on the sisters who were excluded from the administration, or as having, by that term, given them the property subject to the charge that they should hand it over to the children at their decease, or as being a modification of a preceding clause of the will by which the property was devised to the children directly, subject to the usufruct).

37. Century D. [quot State V. Wheeler, 97 Wis. 96, 100, 72 NW 2251.

[a] As synonymous with "conceive." It has been held that the phrase "considers himself aggrieved," as used in the statute of Wisconsin authorizing an appeal by any person who shall "consider himself aggrieved" by any order in relation to laying out, discontinuing, etc., a highway, is practically synonymous with "conceives himself aggrieved" as used in the New York statute, the Court saying: "It will be observed that there is no difference between the two statutes affecting the ques

41

.47

54

53

55

tion here, unless it grows out of a difference in meaning between the words 'considers himself aggrieved' and the words 'conceives himself aggrieved.' If any such difference exists, the former is the broader of the two terms. Conceive means to believe, suppose, form a notion, or think; consider means to think, regard in a certain aspect, look upon, hold, or assume. The former is synonymous with think, believe, apprehend, imagine, understand. That the two terms mean substantially one and the same thing, there is no room for serious discussion," and hence the construction of the statute will be governed by that of the New York statute from which it is derived. State v. Wheeler, 97 Wis. 96, 99, 100, 72 NW 225.

[b] As synonymous with "think" or "believe."-It has been held that the word "consider" as used in questions to a witness, "Don't farmers consider corn mature when it is fit to cut up?" and "You may state to the jury whether or not you consider the corn mature at that time," is synonymous with "think" or "believe." Richards v. Knight, 78 Iowa 69, 71, 72, 42 NW 584, 4 LRA 453.

38. Webster D. [quot McLorinan v. Bridgewater, 49 N. J. L. 614, 616, 10 A 187].

39. Webster D. [quot Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Colorado L. & T. Co., 20 Colo. 1, 4, 36 P 793]. 40. Lake v. Ocean City, 62 N. J. L. 160, 162, 41 A 427.

41. Standard D. [quot Ingard v. Barker, 27 Ida. 124, 137, 147 P 293].

[a] "Consider" in reference to appointment. In construing a statute providing that, in appointment of members of the state board of horticultural inspectors, the governor shall consider any recommendations made by the state horticultural association, it has been held that the words "consider" and "recommendations" do not mean that any person so recommended (that is, favorably presented) by the association, or any person considered (that is, deliberated about and pondered over) by the governor, must be appointed. Ingard v. Barker, 27 Ida 124, 136, 147 P 293.

42. Webster D. [quot McLorinan v. Bridgewater, 49 N. J. L. 614, 616, 10 A 187].

43. Century D. [quot State V. Wheeler, 97 Wis. 96, 100, 72 NW 225].

44.

Standard D. [quot Ingard v. Barker, 27 Ida. 124, 137, 147 P 293]. 45. Standard D. [quot Ingard v. Barker, 27 Ida. 124, 137, 147 P 293].

46. Century D. [quot State V. Wheeler, 97 Wis. 96, 100, 72 NW 225]; Standard D. [quot Ingard v. Barker, 27 Ida. 124, 147 P 293, 297].

47. Century D. [quot State V. Wheeler. 97 Wis. 96, 100, 72 NW 225]: Standard D. [quot Ingard v. Barker, 27 Ida. 124, 147 P 293, 297]. 48. Webster D. [quot Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Colorado L. & T. Co., 20 Colo. 1, 4, 36 P 793].

49. Standard D. [quot Ingard v. Barker, 27 Ida. 124, 137, 147 P 293]; Webster D. [quot McLorinan

v.

Bridgewater, 49 N. J. L. 614, 616, 10 A 187].

50. Standard D. [quot Ingard v. Barker, 27 Ida. 124, 137, 147 P 293]. 51. Century D. [quot State V. Wheeler, 97 Wis. 96, 100, 72 NW 225]; Standard D. [quot Ingard v. Barker, 27 Ida. 124, 147 P 293, 297].

52. Webster D. [quot McLorinan v. Bridgewater, 49 Ñ. J. L. 614, 616, 10 A 187].

53. Webster D. [quot Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Colorado L. & T. Co., 20 Colo. 1, 4, 36 P 793].

54. Standard D. [quot Ingard v. Barker, 27 Ida. 124, 137, 147 P 293]. 55. Crooker v. Trevett, 28 Me. 271, 274.

56. English L. D.

[a] "Considered sound."-It has been held that the term as used in a bill of sale stating that plaintiff bought of defendant one bay horse considered sound, is not an assertion or undertaking that the horse was sound, so as to constitute a warranty. Wason v. Rowe, 16 Vt. 525, 528.

57. English L. D.

[a] Colloquial and technical uses. -In construing an act providing that persons who have resided in any township for a certain term shall be considered as legally settled in such township, it has been held that the word "considered" is not used in its technical definition as to fix the mind on, with a view to a careful examination; to revolve; to think over; to ponder, the court saying: "But the legislature is not required to use words in a law in their stricter and more accurate sense. They are supposed to use words as they are commonly used and understood. But if they disregard the lexicographer, or use words inappropriately, still if they in their context convey a clear meaning to those charged with the duty of interpretation, that meaning is the expression of the law. It is, however, by no means to be conceded that the term subjected to consideration is illchosen. The act speaks to those whose duty it is to pass judgment upon the question of settlement, and in declaring what shall be the determination upon certain facts found, it cannot be amiss to do so in language such as courts of record uniformly adopt in recording their solemn judgments. 'Ita consideratum est per curiam,' serves to conclusively determine issues of law and fact." McLorinan V. Bridgewater Tp., 49 N. J. L. 614, 616, 10 A 187.

58. English L. D. See also Terrill v. Auchauer, 14 Oh. St. 80, 85 (where the phrase, "It is considered by the court," is held to be equivalent to "It is adjudged by the court").

[a] "Considered as recorded, when received."-It has been held that the phrase as used in a statute providing that a chattel mortgage shall be "considered as recorded when received," means that after the delivery and entry the effect shall be the same as if actually spread on the records; this provision, however, applies only when the mortgage is left

59. Burrill L. D. See Considertion post this page.

60. Webster D. [quot Gougar v. Buffalo Specialty Co., 26 Colo. A. 8, 18, 141 P 511]. See Consider ante p 523; Consideration post this page.

[a] "Considerable length of time." (1) Where in an instruction in a case against the city for damages for an injury, the court charged that if the city permitted to be left for a "considerable length of time" a cut in the street, and permitted to be left for "considerable time" a curbstone in the crossing, and that the cut and stone rendered the sidewalk unsafe and dangerous, and plaintiff was injured thereby, etc., defendant was liable, etc., it was held that the phrase "a considerable length of time" was so indefinite as to form no proper test for the guidance of the jury, in as much as the period of ten days and two months might be, in the estimation of the jury, a "considerable length of time," and, though whether the time occupied was reasonable or not was for the jury to determine, the test was the reasonableness of the time occupied, and not a "considerable length of time." Lincoln v. Calvert, 39 Nebr. 305, 312, 58 NW 115. (2) It has been held that the term within the meaning of the rule that, to bar a right to enter lands as against a claimant thereof under erroneous boundary lines, the erroneous lines must have been agreed on between the parties claiming the land on both sides, and afterward acquiesced in for a considerable time is not limited or defined, but is vague and uncertain, and must necessarily depend on the particular circumstances of each case, indeed it has often been said that this acquiescence must have continued for a period of time scarcely less than that prescribed by the statute of limitations. Beardsley v. Crane, 52 Minn. 537, 546, 51 NW 740, 742. See also Strait v. Wilkins, 16 Cal. A. 188, 190, 116 P 685 (holding that statement of trading property that the mortgage thereon had a "considerable time" to run was not false, it not being due for six months).

with the clerk until recorded. Jones | the word 'considerable' in defining v. Parker, 73 Me. 248, 251. what constitutes legal provocation, or such provocation as will reduce murder to manslaughter. There may be cases, however, in which it is not improper, and we are not prepared to say this was not one of them, conceding an instruction as to manslaughter should have been given. The use of the word did not leave the jury to determine the meaning of any technical legal term, but a matter of fact, to wit: whether the provocation was considerable or trivial, and the jury should be credited with sufficient sense to understand the meaning of the term." Lewis v. Com., 93 Ky. 238, 242, 19 SW 664, 14 KyL 212. To same effect Peo. v. Olsen, 4 Utah 413, 11 P 577. (2) "The term 'considerable,' although generally used by text writers in describing that condition which will reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter, is, at best, inexact and indefinite, and, unless explained by the court, well calculated to confuse or mislead the jury; for what one juryman, in the absence of instruction on the subject, might regard 'considerable,' would, in estimation of another, fall short of that degree or character of provocation that would meet the requirement of the law. To make the best or most of the word 'considerable,' it certainly never was intended to mean more or less than legal provocation; and this court has expressly held that the trial court should not leave the jury to determine for themselves what would constitute legal provocation." McClurg v. Com., 36 SW 14, 15, 17 KyL 1339. (3) The phrase "considerable provocation" has been held to mean an assault or battery of some force, which, by reason of its violence or the circumstances attending it, is calculated to excite, and which does excite, the passions beyond control. Strutton v. Com., 62 SW 875, 877, 23 KyL 307. (4) "Mere words can not be said to constitute the considerable provocation contemplated by the statute" [relating to one assaults to to murder, inflict bodily harm]. Steffy v. Peo., 130 Ill. 98, 101, 22 NE 861. See also Cyrus v. State, 102 Ga. 616, 618, 29 SE 917, 918 (where the court said: "If the accused took the life of his paramour solely because his passions were greatly aroused by seeing her lewd and lascivious conduct with another shortly before the homicide, and because when he reproached her for such conduct she expressed no regret, then he had, in legal sense, 'considerable provocation' for his act, but was moved to do it an abandoned and malignant heart, and is guilty of murder'); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Dorr, 73 Kan. 486, 85 P 533; Lincoln v. Calvert, 39 Nebr. 305, 58 NW 115 (two last holding that the phrase in instruction is too indefinite form a proper test for the guidance of the jury); Strutton v. Com., 62 SW 875, 877. 23 KyL 307 (where the phrase is defined as an assault or battery by some force, which by reason of its violence or the circumstances attending it, is calculated to excite, and which does excite, the passions beyond control).

a

a

no

by

[b] "Considerable number of persons."-It has been held that an indictment for maintaining a public nuisance failing as provided by statute to state that the acts charged injured and endangered the comfort, repose, health and safety of "a considerable number of persons" is sufficient, the court saying: "The expression 'any considerable number of persons' is used solely for the purof differentiating public pose nuisance, which is subject to indictment, from a private nuisance. But a considerable number of persons does not necessarily mean a very great or any particular number of an The travelers on a highpersons. way of a sparsely settled country town and those moving along the densely thronged city street are equally considerable number of persons, and an illegal obstruction of a highway in the town and that of a city street are equally public nuisances." Peo. v. Kings County Iron Fdy., 209 N. Y. 207, 210, 102 NE 598.

a

[c] "Considerable provocation."— (1) It has been held that an instruction that the provocation necessary to reduce a killing to manslaughter must be considerable was not erroneous, although the charge did not contain a definition of the term "considerable," the court saying: "Ordinarily it is perhaps, not best to use

to

61. Webster D. [quot Gougar v. Buffalo Specialty Co., 26 Colo. A. 8, 181, 141 P 511].

62. Webster D. [quot Gougar v. Buffalo Specialty Co., 26 Colo. A. 8, 18, 141 P 511].

63. Webster D. [quot Gougar v. Buffalo Specialty Co., 26 Colo. A. 8, 141 P 511].

64. Black L. D.

65. Burrill L. D. 66. Burrill L. D.

See also Consideration of the Court post p 525. 67. Consideration: Averment of consideration see Pleading [31 Cyc 774].

Deed based on, illegal as cloud on title see Quieting Title [32 Cyc 1319].

Distinguished from compensation see Compensation ante p 229.

Failure of, as defense against bona fide holder of municipal bond see Municipal Corporations [28 Cyc 1651].

For which money was received see Money Received [27 Cyc 860]. Illegal:

Gambling consideration see Gaming [20 Cyc 935, 938].

Marriage brokerage

contract

Contracts [9 Cyc 518].

see

Sale of intoxicating liquors see Intoxicating Liquors [23 Cyc 334].

Matters concerning, as badges of fraud see Fraudulent Conveyances [20 Cyc 441].

Of particular classes of contracts:
Accord and satisfaction see Accord
and Satisfaction §§ 14, 15.
Agency see Agency § 27.
Agreement:

Change of rent see Landlord and
Tenant [24 Cyc 1167].

Of landlord to repair see Land

lord and Tenant [24 Cyc 1085]. Antenuptial settlement see Husband and Wife [21 Cyc 1241]. Assignment:

Generally see Assignments § 90;
Mortgages [27 Cyc 1284];
Patents [30 Cyc 952].
Presumption of see Assignments
§ 92.

Between:

74

term means deliberation;68 thought; 69 continuous and careful thought;70 contemplation;" the act of considering.72 Ordinarily, the consideration which prompts an action may not be easily distinguished from the purposes sought to be effected.73 But with regard to legal instruments the word has a more limited and technical meaning, distinct from motive or purposes; it means something of value in the eye of the law;75 something in the way of price or compensation, which may be of value to the obligor or of detriment to the obligee;76 a benefit to the party promising, or a loss to the person to whom the promise is made;" material cause of the contract, without which it will not be effectual or binding; the price or motive of the contract;" the reason which moves a contracting party to enter into the contract;80 the inducing cause. In legal phraseology, consideration, as applied to a court, means the judgment of the court,82 "it is considered by the court," being equivalent to "it Of particular classes of contracts:Mortgage-Continued.

78

estate see Husband and Wife [21 Cyc 1481]. Municipal bond:

New:

Defense against bona fide purchaser see Municipal Corporations [28 Cyc 1616]. For transfer of see Municipal Corporations [28 Cyc 1616]. Certificate of mutual benefit insurance see Mutual Benefit Insurance [29 Cyc 92]. Consideration for waiver of demand or notice see Bills and Notes 981.

Promise within statute of limitations see Limitations of Actions [25 Cyc 1329].

see

Offer of prize in lottery Lotteries [25 Cyc 1635]. Partnership agreement see Partnership [30 Cyc 358].

Descent and Distribution [14 Cyc 171]. Pledge see Pledges [31 Cyc 795]. Postnuptial settlement see Husband and Wife [21 Cyc 1256]. Purchase of swamp land see Public Lands [32 Cyc 921]. Receipt attack for want of consideration' see Payment [30 Cyc 1226].

Release see Mortgages [27 Cyc 1419]; Release [34 Cyc 1048, 1054, 1063, 1071]. Reward see Rewards [34 Cyc 1739]. Sale see Public Lands [32 Cyc 9211;

Sales [35 Cyc 47, 116, 139, 351, 449, 513, 539, 700]; Vendor and Purchaser [39 Cyc 1205-1212]. Separation agreement see Husband and Wife [21 Cyc 1593]. Settlement see Paupers [30 Cyc 1085]; Wills [40 Cyc 2107]. Specific performance see Specific Performance [36 Cyc 595, 609, 775].

Submission to arbitration see Arbitration and Award § 45. Subscription see Corporations [10 Cyc 293]; Subscriptions [37 Cyc 485].

Support of pauper see Paupers [30
Cyc 1145].
Suretyship agreement see Principal

and Surety [32 Cyc 29, 54, 153,
199].

Tax deed see Taxation [37 Cyc 1443].

To devise or bequeath see Wills [40 Cyc 1065].

Transfer of municipal bonds see Municipal Corporations [28 Cyc 1616].

Trust see Trusts [38 Cyc 118].
Use of:

County jail by city see Prisons
[32 Cyc 353].

Street by telegraph or telephone company see Telegraphs and

81

79

Telephones [37 Cyc 1617]. Parol evidence of see Evidence [17 Cyc 656, 659]. Pleading see Pleading [31 Cyc 53, 534].

Reformation of see Reformation of Instruments [34 Cyc 932]. Statement of:

As affecting negotiability see Bills and Notes § 68.

Under statute of frauds see Frauds, Statute of [20 Cyc 262]. Sufficiency to entitle party to specific performance see Specific Performance [36 Cyc 609].

To support grant of exemption from taxation see Taxation [37 Cyc 904].

"Adequate consideration" see Adequate 1 C. J. p 1193 text and note 30. "Any consideration" see Any 3 C. J. p 236 text and note 80. "Beneficial consideration" Beneficial 7 C. J. p 1046 text and note 9.

see

Concurrent consideration see Contracts [9 Cyc 325].

Consideration of marriage see Contracts [9 Cyc 320].

Executed and executory consideration see Contracts [9 Cyc 321].

Failure of consideration see Contracts [9 Cyc 369-371].

Good consideration see Contracts [9 Cyc 319].

Gratuitous consideration see Contracts [9 Cyc 318, 319, 347].

"In consideration" see In [22 Cyc 37 note 23].

Moral consideration see Contracts [9 Cyc 356, 361].

Nominal consideration see Nominal [29 Cyc 1053 note 43].

Past consideration see Contracts [9 Cyc 358-365]. Pecuniary consideration see Contracts [9 Cyc 315].

see Con

.89

to

80. Tomlins L. D. [quot Streashley v. Powell, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 178, 180]. 81. Becker v. Colonial L. Ins. Co., 153 App. Div. 382, 385, 138 NYS 491.

82. Terrill v. Auchauer, 14 Oh. St. 80, 85. See Consideration of the Court post this page. See also Clearwater Timber Co. v. Shoshone County, 155 Fed. 612, 623 (holding that the term as used in rule 18 of the department of the interior, providing for the forwarding of all applications for change of entry or settlement to the commissioner of the general land office for his consideration, is not of the character of a review of a decision already made by local officers, but is in the nature of an original consideration of the subject by the general land office to which office the final decision belongs, and not only does the equitable title pass to the applicant on approval by the general land office, but it does not pass until such approval).

83. Terrill v. Auchauer, 14 Oh. St. 80, 85. 84. 80, 85. 85.

Terrill v. Auchauer, 14 Oh. St. See Consideration ante p 524. Burrill L. D. [cit 3 Blackstone Comm., 396; Coke Litt. 39a; Redwood v. Coward, 1 Ld. Ràym. 147, 148, 91 Reprint 995]; Baker v. State, 3 Ark. 491 (holding that, where a judgment was entered below, "ordered by the Court, that the said defendant," etc., there was no judgment and no appeal would lie). But see 1 Black Judgm. 6 [quot State v. French, 118 Mo. A. 15, 93 SW 295, 296] (where it is said: "At the same time there is no magic in this formula; nor is it a conclusive criterion whether a definitive judgment has been rendered that the entry employs or omits the usual phrase, it is considered.' A judgment may be final and subject to review on writ of error, as well when entered without as with that

see Con

V.

68. Webster D. [quot Cook State, 46 Fla. 20, 51, 35 S 665]; Terrill v. Auchauer, 14 Oh. St. 80, 85. 69. Terrill v. Auchauer, 14 Oh. St. 80, 85.

70. Webster D. [quot Cook V. State, 46 Fla. 20, 51, 35 S 665].

71. Webster D. [quot Cook State, 46 Fla. 20, 51, 35 S 665].

V.

V.

72. Webster D. [quot Cook State, 46 Fla. 20, 51, 35 S 665]. 73. Ford v. Burks, 37 Ark. 91, 94. 74. Ford v. Burks, 37 Ark. 91, 94. 75. Ford v. Burks, 37 Ark. 91, 94. 76. Ford v. Burks, 37 Ark. 91, 94. 77. Frear v. Hardenbergh, 5 Johns. (N. Y.)_272, 277, 4 AmD 356.

78. Tomlins L. D. [quot Streshley v. Powell, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 178, 180]. 79. 2 Blackstone Comm. 444 (quot Latham V. Lawrence, 11 N. J. L. 322, 325; State v. Pirkey, 22 S. D. 550, 555, 118 NW 1042, 18 AnnCas 192 (cit Cyc)].

86. Black L. D. See Consideratum Est ante this page.

87. Black L. D. See Consideratum Est ante this page.

88. Gillespie v. Winberg, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 318, 320 [cit Burrill L. D.; Landar Dictionnaire de la Langue Français].

[a] Derivation.-"The term to consign, or consignation, is derived from the Latin consignare, which signifies to seal; for it was formerly the practice to seal up the money thus received in a bag or box." Bouvier L. D.

89. Ryttenberg V. Schefer, 131 Fed. 313, 321; Gillespie v. Winberg, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 318, 320 fcit Crabb Eng. Syn.; Richardson D.; Smith Syn. Discriminated; Soule Eng. Syn.; Webster D.].

90. Ryttenberg V. Schefer, 131 Fed. 313, 321; Gillespie v. Winberg, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 318, 320 [cit Crabb Eng. Syn.; Smith Syn. Discriminated; Soule Eng. Syn.; Richardson D.; Webster D.].

.96

97

93

94

by one or purchase by another. It connotes delivery, and carries decided implication that the property consigned is not the property of the consignee, the title remaining in the consignor.

A

CONSIGNATIO. (Spanish, consignación). sealed document. In the civil law, a debtor's deposit in course of tender to a creditor refusing acceptance of payment.8% It is effected by depositing what is due in a place, or with an official, designated by law, and by giving notice to the creditor.8% The proper expenses of consignation are chargeable to the creditor.8% Until acceptance by the creditor or judicial confirmation, the deposit may be withdrawn leaving the obligation in force.s But the creditor who consents to withdrawal after consignation waives his rights over the deposit.8% The effect of consignation, when performed in accordance with law, is to release the debtor from all liability for the debt in question.8%

CONSIGNATION. In Scotch law. The payment of money into the hands of a third party, when the creditor refuses to accept it. The person to whom the money is given is termed the consignator.10

92. Gillespie v. Winberg. 4 Daly (N. Y.) 318, 320 [cit Burrill L. D.; Landar Dictionnaire de la Langue Français].

93. Black L. D. [cit Pothier Obligations pt 3 c 1 art 8].

94. Bouvier L. D.

95. Powell v. Wallace, 44 Kan. 656, 659, 25 P 42.

96. Black L. D. See generally Carriers 10 C. J. p 1; Factors [19 Cyc 109]: Shipping [36 Cyc 203-234].

[a] "Consigned 6 mo."-It has been held that a bill of goods sold, in which these words stand by themselves, conveys no distinct idea to a stranger to the dealings between the parties, but evidence is admissible to show that it meant that the goods could be returned if not sold within six months. George v. Joy, 19 N. H. 544, 547.

97. Ryttenberg V. Schefer, Fed. 313, 321. 98.

131

Crabb Eng. Syn. [quot Gillespie v. Winberg, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 318, 321).

99. Standard D. [quot F. F. Ide Mfg. Co. v. Sager Mfg. Co., 82 Ill. A. 685, 687].

1. Rapalje & L. L. D. [quot F. F. Ide Mfg. Co. v. Sager Mfg. Co., 82 Ill. A. 685, 687].

2. Wasey v. Whitcomb, 167 Mich. 58. 72, 132 NW 572.

3. Powell v. Wallace, 44 Kan. 656, 659, 25 P 42; Gillespie v. Winberg, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 318, 320.

4. Powell v. Wallace, 44 Kan. 656, 659, 25 P 42; Wasey v. Whitcomb, 167 Mich. 58, 72, 132 NW 572.

5. Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 326, 14 SCt 99, 37 L. ed. 1093 [quot Sturtevant Co. v. Cumberland, 106 Md. 587, 601, 68 A 351, 14 AnnCas 675].

6. Freeman-Brown Co. v. Harris, 88 S. C. 558, 560, 70 SE 802.

[a] Delivery as an essential element.-It has been held that delivery is necessary to meet the full requirements of the term and that a man cannot consign a thing to another by merely saying that he consigns it, any more than he can deliver it by mere words. Ryttenberg v. Schefer, 131 Fed. 313, 321. But see Brown Co. v. Harris, 88 S. C. 558, 560, 70 SE 802 (where it was held that a delivery by a manufacturer of a written consignment of goods to a selling agent who advances to the manufacturer a part of the market value of the goods on the consignment is a constructive

7. In re Caldwell Mach. Co., 215 Fed. 428, 431.

8. Wasey v. Whitcomb, 167 Mich. 58, 72, 132 NW 572.

no

[a] In reference to title.-(1) It has been held that the term, as used in a contract by which a company agreed to supply plaintiff on his requisition with cash and raw materials in advance to be charged to him against manufactured goods consigned to them for sale, was to be construed in its obvious and common meaning, implying title in the consignor. Dittmar v. Norman, 118 Mass. 319, 324. (2) The word, in a commercial sense, carries a decided implication that the property consigned is not the property of the consignee. The invoice carries implication of ownership, it being well understood that an invoice usually accompanies goods that are consigned to a factor for sale, as well as in case of purchase. Rolker v. Great Western Ins. Co., 4 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.) 76, 83. (3) It has been held that one who consigns goods to another to be paid for only as they are sold by him has no such immediate possession as will support an action of tort for the conversion of the goods, the court saying: "The uncontradicted evidence was that the goods alleged to have been converted were consigned by the plaintiffs. to be paid for only as they were sold. This gave the legal possession of the property to the consignee." Hardy v. Monroe, 127 Mass. 64. also Factors [19 Cyc 120]. 82. Escriche Diccionario p 507; Supplemento p 154.

See

813. Spain.-Civ. Code art 1178. Philippine.-Civ. Code art 1178; Fabros v. Augustin, 18 Philippine 335. 340.

Porto Rico.-Civ. Code § 1146.
Argentina.--Civ. Code art 756.
Bolivia. Civ. Code art 1262.
Chili. Civ. Code arts 1600-1602.
Colombia.-Civ. Code arts

1659.

1658,

France. Civ. Code art 1259. Germany.-Civ. Code arts 372. 374. If the debtor owes a chattel not suitable for deposit he may cause it to be sold at public auction and deposit the proceeds. Civ. Code art 383.

Holland.-Civ. Code art 1442.
Italy. Civ. Code art 1261.
Mexico. Civ. Code arts 1676, 1677.
Portugal. Civ. Code art 759.

Uruguay.-Civ. Code art 1442.
84. Spain.-Civ. Code art 1179.
Philippine.-Civ. Code art 1179.
Porto Rico.-Civ. Code § 1147.
Argentina.-Civ. Code art 760.
Chili. Civ. Code art 1604.
Colombia.-Civ. Code art 1662.
France.-Civ. Code art 1260.
Germany.-Civ. Code arts 381, 386.
Holland. Civ. Code art 1443.
Italy. Civ. Code art 1262.
Mexico. Civ. Code art 1683.
Portugal.-Civ. Code art 764.
Uruguay.-Civ. Code art 1445.
Venezuela. Civ. Code art 1229.
8. Spain.-Civ. Code art 1180.
Philippine.-Civ. Code art 1180.
Porto Rico.-Civ. Code § 1148.
Argentina.-Civ. Code art 761 et seq.
Chili. Civ. Code art 1605 et seq.
Colombia.-Civ. Code art 1661 et